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ABSTRACT 
In the late sixteenth century English commerce expanded under 
the auspices of the Levant Company into the Ottoman Empire, which 
resulted in the establishment of an English Embassy at Constantinople, 
enabling the English Crown to pursue its aspirations as a European 
power. English Ambassadors involved themselves in the affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire and surrounding states, including those of the 
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, both Ottoman vassal states. In 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries a number of men 
claiming to be the rightful rulers of these principalities sought the support 
of the English Crown and its Embassy in Constantinople; prominent 
amongst them was Stefan Bogdan. 
The Introduction discusses various historians' contributions to the 
study of ?tefan Bogdan's career. Chapter 1 examines Moldavia's 
relations with the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Poland. Chapters 
2 and 3 describe the status and activities of the English Embassy and its 
early ambassadors. Chapter 4 deals with England's involvement with 
Moldavian and Wallachian pretenders prior to 9tefan Bogdan's 
approaches. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine Bogdan's aspirations, the 
steps he took to achieve his goal and the reasons for his ultimate failure 
and considers the nature of the support accorded him by the English 
Crown. Chapter 8 discusses the career of Gaspar Gratiani, a former 
embassy employee, who was appointed Prince of Moldavia as a reward 
for subsequent services to the Sultan. The Conclusion discusses the 
preoccupations of English diplomacy in this period as revealed by 
English policies towards Moldavia. This thesis aims to describe the 
establishment of one of the first permanent English Embassies abroad 
and shed light on a difficult period in the history of what is now part of 
modern Romania. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of political contact between England and the 
principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania in the early 
seventeenth century is one which has received little attention from 
English historians since the publication of the 1621 edition of Richard 
Knolles' Generall Historie of the Turkes despite the existence of a wealth 
of primary source material in British archives. Eric Tappe has published a 
number of articles on such early political contacts concentrating, 
however, on the period after the restoration of Charles II to the English 
throne; he has also published a collection of documents found in British 
Archives which relate to the principalities between the years 1427 and 
1601. (1) 
Considerably more research has been conducted by Romanian 
historians on these early political, and also economic, relations, and 
some attention has been devoted to the question of foreign support for 
pretenders to the thrones of the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities, 
both of which were in this period vassal states of the Ottoman Empire. As 
the title of my thesis suggests, I intend to deal mainly with the principality 
of Moldavia and its relations with representatives of the English Crown, 
and in particular with the support accorded to one pretender: Bogdan 
Sasul (son of lancu Sasul) who changed his name to ~tefan Bogdan in 
1600. However, Wallachia's predicament was very similar to that of 
Moldavia and therefore reference will be made to Wallachia's affairs for 
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purposes of comparison. 
Bogdan claimed to be a descendant of the fifteenth century 
Moldavian Prince, Stephen the Great (~tefan Cel Mare), and spent much 
of his early life seeking election to the Moldavian throne through the 
patronage of Ottoman officials in Constantinople (Istanbul) (2) and a 
number of rich Venetians: he was unsuccessful because of his 
opponent's influence with the Sultan and spent a long time in hiding; he 
was even said to have taken refuge in the house of the English 
Ambassador Edward Barton [1588-97]. The Ottoman Sultan sought to 
control changes in the leadership of Moldavia and Wallachia by 
manipulating his right as the suzerain power to confirm the elections of 
their rulers before they took power. In effect the Sultan appointed these 
princes. In doing so he was amenable to persuasion through gifts but 
also to advice as to who was the most suitable candidate. Thus the 
patronage of those who had access to the Sultan and upon whose 
advice he relied, or who could provide the necessary cash and 
appropriate contacts, was eagerly sought by aspiring princes. 
In 1601 Bogdan visited the court of Queen Elizabeth I of England, 
where he received letters of recommendation to the Ottoman Sultan; the 
English Ambassador Henry Lello [1597-1607] was ordered to protect him 
and take up his case at the Ottoman Divan (the Ottoman Council of 
Ministers). Lello obeyed his orders until the pretender was thrown into an 
Ottoman prison in 1604. In 1606 Bogdan escaped from prison dressed 
as a woman and travelled the Courts of Europe seeking foreign 
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assistance to regain his father's throne. Eventually he arrived in England 
in the summer of 1607. He successfully petitioned King James I to grant 
him letters of recommendation to the Ottoman Sultan and to the new 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Thomas Glover; he also received a 
grant of money towards his travel expenses and the promise of 10,000 
French crowns to be used as bribes at the Divan. Whilst in England, 
Bogdan became acquainted with Lady Arbella Stuart, the King's cousin, 
and conceived the idea of asking for her hand in marriage if he was 
elected to the Moldavian throne. 
In Constantinople, Sir Thomas Glover worked energetically to 
secure Bogdan the Sultan's nomination as Prince of Moldavia at his own 
expense, bribery being a useful instrument of diplomacy in 
Constantinople. Despite the enormous sums of money spent, the project 
was a failure. Glover was recalled to England in 1611 and replaced by 
Paul Pindar; by this time Bogdan had abandoned his hopes of ascending 
the Moldavian throne and converted to Islam; he was rewarded with the 
grant of a Pashalik (an Ottoman military province) in December 1611. 
Three Romanian historians have published studies of Anglo-
Romanian relations (3): Nicolae lorga held the view that in the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries Anglo-Romanian relations were largely 
unco-ordinated, the result of adventurous individuals as opposed to 
deliberate state policy; furthermore, he argued that since wandering 
Moldavian and Wallachian pretenders were a feature of this period it was 
inevitable that Englishmen should come into contact with them. Paul 
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Cernovodeanu and Ludovic Demeny have argued that support for men 
such as Bogdan was part of a deliberate commercial policy by the Levant 
Company and the English Crown. Cernovodeanu has expanded upon 
this view in a number of articles and a book on English commercial 
policy. (4) We shall return to these different interpretations later on in this 
introduction. 
The earliest surviving published account of England's 
entanglement with Bogdan was written by William Lithgow, a Scottish 
traveller, who stayed in Sir Thomas Glover's house in 1611 when §tefan 
Bogdan was also in residence there. (5) Lithgow's account is essentially 
an eulogy upon the generosity of Sir Thomas Glover whom he 
considered to have been ill-used by Bogdan. Glover had received the 
pretender into his own house when other Christian Ambassadors had 
refused to help him, he had maintained him at his own expense for two 
years and had promoted his cause at the Divan, providing him with 
money and all other essentials to maintain him according to his status. 
According to Lithgow, Bogdan's ingratitude was demonstrated when, 
having heard that Glover was to be replaced, he sneaked away without 
explanation and converted to Islam the very same morning. Lithgow 
commented that for all his great Dukedom (sic), Bogdan was now content 
with a palace and a pension. 
Lithgow's version of events can be regarded as a useful primary 
source because he knew Bogdan and Glover at the time of the events 
described; despite his disapproval of the pretender's behaviour he 
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conceded that he was a charming and friendly individual; he also 
provides a testimony to Glover's good character which contrasts with 
other descriptions of him. The fact that Lithgow considered it necessary to 
do this confirms other evidence which shows that there was some 
controversy in England about Glover's conduct of his Embassy, not only 
with regard to his prosecution of the King's instructions on behalf of 
Stefan Bogdan. Lithgow's account confirms other sources which show 
that Glover maintained close contact with Bogdan after his conversion to 
Islam. Lithgow's writings also confirm the high status of the English 
Embassy in Constantinople and the cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman 
capital, but they were not intended as an historical treatise; they were 
merely an account of his travels. He made no attempt to discover further 
information about the pretender or enlarge upon the details which he 
reported, many of which he had probably received directly from the 
mouth of Sir Thomas Glover. Lithgow's book is an instructive primary 
source as regards Glover's reaction to 9tefan Bogdan and an 
assessment of the pretender's character. 
A second version of Bogdan's misfortune was written by Thomas 
Gainsford in G/orie of Eng/and (6), an extremely chauvinistic publication 
which takes the form of a comparison of contemporary England with 
various other countries, their cities, forms of government and so forth, in 
which England invariably emerges as superior. In Gainsford's opinion, 
England's "glorie" was amply demonstrated by its Crown's support of the 
''true'' Prince of Moldavia driven out of his own country by an usurper, 
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who sought help as a Protestant and received kindness and the 
protection of the English Embassy at Constantinople. 
According to this account Bogdan was, as a result of either threats 
or corruption, removed by force from the English Embassy and 
imprisoned. Gainsford wrote that after his escape he went to Poland, the 
Habsburg Emperor, and the King of France for help but was rebuffed; he 
then returned to England where he saw the differences in the 
entertainment accorded to Princes between England and other nations: 
in London he was treated with the respect due to his status, given letters 
of recommendation to the Sultan to secure his re-establishment upon the 
Moldavian throne and a large sum of money granted by the Levant 
Company upon the faintest hope of his success. Such English generosity 
was, in Gainsford's view, in marked contrast to the meanness of other 
nations and the avarice of the Turks who accepted expensive gifts upon 
Bogdan's behalf whilst treating him with contempt and scorn, setting 
aside petitions for his cause with excuses and eventually refusing to 
sponsor him as had been promised. Gainsford commented: 
"where is now the Turkish ostentation of supporting the innocent 
and distributing justice to all sorts of people?" 
This is an example of the kind of rabid English patriotism which 
regarded contempt for foreigners as an important attribute of an English 
gentleman, yet saw the patronage of unfortunates as the highest 
expression of English superiority. Since Gainsford clearly received his 
information second-hand, this book cannot be regarded as an important 
primary source from which to glean new information about the English 
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Embassy's dealings with Bogdan. Nevertheless, this source is of use for 
a different reason: as we shall see in this thesis, the decision of the 
English Crown to accord its support to Bogdan was one which had 
provoked considerable controversy within circles close to the Crown in 
England and which also provoked great interest within the wider political 
society in London. Gainsford's book was published in 1618, eight years 
after the removal of Glover as Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan Ahmet I 
in an atmosphere of disgrace and recrimination; this suggests that this 
matter was still discussed, perhaps with regard to whether or not the 
English Crown should in future exercise its patronage in such a manner. 
Gainsford agreed with Lithgow's view that the patronage of Stefan 
Bogdan was motivated by generosity and the desire to assist a Protestant 
prince whose fortunes were at their lowest ebb. As we shall see, King 
James always insisted that he had acted from this most selfless of 
motives. 
There is a short account of Bogdan's career in Richard Knolles' 
Generall Historie of the Turkes (the edition of 1621). Knolles' history, first 
published in 1603 and updated in subsequent years, is a long and 
detailed history of the Ottoman Empire with a particular interest in the 
Empire's European wars and shows a considerable understanding of the 
complex system of relationships between the Ottomans, their vassals, the 
Tatars and the princes of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, and with 
the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Poland. Although meagre on 
detail for Bogdan's early career and occasionally incorrect on certain 
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facts, the study of Sir Thomas Glover's patronage of 9tefan Bogdan 
concurs with Glover's reports preserved in the State Papers. (7) In a 
number of respects the book shows an accurate knowledge of the 
negotiations between Glover and the Ottomans and his less than cordial 
encounters with the Grand Vizier. (8) It may have been based upon 
Glover's own account of his actions in Constantinople which he had 
been required to give on his return to England. 
In agreement with Lithgow and Gainsford, the book ascribes 
James I's reasons for supporting Bogdan to the following motive: 
"His Maiestie of Great Britaine pitying his miserable estate 
recommended him by his letters to Sir Thomas Glover ... with 
commandment to assist him and solicite his restitution." (9) 
The author places the career of 9tefan Bogdan in the context of the 
recent history of Moldavia and its relations with adjacent states. He refers 
to Moldavia's miserable state as being due not merely to the existence of 
so many princes with a claim to the throne but also to the fact that this 
state of affairs made the principalities: 
"prey to Turke, Tartarians and Polonians, all partisans to these 
sovereigns." (10) 
The author saw Bogdan's efforts to gain the Moldavian throne as part of a 
struggle for control of Moldavia between Poland, supporting the Movila 
faction, and the Ottomans. (11) He attributed Bogdan's failure to the 
counter- measures taken against the pretender by Constantin Movila (the 
reigning Prince) and the corruption of highly-placed officials at the 
Ottoman court, in particularly to Movila's financial connections with Murat 
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Pasha the Grand Vizier (the Sultan's Chief Minister), who attempted at 
his instigation to have Bogdan arrested and executed. The author's 
verdict upon the history of the three principalities during this period is that 
events conspired: 
''to the end that these unfortunate regions should never be without 
some touch of miserie;" (12) 
and they had the misfortune to be surrounded by three European powers 
which endlessly interfered in their affairs; he regarded Stefan Bogdan's 
experience as an illustration of this. 
Following a brief interest in §tefan Bogdan in England during the 
early seventeenth century, the pretender appears to have been forgotten. 
Interest in Bogdan was revived in 1897 in an article written by Nicolae 
lorga, one of Romania's best known historians, concerning Romanian 
pretenders who claimed descent from Stephen the Great. (13) Based 
largely upon documents published in the Hurmuzaki series, (14) lorga's 
article gives a brief outline of Bogdan's life mainly concerned with the 
fate of his father lancu Sasul, Prince of Moldavia [1579-82], his early life 
and his involvement with a number of powerful and influential Venetians. 
It describes Bogdan's early campaign to gain the Moldavian throne 
which he pursued by cultivating the patronage of Ottoman officials; even 
at this early stage the rulers of Poland were suspicious of him and on 
several occasions tried to have him maimed or killed. lorga points out 
that Bogdan's life was saved by the intervention of the English and 
French Ambassadors. The account of Bogdan's visit to England is 
extremely brief and lorga gives only a skeleton account of Sir Thomas 
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Glover's efforts on the pretender's behalf. The article places great 
emphasis upon political events in the principalities and the ambitions of 
the numerous pretenders; Bogdan was on the periphery of these events, 
but lorga hints that he could have been drawn more fully into the military 
struggle for control of Moldavia and, had luck been on his side, through 
this he could have ascended the Moldavian throne. Whilst Bogdan's 
fortunes were limited by the turnout of events, he was no mere instrument 
of policy, but a prime mover and a driving force in his own interests. 
In 1913 Ion Botez published two articles (15) which drew attention 
to the fact that a "Prince of Moldavia" and a "King of Moldavia" were 
mentioned in two Jacobean comedies (16) and pointed out that for a long 
time literary historians had been unable to identify these characters. (17) 
In these articles Botez identified the Prince or King of Moldavia as Stefan 
Bogdan by referring to the existence of letters mentioning him in the 
Hurmuzaki publication Tesauru de Monumente /storice vol III [Bucharest 
1860 (ed. Papiu Ilarianu)] and in lorga's article; he argued that the 
coincidence of trends in drama towards heroics and adventure in foreign 
lands coupled with an increase in foreign travel and discovery ensured 
that Ben Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher had no need to invent these 
characters. He concluded that the manners, personality and 
circumstances of this visitor to London created a great impression upon 
those connected with the Court. 
In 1917 Marcu Beza published an article entitled 'English 
travellers in Romania' (18) which confirmed this view and went on to 
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identify the character in the.Jacobean comedies with the Prince whom 
William Lithgow had met in Constantinople, thus pointing out to an 
academic readership that, despite contemporary ignorance about 
Romania, England had a long history of contact with the principalities 
through the travels of a number of Englishmen. In the same year Nicolae 
lorga published Histoire des Relations Anglo-Roumaines [Iasi 1917], the 
English version of which was published in Bucharest in 1931. Continuing 
his previous work upon this subject he wrote about Bogdan as one of the 
most enduring of a number of pretenders: 
"Always most numerous and often of doubtful origin [who] for some 
time found means to get at influential people in Constantinople 
and even gain monetary assistance and diplomatic protection from 
the courts of Western Europe"; (19) 
arguing that the initiative was very much on the part of these pretenders 
to make best use of the generosity of Western courts to support their own 
causes in the East. He regarded Sir Thomas Glover's actions on 
Bogdan's behalf as being motivated by greed; he was: 
"a merchant-diplomat, out for personal gain, who financed princes 
and then had to support them through thick and thin in order to 
recover his money." (20) 
This assessment of Glover's reasons for according Bogdan his support is 
somewhat wide of the mark: as we shall see later on, Glover supported 
Bogdan because he was ordered to. lorga briefly, and with a certain 
amount of irony, surveyed the life and exploits of Bogdan, whom he 
regarded as an unscrupulous adventurer. He concluded that Glover's 
departure marked the end of the first era of Anglo-Romanian relations: 
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henceforth the duties of the Ambassadors were more strictly diplomatic, 
they behaved with greater dignity and their houses no longer afforded 
refuge to pretenders pursued by their enemies; as we shall also see, in 
supporting pretenders to the Moldavian and Wallachian thrones, the 
English Embassy was acting very much in a diplomatic capacity. lorga 
also asserted that British commerce and British influence was not to be 
met with upon the Danube for another two centuries: (21) he had no 
suspicion of official royal or commercial policy to support princes in order 
to gain trading privileges. 
A number of letters relating to Bogdan are to be found in the 
appendix to the English edition of lorga's book; these were discovered by 
Elvira Georgescu amongst the State Papers in the Public Record Office 
in London. (22) This appears to have been the first time that the subject 
was approached using English sources. In 1934 Elvira Georgescu 
published a study of Bogdan's second visit to London and its 
consequences, based upon other documents in the English State 
Papers, including twenty-four letters written by Sir Thomas Glover to the 
Earl of Salisbury between 1607 and 1611. (23) This might have provided 
the means to study the true nature of England's support for the pretender. 
Unfortunately this is not the case: the documents published represent 
only a small proportion of those amongst the State papers; some of those 
selected are the least informative and often only part of a document has 
been transcribed. There are a considerable number of mistakes in the 
transcriptions, which is, however, understandable given the difficulties of 
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the 'secretary hand' in which the letters were written, and there are no 
references to the contents of the missing sections in the accompanying 
article. This is unfortunate since this article has been used as a major 
source of information upon the contents of the British archives for 
Romanian historians, the majority of whom were not until recently in a 
position to visit London to consult these documents. 
Georgescu's article chronicles Bogdan's career between 1607 
and 1611, making some reference to the political problems and intrigues 
in which Moldavia was embroiled due to the policies of the Ottomans and 
Poles, whilst noting that 9tefan Bogdan was responsible for stirring up 
dissent in Moldavia and amongst dissatisfied Moldavian boyars (the 
landowning nobility) who came to Constantinople. Elvira Georgescu 
noted an increasing interest in the non-Christian world amongst Western 
Europeans in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries which 
made it easier for men such as Bogdan to find a sympathetic reception; 
she also refers to England's general interest in Ottoman affairs quite 
apart from Bogdan's suit, and to Bogdan's work on his own behalf in 
correspondence with his protectors the King and Queen of England and 
the Earl of Salisbury; he issued reports upon the progress of his affairs 
and some of his efforts to gain the support of other European rulers. 
There is a brief mention of Bogdan's ill-fated project of marriage 
with Lady Arbella Stuart, with the conclusion that Lady Arbella had given 
the pretender little encouragement; Bogdan's alliance of 1610 with 
Gabriel Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, who aspired to be elected King 
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of Poland, is also outlined. Georgescu's article can be regarded as a 
short survey of some of the salient questions in the matter of England's 
support of this particular pretender. (24) 
Bogdan's career was next discussed in the work of Paul 
Cernovodeanu and Ludovic Demeny as referred to above, (25) the thesis 
of which is that the contacts between the first four English Ambassadors 
(William Harborne, Edward Barton, Henry Lello and Sir Thomas Glover) 
and Moldavian princes were pursued in order to gain trading privileges 
in Moldavia for English merchants, so that they might sell their own 
goods there, buy raw materials to ship home and, in particular, make the 
trade route between the Black Sea and the Baltic, which passed through 
Moldavia, safe for Englishmen to travel. In other words that English 
support for pretenders was a manifestation of English colonialism 
towards the Romanian principalities in order to further the interest of 
"capitalist-type trade" by big international companies. (26) It is my 
contention, however, that the Levant Company had no interest in ~tefan 
Bogdan because they had no well defined policies towards Moldavia. In 
order to advance this argument in the rest of my thesis, it is necessary to 
consider a number of topics which form the basis of Demeny and 
Cernovodeanu's case. 
Economic penetration into the Levant by English merchants had 
been stimulated by the appointment of an Ambassador to Constantinople 
in 1582. In 1583 a set of commercial privileges, known as Capitulations 
were granted by the Ottoman Sultan to English merchants; they provided 
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for the payment of a small customs tax of 3% upon the value of goods 
and the right of English merchants to sail under their own colours. At the 
same time a monopoly trading company, which later became known as 
the Levant Company was set up to administer the trade. (27) Prior to this 
there is evidence of English merchandise, conveyed from the German 
lands to Lwow in Poland, finding its way into the Romanian lands, 
although mostly in the form of gifts. The new circumstances outlined 
above provided opportunities for English merchants to come into direct 
contact with the population of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. (28) 
The principal articles exported by the English merchants consisted 
initially of woollen cloth, and metals (particularly tin) indispensable for 
Ottoman artillery. In exchange they imported spices and other oriental 
products such as fine silks, cotton thread and medicinal drugs. (29) The 
English set up trading-posts, known as factories, in the Near-East, North 
Africa and the Greek islands. Cernovodeanu argues that it was natural 
that the merchants should focus their attention on the principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia because they enjoyed a privileged status within 
the Ottoman system due to their: "economic and political semi-
autonomy"; (30) the possibility of trade with Moldavia was viewed with 
particular interest owing to its pOSition on the Black Sea-Baltic trade 
route. Strong commercial ties with Moldavia might allow the Levant 
merchants to trade directly with Poland in their own goods or those 
bought in Ottoman territories and would ensure distant connections for 
them with Baltic ports. 
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The Levant Company was not the only English Company trading 
in Eastern Europe: there was also the Eastland Company, set up in 1579, 
operating in the Baltic, and the Muscovy Company, operating out of 
Archangel. Moldavia appears not to have had a significant direct 
commercial relationship with the Eastland Company; imports of English 
cloth normally arrived in Moldavia from the south along the 
Constantinople road or from the Black Sea ports and the Danube. Agents 
of the Eastland Company, who bought Moldavian exports such as forest 
produce (potash and "ashes of potash") and big cattle, did so i ndi rectly. 
The goods were brought to Poland from Moldavia for sale in Lwow and 
other commercial centres and sold on by merchants living in Poland to 
agents of the Eastland Company, established in Danzig and other Baltic 
ports. (31) 
According to Demeny and Cernovodeanu's argument there was 
an incentive for English merchants operating in the Levant to trade 
directly with Moldavia, not only to deal in English cloth, but also to 
undercut the Eastland Company by buying Moldavian exports in 
Moldavia. A number of expeditions were made to Moldavia by 
Englishmen, for example John Newberie, who visited the principality in 
1582, and Henry Austell, who went there in 1585, (32) both of whom 
were involved in commerce. The main piece of evidence put forward to 
support the case that the Levant Company was seeking to expand its 
business with Moldavia, is a grant of trading privileges to English 
merchants by Prince Petru 9chiopul in 1588. 
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At his recall to England, Ambassador William Harborne travelled 
through Moldavia on his return home. According to the protocol he took 
with him letters from the Sultan which commanded Prince Petru to 
entertain him courteously. Petru did so and on August 27th September 
5th 1588 at his camp at Tutora granted the following privileges: 
"From now on the subjects and all merchants of her highness 
[Queen Elizabeth I] have permission to settle down and travel in 
our country, to buy, to sell, to make contracts and in a word to look 
after all that is covered by negotiation and in private life with no 
obstacles or prohibitions, submitting themselves for all that to our 
right of customs at 3%. and not at 12% as other foreign merchants 
pay and even natives." (33) 
furthermore, it is argued that the initiative behind the grant of these 
privileges came from the Levant Company. In an article entitled 
'Privilegiul comercial acordat Negustorilor Englezi in Moldova la 1588 ... ' 
(34) Cernovodeanu wrote that the encouragement of Moldavia's external 
trade also entered into the considerations of Petru ~chiopul and those of 
his ministers, amongst whom was the Postelnic [Master of the Prince's 
Household] Bartolomeo Brutti who was particularly active in Moldavia's 
commercial and political business. This is evident from a letter dated 
June 1 st 1587 from Brutti addressed to Queen Elizabeth (35) assuring 
her of his own loyalty and service and the loyalty and perpetual 
friendship of his master Petru 9chiopul. 
Cernovodeanu has suggested that the English Crown supported 
pretenders to the throne of Moldavia because these privileges were not 
upheld by the various princes who occupied the throne. They gradually 
became forgotten because internal conditions in the principality were 
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unfavourable to trade. It was not until the conclusion of the Turko-Polish 
war in 1621, Cernovodeanu points out, that a period of unrest and 
internal uncertainty came to an end thereby creating conditions 
conducive to the spread of normal traffic for the merchants of the Levant 
Company. (36) In the meantime the Levant Company and the English 
Crown resorted to supporting their own candidates to the Moldavian 
throne in order to ensure that England's privileged trading position in 
Moldavia was re-established. It is argued that: 
"after the renunciation of the Moldavian throne by Petru 
Schiopul,Edward Barton, the new Ambassador, who enjoyed the 
confidence of the Grand Dragoman of the Porte and was aware of 
the importance of the role of Moldavia in the international 
framework of commercial exchange initiated by the Levant 
Company in South-East Europe, decided to become personally 
involved in this direction." (37) 
Thus he decided to support the nomination as Prince of Moldavia of Aron 
Voda, who might then respect the provisions of the treaty; in other words 
he sought out a likely candidate to succeed Petru in order to protect 
England's commercial privileges as part of a deliberate English policy, 
which was continued when he supported the nomination of Michael the 
Brave (Mihai Viteazul) as Prince of Wallachia. Furthermore, when the 
hopes invested in both proved illusory, the search was directed towards 
other suitable persons who would show themselves more receptive to 
the extension of Levant Company traffic in South-Eastern Europe. 
Amongst the numerous pretenders wandering between Constantinople, 
the Papal Court and Western Europe at the end of the 16th century, the 
attention of the interested parties settled on Bogdan Sasul (~tefan 
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Bogdan) who was of royal blood. Cernovodeanu maintains with regard to 
Sir Thomas Glover's role, that he calculated the opportuneness of 
supporting a ruler favourable to the English in Moldavia in concordance 
with the interests of the Levant Company. Furthermore, qualities such as 
intelligence and personal charm attracted the goodwill and sympathy 
amongst ruling circles in England and, it is said, were in great demand 
due to the necessity of having a ruler favourable to English commerce 
upon the Moldavian throne. The desire to exploit these trading privileges 
in Moldavia is linked in Cernovodeanu's book English trade policy in 
the Levant with English efforts to gain access for their shipping to the 
Black Sea. (38) 
However, whilst there was without doubt interest in the 1580's in 
the commercial possibilities offered by the principality, this does not 
mean that the establishment of such a trade was a high priority. The 
1590's saw increasing internal instability in Moldavia as the Ottoman 
Empire, Poland and the Habsburg Empire struggled against each other 
to control the Principality's affairs. Thus whilst individual merchants in 
Constantinople might have been in a position to take advantage of 
trading opportunities in Moldavia when conditions allowed, the Levant 
Company establishment, a lengthy sea voyage away in London, was not 
well-placed to promote trade with Moldavia as a long-term investment 
when the Principality's leadership was so prone to change. It is important 
to distinguish between individual merchants who were willing to take 
considerable risks for their own profit and the Levant Company itself, 
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which existed to supervise and administrate the Levant trade, was much 
more conservative in outlook and was wary of committing the Company 
to high-risk investment in peripheral areas of Europe such as Moldavia. 
As we shall see, Edward Barton was approached by supporters of 
both Aron and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) and persuaded to 
place his considerable influence behind their causes. Similarly, it was 
Stefan Bogdan who sought out English support and the English Crown 
granted it despite the reservations of the Earl of Salisbury and later the 
direct opposition of the Levant Company. This thesis will show that there 
was a conflict between the interests of the Levant Company and the 
aspirations of the English Crown. Due to a lack of relevant data it is 
impossible to be certain of the amount of English commercial activity in 
Moldavia either before or after the grant of these privileges. Furthermore, 
we do not know whether or not the trading privileges of 1588 were 
upheld. A letter written by the merchant John Sanderson in 1600 
suggests that trade with Moldavia and Wallachia, disrupted by conflict, 
recovered quickly when peace was restored. Sanderson was writing 
after the defeat of Mihai Viteazul, Prince of Wallachia, who had briefly 
taken Moldavia and Transylvania under his control, and when leremie 
Movila, supported by the King of Poland, had been re-established on the 
Moldavian th rone: 
"Now that Bugdania and Valachia is open, and Poland in great 
friendship with these [the Ottomans] ... sales cannott chose but be 
good ... a wourse time then wee have had these two years past 
was never in these parts;yet now I see so great alteration likelie 
that, if I had any sparke of avvise or counsell that might prevaile 
with my friends, I would say and pray them for their own proffitt to 
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send what I writt for ... " (39) 
This suggests that Petru ~chiopul's privileges had not after all been 
forgotten, furthermore, if trade with Moldavia was attractive and safe 
passage through that state guaranteed under leremie Movila's rule, as 
Sanderson's letter implies, it was unnecessary for the Levant Company 
to support a project to overthrow Movila in favour of ~tefan Bogdan. At 
the time of writing Sanderson appears to have welcomed the accession 
of leremie Movila. One can guess that this trade had some significance 
for Moldavia and that the Prince had granted trade privileges in order to 
encourage it; however, as we shall see, this was not the only reason he 
did so. 
Brutti's letter to Queen Elizabeth, written one year prior to Prince 
Petru's grant of commercial privileges to English merchants, suggests 
that the initiative to establish a formal commercial relationship between 
England and Moldavia came from Petru 9chiopul. There is no evidence 
that these trading privileges were lobbied for by the Levant Company in 
London, although they were doubtless welcomed and taken as evidence 
of England's status in the eastern fringes of Christendom. Harborne had 
first made contact with the rulers of the principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia in September or October 1578 when on his first journey to 
Constantinopl. It is noted by Richard Hakluyt that he met the "Voiavodes" 
(Mihnea II, Prince of Wallachia, 1577-83; Petru ~chiopul, Prince of 
Moldavia, 1574-79) and in order to obtain their good opinion, he offered 
them "certaine courtesies". This initial contact may have been followed 
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up by either Harborne or Petru 9chiopul. There is evidence that 
Harborne had been in regular and amicable correspondence with the 
princely authorities in Moldavia at least since 1585. In October of that 
year one of the Prince's servants wrote to Harborne concerning the visit 
to la1i of Henry Austell and Jacomo Manucci who was an agent of the 
English Secretary of State, Sir Francis Walsingham. These contacts laid 
the foundations of an informal diplomatic relationship between England 
and Moldavia which Brutti later tried to strengthen with his letter of 1587. 
Petru Schiopul's grant of trading privileges in 1588 was probably 
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intended to cement this burgeoning relationship. 
At the Ottoman court the English were held in high regard, partly 
due to the fame of Queen Elizabeth I, and William Harborne had 
established good relations with some Ottoman officials. On the other 
hand, Petru §chiopul had had a somewhat stormy career as Prince of 
Moldavia and was in 1588 in his third reign. (40) In order to maintain his 
position as Prince, he needed influence at the Ottoman court from as 
many quarters as possible, to act as advocates and even to lend money. 
One method of doing so, used by other rulers, was to establish relations 
with foreign Ambassadors and Princes, not only through correspondence 
(hence Brutti's letter) but also by offering inducements and showing 
goodwill towards such rulers (hence the 1588 agreement). 
Secondly it was probably more important for Moldavia to 
encourage trade with England than vice versa. England had already built 
up a substantial trade in other areas of the Levant and could conduct a 
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profitable business without trading with Moldavia. From Moldavia's pOint 
of view encouraging trade with English merchants would increase the 
supply of lUxury goods and English cloth available inside the province at 
reduced prices because they could be bought directly; eventually 
customs receipts would increase as trade increased. We know that there 
was considerable demand for lUxury goods in Moldavia and Wallachia: 
in compensation for the loss to the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia of 
the profits formerly gained from the lucrative export of salt to the Empire, 
now an Ottoman State monopoly, the Princes were granted valuable 
customs concessions on the import of certain goods from the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly lUxury cloth. Thus in 1572 the Prince of Moldavia 
imported 4500 ducats worth of cloth without paying any duty. (41) The 
Princes of Moldavia had plenty to gain from encouraging their 
principalities growth as an international market-place. 
For wealthy and influential men such as Brutti there was the 
possibility of acting as a channel of influence to the Prince for the English 
merchants. The merchants would be unfamiliar with the way of life, 
language and terrain in Moldavia and would welcome assistance from 
agents living in the Principality to facilitate their commerce. Introductions 
to suitable agents could be controlled or manipulated by the likes of 
Bartolomeo Brutti and his associates. There would even be opportunities 
to sell on elsewhere the goods bought from English merchants. 
Furthermore, Bartolomeo Brutti, as we shall see in Chapter IV, was a man 
with ambitions to enter the service of Princes more important than the 
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Prince of Moldavia and was therefore intent upon attracting their attention 
by doing some service for them or their subjects and thereby gaining 
their good opinion. 
There were considerable difficulties for English merchants who 
wished to involve themselves further in trade with Moldavia. Under the 
Capitulations, English ships had not been granted access to the Black 
Sea, hence they had no access to Moldavian sea ports; the alternative 
methods of transport, by road using pack-horses or up and down the 
Danube, were not practical for very heavy goods transported in bulk and 
provided additional difficulties. Firstly the Danube flows into the Black 
Sea in the ports with which English merchants were forbidden from 
trading; secondly the Ottoman authorities operated a monopoly over raw 
materials produced by the principalities which they reserved for their own 
use and the supply of their Empire's needs, and would not allow 
foreigners to buy these goods for export. This monopoly was not always 
rigorously applied but WOUld, nevertheless, have served to discourage 
foreign merchants from involving themselves on a regular basis in 
anything other than the supply of their own exports, or lUxury goods 
bought elsewhere, to the principalities. Since they could not transport 
Moldavian produce out of the Principality and could not buy the goods in 
Constantinople, they were in no position to take full advantage of Petru 
?Chiopul's trading privileges until their ships had access to the Black 
Sea. The timber or potash trades were, for the time being, effectively out 
of bounds for the Levant Company as far as large scale commercial 
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ventures were concerned. (42) 
The Black sea trade was dominated by Greek, Armenian and 
Jewish merchants operating out of Constantinople with agents on the 
Danube and in the Crimea and Dobrudja. The Greeks already occupied 
an important position in the internal trade of the Empire. There were 
Greeks dispersed throughout the Empire; furthermore, Greek merchants 
usually owned their own ships. The Greeks of Constantinople became 
very important as agents for western merchants because they had their 
own networks of agents in the provinces. They supplied goods from the 
Black Sea region and were involved in the contraband trade. The 
Armenians were becoming increasingly important traders in 
Constantinople because of their involvement in the transit trade from 
Persia to Constantinople. The Jews were particularly involved in the 
collection of customs and taxes collected on shipping and merchandise, 
as well as being bankers and money-changers. The Jews, Greeks and 
Armenians controlled most of the goods which were used in foreign trade 
in the Ottoman Empire. They had a vested interest in the development of 
foreign trade, but on their own terms. The main products were cereals, for 
example Ukrainian wheat; wax and honey; leather and other animal 
skins including expensive furs from Muscovy which brought large profits; 
also animal fat, woven materials and tobacco, and wood from the 
Anatolian coast. Moldavia was also a large exporter of timber for 
shipping. It was natural that English merchants should be interested in 
the possibilities offered by this lucrative trade, particularly as it would 
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enable them to compete with the Muscovy Company in the fur trade and, 
more importantly, enter into direct trade with Persia, eliminating the need 
for Ottoman subjects as intermediaries. (43) Efforts to gain access to the 
markets of Persia and to the silk-route between Persia and 
Constantinople were a preoccupation of the Muscovy Company. 
Almost as soon as the Levant Company was established in 
Constantinople, it was petitioning the Ottoman authorities, through the 
English Ambassador, to grant English ships access to the harbours of the 
Black Sea: this access was always refused. Not only did they face 
Ottoman opposition but also that of the Greek and Armenian merchants 
who wished to maintain their own monopoly of the lucrative Black Sea 
trade. In 1606, Sir Thomas Glover, the English Ambassador, managed to 
secure the insertion of a clause in the Capitulations which allowed 
English merchants to trade with Caffa and other Black Sea ports 
provided the cargo was affreighted on Turkish ships and the goods 
exchanged in Constantinople only. The Levant Company therefore had a 
foothold in the Black Sea area and English merchants were in a much 
more favourable position in Constantinople than they had been. 
However, they were not, as a result of this, able to compete on equal 
terms with Greek and Armenian merchants involved in this trade. It is 
likely that the diplomatic activity directed at gaining access to the Black 
Sea was motivated by the desire to gain direct access to the markets of 
Persia and to enter into the fur trade; there is no evidence that the 
extraction of these trading concessions were primarily motivated by a 
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wish to commercially exploit the Principality of Moldavia. 
There were further problems to be solved before the Levant 
Company was in a position to enter into trade with Moldavia in a 
significant manner. Merchants travelling in caravans of pack-horses or 
wagons overland to Moldavia needed some assurance of safety; travel 
would be unlikely to be attempted if there was a constant danger of being 
attacked and robbed by bandits, (44) and it was an even less viable 
journey in war-time. Between 1593 and 1606 the Ottoman Empire was at 
war with the Holy League; the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and 
Transylvania became absorbed in this war. In the period following this, 
these principalities were frequently at arms or occupied by armies and 
there were in addition numerous raids by the Tatars. It would seem 
unlikely that the Levant Company contemplated investing heavily to 
promote an organised trade with Moldavia during such a period of 
instability. 
In this thesis I intend to show that the available evidence does not 
support the argument that England's support of aspiring Princes was 
motivated by a mercantilist policy on the part of the English Crown and 
the Levant Company. Chapter IV will show that Edward Barton was 
persuaded to lend a limited degree of support to both Aron and Michael 
the Brave and was drawn into greater involvement in Aron's campaign 
against his better judgment and without the involvement of the English 
Crown. In Chapter VI we shall see that Henry Lello was a reluctant and 
unenthusiastic advocate of 9tefan Bogdan, whom he regarded as a fraud 
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and a nuisance; Chapter VII will show that Sir Thomas Glover was also 
initially opposed to lending his support to this pretender for sound 
financial reasons, and, throughout his campaign to gain the Moldavian 
throne for his protege, he entertained serious doubts about the wisdom of 
involving the English embassy in such a project because of the extreme 
likelihood of failure. The Levant Company expressed its opposition to the 
project in several letters which have survived and maintained that it had 
no interest in Bogdan. As we shall see in Chapter IV, Levant Company 
merchants complained when Barton became heavily involved in the 
affairs of the pretender Aron. The Earl of Salisbury, the Secretary of State 
and Lord Treasurer of England, advocated only limited support for 
Bogdan to increase England's influence in South-East Europe, provided 
this did not damage relations with the Ottoman Sultan. It was 9tefan 
Bogdan who took the initiative by approaching the Queen and later the 
King of England, persuading them to support him, with a sorry tale of how 
he had been deprived of his rightful throne by an usurper, with 
extravagant promises about how useful he could be to England once he 
became Prince. I intend to show, furthermore, that England's involvement 
with Bogdan had the potential to disrupt the balance of power in this area 
of Eastern Europe to the detriment of England's relations with Poland 
and the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan's displeasure at the English 
Ambassador's intervention in the affairs of one of his vassal states had 
an unfortunate effect upon the Levant Company's commerce. 
The period to be covered by this thesis is one in which the 
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Ottoman Empire was greatly occupied with internal difficulties and wars 
with Hungary and Persia; one can see strong tendencies, held in check 
since the reign of Stephen the Great, for the Principality of Moldavia to 
break away from Ottoman suzerainty. Given the pOlitical realities in the 
area it was not possible to do this without entering into an arrangement 
with a powerful neighbouring state. Having loosened the Ottoman hold 
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under the rule of the Movila Princes (Ieremie, Simeon and Constantin), 
Moldavia found itself under the sway of Poland; this produced tensions 
and conflict inside Moldavia; furthermore, Moldavia was as much an 
instrument of Polish foreign policy as it was of Ottoman foreign policy. It is 
important, therefore, to discuss two matters: firstly the constitutional 
position of Moldavia in the Ottoman Empire, showing the growth of 
Ottoman power over the Principality; and secondly Poland's ambitions 
towards Moldavia and the Polish Crown's decision to install leremie 
Movila upon the Moldavian throne. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE PRINCIPALITY OF MOLDAVIA 
The principality of Moldavia, founded circa 1359, stretched from 
the Eastern flanks of the Carpathian mountains in the west to the river 
Dniester and the Black Sea in the East; between the principality of 
Wallachia in the south and the Kingdom of Poland in the north. Due to 
this proximity Moldavia always had close relations with Poland and 
between 1387 and 1497 Moldavia was an Appanage of the Jagiellonian 
dynasty; at this time Wallachia was already falling under Ottoman control; 
Poland's control over Moldavia weakened during the first half of the 
sixteenth century. (1) 
The reduction of neighbouring princes to vassal status and 
dependence, in preparation for the imposition of direct rule, was an 
integral part of the Ottoman method of conquest. (2) The fate of Wallachia 
had been settled between 1441 and 1459, whereas it was not until 1513 
that Moldavia was completely reduced to vassal status, and the 
principality was not fully in the Ottoman grip until Sultan Suleiman the 
Magnificent [1520-1556] had conquered the greater part of Hungary. 
Moldavian princes had looked to Poland and Hungary for help against 
the Ottomans, but any aid given proved unreliable and not at all 
disinterested in its intention. prince Stephen the Great (9tefan Cel Mare) 
[1457-1504], the foremost Moldavian resistor of Ottoman conquest, found 
his efforts in that direction hampered by having to fend off Poland's 
attempts to restore Moldavia to its own control. Having spent his reign 
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switching his obedience from one side to another in order to escape from 
the clutches of both, in 1503 ~tefan agreed to pay the Ottoman's tribute 
of 4000 ducats annually; at his death in 1504 he advised his son Bogdan 
to submit to the Ottomans if the terms were good, in preference to Poland 
or Hungary. (3) 
After 9tefan's death, the rivalry between his sons caused the 
principality to move further into the Ottoman orbit when Bogdan, the 
Sultan's candidate to rule Moldavia, ascended the throne. Bogdan 
agreed to an annual tribute of 11,000 piastres supplemented by 40 brood 
mares and 40 falcons for the Sultan's own use. The first permanent 
Moldavian envoy in Constantinople, the kapu-kihaya, was established; 
his status as envoy did not preclude him being regarded as a hostage to 
the prince's good behaviour. (4) Henceforth the Ottomans saw the 
opportunity of involving themselves in the election of princes of Moldavia 
by lending their support to one of the candidates, as a means of 
increasing their indirect control over the principality. In 1513 Moldavia 
officially became an Ottoman vassal state, and despite numerous 
attempts to break away from Ottoman suzerainty, some successful for 
brief periods, the principality remained subservient until the nineteeth 
century. (5) 
The Ottomans never ruled Moldavia directly, except for a brief 
period in 1595-6 when Moldavia and Wallachia were officially turned into 
Evalets (Ottoman administrative units) as a punishment for rebellion. 
After a heavy defeat in battle and Poland's imposition of leremie Movila 
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in Moldavia, both principalities had their vassal status restored. There 
had been much speculation as to why this system of indirect rule was 
preserved. Donald Pitcher has suggested that Ottoman vassal states can 
be classified according to the reasons for their subordination, one such 
reason being their military value in such a state. Moldavia, Wallachia and 
Transylvania, the Crimea and districts of Kurdestan fall into this category 
since they formed an outer band on the Ottoman empire's frontiers 
against Christendom in the west and Shi'a Moslems in the east, 
important both for defence and attack. During the period of Ottoman 
expansion the vassal states' subordination was a prelude to absorption 
under direct rule when the empire's borders spread outwards. 
When such expansion stopped, they acted as buffers against invading 
armies. (6) 
The most permanent feature of official relations was the obligation 
to maintain good relations with the Sublime Porte and show obedience 
to the Sultan. The yearly tribute might be regarded as a tangible mark of 
this, in return for which peace was maintained. The amount that the 
princes were forced to pay increased massively in value during the 
sixteenth century: in the years 1552-61 the tribute demanded from the 
prince of Moldavia stood at 30,000 ducats, by 1593 it had increased to 
65,000 ducats. In addition there was a tribute in kind of such things as 
honey, cereals, hides, tallow and cloth. Moldavia and Wallachia came to 
be looked upon as sources of revenue to offset the effects of currency 
inflation within the Empire and to pay for its numerous wars. (7) In this 
36 
and other ways, Moldavia was expected to support Ottoman foreign 
policy. Although the prince was allowed to conduct his own foreign 
relations and sign treaties with other rulers, he was prescribed to be: 
"friend of the Sultan's friends and enemy of his enemies" 
and had to supply military aid, mainly light cavalry, in time of war; the 
prince served in person when the Sultan himself took the field. Moldavia 
had to make provision for the Ottoman forces during war, including the 
delivery of necessary goods at fixed prices which were collected by 
Ottoman officials sent out specifically from Constantinople. Later on these 
officials often became permanently resident in the principality. (8) 
Moldavia also became a source of raw materials and food for 
Constantinople. Firmans (declarations) were issued by various Sultans 
specifying the kind of supplies, such as cereals, sheep and cattle, and 
the price to be paid. Although the buyer was excused payment of various 
fees and taxes during the raising and delivery stages, he often ended up 
selling at a loss. This trade for all practical purposes was a monopoly 
working to Ottoman advantage. The earliest evidence of this system in 
Moldavia dates from 1586; it indicates that despite the prince's supposed 
autonomy in internal matters, in reality he was unable to defend himself 
or his subjects from such an encroachment upon his sovereignty. Both 
Moldavia and Wallachia possessed large quantities of salt whose export 
to the Ottoman Empire provided a major source of revenue for the 
princes. That the Ottomans regarded the principalities' export of this 
natural resource as important is demonstrated by their issue of special 
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regulations to govern the salt trade, which was particularly vital for the 
cattle-raising industry in the Balkans, where salt was rare, for the 
preservation of meat. A large and steady supply of salt was also 
demanded by the cities of the Empire and that supplied by the 
principalities was of high quality. The Sultan's Imperial kitchens received 
114 tons of salt annually as a "Tax on Salt for the Imperial Kitchens". In 
order to ensure that the principalities' salt supplies were not exported out 
of the Empire the Ottomans introduced a State monopoly on salt in the 
second half of the sixteenth century, prohibiting export abroad. This 
amounted to a major encroachment upon the princes' autonomy as well 
as a substantial reduction on their revenue; for example, the Ottomans 
paid the Wallachian treasury 1 asper per boulder of salt but resold the 
salt for 2 aspers per boulder. As mentioned in the Introduction, valuable 
tax concessions for the import of various lUxury goods were granted to 
the princes and boyars as compensation for the revenue lost to them, 
nevertheless the princes found, as in so many other matters, the authority 
over an important part of their principality's economic life removed to 
Constantinople. (9) 
Another form of extortion was that of the compulsory "gifts" initially 
to be given whenever a new prince ascended the throne, the first 
example of which was probably the payment in 1541 by Petru Rare~ of 
12000 ducats when he was placed upon the Moldavian throne for the 
second time by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. As time went on 
numerous officers of state expected to be paid off with such gifts. Due to 
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the frequent changes of prince and to the Ottoman's increasing control 
over their appointment, such gifts became more or less a regular tax and 
were a heavier imposition than the basic tribute. The kapu-kihaya, whilst 
watching over the prince's interests in Constantinople, also paid out 
substantial sums as gifts. A.D. Xenopol calculated that in the early 
seventeenth century, when the annual tribute had been reduced, 
Moldavia and Wallachia were able to produce a yearly revenue of 
600,000-800,000 ducats of which two-thirds went to Constantinople. (10) 
The prince came to be regarded as a 'tax-farmer', responsible for 
collecting and delivering the cash and goods that went to 
Constantinople. For this they had, of necessity, to rely heavily upon the 
boyars (landowning nobility) to collect what was required from the 
peasantry. Whilst the princes came and went in rapid succession, the 
boyars were a fixture, therefore the ruling prince had to rely upon cliques 
of friendly and co-operative boyars as a powerbase. He had little 
opportunity to lay down further foundations to his rule; much of what had 
previously been Crown land was granted to boyars in return for support 
or co-operation and never returned to the Crown. The power of the 
boyars was an obstacle and a counterpoint to that of the prince and 
increased steadily. The political arrangements of the Kingdom of Poland, 
particularly after the Union of Lublin in 1569, which enshrined the 
principles of the noble democracy, were of considerable attraction to 
Moldavian boyars as a model of government which limited the power of 
the monarch. (11) The Ottomans were often able to play the boyars off 
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against their prince should he prove intractable. 
In exchange for tribute the prince, called Hospodar or Voivode, 
was in theory to be an autonomous Orthodox Christian ruler. He was, 
again in theory, to be elected by the boyars of the principality from 
amongst the members of the royal house, subject to Ottoman approval. 
Ottoman officials were not to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
principality; no Ottoman garrisons were to be stationed there; no Ottoman 
troops were to enter the principality during peace-time; no Moslems were 
to settle or to own property in the principality and no mosques were to be 
built. These last principles were due to the Ottoman concept of war: 
Ottoman troops went to war in the name of Allah; conquered land 
became part of the Dar ul-Islam (the land of Islam). A tangible and 
symbolic sign of such proprietorship was the building of a mosque to 
honour the victory. Without such a sign Moldavia was marked as 
Christian soil. Furthermore, fully conquered soil came under the direct 
rule of Moslem officials; land was taken under State control, since it now 
belonged to the Sultan, fortresses were built and garrisoned by Ottoman 
troops. 
In reality, however, Moldavia was no model of autonomy. The 
fortresses of Kilia, guarding the north bank of the Danube Delta, and 
Cetatea Alba (also known as Akerman) (12), which controlled the mouth 
of the Dniester, had been held by Ottoman troops since 1484. Other 
fortresses were constructed and garrisoned on Moldavian soil, for 
example the fortress of Bender in the Province of Bessarabia, to secure 
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the port at Cetatea Alba. Furthermore, Moslems began to settle and 
mosques were built. (13) Meanwhile, as pointed out above , the tribute 
and dues demanded increased and the principality came to regarded as 
a source of resources for core territories and a source of finance for the 
Ottoman Empire's wars; the system of forced purchase was seriously at 
odds with any principle of autonomy. On of the greatest indices of this 
encroachment upon autonomy was, however, in the election and 
maintenance of princes. 
Ottoman interests necessitated the presence of princes on the 
thrones of their vassal states who would keep their frontiers stable and 
secure without constant supervision; full autonomy in electing a prince 
was therefore undesirable if it were to prejudice this. When Petru IV 
Rare9 [1527-38; 1541-46] began to playoff Hungary, Transylvania, 
Poland, Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire against each other, he 
became a liability and was removed by force. This demonstrated that if a 
prince tried to act independently against the Ottoman interest he placed 
himself at war with the Sultan and was treated accordingly. Petru Rare~ 
was replaced by his brother ~tefan who embraced Islam and 
surrendered the Budjak to the Sultan. Petru returned to the throne in 
1541 but at a cost: he had to pay 10,000 ducats for the privilege and, 
most importantly, had to accept a janissary guard (Ottoman infantry)in his 
capital. (14 ) The janissary guard was a symbol and instrument of 
Ottoman control over the prince. Prince Michael the Brave of Wallachia 
also had a janissary guard imposed upon him; he began his famous 
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revolt with a massacre of the janissaries and other Moslems living in his 
capital, Tirgoviste. (15) 
The practice of Ottoman nomination and deposition of princes was 
established at the expense of the principle of boyar election. Although it 
was still regarded as important that the prince should be a descendent of 
a former prince, this was often not the case; some of those appointed 
were not even of Romanian origin. (16) An attendant change occurred in 
the perception of the source of princely authority: no longer by free 
election but now emanating from appointment by the Sultan who, in his 
berat (the proclamation of appointment) enjoined upon all the boyars, 
priests and people that they should recognise the prince as their ruler; if 
they did not their land would be regarded as dar ul-harb (the land of war) 
upon which it was the Sultan's duty to make war. Essentially a prince 
ruled because he had the Sultan's support On the other hand the Sultan 
was obliged to protect the people of Moldavia against their enemies and 
deposed princes who oppressed them. The symbols of the prince's 
authority, the standard, the robe of honour and the cap of office, were 
received from the Sultan. An Aga accompanied the prince to his capital, 
seated him on his throne and had the proclamation of his rule read to his 
people. (17) 
In practice the appointment of a prince was less straightforward. 
The Ottomans did take the views of the native boyars into account, the 
support of a party of whom the prince would need to enable him to rule. 
The new prince usually needed an army at his disposal to depose his 
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predecessor who was usually unwilling to go and who would often flee to 
neighbouring states such as Poland, Hungary, Wallachia or Transylvania 
to drum up support to regain his throne. He would often be joined by 
disgruntled boyars left out of the new prince's administration. There was 
no shortage of people willing to involve themselves in the nomination or 
placing of a prince. Poland was particularly involved in lobbying the 
Ottoman government in favour of or against various candidates for the 
Moldavian throne. The prince of Transylvania frequently intervened: it 
was at the instigation of Sigismund Bathory in 1592 that the English 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Edward Barton, joined the campaign to 
obtain the nomination of Michael the Brave to the Wallachian throne (18) 
and in 1610 Gabriel Bathory entered the military and diplomatic fray on 
behalf of 9tefan Bogdan. 
Thus by the second half of the sixteenth century, the usual method 
of obtaining the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia was to obtain the 
nomination of the Ottoman Sultan and interference in the appointment of 
princes became an instrument in the hands of other rulers to attempt to 
shift the balance of power in this part of Europe in their own favour. Three 
ingredients were vital to secure the throne: influence at the Ottoman 
Court, the means to depose the old prince and money. Each aspiring 
prince would attempt to buy the consent of the Sultan and in addition that 
of the great officers of State, the reigning Sultana, the Sultan's mother, 
the harem, the Eunuchs and anyone else who had influence with the 
Sultan. When Radu Mihnea was removed from the throne of Wallachia in 
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1611, Radu gerban offered up to 1 00,000 ducats to be recognised as his 
successor. (19) The growth of a direct financial relationship between the 
Sultan and the princes contributed to the decline of princely power as 
their monetary obligations towards him, upon which their continuation 
upon the throne depended, increased. The princes of Moldavia and 
Wallachia became heavily dependent on money borrowed from bankers 
and money lenders inside and outside the Ottoman Empire, and 
occasionally upon other rulers who supported them. The Polish Crown 
paid heavily to support the Movila princes on the Moldavian throne. 
A further factor entered the mire of intrigue and corruption 
surrounding the nomination of princes with the arrival in the Ottoman 
capital of Ambassadors from France, Venice and England. They were not 
able to involve themselves on the military front but they were in a position 
to provide influence at the Ottoman Court and money. They became 
involved when aspiring princes actively sought their support. Whilst the 
Ottomans were somewhat suspicious of intervention in their internal 
affairs, these Ambassadors were to achieve some successes: the French 
secured the Wallachian throne for Petru Cercel in 1583; the English 
Ambassador of Edward Barton obtained the throne of Moldavia for Aron 
Voda and was influential in obtaining the nomination as prince of 
Wallachia for Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul). Once the value of 
approaching these Ambassadors was recognised, pretenders took to 
visiting the courts of Europe to obtain letters of recommendation to the 
Sultan from foreign rulers and financial aid. The Ottoman Empire's 
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appropriation of the right to place princes in Moldavia and Wallachia 
drew these-principalities into the web of international competition in 
Eastern Europe, the threads of which were to reach many influential 
courts in Western Europe. An examination of the career of Stefan 
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Bogdan will serve to explore and illuminate the processes at work. 
Despite the growth of Ottoman power over Moldavia, Poland 
continued to have a deep interest in, and pursue relations with, the 
principality and continued to have some influence in the area. Poland 
was looked upon as a haven for Moldavian refugees and as a natural 
ally to aid the principality in curbing Ottoman encroachment upon its 
political autonomy. (20) Polish-Ottoman relations were greatly concerned 
with Moldavia but were rarely based upon direct conflict and hostility; 
Poland and the Ottoman Empire occasionally found themselves in an 
uneasy co-operation, particularly in the face of the actions of Moldavian 
and, to some extent, Wallachian princes whom they regarded as 
rebellious, who threatened to upset the equilibrium between the two 
powers by flirting with Habsburg support to pursue their independent 
interests. The guiding principle of Poland's foreign policy in the South-
east during the sixteenth century seems to have been to avoid a direct 
military engagement with the might of Ottoman military power. This 
section will review the considerations that influenced Poland's actions 
with regard to Moldavia in the period specified in the thesis title, thus all 
the illustrations of these considerations are taken from this period, 
especially the two decades either side of the turn of the century. This is 
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not intended as an exhaustive survey of Turko-Polish or Moldavian-
Polish relations. 
Moldavia's status as a vassal state, that is not under the direct rule 
of a 8ey/erbey (an Ottoman military governor) and with no Ottoman 
troops in permanent residence, made it a useful 'buffer zone' protecting 
Poland against the might of Islam. The first necessity was, therefore, to 
ensure that the rule of Moldavia remained in the hands of a Christian 
prince. Ambassador Edward Barton remarked: 
"having the Bugdan's [Le. the Moldavians] (21) Christian confiners 
[on the border], his subiects rest secure from the tyranny of the 
Turkes, if a Beglerbey should set in Bugdania, he should have like 
troubles and dayly discontentment as the Emperour of Germany 
and the Grand Signior his neighbours have." (22) 
The rulers of Poland liked to present themselves to the Ottomans 
as the Sultan's friend; correspondence frequently contained references 
to "ancient friendship" and good neighbourliness which their 
predecessors had cultivated persistently and which was stipulated in 
treaties. As well as being an area of primary production for the Ottoman 
Empire, the Balkan peninsula also provided for some of the agricultural, 
pastoral and mining requirements of Poland; therefore it was not only 
political considerations but also preSSing economic needs which kept 
Poland-Lithuania in the Ottoman orbit and ensured its continued interest 
in Moldavia and in gaining access to the Black Sea area. (23) Such an 
attitude was dictated by necessity. Foreign commentators not conversant 
with the military and economic realities facing Poland looked askance at 
such accommodation with the infidel, seemingly at odds with the welfare 
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of Christendom. To illustrate: in 1595 when the Habsburg Emperor was 
enjoying considerable success at war with the Ottoman Empire, it was a 
matter of some comment that that the King of Poland did not enter the fray 
on the side of Christendom, despite, as Edward Barton reported: 
"many earnest invitings by the Emperor and his partners to join 
with them." 
The reason, Barton went on, was that Sigismund Bathory, the Prince of 
Transylvania (a Hungarian) an ally of the Habsburg Emperor, had taken 
the "provinces" of Wallachia and Transylvania under his 'protection' and 
placed trusted deputies there as princes. (24) But: 
"the king of Poland [was] offended that the Prince should meddle 
with Bogdania which formerly belonged to the kingdome of 
Poland." (25) 
This letter leads us to a consideration of a third factor. There was a 
triangular relationship between Poland, the Ottoman Empire and the 
Habsburg Empire centred on the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia 
and Transylvania. With regard to Moldavia, the most important 
relationship was, generally speaking, between Poland and the Ottomans. 
However, when Habsburg fortunes were rising, the threat that they might 
attract the principalities into their orbit became real. Moldavia's first 
emergence as a principality there had been through rivalry over her 
alignment between Poland and Hungary. (26) Much of the old Kingdom 
of Hungary was now under Ottoman rule as the Pashalik of Buda. The 
King of Hungary, now ruling over a sliver of territory in the north-west, 
was a vassal of the Habsburg Emperor. From a Habsburg point of view 
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the orientation of the Romanian principalities became an important 
consideration in the war with the Ottomans. As vassals of the Sultan, the 
Moldavian, Wallachian and Transylvanian princes were obliged to 
provide military service and supply his armies in the field. Furthermore, 
the principalities were a natural theatre of war for the Ottoman and 
Habsburg armies, so whoever had control of them was at an advantage. 
It was the Habsburg Emperor's success in this that provoked Poland's 
anger: it wanted no Habsburg satellites on its southern or western 
borders. 
Rebellion against the Sultan's suzerainty by the principalities 
could lead to Habsburg encroachment there or make their maintenance 
as stable buffer-states untenable; the danger was that the Sultan might 
consider it more practical to place them under the direct rule of a 
Beylerbey with Ottoman garrisons stationed on their soil, thus posing a 
direct threat to Poland's southern border. Edward Barton remarked: 
"for if now the Tartar a people unarmed by the confinity of Podolia 
of Poland enter and was the same with infinite damage without 
resistence how much more the forces of the Grand Signior if they 
fostered in Bugdania, neighbour to the house of Poland, wilbe 
more able to ruine the same." (27) 
Tatar raids were a great menace to Polish territories. The Tatars of 
the Crimea were vassals of the Sultan, called upon to serve as light 
cavalry and as raiders, inflicting great damage with lightning strikes and 
'scorched earth' tactics. They guarded the Steppe approaches to the 
Black Sea and could be called upon to quell rebellion in the 
principalities. (28) Tatar parties raided Polish territory annually, burning, 
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looting and carrying off prisoners to be sold as slaves. Polish attempts to 
control them through police operations were put forward as evidence of 
Poland's defence of Christendom. (29) Protestations against Tatar raids 
were a frequent content of correspondence between Poland and the 
Ottoman Empire. A further cause of concern was that if Moldavia became 
an Ottoman province it could be used as a base for Tatar raids in to 
Poland's territory. (30) 
On 4th October 1595, Barton reported that the Tatar Khan had 
requested that his brother be made ruler of Moldavia: 
"promising that in such case nott only to conquest the same, but 
byndinge himself alwayes to maynteyne itt against the King of 
Poland, the Prince of Transylvania and others." 
The Sultan refused, but in order not to provoke the Tatars, he agreed that 
a cousin of the Khan, now in the Sultan's service, should govern the 
province with Ottoman, not Tatar, soldiers. (31) There was a real threat 
that Moldavia might be taken under direct rule as a result of Prince Aron's 
rebellion and it was this that lead to the decision of the Polish Chancellor 
Jan Zamoyski to place leremie Movila on the Moldavian throne by force 
in October 1595. Zamoyski managed to negotiate the agreement of the 
Tatar Khan; the "election" of Movila was confirmed by the Sultan probably 
in February 1596 after he was assured that Poland would pacify the 
present tumults and that the said prince would be faithful and loyal to the 
Sultan. The Poles warned that: 
"if the Sultan prefer a Turk to the Government thereof, [the King] 
foresaw a cause of perpetual debate between this Empire, and the 
King of Poland," 
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probably a veiled threat that Poland would be prepared to join with the 
Habsburg's to throw out a Moslem ruler in Moldavia in order to defend its 
own interests. (32) 
The Poles pursued direct relations with the princes of Moldavia. 
These relations were often soured on the one hand by Cossack raids into 
Moldavian territory (33) and on the other by raids into Polish territory by 
the subjects of the prince of Moldavia. In 1594 inhabitants of the province 
of Podolia, which bordered Moldavia to the north, complained to the 
Polish Chancellor Zamoyski that such raiding incursions had been made 
with the knowledge of Prince Aron. The previous year Zamoyski had had 
cause to complain to Aron about the robbing of Polish merchants in 
Moldavia and directed him to ensure that justice was rendered. The 
rulers of Poland were often looked to by the prince or inhabitants of 
Moldavia to intercede on their behalf with the Sultan regarding Tatar 
raids and the damage done to lands, livestock and people. (34) 
Polish envoys were even requested to intervene with the 
Ottomans over the amount of tribute paid by Moldavia, for whom a great 
rise would: 
"ruin the country, make the people poor ... without whom it would be 
difficult for the land to bear fruit." (35) 
At various times Moldavian princes fled to Poland to evade the wrath of 
the Sultan; indeed when 9tefan Bogdan escaped in 1606 he made his 
way via Wallachia to Poland. Conversely the King of Poland could often 
be relied upon to co-operate with the Ottomans to bring "rebellious" 
princes to justice. In 1582 lancu Sasul, 9tefan Bogdan's father, escaping 
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the Sultan's wrath and intent upon flight to Transylvania, travelled 
throug h Poland where he was arrested and executed upon the orders of 
King Stefan Bathory who blamed him for raids into Polish territory. In 
1594 Petru ~chiopul, after being deposed upon the Sultan's orders, did 
not dare to commit himself to the protection either of the King of Poland, 
or of the prince of Transylvania, lest the Sultan demand they hand him 
over: 
"by which way the Grand Signior formerly hath recovered many 
princes fled." (36) 
The Poles were no more interested than the Ottomans in fostering 
independence for Moldavia Poland had not abandoned the dream of 
Polish territory once again stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 
The actions of the Ottomans suggest that whilst Moldavia remained 
under Christian rule, the ideal prince was one who kept the peace in his 
principality, paid all taxes and dues exacted by the Sultan and co-
operated fully with Ottoman foreign policy objectives. Otherwise he would 
be swiftly replaced. The rulers of Poland had never given up their claims 
to suzerainty over Moldavia; throughout the sixteenth century they had 
been unable to make good these claims. The late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century saw Poland in a position of comparative strength. 
The Ottomans were involved in wars elsewhere and were suffering 
internal difficulties: revolts, the insubordination of their standing infantry 
(the janissary corps), administrative difficulties, the effects of inflation and 
a series of ineffective Sultans. (37) Being thus otherwise occupied the 
Ottomans allowed Poland to increase its influence over Moldavia. 
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Poland began the seventeenth century as one of the most 
powerful states in Europe. The threat to its eastern border had abated 
whilst Muscovy was plagued with dynastic and internal strife and a series 
of pro-Polish princes had been installed upon the Moldavian throne in 
the shape of the Movila family; there was also a strong pro-Polish party in 
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the principality. (38) The Ottomans allowed leremie Movila to maintain a 
Polish guard; there were Polish advisers in Moldavia and the Movila 
were supported militarily and diplomatically and with money and gifts in 
Constantinople. Poland used this position to negotiate for Moldavia's 
return to Polish suzerainty. If this was not forthcoming, the King of Poland 
was prepared to accept the right of nomination of Moldavian princes, 
although these princes would still have to pay tribute to the Sultan. (39) 
This right was apparently promised by the Sultan in 1600 but was 
probably never honoured. In 1606 Poland was still pressing for the 
above concessions. (40) In 1611 Constantin Movila was deposed in 
favour of Stefan Tom~a, an Ottoman candidate. After this, although 
Poland continued to try and influence nomination of princes, they were 
never again in such a strong position in Moldavia. 
The period in which Moldavia became embroiled in the Hungarian 
war was crucial for the principality's future: there was a real danger that it 
would be taken under direct Ottoman rule. When in 1594 Moldavia, 
Wallachia and Transylvania made common cause with the Habsburg 
Emperor, their defection constituted a serious threat to the Ottoman lines 
of communication from Constantinople to Belgrade, Buda and Gran. The 
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Danube was of enormous importance as a water-route much used in the 
transport of guns and munitions to the Hungarian front. (41) It is arguable 
that Poland's action in sponsoring and placing the Movila on the 
Moldavian throne, ensuring that they co-operate with the Ottomans and 
rule in peace, was instrumental in maintaining Christian rule in the 
principality and its official autonomy. For Poland, this period of war (1593-
1606) demonstrated both the danger of Moldavia being placed under the 
control of a 8ey/erbey and the threat of the principality falling under 
Habsburg influence. Having placed their clients, the Movila, on the 
throne, the rulers of Poland were closer to the restoration of their former 
suzerainty; for this reason they strenuously opposed the aspirations of 
§tefan Bogdan. 
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CHAPTER II: THE ENGLISH EMBASSY AT CONSTANTINOPLE 
In order to consider how and why the English Embassy became 
embroiled in the affairs of Moldavian pretenders, attention must be paid 
to its 'raison d'etre' and the circumstances in which it worked. The 
embassy's inception took place against the background of the 
establishment of the 'Company of Turkey Merchants' in 1581, which was 
reconstituted in 1592 as the Levant Company. A brief outline will be 
given of the circumstances which led to the extension of English 
commerce to the Ottoman dominions. The main purpose of this chapter is 
to establish the ambassador's diplomatic credentials and depict the 
environment in which he operated. Greater emphasis, therefore, will be 
reserved for an analysis of the importance of ambassadorial status, the 
extension of the embassy's political role, the bearing of communication 
difficulties with England and relations with the Ottoman authorities on the 
ambassador's prosecution of his duties. Extensive use will be made of 
direct quotations from primary source material which conveys a sense of 
the atmosphere in the Sultan's capital city. 
The project to institute direct commercial relations with the 
Ottoman Empire was taken in hand by two powerful and influential 
London merchants, Edward Osborne and Richard Staper. (1) The 
prospects were attractive and the setting up of an English trading 
company in the Levant was a logical step. The demand in England for 
goods from the East, in particular spices, silks, drugs, oils, carpets and so 
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forth, had previously been satisfied by foreign merchants: by the 
Venetians in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and thereafter by 
merchants operating out of Antwerp which became a depot for oriental 
goods conveyed via the Cape of Good Hope by Portuguese shipping. 
However, the English market for these lUxury goods was at the mercy of 
events abroad over which England had no control. The Venetian trade 
had declined with the eclipse of Venice's seapower by the Ottoman fleet 
and the revolt of the Netherlands from the King of Spain after the 1560's 
once again disrupted this trade. Shortages caused by fluctuations in 
supply must have focussed the minds of English entrepreneurs on the 
advantages of making their own inroads into oriental commerce. Finally, 
Spain's aggressive ambitions towards Portugal, which culminated in that 
country's conquest in 1580 by Philip II and the absorption of the 
Portuguese commercial empire into the Spanish domain, threatened to 
put England's rival and enemy in a position to dominate the entire 
oriental trade and to flaunt her increased naval power to England's 
disadvantage. (2) The threat from Spain was a powerful factor in 
Elizabeth I's willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the 
Ottoman Sultan. 
These commercial considerations coincided with the widening of a 
previously parochial English outlook, as alluded to in the Introduction of 
this thesis to embrace the glamour and mystery of the East and a taste for 
the pleasures of foreign travel. The might of the Ottoman Sultans had 
been made apparent when Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent marched 
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his armies as far west as Vienna in 1529 and indeed the works of a 
number of Elizabethan dramatists assumed in their audience some 
knowledge of the manners and customs of the Ottoman Empire. (3) 
Some English merchants had already visited the Levant in an individual 
capacity. For example, in 1553 Anthony Jenkinson had been granted 
safe conduct by Suleiman the Magnificent and permission to trade in his 
dominions on an equal footing with the Venetians and French. This 
privilege appears not to have been made use of. (4) Moreover the 
difficulties faced by merchants on their own were such that, Hakluyt 
suggests, after 1550 the Levant trade was: 
"in manner quite forgotten" 
until Osborne and Staper revived it, although there is evidence that a few 
English merchants had been conducting a brisk trade into the Ottoman 
territories before the founding of the 'Turkie Company' (5) However, 
rather than allow individual merchants to trade on their own Osborne and 
Staper favoured a monopoly company to protect, supervise and 
administrate English commercial activity in the Levant. It would also 
ensure that the number of merchants permitted to trade would be small, 
ensuring that the profits to be made were restricted to a small group. 
The possibilities were alluring; the Venetians had continued to 
trade in the Levant and the French had been established there since 
1536. Naturally, in the minds of those hoping to gain trading privileges in 
the Levant, what a Frenchman could do, an Englishman could do better. 
Furthermore, the cessation of the Ottoman Holy War against 
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Christendom, following the death of Suleiman the Magnificent, offered 
stability and peace, conditions which were conducive to trade of the sort 
which the Levant Company had in mind. 
In order for the 'Turkie Company' to operate successfully, the 
persons and goods of English merchants needed a guarantee of safety. 
Edward Osborne and Richard Staper sent agents to the Sultan in 
Constantinople at their own expense to secure a safe-conduct for William 
Harborne; the latter travelled there in 1578 to secure a freedom to trade 
for all English subjects. In June 1580, after an exchange of letters 
between Queen Elizabeth and Sultan Murat III [1574-1595], the latter 
extended a general promise into a formal grant of twenty-two articles or 
"Capitulations" which set down the privileges accorded to English 
merchants in their own right. Previously they had had to trade under the 
French flag and under the surveillance and representation of the French 
Consuls in accordance with the French treaty of Capitulations 
of 1536. (6) 
A monopoly company was the normal method of commercial 
organisation in sixteenth century England. William Harborne defended 
the monopoly trade in the Levant because it served to: 
"increase the profits and lessen the dangers", 
and made it easier to collect the funds necessary to finance the 
embassy. (7) 
On 11 th September 1581, Queen Elizabeth granted twelve 
merchants a patent giving them the sole right to trade in the Ottoman 
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Empire for seven years, all other English subjects being forbidden to do 
so. The patentees were given authority to make laws and ordinances for 
the government of their merchants and trade, provided these accorded 
with English law, and to fly the royal arms on their ships. In return they 
were obliged to import and export enough merchandise to pay customs 
duties of 500 pounds per annum during six out of the seven years of the 
patent. The Queen also reserved for herself the right to nominate two 
members of the Company. (8) 
The next problem was to gain a foothold at Constantinople and 
establish appropriate conditions for trade to take place. However, 
problems arose as soon as the English Capitulations had been granted. 
The Venetians and, particularly, the French were opposed to the advent 
of a rival group of merchants. In 1580 the Secretary of State, Sir Francis 
Walsingham, warned of attempts to sabotage the merchants plans, 
suggested that an ambassador's: 
"repair thither is to be handled with great secrecy ... for that 
otherwise the Italians that were here will seek underhand that he 
might be disgraced at his repair thither." (9) 
The French Ambassador argued that the issuing of English Capitulations 
was contrary to a clause in the French Capitulations which placed 
English merchants in the Levant under the French Ambassador's 
protection. Not only was this a blow to French status and jurisdiction, it 
would also deprive the embassy and consuls of the payment of a levy or 
"consulage" by those trading under their flag. (10) Thus even before 
Harborne returned home the French Ambassador at Constantinople, 
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Jacques de Germigny, secured the cancellation of the English 
Capitulations. Harborne's efforts to obtain their restoration were thwarted. 
Germigny was able to 'pull rank', partly because the Sultan wished to 
maintain good relations with France, but also because Harborne had no 
official status; Ottoman society was stratified and very status-conscious. 
Harborne had been negotiating in a private capacity, as a merchant on 
behalf of merchants. The Ottomans were amenable to establishing both 
commercial and diplomatic relations with England. After the cancellation 
of the Capitulations the Sultan himself requested Queen Elizabeth to 
send an Ambassador to him to continue negotiations. (11) Thus the 
question of the title and authority of the Company's representative came 
to the fore. 
During the negotiations in England concerning Harborne's status, 
the major stumbling block was the source of financial support for the 
embassy: the Company hoped the Crown would take on this role. 
However, the Queen at this time was not in a position to pay for an 
embassy in a far-away capital; on the other hand the financial prospects 
of the new company were good; furthermore, it was more in the 
immediate interests of the merchants to have a permanent embassy in 
the Ottoman capital than in those of the Crown. The Queen, therefore, 
insisted that the Company pay and refused to commission Harborne until 
they agreed. (12) The embassy was financially supported by the 
Company, not the Crown, throughout the period under discussion. It is 
often stated that whoever holds the purse strings has the greatest 
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influence over policy. In this case that was not so: since the ambassador 
was present as a representative of the Crown, with credentials from the 
sovereign to give him authority, he could undertake diplomatic duties as 
well. How often the Crown cared to make use of this capacity was its 
business; the Company had no veto power over diplomatic activities. 
In the Company's eyes the embassy was primarily present in 
Constantinople to build and protect English commercial interests. Yet if 
they had merely needed a 'commercial agent' they would no doubt have 
settled for this cheaper alternative. Since both the French and Venetian 
merchants were under a fully-fledged ambassador, in order not to place 
English merchants at a disadvantage their protector and negotiator 
required equal status. It was hoped that by becoming his sovereign's 
representative, Harborne would be in a position to establish official 
relations with Ottoman Ministers who could assist him in outmanoeuvring 
further attempts to cancel the Capitulations. 
The importance of ambassadorial status is illustrated by the 
expense to which the Company was prepared to go, with no certainty of 
the re-establishment of the Capitulations: Harborne would require 
travelling expenses for himself and a suitable retinue; money to establish 
and equip an embassy; a salary to maintain himself in a style befitting his 
position, as well as presents for the Sultan and bribes for his officers and 
favourites in order to obtain audience and favourable consideration. (13) 
A second illustration is the efforts to which the French and Venetians 
went to prevent Harborne being officially received. The French 
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Ambassador alleged that this would breach the Franco-Ottoman alliance; 
the Venetian Bailo Marosini was ordered by his government to pay 
15,000 zecchini to obstruct the Englishman's reception. However, the 
Grand Vizier dismissed the French and Venetian objections, stating that 
the Sublime Porte was open to all those who desired peace. William 
Harborne received his commission as Ambassador from Queen 
Elizabeth in 1582 and her letters of recommendation to the Sultan, both 
of which set out the ambassador's duties to: 
"nourish and deserve the benevolent affections of good princes 
towards us" 
and to keep the league of peace between the Queen and theSultan 
"perfect and inviolable" in addition to his duties to nourish and preserve 
England's trade in the Levant and protect the English merchants' trading 
privileges. Harborne was received by Sultan Murat III in May 1583 with 
ceremony equivalent to that normally accorded to a French Ambassador 
and the Capitulations were restored. The foreign embassies in 
Constantinople were established in Pera, a suburb of Galata, a port of 
Constantinople, on the Asian side of the Golden Horne, which dominated 
international traffic and at which foreign ships landed. The western 
merchants had their houses and shops there. There were many other 
shops and markets there dealing with the sorts of goods in which those 
engaged in commerce were interested and also with merchandise 
connected to shipping. Galata had a very large non-Moslem population, 
prominent amongst which were the Jewish, Greek and Armenian 
communities. The role of Greek and Armenian merchants in the Ottoman 
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Empires trade has been mentioned. The Greeks dominated the Galata 
guilds involved in ship construction, repair and equipment etc. 
Armenians, Greeks and Jews were very active in the guilds which dealt 
with merchandise of interest to foreign merchants, for example: Silk 
traders (Armenians); Satin traders (Jews); Jewels (Jews and Greeks). 
Jews were also active as brokers between the Ottoman administration 
and foreign merchants, especially, as we have seen, customs and 
taxation, for whilst the tax-farmers were mainly Moslems, they tended to 
employ Jews to deal with non-Moslems. The Ottomans tended to be 
scornful of foreign merchants and preferred not to deal with them directly. 
For foreigners to negotiate the massive bureaucracy of the Ottoman 
Empire without assistance from those who understood it was extremely 
difficult. They therefore looked to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish 
merchants of Galata to assist them. A close relationship between the 
foreign merchants and the non-Moslem residents of Galata was 
established; this insulated the foreign merchants from significant contact 
with Moslems. (14) 
Anglo-French, and to a lesser extent Anglo-Venetian, rivalry, did 
not cease. Further unsuccessful attempts were made to have the English 
Capitulations dismissed. Harborne meanwhile began to make a success 
of his embassy. He won a reduction in the customs duties payable by 
Englishmen from 5% to 3%, thereby placing his countrymen in a more 
favourable position than their foreign competitors. 
There was greater scope for social intercourse amongst the 
62 
permanent Christian ambassadors and the merchants whom they 
represented. Social contacts were desirable between the different 
nations, for they lived in a small and narrow society. The English, French 
and Venetian ambassadors lived in the same quarter of Constantinople: 
Pera. They also had summer residences in the small village of Belgrade 
outside the city. For the ambassadors, social life was taken up with 
elaborate banquets and complex ceremonial. However, national pride 
and questions of etiquette made such occasions fraught with difficulty. 
This was particularly true with regard to the English and French 
Ambassadors when they were together, between whom there was a 
long-running battle over precedence in matters of ceremony, which the 
latter claimed as their own. Nevertheless strict attention was paid to 
protocol and both the English and French Embassies diligently paid each 
other courtesy visits on all important occasions which were conducted 
with elaborate formality, each nation intent on exceeding the others in 
their displays of wealth and splendour. 
In the period under discussion, Anglo-French relations were also 
complicated by the question of authority over the merchants-forestiers, 
(Western European merchants not represented in Constantinople by 
permanent ambassadors), a dispute which had some royal 
encouragement on both sides and particularly over the Dutch merchants 
who came in increasing numbers to the Levant after 1594. This dispute, 
pursued over many years under the auspices of Edward Barton, Henry 
Lello and Sir Thomas Glover, was marked by Ottoman prevarications and 
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complicated intrigues by the English and French against each other. 
Relations soured to such an extent that Glover was convinced that the 
French ambassador was trying to assassinate him. The matter of 
jurisdiction over the Dutch was eventually resolved in 1612 when they 
received Capitulations of their own and established an ambassador in 
Constantinople; this did not end Anglo-French rivalry. Such a conflict 
over jurisdiction is an indication of the muscular and often aggressive 
attitude of the English Embassy, which aimed to supplant the French 
Embassy in the pre-eminent position in Constantinople, and of the 
Levant Company which aimed to supplant France as the most powerful 
trading nation in the Levant. Nevertheless, when relations were very bad 
co-operation was still possible: 
liThe two Ambassadors of France and England, though very ill-
disposed towards each other, are still united over the interests of 
their sovereigns, which is to harass Spain." (15) 
Relations between the English and Venetian Ambassadors were 
usually much warmer; being uncomplicated by questions of precedence 
or jurisdiction they were more informal and friendly. For example, 
Agostino Nani, the Venetian Ambassador, was on very good terms with 
Henry Lello and met with him frequently, even though at this time the 
activities of English pirates in the Levant, attacking French and Venetian 
shipping, were a major source of tension. Anglo-Venetian friendliness did 
not mean that Venice and England were not commercial rivals. The 
establishment of an English presence in the Levant had been a threat to 
Venetian commerce and the Venetians had been very keen to secure the 
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exclusion of English merchants. In 1601, Agostino Nani suggested to the 
Grand Vizier that the only solution to the problem of piracy was for the 
Sultan to ban all English ships from his ports, because the English, under 
the cloak of friendship, were secretly trying to prevent the traffic of other 
nations. (16) 
The letters of the Venetian Ambassadors contain many 
expressions of hope that the Levant Company would find the Oriental 
trade not sufficiently profitable and would therefore dissolve itself. It was 
in Venice's interests to undermine England's position. Under the surface 
of amity and civility, the three permanent embassies were engaged in 
subversion against each other. As Nani wrote: 
"I will proceed with the utmost caution and secrecy so as not to be 
discovered, for the English Ambassador, while complaining to me 
of the friendly offices of the French Ambassador, was able to relate 
them precisely word for word as they were said, and openly 
displayed his hostility, while covertly he alluded to me by 
complaining that my Dragoman sometimes also acted in an 
unfriendly spirit." 
Influence with the Ottoman Divan (Diwan-i Humayun: the Imperial 
CounCil) (17) was necessary to ensure that the Capitulations were 
observed, to protect English merchants from enslavement, imprisonment 
and unlawful exactions of money by Ottoman officials. These usually 
proved to be difficult tasks, for the observance of the Capitulations 
depended largely on the goodwill and generosity of the Sultan and his 
government; in many areas of the Empire his writ scarcely ran. Success 
depended on the diplomatic skills of the English ambassador in forging 
political alliances and knowing who needed to be cultivated with gifts 
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and bribes. 
A favourite tactic employed by the French and Venetian 
Embassies to undermine the position of their English counterpart was to 
cast doubt on his status by reference to the fact that the Company paid 
his salary. Thus in 1593 the Venetian Bailo wrote home that Edward 
Barton: 
"is dependent on the English merchants who pay his salary and 
employ him in the interests of their trade" 
implying that he was merely a commercial agent. Harborne went to great 
trouble to maintain the pretence that he was: 
"only maintained by her Majesty and that rather for causes of 
estate than of traffic." (18) 
It was feared that if the Ottoman government regarded the English 
ambassador as a stipendiary of merchants, his dignity and status would 
have been adversely affected and the Sultan's Ministers would probably 
refuse to receive him; merchants were of low status in the Ottoman 
Empire. Harborne protested to the Grand Vizier that: 
"he was a great noble, greater than any other here; and even if 
that were not so, they had no right to consider his private position, 
but only the magnificence of the Queen his mistress." (19) 
From its inception the embassy had a dual role and there was the 
possibility of tension or even conflict of interest between the 
ambassador's function as guardian of merchants and royal 
representative at a foreign court. Osborne and Staper's project had 
received royal backing almost from the beginning. The Queen had paid 
for Harborne's first trip to Constantinople, her two chief ministers also 
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showed their support: the Secretary of State, Sir Francis Walsingham, 
wrote "A Consideration of the Trade into Turkey", (normally regarded as 
having been published in 1580 but which could have been published in 
1578, which would suggest that Walsingham was a prime-mover behind 
the establishment of the Levant trade). There were various advantages in 
opening up direct relations with, and a trade route to, the Ottoman 
Empire. Such a trade would naturally increase the Customs revenues of 
the Crown as well as the prosperity of the English cloth industry; it would 
also greatly benefit the security of the realm by strengthening and 
maintaining the "navy" which was, as Walsingham put it: 
"one of the principallest strengths and defences of this realm 
which otherwise would like to decay." (20) 
Of the greatest political significance was the need to counteract the naval 
strength of Spain and an English alliance, or at least friendly relations 
with the Ottomans, would be of advantage to both sides, for the King of 
Spain: "can never be without wars with the Turk." (21 )The advantages to 
English foreign policy against Spain must have been a powerful factor in 
the Queen's decision to grant diplomatic status to William Harborne. The 
Turkey Company itself alluded to these advantages when pressing their 
case: 
"considering the mighty power of this prince ... [Le. the Sultan] a 
very friend of his friend, and the late heavy enemy to his contrary ... 
and his uninvited amity tending to the benefit of her people is not 
to be refused ... her Majesty pleasing to use of the Grand Signor in 
any matter of estate, having her agent there continually resident, 
the same may be readily effectuated." (22) 
Harborne was assiduous in selling to the Ottomans the advantages of 
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alliance with England against Spain, in particular after the King of Spain 
brought Portugal's Indian territories, which adjoined the Sultan's 
territories, under his control. As war between England and Spain 
became more likely, Harborne's efforts intensified. 
Since the Ottoman naval defeat at Lepanto (1571), in which the 
Spanish fleet was heavily involved, relations between Spain and the 
Ottoman Empire had been based on a series of truces which required 
renewal every few years. Harborne, hoping to persuade the Sultan to 
abandon the truce, was careful to emphasise the common danger shared 
by the Sultan and his own sovereign. He appears to have obtained a 
promise, shortly after his arrival, that if Queen Elizabeth's fleet attacked 
Spain in the Atlantic, the Sultan would reciprocate in the Mediterranean; 
a similar promise was exacted in writing in 1585. England's appeal to the 
Ottomans for assistance against Spain was supported by King Henri III of 
France who sent an envoy to the Sultan in 1588 to warn him that if Philip 
conquered England he would soon overwhelm the Ottoman fleet too. In 
spite of continual reminders the Ottomans never complied with their 
agreements. (23) 
A second tactic was to appeal to Moslem hatred of idolatry, a 
hatred also shared by Protestants. It was hoped that common cause 
could be made by persuading the Sultan of the similarities between his 
faith and that of the Queen of England. In her writings addressed to the 
Sultan, Queen Elizabeth referred to herself as: 
"the most invincible and mighty defender of the Christian faith 
against all kinds of idolatries of all that live among the Christians 
and profess the name of Christ." (24) 
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In November 1587 Harborne suggested to the Sultan that he had been 
given his power by God expressly for the purpose of destroying image-
worship and that he must not incur divine wrath by ignoring a chance to 
do so in alliance with England. By this time Anglo-Spanish relations had 
been broken off and war was inevitable. Harborne complained bitterly 
that his Queen was struggling alone to fulfil the command of God; that 
confident of the friendship and promises of the Sultan she had refused 
peace with Spain, thereby placing her kingdom in jeopardy; now Philip II 
was determined to destroy her completely with the assistance of the 
Pope and all idolatrous Princes. After her defeat, he warned, since there 
would be no other obstacle to his power, Philip would direct his invincible 
military forces to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Although 
Harborne failed in this attempt to obtain naval co-operation, he did 
manage to persuade the Sultan not to enter into a new truce with Spain, 
and hoped that this would dissuade Philip II from making an attack on 
England. The attack went ahead in the shape of the Spanish Armada; 
Philip was sufficiently confident of Ottoman inactivity not to be deterred. 
After Harborne's retirement in August 1588, Edward Barton took 
over as agent until a new ambassador could be appointed and continued 
his efforts to obtain an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Spain, even after 
the defeat of the Armada: on 18th January 1589 he wrote that he was 
daily doing his best to incite the Ottomans against Spain. He also 
suggested that there should be a delay in the appointment of Harborne's 
successor to demonstrate the Queen's disappointment and show the 
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Sultan that he could not take England's friendship for granted. (25) 
In February 1589, Barton complained to the Grand Vizier that the 
previous year the Ottoman vassal state of Ragusa, also known as 
Dubrovnik, had sent ships and 4,000 mariners to aid the King of Spain, at 
the behest of the Viceroy of Naples. The Vizier promised to warn Ragusa 
not to do so again; he also promised the preparation of the Sultan's fleet 
for the coming summer, but Barton remarked that no evidence of this 
could be seen at the arsenals. Furthermore, one Hassan Pasha had 
informed him that unless an uprising in Tripoli compelled it the Ottoman 
fleet would not set forth one galley. (26) 
So greatly did England desire alliance with the Ottomans that as 
time went on the ambassador's manner of addressing the Sultan and his 
Minister's became more and more servile. The Sultan was at this time at 
war with Persia, which was one reason why he did not wish to commit 
himself to an alliance and further conflict. Moreover the more desperate 
for an alliance England appeared to be, the more sensible it appeared to 
the Ottomans to stay out of naval conflict between England and Spain, in 
case England was defeated. If Spain had threatened the Sultan's fleet an 
alliance with England might have come about, but the Ottomans tended 
to show reluctance to make decisions on diplomatic matters until forced 
to do so by circumstances; therefore they made plenty of promises, then 
one excuse after another, from which very little materialised. One major 
advantage of good relations with England was the English trade in tin 
and gunpowder, both important for the Ottoman artillery. Therefore, care 
70 
was taken to keep the English in hope of success which failed to 
materialise as a result of adversity and not from indifference. (27) 
Despite his reluctance to enter into a formal alliance with England, 
it would be untrue to say that the Sultan did not desire friendship with 
England. In 1585, the Venetian Bailo Marosini reported to the Senate on 
the importance of the Protestant faith in Anglo-Ottoman relations: the 
Sultan was convinced that, owing to the English Crown's anti-Catholic 
stance, England would never unite against him with other Christian 
princes. The Sultan apparently hoped that it would be possible to play on 
these religious differences to his advantage. (28) Harborne and Barton's 
diplomacy in this area achieved little of substance but established 
England in the Sultan's opinion as a friendly power. 
Harborne justified his residence in Constantinople as being: 
"a marvellous eyesore for suspicios heads... [meaning the 
Queen's enemies]" 
and similarly Edward Barton was later to assert that his presence had: 
"prevented the Spaniard from resolving confidently upon his 
enterprises and ... forced him to spend in these parts 300,000 
ducats yearly in extraordinary charges." 
Despite Harborne's lack of success in obtaining an alliance, the 
Sultan clearly had a high regard for him. The defeat of the Spanish 
Armada further increased England's prestige. In 1589, after Harborne 
had been recalled to England, Murad III wrote to Queen Elizabeth 
praising his loyalty in pursuing his Mistress's interests, and asked her to 
reward him: 
"worthy to be of you esteemed, honoured and before others 
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promoted." 
Furthermore, he suggested that Harborne return to Constantinople to 
continue as ambassador: if this were not possible some other 
ambassador should be appointed without delay. (29) Such high regard 
was not merely reserved for the first English ambassador: his successor 
Edward Barton was soon to carve out for himself a similar pOSition of 
favour and eventually became an even greater influence with Sultans 
Murat III and Mehemet III. John Sanderson, who had been Barton's 
secretary, wrote: 
"I note the extraordinary esteme [that] was had of the ambassiatour 
aforenamed with them all in generall, both Christians, Turkes and 
Jewes." (30) 
The extent of his prestige and of the trust in which he was held is 
illustrated by events in 1590: 
"Learning that the Grand Signior is preparing for war with the 
Poles her Majesty [Queen Elizabeth] commands Barton to urge 
him to desist. England draws all kinds of munitions out of that 
country, and relies upon those supplies to carry on the war with 
Spain." 
Furthermore, it was in England's interests to prevent the Ottomans being 
diverted into another war because they needed them to be free to attack 
the Spanish fleet. Apparently as a consequence of the Queen's 
representations, Sultan Murat III concluded peace with Poland. (31) In 
1593, Stefan Bathory, Prince of Transylvania [1581-1602] wrote to 
Edward Barton and Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, on behalf of Mihai 
Viteazul; these letters helped him obtain the throne of Wallachia. The 
previous year G. Gifforde commented that Barton's prestige was shown 
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by his successful backing of Aron Voda for the throne of Moldavia. (32) In 
1596 Barton, with the Queen's permission, accompanied Sultan 
Mehemet III and his armies to lay siege to the fortress of Agria (Eger) in 
Hungary. Thomas Glover, who was Barton's secretary at the time, wrote a 
description of the journey and justified his actions as follows: 
"if any think it ill that a Christian Ambassador should accompany 
the Turke in this war against Christendome they may please to 
understand that his intents were to doe service to the Christians if 
occasions were offered for peace: as also he did in delivery of the 
Emperor's servants here mentioned." (33) 
Under Harborne and Barton the English Embassy established a 
reputation for diplomatic skill and trustworthiness which the Sultan and 
the Habsburg Emperor were glad to make use of. Barton's attendance of 
the Sultan's campaign was probably the pinnacle of his diplomatic 
career and demonstrated the esteem in which he was held by the Sultan. 
When Barton died in 1597, Girolamo Capello, the Venetian Bailo, 
commented: 
"By the death of the Ambassador the Turks have lost their 
intermediary in treating of peace with the Emperor." 
The Sultan hoped that Barton's successor Henry Lello would be 
equally useful to him. When, shortly after Barton's death in 1598, 
overtures for peace were again made to the Habsburgs by the Ottomans, 
Lello was approached to assist in the negotiations: 
"The Sultan will not write the first letter, and is said to have 
requested the English Envoy [i.e. Henry Lello] in consequence to 
begin the negotiations and to write to the Waiwode Michael [i.e. 
Mihai Viteazul] and to advise him to send the tribute. It is thought 
that this would be the beginning of a peace to be concluded 
between his Msajesty [i.e. the Habsburg Emperor] and the Sultan. 
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This is why the English envoy has been sent to the Prince of 
Wallachia [i.e. Mihai Viteazul] to give him every information and to 
ask him to impart what he has learned to the Emperor through one 
of his envoys." (34) 
Under Henry Lello, Ottoman aid was again sought against Spain, 
motivated as much by a desire to revive the friendly relations based on 
mutual enmity towards Spain enjoyed by the English Embassy under 
Harborne and Barton as by the expectation that an actual alliance would 
come about. In February 1602 the Venetian Bailo wrote that Lello had 
communicated with Lieutenant Halil Pasha and the Chief Eunuch: 
''that certain of the Spanish ships had attacked his Mistresses fleet, 
and that the English fleet should take the sea as strongly as 
possible, in order to execute a joint attack on the King of 
Spain." (35) 
However, during Henry Lello's appointment as ambassador the 
honour in which the English Embassy was held went into decline; this 
was accelerated by the death of Queen Elizabeth I in 1603. One of the 
major reasons for Lello's difficulties appears to have been his lack of 
experience when appointed which meant that he was not so useful to the 
Sultan as his former master had been. Once it was clear that he did not 
enjoy the Sultan's favour as Barton had done, he began to be treated 
with disdain by those Ottoman officials whose confidence Barton had 
enjoyed. A further cause of the decay in Anglo-Ottoman relations was the 
suspicion that England was preparing to make peace with Spain, for 
despite avoiding involvement in a joint operation the knowledge of a 
mutual interest and the threat of co-operation was considered an 
important weapon against Spanish ambition. (36) After the death of 
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Elizabeth I, Lello complained that the Sultan declined to recognise him 
as ambassador and refused to observe the Capitulations. (37) The 
position of the embassy was made worse by King James I's attitude 
towards the Ottoman Empire: he expressed himself firmly opposed to 
Anglo-Ottoman co-operation and pronounced in favour of Christendom 
uniting to drive out the infidel. Thus he was highly indignant at the 
conclusion of peace between the Habsburgs and the Sultan in 
1606. (38) He frequently stated that he had little interest in good relations 
with the latter, of whom he spoke with great disdain with regard to the 
embassy: 
"He says he keeps an Ambassador at the Porte not for his own 
pleasure or interest but to satisfy his subjects who are Merchants 
there, and who bear all the charges of the Embassy; he has no 
share in it beyond consent." (39) 
Therefore in 1605, when the Ottoman government suggested that King 
James mediate a peace between the Sultan and the Habsburg Emperor, 
(which could have greatly benefited the English Embassy by increasing 
the favour in which England was held), Lello felt it necessary to play 
down this suggestion, because he did not consider that his King would 
wish to involve himself. (40) Although James appears to have been 
persuaded that the good relations established with the Sultan under his 
predecessor should be maintained, his lack of enthusiasm precluded any 
close association between the two Crowns.This expressed distaste of the 
Ottoman Empire did not prevent him attempting to make use of the Anglo-
Ottoman diplomatic relationship to support the aspirations of Stefan 
Bogdan in the interests of increasing English influence in Eastern 
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Europe. 
The activities of English pirates in the Mediterranean, which Lello 
was powerless to stop, had done great harm to England's reputation in 
the Ottoman Empire: 
"Achmet Pasha publicly reproached the Dragoman [Interpreter] of 
the English Ambassador with much bitterness, saying that the 
Porte received nothing but damage from the Queen's subjects, 
and in his anger went so far as to declare that the Ambassador 
was doing no service here and had better go." (41) 
By 1606 the Sultan and some of his Ministers considered breaking off 
relations with England altogether, although others emphasised the 
benefits of friendly relations with England and regular commerce, in 
particular the import of gunpowder. (42) 
Since the English Embassy was no longer required to persuade 
the Ottomans of the advantages of a naval alliance against Spain it was 
no longer involved in the kind of high level political activity carried out 
under Harborne and Barton. When Henry Lello was ordered to support 
Stefan Bogdan's campaign for election to the throne of Moldavia, he ) 
received explicit instructions not to carry his support so far as to do 
anything which could prove offensive to the Ottoman authorities. The 
business of the embassy was largely confined to promoting and 
protecting the interests of English merchants operating in the Levant; 
Lello was content that the embassy's role in the Sultan's dominions 
should not be extended. 
When appointed as ambassador, Sir Thomas Glover, unlike Lello 
at his appointment, had the advantage that he was already experienced 
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in the work of the embassy and was apparently well respected by the 
Ottomans. Glover seems to have hoped to conduct the embassy's 
operations along the lines established by Edward Barton. Hoping to 
revive the idea of Anglo-Ottoman co-operation against Spain, Glover 
offered the co-operation of English shipping for a projected Ottoman 
armada, (43) but this idea met with no enthusiasm at home. 
Nevertheless, under Sir Thomas Glover, the role of the English Embassy 
in Ottoman affairs was extended and he became secretly involved in 
negotiating on the Sultan's behalf for peace with Spain. Glover's 
personality was such that he was not easily intimidated or dragooned. 
His demeanour did not make him particularly well-liked but affection was 
not a vital ingredient for diplomatic success. Glover was able to demand 
that his dignity be respected. For this reason he seems to have been 
better regarded in Constantinople than his predecessor, however 
Glover's influence never reached the heights achieved by Barton or 
Harborne. One reason for the failure of Glover's suit on behalf of Bogdan, 
when compared with Barton's success in supporting pretenders, was the 
difference in esteem in which the two men were held. 
The concentration in this chapter upon the diplomatic activities of 
the ambassadors is not to make any judgment upon the relative 
importance of the embassy's diplomatic role and the duties undertaken 
on behalf of the Levant Company. It is merely to assert that from its 
inception the embassy built up a tradition of diplomatic activity 
unconnected with the commercial policies of the Company which 
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supported it financially. 
There is some ambiguity as to whether the Crown or the Company 
had the right to choose the ambassador in the early years. Naturally it 
was the Crown which made the appointment, but it has been assumed, 
for example by A.C. Wood, that until the reign of Charles I and the return 
from Constantinople of Sir Thomas Roe in 1628, the office was filled by 
Company appointees without royal interference. It is true that in 1625, 
when the King tried to force the appointment of Sir Thomas Phillips and 
then that of Sir Peter Wyche, the Company vehemently objected. 
However, this was partly due to the high-handed manner of the King's 
proceedings, since he did not bother to consult the Company about the 
appointment and partly due to the unsuitability of the candidates, in 
particular Phillips who was a courtier and client of the Duke of 
Buckingham and had no experience of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Company therefore asserted its right to elect the ambassador against the 
encroachment from the King, although they eventually had to submit. (44) 
Nevertheless, it would not be true to say that the Crown had never 
previously exerted influence on the appointment of ambassadors. 
Harborne and Barton were, as far as it is possible to tell, Company 
candidates. The latter had been Harborne's secretary and remained in 
Constantinople after his voluntary departure, but was not officially 
commissioned until 1592. There was some uncertainty as to whether it 
was to the Company's benefit to continue to support an ambassador. As 
we have seen both Harborne and Barton wrote to the Secretary of State, 
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Walsingham, to argue that the embassy was important and probably 
pressed him to use his influence to ensure that the embassy 
continued (45). Similarly Lello, who had for a short time been Barton's 
secretary, took his place when the latter died. However, it appears by 
Lello's own admission that he received ambassador's credentials 
through the intercession of Sir Robert Cecil. (46) Lello later pleaded his 
case to the King and Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury, for his own 
continuance as ambassador. (47) It was the Company which certified 
Lello that he was being recalled but the decision appears to have been 
taken under some pressure from the Crown. Thomas Glover had lobbied 
the Crown and the Company to secure Lello's dismissal and used his 
influence with the Crown and the Company to win the embassy for 
himself. He was a Squire of the King's Body, but was also an 
experienced former employee of the Company in Constantinople. Glover 
used his influence at Court and with the Company to win the English 
Embassy for himself. Presumably his appointment was a matter of mutual 
agreement between the Crown and the Company. (48) Glover's removal 
from the embassy was purely a Crown decision; the exact circumstances 
will be explained in Chapters III and VII. The Company had been 
prepared to renew his appointment when they received notice from 
Salisbury: 
"We have been certified by Sir Thomas Lowe our Governour and 
the rest that it hath pleased his Majesty for some special service to 
recall Sir Thomas Glover from his residency at Constantinople and 
in his place by their nominacon to elect and constitute [Paul 
Pindar] Ambassador." (49) 
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It appears from this letter that Paul Pindar's nomination was 
decided as a result of consultations between the Crown and the 
Company. His recall was largely a Company matter: Pindar was anxious 
to return to England when his term ended and the Company decided to 
suppress the embassy and rely on an Agent at Constantinople. (50) One 
may conclude that although the Company paid the ambassador's salary 
and expenses, its right to elect him was a prescriptive right based on the 
Crown's willingness to appoint candidates acceptable to the commercial 
interests of the Levant merchants. The Crown retained the right to 
commission and remove ambassadors without reference to the Company 
and frequently intervened directly with the Governor in the Company's 
affairs. 
All the ambassadors took care to furnish the Crown with detailed 
reports on the internal affairs and foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, 
with particular emphasis on the Sultan's dealings with the Habsburg 
Emperor, the- King of Poland and the prinCipalities, as these matters were 
seen as tending to the welfare of Christendom. For example Henry Lello 
wrote every fortnight to the Secretary of State, newsletters were also 
circulated to England and probably to other embassies in Europe, in 
particular the Crown's representatives in Venice, the affairs of that State 
being of importance to the ambassador in Constantinople's prosecution 
of his duties on behalf of the merchants, as well as in his dealings with 
the Venetian Bailo in Constantinople. The efforts undergone to dispatch 
such reports are evident from reading them and the careful attention to 
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accuracy is suggestive of a great interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe 
amongst some members, at least, of the English government. 
It is difficult to assess exactly how the ambassadors obtained their 
information. The main sources were probably the Dragomans, officially 
Interpreters, who were employed for routine negotiations with ministers 
and officials, conveying messages and acting as a general channel of 
communication between the embassy and the Divan (Imperial Council). 
They were expected to make contacts inside the Ottoman administration 
to gather intelligence. The Ottoman government was a hot-bed of intrigue 
and it was therefore in the interests of the ambassador not only to 
discover information on matters of policy but also on who was out of 
favour with the Sultan and who was worth cultivating. The Dragomans 
also frequently came into contact with their counterparts in the employ of 
other embassies, another source of information. Italian was the 
diplomatic language of the Levant; many of the Dragomans were 
Ottoman subjects of Italian origin, or Italianised Levantines and therefore 
often in danger of summary punishment by an official displeased at what 
they had to convey. They were often reluctant to deliver messages which 
might be the cause of displeasure or to forcefully press for the information 
required by their masters. Furthermore, Dragomans from rival embassies 
were even known to fabricate amongst themselves what to say to 
Ottoman officials and their masters to avoid annoying either side and 
putting themselves in danger. With such disinformation and confusion 
involved in prosecution of official business it is little wonder that 
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ambassadors frequently complained about the Dragomans. Furthermore, 
many of them were decidedly untrustworthy, often abandoning their 
masters to serve other ambassadors or the Ottoman government, or even 
acting as double agents. Therefore secrecy was very difficult. (51) 
However, for a skilful and trustworthy Dragoman the rewards could 
be rich. Perhaps the best example of a successful career is Gaspar 
Gratiani who was employed at the English Embassy as a Dragoman. He 
was also in the service of Stefan Bogdan around 1605, but no doubt left ) 
his service when he realised Bogdan was not likely to ascend the throne 
of Moldavia. He was later encountered negotiating with the Habsburgs 
on behalf of the Ottoman government. His service of the Sultan was 
rewarded with the Duchy of Naxos and, in 1619, with the principality of 
Moldavia. (52) Bartolomeo Brutti was another individual who rose to a 
position of power after commencing his career as a Dragoman; his 
nephews Cristoforo and Bartolomeo Borisi also rose to prominence 
through careers as Dragomans. 
The ambassadors themselves were assiduous in establishing a 
network of informants, building friendships with senior Ottoman officials 
and the Sultan's favourites, including the Eunuchs of the Harem. (53) 
They also maintained cordial relations with other Christian ambassadors. 
Although outside the period under discussion, the following extract from 
a newsletter written by Sir Thomas Roe in 1622 concerning the Polish 
Ambassador is interesting: 
"He had order to communicate with mee and ye other Ministers of 
Christian Princes ... I have not yet visited him by reason of my 
sickness and am now resolved not to deferr it, because he hath a 
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letter from the King [of Poland] and as he pretends, other things to 
communicate with me, which he cannot doe by message." (54) 
They also made contact if they could with envoys of other foreign princes 
as well as travellers and merchants, for news of the territories through 
which these people had passed. The consuls employed by the Company 
to act as the ambassador's deputies in the major commercial centres, 
collected information in a similar manner and communicated it to 
Constantinople. Finally, the embassy made use of paid informants and 
spies. In 1614 Paul Pindar wrote: 
''there is little occured of grate matters worth ye aduising for indeed 
of all reports among the people I am stil jealous of the truth of them 
because they are so generally given to lying and inventing of 
newes. For they do for ye most part drinck certain drinks and eat 
certain confections with opium and some other ingredients of yt 
nature, wch do intoxicate their braines and then they will talke and 
discourse their fancies wth such confident assuerations that many .-
things are related so by hearsay from others yt very often it is 
report of very strange newes for truth yt are only mens fantastical 
dreamings." (55) 
However, it was reported that Barton deliberately encouraged guests in 
his embassy to drink large amounts of alcohol in order to gain 
information. Given the possibility of disinformation, misinformation or 
downright lies, the ambassadors were careful to get confirmation of the 
truth. A great advantage in this area was a knowledge of local languages 
and Ottoman Turkish, (56) not only for gathering and checking 
information but also during negotiation. 
The ambassadors were often charged with specific instructions on 
political as well as commercial matters. The distance between 
Constantinople and England forced the ambassador to rely on his own 
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judgment and diplomatic skill. Nevertheless success in crucial 
negotiations, especially when money was to change hands, frequently 
required final agreement from London. The Company itself was not 
immune from intrigue and backstabbing and an ambassador was often 
fearful that misjudgment on his part, if taken on his own initiative, would 
be taken up by his rivals, leaving him liable to recriminations when he 
returned to England. There were many men ambitious to fill the 
ambassador's shoes and not averse to campaigning to have the present 
incumbent removed. (57) Furthermore, the Ottomans often required 
Royal letters to satisfy them of the veracity of the English Embassy, as 
happened to Henry Lello in his efforts to placate the Sultan's wrath at the 
activities of English pirates in the Levant. (58) Delays in communication 
with England could cause serious difficulties, as is evident from the note 
of desperation which sometimes crept into correspondence. (59) 
Out of a small sample of letters which include the date of receipt, 
none of them reached their destination inside 60 days, most took 
between 65 and 85 days; one letter from Sir Robert Cecil took 111 days 
and a letter to Sir Thomas Glover from the Levant Company took 157 
days, over 5 months. Henry Lello also complained at receiving no letters 
from England for 9 months. (60) Some letters failed to reach their 
destination altogether, having either been lost of stolen. Those sent by 
sea could be lost through shipwreck, or mislaid or misappropriated when 
the ship stopped at ports on the way; the activities of pirates created an 
added danger. Equally, overland routes were fraught with danger from 
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bandits and robbers. Messengers travelling by land or sea were 
vulnerable to weather or local conditions which could delay them on any 
part of their journey for days or weeks. (61) 
Various methods were employed to overcome these problems. 
Several copies of each letter were sent to increase the possibility of 
information reaching its destination. The ambassador would usually 
include a 'precis' of the contents of his previous letter each time he wrote. 
The Crown and the Company wrote much less frequently and it is a lot 
less clear whether they regularly dispatched copies of their 
correspondence. Both the Crown and the Company were somewhat 
tardy in replying to the ambassador's letters. Sir Thomas Glover 
complained to the Company, which had not answered his letters on a 
matter of grave importance: 
"it causeth me greatly to misruale at yor silence, espetia"ie in this 
principall matter, which soe highlie conserneth providence." (62) 
On extremely important matters letters were entrusted to special 
messengers, instead of being placed in the hands of ordinary merchants, 
or ships' crews. However, even such special messengers were not 
merely sent to the Levant to deliver letters but had other business to 
conduct as well; the letters, therefore, were frequently delayed for the 
preparation of these matters. Thus Henry Le"o's letters of credence as an 
ambassador were held back until the ship transporting Thomas Da"am 
and the present of a musical instrument was ready to depart. (63) 
Letters to and from Constantinople were normally sent via Venice, 
often on Venetian ships, which sailed to and from the Ottoman capital 
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very frequently. Sir Thomas Glover employed an agent there to handle 
his correspondence, in order to increase its chances of reaching England 
without interception. It is probable that other ambassadors employed a 
similar method. (64) Letters were sometimes sent overland in caravans of 
merchants travelling to or from Constantinople via Poland or central 
Europe. But in times of war or unrest this was not a reliable method. (65) 
A further major problem was that of correspondence being 
intercepted by spies, as Edward Barton remarked in a letter of June 27th 
1589 in which he requested that he might be told if his letters arrived 
safely. Naturally the English ambassador's rivals were anxious to lay 
their hands on information concerning his most secret negotiations. If 
letters were intercepted by the Ottomans containing hostile comments, 
then the repercussions for the embassy might be damaging. To guard 
against espionage, each ambassador was issued with a cipher to 
encode secret or sensitive information. The most common use of code 
was a substitution of numbers for certain names; thus the Sultan was 
referred to as 105, the King of Poland was 16 and the Emperor was 10. In 
some letters certain paragraphs, sentences or merely parts of sentences 
were encoded using symbols in the place of letters, all the encoded 
words were run together with no spaces between them, only occasionally 
were whole letters written in code. Considering the grave concern 
expressed by Barton at the interception of letters, it is reasonable to 
assume that some coded letters also suffered this fate, the codes might 
have been broken if enough samples were obtained, therefore the 
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ciphers could be used only in matters of the utmost importance. The 
English Embassy was no doubt also involved in the interception of letters 
from other embassies. A large number of letters contained in the 
Calender of Venetian State Papers are noted as having been originally 
written in cipher. The ambassador's cipher was issued by the Crown and 
used for diplomatic correspondence. This fact and the quality and 
meticulous attention to detail of the ambassador's letters is a further 
indication that the embassy was not merely a commercial agency 
masquerading as a diplomatic post for business reasons; it was of 
genuine political importance and fully competent to deal with sensitive 
diplomatic business. 
The embassy employed a large staff. After the ambassador the 
most important offices were those of the Treasurer and Secretary, who 
was also known as the Chancellor. The Treasurer was responsible for 
collecting all the money due to the embassy from the Consulage, levied 
at 2% on all imports and exports at the Constantinople 'factory'. He also 
paid out, at the ambassador's request, money for "avanias" (illegal 
payments extorted by Ottoman officials), gifts and bribes and paid the 
wages of all Company servants. (66) The Secretary documented all the 
official business of the Constantinople factory and the embassy. He 
ranked as the ambassador's deputy when the latter was ill or absent and 
was sometimes employed in negotiations with the Ottomans on his 
master's behalf. In the early years of the embassy he usually took on the 
ambassador's role after his death or departure. (64) The embassy also 
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had a resident doctor and Chaplain on its staff to serve the whole of the 
Constantinople factory. The Chaplains were at this time paid 50 pounds a 
year and granted a free passage to the Levant, with a grant to equip their 
Ministry. Many of the Chaplains were men of great learning and piety, 
who used their time in the Sultan's dominions to study the manners and 
customs of the Turks, the Eastern churches and explore the many 
classical remains in the Balkans and the Middle East. William Biddulph, 
who was Chaplain to Henry Lello and briefly to Sir Thomas Glover until 
he incurred the latter's enmity, wrote an account of his experiences which 
was published in the series Purchas His Pi/grimes. (68) 
The ambassador also employed Janissaries to guard him and 
never ventured out unaccompanied. Besides the prestige value of having 
a permanent guard, such a practice was strictly necessary to prevent him 
being subjected to insults, shoved and spat on in the streets. Between 
1582 and 1588, William Harborne expended 362 pounds 18 shillings 
and 4 pence in Janissaries' wages. The list of Harborne's expenses is a 
useful source to glean information on the style in which the ambassador 
lived: it included over 1,000 pounds spent on his apparel and a similar 
amount in Dragomans' wages. The stable bill was over 600 pounds ;the 
housekeeping expenses nearly 4,500 pounds. Servants wages 
accounted for 1,372 pounds and charges at the Ottoman Court (a 
euphemism for bribery) came to 2,683 pounds with a further 1,442 spent 
on presents. The sum total for Harborne's embassy was 15,341 pounds 8 
shillings and 2 pence. (69) The Company was seriously concerned at the 
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expense of the embassy, which further increased under Barton, in 
particular due to his diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Sultan and his 
expedition with the Sultan's army into Hungary. However, it was 
imperative the ambassador lived in splendour, for a show of pomp and 
grandeur was expected of a man of his status; he could command little 
respect in the magnificent surroundings of the Ottoman Court if he lived 
simply and dressed in plain or dowdy clothes. 
As well as the money raised from the consulage at the 
Constantinople factory, the Company was also entitled to levy a tax on 
currants to assist them in paying for an embassy, although they also had 
to pay the Crown 4,000 pounds a year for this privilege. (70) The 
ambassadors also received an allowance from the Sultan. (71) However 
they constantly complained of being short of money. In 1589, Edward 
Barton argued that if the embassy was to be maintained either the Queen 
or the Company should increase his allowance for household expenses: 
"for hithertoe her Majesty's officers have been far inferior in 
countenence to those of other Princes, not expending the third part 
of that which the Emperor and the King of France's Ambassadors 
are allowed." 
He felt that this brought dishonour upon the Queen. (72) Yet in fairness to 
the Company the Constantinople embassy was something of a 
'bottomless pit' into which more and more money could be poured, to 
achieve ever more splendid results for the ambassador's appearance. A 
large retinue of servants and grooms were employed, some of whom 
came from England whilst others were Greeks and Armenians, some 
permanently and others hired for special occasions, in order to outshine 
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the rival embassies. In 1599, Thomas Dallam wrote: 
"The last of October my Lord Imbassador wente to the Vizier's 
house with all his train of Englishmen; for that daye the Vizier had 
appointed to end a controversie which was betwixt him and the 
French Imbassador, but the French Imbassador seinge us go by 
his house with a greater company than he could make, he would 
not com after us, the which was little for his credditt." (73) 
The ambassador's entire retinue had to be provided with a livery, which 
probably had to be renewed for each audience with the Sultan. Thomas 
Dallam described Lello's retinue on the occasion of the delivery of a 
present to the Sultan, at which ceremony Lello was to deliver his letters 
of crede nce: 
"he did ryde Iyke unto a kinge, onlye that he wanted a crowne. 
Thare roode with him 22 jentlmen and martchantes, all in clothe of 
goulde ... The other six weare martchantes; these did ridein vestes 
of clothe of golde, made after the cuntrie fation [perhaps meaning 
the rural fashion of the area around Constantinople], thare went on 
foute 28 more in blew gownes made after the Turkie fation [i.e. the. 
Ottoman style] and everie man a silke grogen [grosgrain] cape, 
after the Italian fation. My liverie was a faire cloake of French 
green. "(74) 
It was important for an ambassador to try and outdress his fellow 
ambassadors and thereby to increase the esteem in which he was held 
by the Ottomans. A suitably majestic manner had to be cultivated in all 
proceedings. This appears to have been one problem which Henry Lello 
experienced: his apparent difficulty in projecting a confident "gesture and 
oration" (75) which had been second nature to his predecessors. The 
necessity of such demeanour will be dealt with below. Glover was 
disgusted with Lello when, in order to pay his debts, he was: 
"himself in publicke in the market place daylie in selling of his 
gowns, furs, saddles and other household stuffe, which much 
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defames the honourable place he held here and in the vulgar 
voice it is reported that he rather merits the name of merchants 
factor than the King of England's Ambassador." (76) 
When an ambassador presented his credentials to the Sultan, he 
did so at a ceremony referred to as "kissing theSultan's hand." Lello 
described the form of reception to Thomas Dallam thus: 
"We call it kisinge of the Grand Sinyor's hande, bute when I com to 
his gates I shalbe taken of my horse and seartcht, and led betweixt 
tow men holdinge my hands down at my sides and so lede unto 
the presence of the Grand Sinyor, and I muste kiss his kne or his 
hangings sieve. Havinge deliverede my letters unto the 
Coppagawe [Cap; Aga: gatekeeper] I shalbe presently ledd 
awaye, going backwardes as long as I can se him, and in peyne of 
my heade I must not louke to have a sighte of him." (77) 
Whenever there was a change of ambassador or a new Sultan ascended 
the throne presents were given to the Sultan, the Sultana and usually 
many of the chief officers: the Grand Vizier, the Admiral of the Fleet, the 
Janissary Aga [Le. the Commander of the Jannisary corps] and the Chief 
Pasha. (78) Edward Barton presented the Sultana with the following: 
"12 goodly pieces of plate, 36 garments of cloth of all colours, 20 
garments of cloth of gold, 10 garments of satin, 6 pieces of fine 
Holland [cloth], and certain other things of good value." 
To the Sultana Safiye, Queen Elizabeth sent: 
"a jewel of her Majesty's picture set with rubies and diamonds; 3 
pieces of gilt plate, 10 garments of cloth of gold; a very fine case of 
glass bottles, silver and gilt; and 2 pieces of fine Holland." (79) 
The present presented on behalf of Henry Lello, which Thomas Dallam 
had built and delivered to Constantinople, was a musical instrument, a 
magnificent golden organ, which also chimed the hours. Thomas Dallam 
was one of the most skilled organ-builders in England; this was clearly a 
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very prestigious present. It is known that Barton complained about the 
delay in arrival of the Queen's gift to Sultan Murat III which did not arrive 
until October 1593. The present was a prerequisite for the recognition of 
his new status as ambassador and the prolongation of the English 
capitulations. On delivery of a present to the Sultan, the ambassador was 
allowed by custom to make three demands "as thought expedient to the 
Queen's honour". (80) 
At the reception of an ambassador, the Sultan occasionally 
presented gifts. When Sir Thomas Glover boasted of his own magnificent 
and honourable reception, he emphasised the Sultan's gifts of vests of 
gold to him and his gentlemen and that he granted him an allowance to 
provide for his household, which Glover said was contrary to his usual 
custom. (81) This is probably a great exaggeration, for we know that 
others received an allowance from the Sultan, although not necessarily 
at their arrival, but there may be some truth in it for Lello had warned 
Dallam that: 
"It was never known that upon the receaving of any present he 
gave any reward unto any Christian, and tharfore you must louke 
for nothing at his hands." (82) 
Gifts, whether given at changes in administration or at other times, 
were looked on by the Ottomans thus: 
"what we or any other Christians can bring unto him he do thinke 
that we doe it in dutie or in feare of him or in hoppe of some great 
favoure we expect at his hands ... wheat the preparinge we made 
and have bene aboute ever sence your [Dallam's] cominge, [are] 
for the credite of our nation." (83) 
The Ottoman assessment of the English's motives was not altogether 
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wide of the mark, as Girolamo Capello, the Venetian Bailo remarked: 
"The English who know their advantage, will make great profit out 
of this, and will find a ready assent to all their demands." (84) 
However, the capital to be made out of a gift could be shortlived if 
handled badly; Lello spoke impertinently to a Vizier and was sharply 
rebuffed. Capello reported: 
"The bombast of the English is considerably reduced. Their ship 
sailed away two days ago and the Ambassador is left with very few 
people, and I suspect he will presently lay aside all his imaginary 
claims;if the Cheif Gardner did not support him he would fare 
ill." (85) 
The giving of gifts was an instrument of diplomacy, but because all 
supplicants at the Divan provided gifts as a matter of course, it was by no 
means the key to success at the Ottoman Court. 
It was asserted above that the Sultan's government was a hot-bed 
of corruption. Under the early Sultans, however, efficiency and sound 
judgment were the mark of the Ottoman administration. Decline had set 
in swiftly after the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent; although it was still 
possible for men of ability to achieve high office, the Ottoman Court 
became a place where factionalism, intrigue and the struggle for 
influence over the Sultan were rife. One of the main causes of this was 
the quality of theSultans themselves. Lello described Sultan Mehemet III 
as a man of: 
"no wisdome or capacitie ledd by the Empresse who hath no 
regard butt money, his Counsell nott of wisdome able to manage 
any thing for the good of the Empire and nott suffered or daringe 
doe anythinge without the Empresse consent ... " (86) 
The sons of the reigning Sultan were imprisoned in the Harem, in 
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an atmosphere of bribery extortion and petty political feuding, in order to 
prevent them building up bodies of support to enable them to attempt a 
coup against him. Any suspicion of such action carried the threat of 
death. When the Sultan died his eldest son would succeed and would 
execute his own brothers incase they became a focus of revolt. 
Therefore those in line for the throne were brought up under a constant 
threat of death in an atmosphere of boredom and claustrophobia Such 
conditions are unlikely to have been conducive to mental or moral 
strength. Furthermore, the Sultan came to the throne with no experience 
of warfare, administration or important political decision making. It is 
small wonder therefore that the Sultans in the period under discussion 
were heavily under the influence of their favourites, who usually included 
their mothers and other women of the Harem and the Eunuchs with 
whom they had been brought up. Needless to say these people had also 
spent all their adult lives in the palace and had no experience of the 
world beyond its walls. Lello summed up the problem thus: 
"The ould Empress is in greater favour than she ever was and is 
thought she once again will carry the cheiffest sway of this Empier 
and displace this noe P: [Pasha] and prefferr to the place Ebrahim 
Bassa her son-in-law such is the inconstancies of 105 [the Sultan] 
in all his accione for what he commandeth one day wth the 
counsel and advise of some is the next day revocated by the 
advise of others." (87) 
Due to the Sultans' failings an increasing burden fell on the Grand 
Viziers who became increasingly powerful in government. Once a man 
attained that office, the Sultan's entourage would forge new political 
alliances either with the new Vizier, in order to benefit from his patronage, 
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or with his rivals in order to seek his removal. The Viziers and all the 
others in office had to calculate the effects of policy on his chances of 
staying in power. (88) The Sultan's ministers and his favourites were in a 
position of tremendous power and influence, because they were 
guaranteed access to him. It was natural, therefore, for others to court 
their favour. A suit supported by one of these people had a good chance 
of success. 
Inflation was a major problem in the Ottoman Empire. Those hit 
hardest were people on fixed incomes such as government officials, who 
were thus likely to be tempted by bribes and greed began to pay an 
important role in some aspects of decision making. Corruption became 
commonplace and as the Sultans lacked the strength of character to 
stamp it out, those with a vested interest in the system would viciously 
intrigue against a Grand Vizier who wished to carry out reforms to end 
such practices. The depth of venality is well demonstrated by another of 
Lello's letters. He reported that the Sultan had commanded a vizier to be 
strangled, his usual command when the service of one of his officials 
displeased him: 
"but for money the old Empresse saveth all their lives, who upon 
this bad newes imputeth the same to the cheif viceyre who is by 
reporte to be deposed wth in two dayes and one of his son-in-
lawes thereto preferred." (89) 
The Sultana was clearly worth cultivating; thus, as Dallam 
reported, Lello sent Paul Pindar, who was then his secretary, to present 
privately to her a coach worth 600 pounds. (90) As Barton had reported: 
"matters of importance cannot be handled with these but with 
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excessive expense." (91) 
Barton had considered that the reason for the Ottomans' failure to enter 
into alliance with England was that the Spanish had out-bribed him with 
the Viziers to procure their efforts in dissuading the Sultan. (92) It is 
apparent that various interested parties in a particular negotiation would 
bribe the same officials, with the result that whoever gave the most 
money had the greatest chance of receiving a favourable outcome. In 
many important matters, delaying tactics would be employed in the hope 
of extorting as much money as possible. This appears to have been 
ultimately the case in Glover's suit on behalf of~tefan Bogdan. 
The servants of those with access to the Sultan set themselves up 
as channels of influence. John Sanderson gave an account of a grisly 
murder of a woman and her sons: 
"This was an act of the Spahies, in spite of the Great Turkes 
mother; for by the hands of this Jewe woman she took a" her 
bribes." (93) 
The most interesting account of the means through which 
negotiations could be successfully handled dates from a period outside 
that under discussion in this thesis; but there is little doubt that the 
process employed was similar. It concerns the lengths to which Sir 
Thomas Bendysh, who was ambassador at Constantinople between 
1647 and 1661, had to go to obtain the dismissal of his predecessor Sir 
Sackville Crow [1633-47] and his own acceptance as ambassador. 
Before Bendysh's arrival Crow had given the Grand Vizier a great 
present to secure his own reinvestment as ambassador; the Vizier 
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accepted his generosity but did not reinvest him; instead he had Crow 
placed under house arrest at the request of the English merchants, which 
cost them 40,000 pounds. 
On arrival Bendysh demanded audience with the Sultan. The 
Grand Vizier delayed matters by declaring that he should present to him 
his letters of credence and the letters cancelling Crow's commission. 
Bendysh was meanwhile informed by another source that the Vizier 
would try to affront him by refusing to carry out his investiture as 
ambassador, thus he sought the aid of the "Vizier's Jewe" to influence the 
Vizier in his favour. It would be reasonable to assume that money 
changed hands during this interview. The visit to the Vizier took place; 
however he declined to listen, merely suggesting a meeting between 
Crow and Bendysh; he then attempted to persuade Bendysh to part with 
Crow's letters of revocation. When he refused the Vizier employed a 
different tactic, informing Bendysh that he believed him to be the true 
ambassador but must hear Crow's side of the story too. Bendysh replied 
that since the Vizier believed him and had received a fine present from 
him, he should do him the honour of investing him. The Vizier said 
nothing and left. 
Bendysh later found out that the Vizier had been given five bags of 
money by the Venetians to hinder his investiture. The French 
Ambassador was also active on Crow's behalf; he was said to be: 
"commonly called Sir Sackville Crow's broker; this man swears 
and says anything Sir Sackville Crow would have him." 
8endysh eventually went to see Crow in the company of three of the 
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Vizier's officials; Crow was forced by them to read his letter of revocation. 
However when 8endysh attempted to gain audience with the Sultan, the 
Vizier attempted to delay him with placatory messages. 8endysh's next 
tactic was to send messages to various unspecified "great men" around 
Constantinople, saying that Crow and the French and Venetian 
Ambassadors were trying to deprive him of his rightful office even though 
Crow had been removed from office by the Sultan's hati-serif, in the hope 
that this would reach the Sultan's ears. He then wrote to the Vizier to ask 
for his assistance in gaining audience with the Sultan and threatening 
that if progress was not made he would return to England to report upon 
how he had been treated in Constantinople. The Vizier eventually 
agreed to 8endysh's investiture, which took place on October 10th 1647. 
The new ambassador then offered the Vizier a gratuity of 20,000 pounds 
to redress a number of grievances including the swift confirmation of the 
Capitulations, reassurances as to his own rights of precedence and the 
immediate deportation of Crow. Further delaying tactics were employed 
by the Vizier. Finally the merchants went back to the "Vizier's Jewe" who 
promised to see these things granted for the sum of 55,000 pounds. 
8endysh preferred not to become directly involved; he told the merchants 
that the matter should be a private transaction between themselves and 
the Jew, whilst he would appear to rely on gratuity with the Vizier. The 
bargain was concluded and within five days the "Vizier's Jewe" obtained 
a hati-serif as desired. (94) Little of substance could be achieved at the 
Divan without bribery. 
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Relations between the ambassadors and the Ottoman court were 
rarely concerned with anything other than official business Differences in 
religion and social life meant that closer associations occured on few 
occasions. Sometimes, however, it was possible to overcome mutual 
suspicions and establish friendships. Barton possessed about as much 
of the Ottomans' confidence as it was possible to win. John Sanderson 
pOinted out: 
"By meanes chieflie of the Turks mother ['s] favoure and some 
money he made and displaced both princes and patriarkes, 
befriended Viseroyes and prefferred the sutes of cadies (who ar 
thier chefe priests and spiritual justices). The Hoggie, a very 
comely, grave and wise Turke, who was Sultan Mahomets 
schoolemaster and I may say counsellor was a very true friend 
and an assister of Master Barton in all his business with the Grand 
Signior." (95) 
When, as previously mentioned, Henry Lello sent his secretary 
Paul Pindar to the Sultana with a present: 
"[she] did take greate Iykinge to Mr. Pinder, and afterwardes she 
sente for him to have his private companye" (96) 
Such instances appear to have been rare. Nevertheless it was possible, 
with careful handling, to establish a working relationship with even the 
most ill-disposed Ottoman official. One major problem was that a change 
of Vizier, which happened quite frequently, disrupted such a modus 
operandi and required establishment of relations with the new office-
holder. Thus Pindar, during his own embassy, lamented the execution of 
the Grand Vizier, Nassuf Pasha, even though he was: 
"a cruel, turbulent and most uniust man. [o~ ... uncivil and unfriendly 
deportment against all Imbrs [i.e. ambassadors],,: 
99 
although his successor had expressed goodwill towards him: 
"I have rather cause to be very sorry then glad of this sudden 
alteration." (97) 
We have seen that Harborne and Barton in particular were able to 
establish the embassy in a position of influence and inspire confidence in 
the Sultan and his senior officials as to their abilities and trustworthiness. 
The Ottomans also expressed goodwill towards Queen Elizabeth and a 
certain admiration for her. Yet they did not in any way regard Christian 
princes as equals. The normal attitude towards non-Moslems was one of 
extreme contempt and scorn. The Sultan's Christian subjects were very 
much second class citizens and foreign Christians were treated with 
sufferance. Even West-European men of status were popularly known as 
"hogs" and Pera, the quarter of the city in which foreign ambassadors 
lived, was referred to as the "pig-quarter". (98) The description of the 
elaborate ceremony involved during an audience with the Sultan is an 
indication of the ambassador's low status and illustrates the suspicion 
with which he was viewed. When Dallam had seen the Sultan receive his 
present, he found Lello and all his Company: 
"had stode all these tow houres expecting the Grand Sinyor's 
coming to another place whear he should deliver his Imbassage 
and letteres ... As he was speakinge unto me their cam towe brave 
Turkes ridinge to my Lord, biddinge him to take his place and 
staye a little." (99) 
He was probably introduced to the Sultan as "the naked and hungry 
barbarian" who "ventured to rub his brow upon the Sublime Porte." (100) 
Lello was further humiliated in 1601 when although he had brought a gift 
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with him, as was the usual custom, he was dismissed by the Viziers with 
only a couple of words and was not even permitted to sit down, which 
upset him greatly. (101) 
In 1599 the Venetian Bailo noted that Lelia was a man of little 
experience and less prudence; when he spoke to the Grand Vizier about 
certain claims he had, he was rebuffed in such a manner that he had to 
withdraw in confusion. (102) A year later he wrote: 
"The Capudan showed that he made little count of the [English] 
Ambassador and said at length that, as far as he could see, the 
Ambassador was good for anything else, except to be 
Ambassador at the Porte." (103) 
Attempts at humiliating ambassadors was something of a ritual which the 
Ottomans enjoyed at every possible opportunity; Lelia's problem was that 
he did not know how to react to this. He was neither stubborn, cunning 
nor forceful enough to inspire respect amongst the Sultan's senior 
officials, with only one of whom did he have good relations: the "Chief 
Gardner". (104) 
The esteem in which he was held had reached such a low ebb by 
1601, that he was not able to gain audience with the Sultan to present an 
important petition; he was reduced to waiting in the Sultan's garden in 
the hope of seeing him. When the latter caught sight of him, he enquired 
what it was he wanted. Lelia made signs that he wished to present a 
petition and the Sultan ordered a cord to be let down from the window of 
his kiosk. Lelia had to tie the petition to the cord. (105) Lelia was greatly 
ashamed of the indignity and he made no mention of it in his letters home 
to England; the Venetian found out about this incident from his own 
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sources. 
Lello was quiet and timid and seems to have had no 
understanding of how to deal with affronts to his dignity. John Kitely, in a 
letter to John Sanderson, gives a most unkind account of his diplomatic 
manner: 
"he satt uppon his horse with a ruddie [i.e. red with blushing] 
downe look, as though he had been streyning at a close stoole: 
and when he came before the Grand Signor, stoode with his 
hands handsomlie before him, like a modest midwife, andbegan a 
trembling speech in Inglish, as you knowe sounding like of a 
goose devided into semiquavers; which was so disgratiouse that, 
had it not bine for respect of Hir Majestie, he had bine deprived of 
all the Grand Signor his graces." (106) 
Sir Thomas Glover's rumbustious and flamboyant manner was 
more suited to commanding respect, but he tended to ruin the effect 
because he found it difficult to moderate his hot temper. Whilst he 
persisted with his efforts to obtain the Moldavian throne for 9tefan 
Bogdan he incurred the wrath of the Grand Vizier: on one occasion, both 
men became so heated that the Vizier threatened to send him in chains 
to England to be executed. (107) On another occasion Glover was 
refe rred to as: 
"that red boar of an English Ambassador." (108) 
Glover does not appear to have been much more popular with the 
Ottoman Divan than Henry Lello. 
Sir Thomas Bendysh triumphed in his dispute with Sir Sackville 
Crow because he was patient yet persistent; he argued his case with skill 
whilst maintaining his dignity and eventually he was prepared to call the 
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Vizier's bluff. Yet he also frequently suffered attempts to affront his dignity. 
On one occasion when, in order to insult him, the Vizier removed 
Bendysh's chair from the room in which they were to meet so that he 
would have to conduct his business standing, Sir Thomas ordered one of 
his gentlemen to kneel down and lean on his hands and then sat down 
upon him. At another audience, the French Ambassador was given 
precedence in seating positions, at which Bendysh took umbrage and 
pushed the French Ambassador from his chair to sit on it himself. On a 
third occasion during an argument between Sir Thomas and the Grand 
Vizier, Bendysh stood up and kicked the stool out from under the Vizier, 
saying that his Master Charles I was dishonoured by the Vizier's 
behaviour and would have reparation for the Vizier's affront. Surprisingly, 
such actions did not harm his reputation at all: 
"This resolute and gallant behaviour made him only the more 
considerable." (109) 
whereas Lello had been soundly rebuffed for impertinent behaviour. It 
seems that if arrogance and contempt were met with arrogance and an 
insistence on being treated in a fashion appropriate to his status, an 
ambassador would be accorded more respect than if he was meek and 
civil. Nevertheless, despite Lello's frequent humiliations at Ottoman 
hands his embassy does not seem to have been as unsuccessful as his 
enemies made out; the merchants at least appeared to have been 
satisfied with his performance and he remained English Ambassador for 
nearly 10 years. Furthermore, we shall see that Lello's cautious 
approach to conducting his embassy prevented him from being seriously 
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compromised by his support of §tefan Bogdan. 
Some brief attention should be paid to relations between the 
English Ambassador and his counterparts from other nations in 
Constantinople. Such relations are of lesser importance than those with 
the Ottomans for the purposes of this thesis. The English Ambassadors' 
main contacts were with the French and Venetian Ambassadors; like him 
they were permanent representatives and fulfilled a similar function. The 
King of Poland and the Habsburg Emperor frequently sent 
representatives to Constantinople for specific purposes, but they were 
not permanently resident during this period. They were occasionally held 
under house-arrest as hostages for the good behaviour of their masters. 
Opportunities for co-operation on matters of mutual interest between the 
English Embassy and the Polish and Imperial representatives occurred 
infrequently for they had few areas of interest in common; likewise they 
had few issues on which their interests were in direct competition, so the 
occasion for rivalry and ill-feeling were also infrequent. Nevertheless the 
English Ambassadors were assiduous in paying courtesy visits and 
maintaining cordial relations in order to collect information on the state of 
Turko-Polish relations. The Ottomans appear to have looked upon such 
proceedings as a form of conspiracy and did their utmost to discourage 
them; they occasionally forbade such meetings to take place. (110) 
Edward Barton built up good relations with the Polish Chancellor Jan 
Zamoyski during the 1590's in order to oppose the extension of 
Habsburg interest in Eastern Europe; during this period, diplomatic 
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contact became a matter of some importance to England and Poland. 
Polish interests came into direct conflict with English activities when 
England began supporting Stefan Bogdan; the Poles were particularly 
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industrious in working against the English Embassy and Bogdan, for if 
Bogdan replaced Poland's client, leremie Movila, upon the Moldavian 
throne, Poland would lose much of its influence in Moldavia. Matters 
became extremely heated and Sir Thomas Glover and a Polish 
ambassador almost came to blows. Eventually the King of England 
intervened and recalled Glover. 
The English Crown's representative in the Ottoman capital had a 
difficult task to perform. He was cut off from his home in an environment 
in which he faced occasional danger, frequent harassment and attempts 
at humiliation and almost constant frustration and procrastination. Yet the 
ambassadors' letters to England are circumspect concerning the 
frustrations and delays, only in moments of great annoyance did they 
expound on these matters. It will become evident later that the 
government in London had little understanding of the difficulties with 
which the Ambassadors had to contend. Edward Barton had supported 
pretenders with such apparent ease that it was natural that other 
pretenders should turn to the embassy as a safer, more reliable and less 
mendacious source of patronage. The English Crown showed itself 
similarly amenable to such activities and expected Lello and Glover to 
achieve the same quick success. Yet the latter two never commanded the 
amount of influence that Barton had; when they failed to obtain the throne 
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of Moldavia for 9tefan Bogdan, they were suspected of misconduct and 
had to answer serious charges made against them. 
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CHAPTER III: BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF FOUR 
AMBASSADORS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 1588 
and 1620 
In this chapter I intend to present an account of the origins and 
careers of four ambassadors to Constantinople: Edward Barton [1588-
97]; Henry Lello [1597-1607]; Sir Thomas Glover [1606-11] and Paul 
Pindar [1611-20] in order to enlarge upon one of the themes of the 
previous chapter: the status of the English Embassy. Therefore 
considerable attention will be given to the methods by which the 
individuals concerned obtained appointment as ambassador, the intrigue 
and rivalry involved and the influence of the English Crown in the 
process. I shall show that all four men were extremely ambitious and that 
appointment to the ambassadorship was the pinnacle of a career of 
service to the Levant Company abroad and a possible springboard to 
further advancement in England; if made use of properly it was also a 
position from which great wealth could be accrued. Most of the 
ambassadors' time was spent in ensuring the observance of the 
Capitulations and protecting the lives and property of those they 
represented, which has little importance for this thesis, therefore 
accounts of the ambassadors' main preoccupations will be given only 
briefly unless they serve to enlarge upon questions of relative success or 
failure in their duties or of the difficulties they faced in carrying out their 
duties. 
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Some attention has already been given to the illustrious career of 
Edward Barton: he became in effect a yardstick by which the careers of 
Lello and Glover came to be measured by their contemporaries to their 
disadvantage. Barton was born around 1562, probably the second son of 
Edward Barton of Wenby in Yorkshire, of whom nothing is known (1); 
Edward Barton senior may have had some connection with the Baltic 
trade in which Edward Osborne and Richard Staper had been involved, 
alternatively he may have been a member of the same City Livery 
Company as either Osborne or Staper, for the young Edward was 
appointed as secretary to William Harborne in 1583 at the age of 21, 
despite having had little education. Fynes Moryson described him thus: 
"He was no more learned then the Grammer Schoole and his 
private studyes in Turkye could make him, but he had good skill in 
languages, especially that of the Turkes." (2) 
The languages he knew included Turkish, Latin, Greek and 
probably Italian and French. In order to begin the process of establishing 
a Levant trade, the Company preferred men of experience in trade to act 
as ambassador, to men of learning: with the possible exception of Henry 
Lello the first five ambassadors were not men who had been educated as 
"gentlemen", Edward Barton probably accompanied Harborne to 
Constantinople in 1583; he never returned to England again. In 1584, in 
order to extend the English Embassy's direct contacts with rulers, 
Harborne sent him to the Barbary States to register the English 
merchants' Capitulations with the Viziers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, 
where English seamen faced great danger of capture by the Sultan's 
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subjects in acts of piracy. Assurance was sought that English ships would 
be allowed to pass freely and be allowed to defend themselves if 
attacked: 
"To the end that our ships might not come in danger of breach of 
league, if they should shoote at the gallies of those of Algier, Tunis 
and Tripolis in the West." 
Barton had further business with the "Romasan" 8ey/erbey of Algiers 
concerning the freeing of slaves. (3) He was also sent to Tripoli to 
procure the release, on Sultan Murat Ill's commission, of one Thomas 
Sanders and others who had been captured by pirates on a ship called 
"The Jesus", Sanders writes thus of the meeting with Barton: 
"all our Company that were in Tripolis came that night for joy to 
Master Barton and other commissioners to see them. Then Master 
Barton said unto us, welcome my good countrymen, and lovingly 
intertained us, and at our departure from him, he gave us two 
shillings, and said serve God, for tomorrow I hope you shall be as 
free as ever you were." (4) 
Barton was treated with respect by the Governor of Tripoli, although as a 
mere secretary he did not entertain him personally: 
"The King arose and went to dinner, and commanded a Jew to go 
with master Barton and other commissioners to show them their 
lodging which was a house provided and appointed by the said 
King. and because I [Sanders] had the Italian and Spanish 
tongues, by which their most traffique in that countrey is, Master 
Barton made me his Cater to buy his victuals for him and his 
Company, and delivered me money needful for the same." (5) 
Edward Barton was extremely competent as Secretary to the Embassy; in 
the extract above he comes across as fully aware of the dignity of his 
pOSition but also as a considerate and generous man capable of 
inspiring respect, affection and admiration in others. When William 
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Harborne departed for England in August 1588 he was confident to leave 
Barton behind as agent to look after the Queen's and the Company's 
interests, despite his youth. 
Fynes Moryson, who stayed at Barton's house was most 
impressed with Barton: 
"He was courteous and affable, of good stature, corpulent, fair 
complexion and a cheerful countenance, which last made him 
acceptable to the Turkes, as likewise his person (for they love not 
a sadd countenance and much regard a comely person) ... he was 
man of good life and constant in, the profession of the reformed 
religion ... " (6) 
As noted in Chapter II, life for the English in Constantinople was limited 
mainly to the society of a small group of bachelors. Alfred Wood 
described the social life of the English community in his book on the 
Levant Company: 
"They were magnificent in their clothing, houses, furniture, horses 
and equipage; their tables were laden abundantly; they kept a 
large staff of domestics; and they gave lavish entertainments, 
which were generally prolonged until the comunalty was drowned 
with the good liquor provided ... At Constantinople the 'Jolly Cup' 
commonly closed the evening, either in the merchants houses or 
the cabarets of Galata where the Franks [West Europeans] 
enjoyed a kind of liberty found scarcely anywhere else in the 
Ottoman Empire ... the majority of factors remained single and 
placed a very liberal interpretation upon the liberty they might 
enjoy in that condition ... looser connections that the marriage bond 
were frequent ... " (7) 
It is estimated that there were over 200 cabarets in Galata, in which the 
low-life of Constantinople were said to gather. John Sanderson, who 
knew Barton well, described the effect that a long period spent in 
Constantinople had on him: 
"I sawe a great alteration;from serving God devoutly, and drinking 
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only puer water, nowe to badnes stoutly and much wine (the witts 
hater). Ther to live I perceaved great temtation." (8) 
There were also allegations made during a court case of 1594, that 
Barton had been less than honest in his dealings with Aron Voda. 
Sanderson was strongly disapproving of the bawdy atmosphere of 
Barton's household, alleging that Barton had built an enclosure "for the 
conveyance of whores" and that at one time there were seventeen such 
women in the house: 
"but the ambassiator caused all to depart except his owne, wit 
who me and alcami [alchemy] he wasted his allowance. But what 
availed my counsell? Prid [e] and selfewill was to rife in all." (9) 
It was also reported that Barton was forced to move his quarters 
from a Moslem area to the Christian Quarter of Pera, because the 
activities of his household were considered offensive to Moslems. 
Sanderson's description may have been something of an exaggeration, 
since he was not a man given to moderating his feelings and although he 
and Barton were friends they had a somewhat stormy relationship: 
Barton once punched Sanderson in the face and locked him in a room 
after the latter had attacked another man in his presence; furthermore 
Barton owed Sanderson a lot of money. It is possible that the question of 
offence to Moslems was a useful excuse to have the Embassy moved to 
an area where it could be kept under surveillance easily. However, both 
Sanderson and Barton seem to have respected each other and it is 
unlikely that the above account of the ambassador's domestic 
arrangements is a complete fabrication. The normal duties of the 
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ambassador on be half of the Company must have become tedious to a 
man of great intelligence after a long period in office and it is probable 
that Barton cultivated a taste for extravagant living in order to relieve the 
boredom. The need to relieve boredom was probably another motive for 
Barton to involve himself in political activity in Constantinople. 
He secured the friendship of a number of the highest ranking and 
most influential officials of the Ottoman state, including the Grand Viziers 
Ferhad Pasha and Sinan Pasha, the Mufti Mehemed Bostanzade and 
Cigala, the Kapudan of the Ottoman Navy (Yusuf Sinan Pasha 
Cigalazade, a renegade Venetian). Furthermore, his involvement as a 
mediator during 1589-90 when negotiations to settle the Empire's 
differences with the Kingdom of Poland took place attracted the good 
opinion of Sultan Murat III who held him in great favour; Barton also 
enjoyed the great favour of Murat's successor Mehemet III [1595-1603]. 
His understanding of the complexities of Ottoman politics and his 
sympathetic attitude towards the state in which he had carved out an 
important role for himself ensured that he became a trusted source of 
advice for the Sultan. 
Although he does not seem to have been raised to the rank of 
Ambassador until 1592, Barton wanted to be seen as an important 
diplomatic representative of his sovereign, a major influence in the 
political affairs of Eastern Europe; in doing so he distanced himself from 
his other role as protector of the English merchants. He established good 
relations with the Polish Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, who was intent upon 
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keeping Poland outside the Habsburg-sponsored coalition against the 
Ottoman Empire, and used his influence with the Sultan's ministers to 
persuade them to adopt a moderate policy towards Poland. Barton 
perceived that the anti-Ottoman alliance put England's commercial 
interests in the Mediterranean at risk from Spanish advances into the 
area; Spain was a member of the Habsburg coalition and England's rival 
as we saw in Chapter II, and extensive efforts were made by England to 
secure Ottoman co-operation against the Spanish fleet. Barton, therefore, 
hoped to secure a maintenance of the status quo in South-East Europe 
by preventing the Habsburg coalition from holding the balance of power 
in the area. In 1591 he seems to have offered some support to 
Sigismund Bathory's campaign to gain the Polish throne if it became 
vacant, in opposition to a Habsburg. candidate. In 1591 Barton also tried 
to persuade Sultan Murat to take up arms against the Habsburg's, to "set 
the infidel against idolators", but was forced to reverse his policy and 
argue for peace, upon the orders of Queen Elizabeth I. 
It was a great honour for Barton to be ordered by Mehemet III to 
accompany the Ottoman army into Hungary in 1596 in case he could be 
of use as a mediator in any negotiations which might become necessary. 
It demonstrates the trust in which Barton was held because, as it was 
thought, nothing like this had occurred before. There could have been 
repercussions for England's reputation and commerce if Barton had 
refused: it was argued in his defence that a refusal could have been 
interpreted as a calculated insult, although in actual fact the French 
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Ambassador refused a similar invitation. In truth Barton wanted to go on 
this expedition and believed that it would be to the embassy's advantage 
if he did so. Barton's expedition incurred considerable displeasure in 
England, in particular from Queen Elizabeth: it greatly offended her that 
her Ambassador was accompanying the Infidel into battle against 
Christian armies bearing England's colours on his tent; the French 
Ambassador in Constantinople made use of the climate of opinion 
(against Barton amongst Christians) by spreading rumours, which were 
widely believed, that Barton was bearing arms. This was probably not 
true; furthermore, he and Thomas Glover, who wrote an account of 
Barton's expedition, protested strongly that the English Ambassador's 
presence might make it possible to procure peace between the Ottomans 
and Hungary. Glover also insisted that Barton successfully obtained the 
release of captive Christians to prevent them being sold into slavery. He 
obtained the release from captivity of 23 members of a former Imperial 
Embassy, imprisoned since 1593 and sent his Dragoman, another 
member of the Brutti family, to Prague to offer his services as 
mediator. (10) 
Suspicions as to Barton's loyalty were rife because it was felt that 
he was becoming too closely associated with the Ottoman Court, it was 
even considered that there was something un-English about him. Fynes 
Moryson perceived Barton's long absence from England, and the English 
government's ignorance of the reality of life in the Ottoman Empire, as 
militating towards frequent misconstructions being placed upon Barton's 
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activities : 
"howsoever Mr. Barton had strong parts of nature and knew well 
how to manage great affairs in the Turkes Court; yet he coming 
yong to serve our first Ambassador there and being left to succeed 
him, could not know the English Court, nor the best wayes there to 
make good his actions." (11) 
He also excited the resentment of the merchants in Constantinople who 
felt that he was not sympathetic to their interests and was blind to the 
effects his activities might have on their commerce; they considered that 
his diplomacy constituted meddling in State activities and that if he made 
a mistake which harmed the Ottoman cause retribution would be taken 
out on them resulting in the confiscation of their goods. (12) They 
depended upon the goodwill of the Sultan to ensure that their privileges 
were upheld. 
The merchants' fears appeared to have been justified when 
Barton's proteges, Aron Voda and Michael the Brave, (Mihai Viteazul) 
rebelled against the Sultan, refusing to pay tribute and acting in the 
interests of the anti-Ottoman alliance; however the Sultan did not blame 
the English Ambassador for the behaviour of these princes and even 
made use of his influence with them in unsuccessful efforts to negotiate 
their return to obedience. Barton also managed to secure the 
appointment of one Meletius as Patriarch of Constantinople. Meletius, 
formerly Patriarch of Alexandria, had been a frequent visitor to Barton's 
house: 
"This holy Patriarcke Padre Melete was a very comely blacke 
longe-beared man ... This man was very meeke in the shewe of his 
behaviour towards all sorts and manner of men ... Yet he inspired 
and got by Master Barton's meanes and money to be Patriarcke of 
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Constantinople." (13) 
After Barton's death Meletius left the Patriarchate: there are several 
contemporary versions of the circumstances of his departure. John 
Sanderson asserted that he had become tired of the continual financial 
exactions of the Ottoman authorities whereas William Biddulph wrote that 
Meletius' enemies were able to force him from office once he lost his 
powerful patron. As an important contact with the Ottoman government 
and as Meletius' creditor, Barton was in such an enormously influential 
position close to the Patriarch that he was probably greatly resented by 
members of the Orthodox Church hierarchy, who must have baulked at 
the prospect of a heretic having influence over the head of their Church, 
particularly if Barton was perceived as interfering in Church matters. 
Biddulph wrote that: 
"being a man of knowledge ... he laboured to reforme the Greekes 
of many of their superstitious customes ... whereupon ... [after 
Barton's death] they said their Patriarch was an Englishman, and 
no Greeke and therefore ... diesplaced him. Yet bearing some 
reverence towards him for his learning they made him again 
Patriarch of Alexandria ... " (14) 
If Biddulph, a clergyman employed by the Levant Company and a man 
close to the ambassador, interpreted Barton's interest as an attempt to 
influence the Patriarch on matters of doctrine, it is understandable that 
the Greek church hierarchy placed an even less favourable interpretation 
upon the ambassador's discussions with the Patriarch. Barton's influence 
with the Ottoman Divan enabled him to protect Meletius from excessive 
financial demands from the Ottoman authorities and from his enemies 
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within his own church; it is likely that he was forced out of office once 
Barton's death had removed a major source of influence and finance. 
Barton greatly enjoyed the sense of power and importance 
brought by the opportunities to use his favoured position with the Sultan 
to patronise others. He had a taste for power politics and intrigue and 
revelled in his role as maker of Princes and Patriarchs and peace 
negotiator between the major powers of Eastern Europe: he was 
immensely proud of his accomplishments as a diplomat. However, other 
Englishmen did not view his activities in the same way. Edward Barton's 
unusually good relationship with the Ottomans and his efforts to maintain 
peace between them and their neighbours was often misinterpreted as a 
desire to subvert the efforts of Christendom to defeat the Islamic threat on 
its borders. Fynes Moryson argued: 
"they did him great wrong, who did attribute his greatnes in the 
Turkish Court, to his betrauing the Counsells of Popish Christian 
Princes, especially such as were enemies to the State of 
England ... he protested to abhor from furthering the Turkes 
designes against any the greatest enemy of his profession and 
Country, further then to divert them for the tyme from some 
malicious attempt." (15) 
Barton's success is particularly striking in that from the time of 
William Harborne's departure in 1588 until 1591 or 1592 he had not 
formally received his commission as Ambassador, merely holding the title 
of Agent: this did not impede his proceedings with the Ottoman 
government, he had a reputation built up during his time as Harborne's 
secretary and the useful contacts established, and his knowledge of 
Ottoman Turkish and the Ottoman modus operandi to assist him and he 
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quickly inherited the favour which Harborne had previously enjoyed: 
"I thinck no Christian ever had greater power with any Emperor of 
Turkye or the offices of his state and Court then he had in his 
tyme." (16) 
Richard Wrag recounted how, on the occasion of the delivery of Queen 
Elizabeth's present to Sultan Murat in 1593, Barton was able to obtain 
redress for an insult accorded him by the Grand Vizier by threatening to 
withhold delivery of the gift: 
''to no small admiration of all Christians that heard of it, especially 
of the French and Venetian ambassadors, who never in the like 
case against the second person of the Turkish Empire durst have 
attempted so bold an enterprise with hope of so friendly audience 
and with so speedie redresse." (17) 
Barton's political activities inevitably cost him money because he 
invested his own funds to support his proteges aspiring to high office, on 
the understanding that he would be reimbursed once they achieved 
office; frequently he was not. He was constantly short of money, 
complaining that he received a smaller salary than the other Christian 
ambassadors in Constantinople. Matters were made worse by the fact 
that the merchants were frequently tardy in paying his allowance. In 1596 
he was paid 1,500 gold ducats by the Company every half year, 1,100 Ii 
(pounds) by the Queen of England and 1,000 Ii by the Sultan, although 
this last was paid in kind: wood, mutton, beef, hay, oats and such 
provisions; great difficulty and expense had to be undergone to procure 
the Sultan's allowance. Barton was noted as being in debt to the 
Company to the tune of 4,000 Ii and had to borrow 5,000 crowns from 
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John Sanderson to pay for his journey with the Sultan's army into 
Hungary in 1596. The Secretary of State, Lord Burghley, was persuaded 
to conduct an enquiry as to: 
"What entertainment has been made to Mr. Barton in certainty, and 
whether he has been allowed the 4 per cent promised [probably 
referring to the Consulage]; what allowance he had from the 
beginning of his service; when he has had any and what it was for, 
as he complains of great want and unkind answers and that 
Collins and Salter the Consul and vice-consul at Tripoli deny him 
relief." (18) 
Barton's financial problems were compounded by his decision to 
stand surety for Aron Voda when he became Prince of Moldavia. Aron 
did not pay his debts and Barton was later sued by one Charles Elman to 
the tune of 25,000 crowns. At his death, after the sale of his property to 
pay his debts and funeral expenses, Barton was described as "not 
wourth one asper" (19). He seems to have been motivated primarily by 
the desire for power and influence rather than the pursuit of great wealth. 
Money seems to have been a means to carry on the business he 
enjoyed, not an end in itself. He died aged around 34 years old in the 
latter part of December 1597. The Dictionary of National Biography 
states that he died on the island of Halki where he was seeking refuge 
from the plague, having succumbed to the disease there. However, a 
letter in the Travels of John Sanderson shows that in fact he died of 
dysentery in Constantinople and was buried at Halki: 
"honourably, having about 300 persons accompanying his corpes 
to the waterside and so retourned for he was buryed at the 
monastery 20 miles of." (20) 
He left a sister, Mrs Mary Lough, and a kinsman, Robert Barton. 
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Sanderson described a visit to his tomb: 
"[he] Iyeth interned (according to his always desire) under an olive 
Tree, before the entrance into the Monasterie ... a stone of white 
marble is layed upon him. Letters thereon engraven of his title and 
Decease." (21) 
Barton's early death was a great loss to the Embassy: the 
merchants were less lucky in his successors. If he had lived he would 
probably have remained Ambassador for many years. Barton's 
successful support of pretenders to the thrones of Moldavia and 
Wallachia had a significant impact upon events in the principalities, as 
we shall see in Chapter IV. Furthermore, other pretenders saw the 
wisdom of going to England for support rather than to Venice or France. 
Out of the four ambassador under consideration, Henry Lello is the 
one about whom there is least information: apart from the English and 
Venetian State Papers, the major source of information about him is John 
Sanderson's correspondence which is, to say the least, a hostile source. 
Furthermore, I have been unable to discover where he was born or 
where he died and information as to his activities before and after his 
tenure of the Constantinople Embassy is somewhat scarce. 
Amongst the names of the men to whom the Levant Company 
Charter was granted is that of one Henry Lello, an associate of William 
Harborne. (22) This Henry Lello was probably the Ambassador's father, 
since to be admitted to the fledgling Company a man would have needed 
substantial capital to invest, commercial experience and prominent 
membership of one of the major City of London Livery Companies whose 
members were active in the overseas trading Companies such as the 
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Muscovy Company. According to the work of T. K. Rabb, our Henry Lello 
became a member of the Levant Company in 1600, four years after he 
first went to Constantinople as Barton's secretary. (23) As a boy he 
received a gentleman's education at Oxford University, although there is 
no record of his matriculation; he then attended the Inns of Court in 
London; later in 1603, whilst he was Ambassador at Constantinople, he 
was admitted to the Fellowship of Gray's Inn. (24) One can only 
speculate as to how he was employed between finishing his education 
and becoming Barton's secretary in 1596. He probably had some 
connection with trade in Italy because he had a fluent knowledge of 
Italian.(25) 
When Edward Barton asked for: 
"som sufficient man to be his secretary ... [they] ... findinge a man 
meet for the same .. [had] ... compounded with him to come thether 
for his Honour's service." (26) 
The young Henry Lello probably used his father's influence to obtain the 
appointment as secretary, it is also probable that he had some 
connection with the English Court for he was acquainted with Sir Robert 
Cecil the Secretary of State. Acquiring the appointment was something of 
a career move: working to assist the ambassador in his official duties 
would bring experience in the functioning of the Ottoman government 
and the operation of diplomacy, as well as a chance to learn Ottoman 
Turkish: such experience would be invaluable for a subsequent 
application to fill the ambassador's job when it became vacant. It is worth 
noting here that all of the ambassadors under discussion here had 
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previously been secretary to the Embassy. In the early years something 
of an informal career path appears to have been established and for all 
the initial lack of financial renumeration the sercretary's job was worth 
having. The following extract concerns the Venetian Ambassador to 
England's conversation with Paul Pindar's newly appointed secretary 
who was on the point of leaving for Constantinople: 
"He is going with the full intention of succeeding to the post, 
otherwise he would not have left the Prince's service." (27) 
Lello was unfortunate in that he had little time to acquire 
experience as secretary before the sudden death of Edward Barton. 
Being an ambitious man he welcomed his subsequent appointment as 
Ambassador, indeed he probably petitioned for it: in Chapter" we saw 
that he obtained the position through the favour of Cecil, the Secretary of 
state. Lelia's short occupation of the office of secretary had apparently 
not been particularly impressive: on hearing of Barton's death, Elizeus 
Sothven at Aleppo lamented to John Sanderson: 
"So for this wee have in truth great cause to be hartely sorrey; and 
more for that in that place is nowe none of our nation capable to 
supply his ro[o]m. I wishe it had not bee your happ to have come 
awaye before this chance had happened; for now ther is none fitt 
in any sort to performe the place; being Harry Lyllow, for want of a 
better ... [is] ... faine to supply." (28) 
Lello experienced enormous difficulties in attempting to establish 
his authority and gaining some measure of respect; his acknowledged 
lack of experience made this task all the harder and he does not seem to 
have been able to overcome his initial problems. His dislike of the 
Ottomans is occasionally evident in his correspondence and his 
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prejudices prevented him gaining a proper understanding of the society 
in which he had to work. His approaches to the Ottoman authorities were 
rarely judged correctly: according to his critics, he was humble when he 
should have been haughty and impertinent when tact was needed (29) 
and lost patience easily. Some of his prejudices may have originated in 
his great piety; all the ambassadors carried on some sort of religious 
observance but it is particularly striking in the accounts of Henry Lello 
that he was regarded as a very religious man and seems to have made a 
virtue out of appearing virtuous. This is not to say that he was anything 
other than sincere in his religion but his somewhat ostentatious piety 
seems to have been thoroughly irritating to some of his colleagues 
although others altogether approved. For example, Thomas Dallam 
mentioned proudly that: 
"My Lord would not suffer he to go to worke, because it was our 
Sabothe day." (30) 
William Biddulph, preacher for the factory at Aleppo wrote that Lello in 
many ways exceeded Barton's greatness: 
"especially in his religious carriage and unspotted life; and had no 
the times been more troublesome in his Regiment, than in the 
times of his predecessor Master Barton; he would everyway have 
gone beyond him. He first of all reformed his familie, and 
afterwards so ordered himself in his whole carriage that he 
credited our Countrey." (31) 
From the opposite point of view John Kitely, the Embassy 
physician who despised Lello, lampooned Biddulph's eulogy, drawing 
attention to his alleged misdeeds as ambassador: 
lIa worthie drugge in virtue (as Theophilus [William Biddulph] 
sayeth) ... he reformed his house (you know) to his great profite; he 
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was an instrumtental cause that manswooled the Bishoppe of 
Salonique ... enstalled Prince Yancolo in the stockes, was beaten 
by Brevis; and the Mary Rose was burnt in his regiment." (32) 
It is difficult to say what was meant by reforming his house; it is possible 
that the reference was to the Embassy household: he is hardly likely to 
have approved of the licentious lifestyle enjoyed by his predecessor. He 
also voiced his disgust at his successor, Sir Thomas Glover's sexual 
appetites; Lello's statements were used by Glover's enemies in England 
to undermine him in the Company's estimation. (33) 
Lello's religious zeal was to cause trouble amongst his fellow 
ambassadors: firstly through his request to convert a building in Pera to 
exclusive Anglican worship and subsequently by an ill-judged 
conversation with a Pasha, which ended in Lello slandering the King of 
France as a traitor and a Papist. The latter incident was smoothed over 
by Lello's secretary, Paul Pindar, and the offending remarks were blamed 
on mistranslation by Lello's unfortunate Dragoman. (34) The plan to 
establish an Anglican centre of worship was a genuine attempt to curb 
the licence of the English factors in Constantinople. A similar project had 
already been attempted by Edward Barton but it would appear that 
Lello's mode of putting his plan into operation upset his colleagues who 
accused him of trying to gain special treatment for the English. Lello 
wanted to raise the status of the Anglican religion in Constantinople, 
particularly because the other IIFranks", the Greeks and the Turks 
referred to the English as Lutherans and lIinfidels", saying that they did 
not believe in Christ. Lello insisted that he wished to educate these 
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people as to the true nature of the Anglican rite. The Venetian 
Ambassador, Girolamo Capello, considered the relations of the 
various religions in Constantinople a matter so delicate and sensitive 
that to meddle with it might produce the gravest (unspecified) 
consequences. (35) Lello seems to have been extremely short-sighted 
towards those of a different religious persuasion and distaste for Islamic 
customs and the corruption of the Ottoman bureaucracy compounded his 
inability to comprehend the Ottoman mentality. 
However, he was not a hypocrite, nor was he harsh or cruel. 
Thomas Dallam wrote warmly of Lello's kindness and friendliness and 
much is made of his meek deportment, even by his enemies; some of his 
letters to the Secretary of State are humble to the point of 
obsequiousness. There is no consensus as to his character in the 
available source material: to those who liked him he was a kind, wise 
and religious gentleman; to those who disliked him he comes across as a 
smug and narrow-minded fool; to the Ottomans he was a "hogge", worse 
than a "knave", a madman and an "insufficient swine", incapable of any 
reason. (36) However, despite the contempt of the Sultan's officials and 
the slanders of his enemies, Lello's Embassy was not the picture of 
incompetence that the hostile sources make out. Orhan Burian has 
published an account of Lello's Embassy which shows that he was quite 
successful as Ambassador, the merchants' trade did not suffer under his 
care, on the contrary in the Capitulations issued to English merchants 
England's status as most favoured nation was confirmed; furthermore,.as 
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we shall see, although Lello failed to gain the Moldavian throne for 
9tefan Bogdan as he was ordered to do, he managed to avoid becoming 
embroiled in the pretender's intrigues, something which his successor 
failed to do. (37) If Lello's Embassy had been a failure he would have 
been recalled long before completing ten years in the post, regardless of 
the expense of providing a replacement. 
The main problems of Lello's Embassy were as follows: the 
dispute with France about jurisdiction over the Merchants-forestiers, 
mentioned in Chapter II; the perennial problem of English piracy in the 
East Mediterranean, which Lello could hardly have been expected to 
solve himself and which was to pose similar problems for his successors; 
the imprisonment by the Ottomans of Sir Thomas Sherley (38); and his 
promotion of 9tefan Bogdan, which resulted in the latter's imprisonment 
by the Ottomans whilst under his protection. Lello was accused by those 
who hoped to remove him from office of deliberately betraying Bogdan. 
When Lello returned to England, he did so in some disgrace to face 
charges which included allegations that he had ill-treated a man 
recommended to his protection by the Queen of England. 
Chief amongst those working against Lello were Thomas Glover, 
John Sanderson and John Kitely. Glover, who had been Lello's secretary 
between 1600 and 1604, wanted to ascend the 'career-ladder' to 
become ambassador. He spent two years in London, working for his own 
advancement and undermining Lello's reputation with the Levant 
Company, by bringing Lello's alleged incompetence to the notice of its 
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leading members, and with the Crown by highlighting dissatisfaction over 
Lello's efforts to gain the Moldavian throne for §tefan Bogdan, hinting at 
betrayal. John Sanderson had initially been opposed to Lello's 
appointment as Ambassador because he had considered himself better 
qualified for the appointment, nevertheless when he returned to 
Constantinople in 1600 he had given Lello his full support. At the same 
time he had also offered Thomas Glover his patronage and began 
working against Lello on Glover's behalf after once again falling out with 
the ambassador, initially over lack of recompense for a horse of his which 
he alleged Lello had deliberately "run to death", and after that for being a 
major party in a dispute in which Sanderson was involved with Mary 
Lough, the administratrix of Edward Barton's will. (39) John Kitely's 
motive for siding against Lello appears to have been based entirely upon 
personal antipathy. The campaign against Lello's reputation did not end 
when he was replaced by Glover, indeed it became even more vicious 
after his return to England. Glover even tried to enlist the aid of Thomas 
Sherley in the campaign against Lello; in a letter written in August 1607 
he hinted that Sherley ought to spread damning stories about Lello in 
London that Lello was a fraudulent and deceitful hypocrite who, under 
the pretence of puritanism and godliness, sought all means possible to 
damage others and defraud them of their goods. 
At Glover's arrival in Constantinople, he and Lello embarked upon 
a dispute which began as a petty squabble based upon individual pride 
but swiftly escalated into a serious public quarrel. Lello had been piqued 
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to learn that he was being replaced by his "sometyme old servant" (40); 
his attitude seems entirely understandable if he was aware that Glover 
had been plotting against him; certainly the latter's subsequent treatment 
of him left a lot to be desired. Lello received a most impertinent letter from 
his appointed successor asking him to vacate the Ambassador's 
residence immediately and find alternative accommodation. The terms in 
which Glover couched his request were an affront to Lello's dignity 
because it was implied that the latter no longer had any status. Lello had 
a further grievance with the Levant Company merchants who were 
reluctant to finance his journey home: he appealed for help to Sir Robert 
Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury. A less arrogant person than Glover would 
have handled Lello with patience and due respect to his former position, 
thereby avoiding a damaging quarrel. 
The animosity between the two men was of long standing: Glover 
remarked that there were many in England who did not believe that he 
and Lello were capable of coming to an amicable agreement; he 
subsequently complained about his: 
"ould and inveterate enemy breaking out into open malice." (41) 
Lello was so consumed with his sense of grievance that he allowed his 
hatred of Glover to get the better of common sense or professional duty to 
avoid holding the English Embassy up to ridicule. He delayed his 
departure to England upon the pretext of lack of money. The French 
Ambassador, spying an opportunity to damage the reputation of the 
English Embassy, publicly supported Lello, who reciprocated. Lello 
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visited the French Embassy frequently and, according to Glover, failed to 
pay courtesy visits to the English Embassy or do anything to help his 
successor's proceedings. (40) He also allowed himself to become the 
centre of a group of Englishmen who had fallen out with Glover, notably 
Hugh Holland, whom Glover had unilaterally denounced as a "notorious 
papist" and William Strachey, Glover's secretary, who had incurred the 
disapproval of his master. Lello continued to write letters to the Secretary 
of State, as if he were still Ambassador, containing copious abuse of 
Glover. Friends warned Glover: 
"Master Leillo hath not of late used you [Glover] very kindly. The most ill of 
his late writing is little credett to himselfe, for he hath manifested his 
malitiouse hart." 
Eventually the Earl of Salisbury was forced to intervene: he wrote sternly 
to both men after receiving news of Glover's assertion that Lello was 
plotting to murder him and that he was a traitor to King James. (41) 
Particularly serious in Salisbury's eyes was Lello's association with the 
French Ambassador which was rumoured to be undermining Glover's 
efforts to obtai n the patronage of the Merchants- fo res tiers. Lello was also 
alleged to have said publicly that Glover had no authority from England 
to act on this matter. Salisbury warned Lello to leave Constantinople as 
soon as possible and advised him that not only was he expected to give 
an accou nt of his treatment of 9tefan Bogdan but he would have to 
answer charges of bringing the Embassy into disrepute: 
"Yf Lillo have wrought of envy (as you writt) to crosse your 
proceedings, he will never be able to answer it, but your Lordship 
being very well assured thereof, spare not to writt it again and 
againe as of his former dealing with Yancoline." (42) 
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By the time this letter was written Lello had already left Constantinople, 
presumably because Glover had made arrangements with the English 
merchants to give the former Ambassador the money he needed to 
repay. Nevertheless the quarrel with Glover was resumed upon his 
arrival in England where John Sanderson acted as Glover's informant 
and adviser. He suggested that Glover write frequently to Salisbury 
concerning Lello, but that he should concentrate on defending his own 
"fame and effectual proceedings" in order not to appear malicious. 
Sanderson was concerned that Glover's enemies in England would 
support Lello and slander him to the Secretary of State and the Levant 
Company: he was correct in his suspicions, for by November 1607 
Glover was being accused of bigamy, of violence towards his household 
and servants and of bringing the Embassy into disrepute. 
Lello's initial reception in England was decidedly cool: 
"At first recept of the Grand Signor's Letters the King's Magistie 
shewed no countenance, nether gave him wourd for his welcome 
in Ingland: but however, afterward he procuered frendship to be 
heard in a message he brought from Savoy, and two sondry times 
was with his Magistie. Himselfe [Lello] touldeth me that he was to 
goe againe the day after; which he did, and was knighted." (43) 
His return to favour did not satisfy him; he was intent on revenge against 
Glover and his supporters, particularly Sanderson, whom he considered 
had not only advised Glover to apply for the job of secretary to the 
Embassy but was also the sole cause of his subsequent preferment as 
ambassador. (44) He decided to attack Sanderson through that which he 
held most dear, his money, hence the great energy he exerted in the 
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aforementioned dispute over Edward Barton's estate. Sanderson urged 
Glover to act quickly to counter Lello's justification of his conduct of his 
Embassy: 
"for I see he is subtill and unjust in his cariadge of wourd and so 
no doubte in deeds ... Eldred is his counsoler ... yours formerly and 
my ever most mortal enemy ... I for my part have bine most divilasly 
[devilishly] deceaved in his Machiavellian carriadge towards me ... " 
The French Ambassador had remained in contact with Lello, 
providing him with detrimental stories about Glover which were used to 
attack him. (45) Lello also had spies inside the English Embassy; from 
this source allegations reached England that Glover had sodomised a 
young boy, that he had committed adultery with a maidservant employed 
at the Embassy, that he was sadistic in his behaviour towards his male 
servants and was cruel to his wife. There were further accusations that 
Glover was completely under the thumb of 9tefan Bogdan, with the 
implication that Bogdan was privy to information detrimental to his 
protector's reputation. (46) William Biddulph's eulogy of Henry Lello, 
which included an attack upon Glover, was published by Lello's 
supporters, probably as part of a campaign to have him restored to the 
embassy; this was frustrated by Glover's supporters within the Company. 
Nevertheless Glover's reputation had been tarnished by Lello's 
propaganda which gave weight to the displeasure of the English factors 
in Constantinople at his financial exactions, his threats towards them and 
his neglect of their concerns whilst he was involved with the affairs of 
9tefan Bogdan. (47) Glover's removal from office was not a direct result 
of Lello and his supporters' campaign, nevertheless it contributed to 
suspicions that Glover was untrustworthy and even disloyal to the Crown. 
Glover meanwhile had not ceased to attack Lello's reputation. In 
1608 he sent a memorandum recording an incident of 1600: 
"The vizier sent Master Lello wourd from the Divan ... that he was a 
caphier... [Kafir, an infidel] that is worse than a knave, and bad him 
depart from the contry ... (the vizier had rebuffed him to his face, 
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called him a madman and said he had written to the Queen what 
he was and that she out to know what an insufficient swine the 
merchants had placed in Constantinople) ... willing Thomas Glover 
[at that time secretary] ... that when occasion of bisiness was he 
should come and informe him; for he said this ganchier (hogge) is 
not capable of any reason." (48) 
Since this extract shows Lello in an extremely bad light, whilst putting 
Glover forward as competent and respected by the Ottomans, its purpose 
was obviously to counter Lello's aspersions upon his good character by 
highlighting the different capabilities of the two men and to prove that 
Glover was most qualified to be ambassador. 
Lello's behaviour towards Glover, however unjust the latter's 
treatment of him, belies the noble, virtuous image of him put forward by 
Biddulph. It seems that Lello was kind, generous and friendly towards 
those he likely and respected, but was roused to hatred and malice when 
someone crossed him. He was capable of bearing a grudge for years 
and in such a case behaved foolishly and unpleasantly. 
He made a considerable fortune in the Levant, continuing to trade 
whilst he was ambassador and, according to Sanderson, rarely did a 
ship leave Constantinople without Lello shipping out merchandise for his 
own profit. On his return home he shipped 11 bails of silk via Venice. His 
business ventures continued: on February 6th 1608 he was admitted as 
a freeman of the East India Company, investing 137 pounds 10 shillings 
in the fourth East India voyage. (49) Thereafter Henry Lelia disappears 
from the records, apart from a codicil to the will of Dame Anne Spencer, 
widow of Sir John Spencer, citizen and alderman of London, which 
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reads: 
"To Sir Henry Lelloe knt a jewel of £10." (50) 
Sir Dudley Carleton, English Ambassador in Venice, described Sir 
Thomas Glover's arrival there in 1612 on his journey home to England: 
"he appeared one day like a comet all in crimson velvet and 
beaten gold, but had all his expectations marred on a sudden by 
news of Prince Henry's death." (51) 
This anecdote neatly illustrates Glover's love of pageantry and his delight 
in being the centre of attention. He was an extravagant character, 
arrogant, proud and ambitious; his assessment of his own importance 
reached such heights as to be entirely out of proportion and he was 
bound to make himself unpopular: Carleton, although circumspect, was 
not an admirer and this quotation suggests that he was highly amused at 
Glover's failure to make the desired impression. 
Thomas Glover came into the world in a suitably chaotic manner. 
He was born at sea on a journey between Danzig and London. His 
mother was described as a "Pollonian" by William Lithgow. (52) Glover's 
grandfather, John Glover of Baxterby in Warwickshire, came to reside at 
Mancetter in that same county. He had four sons: John, William, Robert, 
who was burned at the stake as a heretic in Coventry in 1555, (53) and 
Thomas (54) the father of our ambassador. Thomas senior, being a 
younger son and therefore not in expectation of any property, went into 
commerce. He became involved in the Muscovy Company in its infancy, 
accompanying Anthony Jenkinson, who was to be instrumental in 
ensuring the early success of the Muscovy Company, on his first voyage 
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to Russia in 1557, where the latter had been commissioned to act as 
agent for three years. (55) Thomas Glover senior probably took over from 
Jenkinson as agent in Moscow, he was certainly employed in that 
capacity between 1563 and 1573. He purchased his Polish wife from the 
Tsar Ivan the Terrible: 
" ... the Kinge [Tsar] had sold one Thomas Glover, a cheiffe agent for 
that Company [the Muscovy Company] a wiff bowren of a noble 
howse in Polland, Basmanovey, taken captive at Pollotzcoe, for 
ten thowsand Hongers [Hungarian?] ducketts in gold; and yet 
shortly after, fallinge into som displeasur, robbed him of 16 
thowsand pounds more in cloth, silk, wax, furrs and other 
merchandizes, and sent him and his deare wiff emptie owt of this 
land." 
Thomas Glover was banished from Russia in 1573 as a result of 
Queen Elizabeth's complaints to the Tsar that he and other Englishmen 
had been conducting a trade independent of the Muscovy Company; our 
Thomas Glover was probably born on his journey home to England. (56) 
Thomas Glover junior was brought up in Constantinople "from a boy". 
Probably his father, who was eventually pardoned by Queen Elizabeth, 
used his connections with the big trading companies in the City of 
London, prominent amongst whom were Edward Osborne and Richard 
Staper, to gain his son a position as a page in the retinue of Harborne or 
Barton. In order to make a career with the newly constituted 'Turkie 
Company', as his father had done with the Muscovy Company, the young 
Thomas Glover needed to gain experience in the working of the 
Embassy, the conduct of successful negotiations with the Ottomans and 
their language. He could already speak and write the "Slavonian tongue" 
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(meaning Polish) fluently. (57) Glover held a position in Barton's 
household around 1592; in 1596, by now aged 23, we find him employed 
as Barton's secretary accompanying him on his journey with Sultan 
Mehemet III to war against Christendom in that year. (58) During this 
period he had some involvement in Barton's dealings with Moldavia and 
Wallachia, incurring debts of his own. (59) He was replaced as secretary 
to the Ambassador by Henry Lello in March 1597; when Barton died in 
September of the same year, Paul Pindar took over the post of secretary, 
but Glover remained in Constantinople: 
"many times serving as dorogman [Dragoman] to his Lordship 
[Henry Lello] ... having need of conferrance with the greatest 
men ... " (60) 
It must having been during his youth, under the influence of Edward 
Barton, that he acquired his taste for rich and splendid clothes, 
extravagant living and other predilections which will be described later. 
In 1599, when Pindar was sent to England with letters from the 
Sultana to Queen Elizabeth I, (61) Glover took his place as secretary to 
Lello who acknowledged him as a competent man who served him well. 
It was agreed in all quarters that Glover's understanding and experience 
of Ottoman law, custom and protocol made him a useful employee of the 
embassy: 
"indeed the ambassiator cannot misse him ... " (62) 
John Sanderson, however, felt that the status of the embassy would be 
increased if the secretary were a more educated man: 
"som yonge jentellmen that had the Lattin tongue perfect wear 
sent out from England for the purpose." (63) 
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Glover was extremely ambitious: he was prepared to take on the 
job of secretary, although for over a year he received no proper salary, as 
a stepping-stone to better things. He used his position to forge powerful 
connections through John Sanderson. The latter had taken on the role of 
patron and wrote to Glover frequently with advice which usually 
contained exhortations to moderate his behaviour: he emphasised the 
importance of not making enemies, especially amongst the powerful 
members of the Levant company whose good opinion would be useful to 
him. (64) Others sought Glover's advancement; Sanderson wrote to John 
Kitely in 1604: 
"Per Master Glover I receaved your kind, and in his case most 
favourable, letter. He is mutch bound to you how grateful I know 
not. He is forward to the highest place of preferment at 
Constantinople. Yf God prosper his health and actions, this 
voyage the next springe the present for the Great Turk shalbe sent 
to him." (65) 
In 1603, Sanderson wrote that the Company knew well, through his 
furtherance of their business, that he was an asset to them both in 
Constantinople and elsewhere and that he deserved to be promoted 
ahead of all others. (66) 
Although Lello had no complaints over Glover's usefulness, 
relations between the two men were not good. Rumours that Glover had 
openly criticised his master reached Sanderson in Scanderoon; he 
advised his friend that it would be to his credit to be meek in his 
behaviour towards Lello, that he should: "support his imperfections." (67) 
Lello was probably jealous of Glover's successful handling of the 
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Ottoman Divan in contrast to his own rebuffs: whilst he received threats 
from the Vizier, Glover was treated with respect. It seems to have pleased 
Glover to encourage such treatment. 
Lello sent him to England in November 1603, to explain the state 
of the Constantinople embassy and the problems caused by the activities 
of English pirates for the merchants and the Embassy. Glover probably 
left London to return to the Levant in May 1604. (68) Whilst he was in 
London he was in close contact with Sanderson who now lived there and 
was active in the Company on behalf of his protege, who was showing a 
distinct lack of gratitude for Sanderson's efforts which were beginning to 
bear fruit: 
" he hath not honou red me with the valewe of 2d at his 
comminge, all the time of his beinge, nether at his departure out of 
Ingland ... What meanes of his great good I have bine cannot be 
hidd, yf himself would; though now peradventure, rising he may 
scorn his best consellor." (69) 
Glover, clearly aware of his growing reputation with the Company and at 
Court was becoming arrogant. In prosecuting Lello's business, Glover 
would have come into contact with the Secretary of State, Cecil, who was 
to become his patron; Glover appears to have impressed Cecil with 
the "spirite and courage" which the Viziers in Constantinople had 
admired. (70) He also seems to have been a wealthy man: Sanderson 
informed his correspondent Robert Barton that Glover had offered to lend 
Barton money and that said he had the means to enrich his friends. (71) 
Sanderson appears to have hoped that, if Glover became ambassador, 
he would concentrate upon making his fortune in the Levant 
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(ambassadors were at this time allowed to trade upon their own account) 
and in so doing would, out of gratitude, promote Sanderson's 
commercial interests. He had a reasonable expectation of this since Lello 
had made himself very rich during his term of office and his servants and 
supporters had shared in his good fortune. (72) 
Glover did not stay long in Constantinople; in October 1604, 
Francisco Contarini, the Venetian Ambassador there, wrote that Glover 
had been received in audience by the Sultan and had presented letters 
from the King of England on the subject of piracy. He also said that he 
was to return to England shortly where he would receive credentials as 
English Ambassador to Constantinople. Glover had therefore already 
been canvassing support in earnest. Lello appears to have been 
unaware of Glover's machinations for, when Glover left the Ottoman 
capital in December 1604, he took with him a letter of recommendation 
written by Lello requesting the King to give his former Secretary some 
preferment in his service. It is possible that the ambassador hoped to use 
Glover as an informant, to provide information about the King's wishes 
and to give advance warning about threats to Lello's position, as well as 
to promote his interests at Court. Glover became a "Squire of the King's 
body", 
"A gentleman as highly estemmed as of them that honourably 
attend upon our person." (74) 
Glover used his position to ingratiate himself at Court. Immediately upon 
his return to England, confident of his own advancement, he applied for a 
Coat of Arms, which was granted on 11 April 1605. (75) He also courted 
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the favour of the Secretary of State, with whom he would correspond if he 
became ambassador. Cecil, if impressed with Glover, would be a 
valuable patron since his influence with the King and the Levant 
Company was enormous. Cecil did indeed use his influence to obtain 
Glover's knighthood and probably his appointment to the Embassy; 
Glover also enjoyed the favour of the Lord Chamberlaine. (76) Cecil 
made use of Glover as an adviser on Ottoman affairs. 
Once Glover had become aware that he would not be appointed 
Ambassador to Constantinople immediately, he began a subtle 
campaign to undermine Lello in the esteem of the Company and the 
Crown. In his letter of recommendation for Glover, Lello had asked if he 
was to continue as ambassador and had been requested to remain. (77) 
Glover seems to have taken it upon himself to furnish details of his former 
master's rebuffs, failures and ill-treatment by the Ottomans. (78) Lello's 
alleged ill-treatment and betrayal of Stefan Bogdan, in particular, 
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damaged the King and Secretary of State's estimation of him. Salisbury 
had already been petitioned by Bogdan and Gaspar Gratiani; Glover and 
his allies appear to have done their best to imply something disgraceful 
in Lello's behaviour towards the pretender. Glover wrote to inform Lello of 
the King and Salisbury's displeasure that the pretender had been 
imprisoned whilst under the protection of the Embassy. (79) 
There was considerable competition for the post of Ambassador in 
Constantinople, but Glover was an obvious choice; Lello was informed 
by the Company in April 1606 that he was to be replaced by Glover: 
"Supposing the same to be to great purpose and effect for better 
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effecting of their business." (80) 
Glover was knighted on August 17th 1606 and a royal warrant was 
issued for the engraving of the signet ring with which he would seal his 
official correspondence. Glover sent servants ahead of him to 
Constantinople to make arrangements for his arrival. These 
arrangements included the removal of Lello from the Ambassador's 
official residence. Glover's letter to Lello, referred to above, expressed 
the new ambassador's regret that he could not accommodate his 
predecessor due to the "somewhat extraordinary" size of his retinue; to 
add further insult Glover demanded that Lello immediately deliver all the 
household goods belonging to the embassy (plate, linen, carpet, kitchen 
utensils etc.) into the hands of a servant, with a warning that if he did not 
co-operate trouble would await him in England. Lello was told that if he 
made no difficulties, Glover would be pleased with hi m and the Company 
would be more likely to favour him when he returned to England; 
furthermore, there was the hint of a threat that a lack of co-operation 
would result in forceful complaints being made with the object of 
obtaining Lello's disgrace. Glover's arrogance had reached new heights 
with his latest preferment: the new ambassador boasted that this 
appointment was due first and foremost, not to the favour of the Company 
and the Secretary of State, but of the Almighty Himself. (81) 
Glover arrived in Constantinople on December 23rd 1606; on the 
28th his ships entered the Sublime Porte on the Sultan's orders. The 
Sultan watched a display mounted by the English community of mock 
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combat and discharge of artillery and was said to have been so 
impressed that he sent ten of his pensioners to welcome the new 
ambassador conveying gifts. When Glover and his retinue disembarked 
they were honourably escorted to their lodgings by several of the 
Sultan's officers, captains and companies of soldiers. Glover boasted 
that such treatment showed extraordinary favour, much more than was 
customary. (82) In fact this seems to have been standard protocol. In 
January 1607 Glover presented the King's letters and present to the 
Sultan who was said to have been delighted with his gift. (83) After a 
month's delay he was admitted, on February 8th, to kiss the Sultan's 
hand which marked his official acceptance as Ambassador to the 
Ottoman Court. He had, in the meantime, visited the Viziers, magistrates 
and ministers to court their favour, asking them to be present at the hand-
kiSSing ceremony in order to: 
umake the way better and more acceptable against my entrance to 
the Grand Signior." (84) 
Meanwhile, Lello's delayed departure was cramping Glover's 
style, particularly when he began selling his belongings openly in the 
markets of Constantinople and continued his open association with the 
French Ambassador, whilst Glover was petitioning on the question of the 
Merchants-Forestiers. Glover alleged that Lello denied that his successor 
he had any right to the Consulage and had refused to accept money 
collected on Glover's instructions to assist him in paying his debts 
thereby allowing him to depart. Glover insisted that he had treated Lello 
with respect, honour and courtesy. Lello disagreed with this, referring to 
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his successor thus: 
"a man so blown bigge with his owne pryde that they who have 
sett him up as an Idoll against me and therefore much les myself 
are to hope but little good from him." (85) 
Glover's high-handedness towards the members of his own retinue 
created considerable friction amongst the English community: he 
accused his secretary William Strachey of intriguing with Lello against 
him and forbade the two men to meet; Strachey disobeyed, no doubt with 
Lello's encouragement, stealing out at night when others were asleep. 
Strachey was also accused of showing a letter from the King addressed 
to the Sultan to Henry Holland, a "notorious Papist" whom Glover had 
placed under house arrest on suspicion of espionage until he could 
supply testimony supporting his loyalty to the English Crown. (86) 
Strachey was turned out of the Embassy; he returned to England around 
June 18th 1607, much aggrieved, and assisted Glover's enemies in the 
campaign against him. (87) News reached England of a stream of vicious 
accusations by Lello and Glover against each other. Glover even 
accused Lello of stealing the plate and furnishings belonging to the 
Embassy and of passing information regarding England's campaign for 
jurisdiction over the Merchants-Forestiers to the French Ambassador. 
Glover'S spies in the French embassy reported that it was the source of 
rumours that Glover had forged the new Capitulations, granted in 1606, 
to give himself jurisdiction over the Merchan ts-Fores tiers; Glover alleged 
that Lello's influence was behind all this; he also wrote to the Earl of 
Salisbury that he had information that Lello did not intend to return to 
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England but planned to become a French subject. (88) 
Many of the accusations against Lello doubtless had their roots in 
Glover's fertile imagination. Every setback Glover suffered and every 
move the French Ambassador made against him was blamed on Lello's 
envious and malicious intrigue. The new Ambassador's hatred of his 
predecessor was extravagant. Glover had gloried in his success at 
obtaining a renewal of the Capitulations which included a new clause 
bringing the Dutch and all other Europeans, except the French and 
Venetians, under the English banner. He also took the opportunity to 
draw attention to Lello's "incompetence" by making an issue of the title 
accorded to the King of England in the Capitulations obtained by Lello 
which was inferior to that accorded to the King of France. (89) The French 
Ambassador's anger at the extension on paper of Glover's authority and 
the probable consequences of this in matters of precedence was a cause 
of considerable tension between the two Embassies. The French 
Ambassador's bribes obtained Ottoman agreement to cancel the grant 
on the grounds that the extension of Glover's authority had been 
unintended, but Glover refused to surrender the Capitulations and lost 
his temper with the Vizier, insulting him; the Vizier retorted: 
''that he would inform my kinge, that I was more fitt to have bin 
employed in some war-like affayres to gett townes and Castles, 
than to be an Ambassr here, to extorte and take things from them 
perforce." (90) 
The French Ambassador began to conduct a personal campaign to have 
Glover recalled: he wrote a letter of complaint about the new English 
Ambassador to the King of England. When the Venetian Bailo tried to 
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mediate between the two parties involved in this increasingly 
complicated dispute, Glover dismissed him as a "double-faced villain", 
The dispute was expanding to involve the English and French mercantile 
communities in Constantinople. When some Frenchmen attacked Glover 
in his garden, he accused Lello of conspiring to murder him.(91) In a 
letter of June 9th 1607 the Levant Company rebuked Glover: 
''the merchants themselves do not give any contentment wch maketh us 
beleeve that wch was ever doubted that your place you now hold made 
you forget youself." 
Glover was ordered to moderate his behaviour, to leave the matter of the 
Merchants-Forestiers in abeyance and not to be credulous of rumours 
which were probably invented by others to exacerbate the feud. He was 
further censured for ejecting Strachey from his house in a foreign country 
without means of support and was called upon to reconcile himself with 
his employees or furnish them with the means to return home. Finally he 
was exhorted to model himself upon Edward Barton, whom they made 
out to have been a model of virtue: 
"A man of that courage and temper that his better fortunes did not 
make him seem greater than he was, nor could misadventures 
anyway dismaye him, neglecting ... [mercies] ... proceeding from 
other mens weaknes, disdayning revenges, giving place to noe 
when the matter required it and yet as sociable and familiar with 
the meanest merchants here as could be wished, whereas nowe 
we are informed that you regard them not but suffer them to 
waite and attend your pleasure as people of no respect when they 
have occasion to repair unto you, yet we accompt them as 
ourselves." (92) 
The Company foresaw damage to the Embassy and the Company's 
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concerns if Glover's feuds continued. For instance, the hostility between 
the new Ambassador and his predecessor must have created practical 
difficulties and prevented Lello handing over the business of the 
Embassy to Glover. Lello was not inclined to explain the current state of 
negotiations, the attitudes of the Sultan's ministers and favourites and the 
currently most reliable sources of information. The Embassy archives and 
files should also have been handed over and explained. The subsequent 
delays in Glover's prosecution of his business meant that time which 
should have been spent on Embassy business was wasted finding out 
the exact state of that business. It is not known what Lello did with his 
papers, whether he took them with him or whether they remained in 
Constantinople. Resolution of the various matters of controversy was 
sought but not achieved. Glover's feud with Lello continued after the 
latter's departure from Constantinople, both parties unwilling to back 
down and seek a reconciliation. (93) On Lello's departure, Glover 
expressed the hope that God would reward him as he deserved. (94) 
Although Sir Thomas Glover had a difficult relationship with the 
merchants he worked hard on their behalf and achieved some notable 
successes. As we have seen, he secured a renewal of the Capitulations, 
the text of which was used as a standard for later Capitulations. (95) His 
forceful manner and his ability to exert his authority was noted in Chapter 
II and his vigour in protecting the life, liberty and property of English and 
other Christian merchants was mentioned by a several observers: 
"he relieved more slaves from the Galleys, pay'd their ransomes 
and sent them home freely to their Christian stations, and kept a 
better house, than any Ambassador did, that ever lay at 
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Constanti nople." (96) 
His house was said to have been a sanctuary to which Christian slaves 
fled in secret before being sent home; Glover's actions in helping these 
unfortunates were not universally admired perhaps because some of 
them had been engaged in piracy; the Levant Company complained to 
Glover: 
"of the great damage wee are brought into by your ordinary 
receaving into yor house and conveying them away in or shipping 
of sundry [Christian] captains and whereby you much injure the 
dig nity of yor place and hazard the loss of our goodes and 
imprisonment of our people praying you therefore to be more 
considerate hereafter to prevent so great inconvenience." (97) 
In 1609 he briefly obtained a licence for an English ship "The 
Royall Defence" to enter the Black Sea and a project was instituted to 
open up a silk-route via Trebizond and Persia. Although this project was 
forbidden by the Ottomans in 1610, the procurement of this privilege 
demonstrates Glover's assiduity in pursuing commercial matters. William 
Lithgow related how Glover obtained summary punishment of the 
Ottoman Governor of Patras at whose instance the English consul there 
was poisoned during the winter of 1610-11 : 
"for whose death the worthy and generous Ambassador, Sir 
Thomas Glover ... was so highly incensed, that he went hither 
himselfe to Peterasse; with two Jannizaries, and a warrant sent 
him from the Emperour ... [the Sultan] ... who in the midst of the 
market-place of Peterasse caused one of these two Janizaries 
strike of the head from the shoulders of that Sanzak [Le. Saniak 
Bey] and to put to death divers others also that had been 
accessory to the poysoning of the English consul; and the 
ambassador returninge againe to Constantinople, was held in 
singular reputation even with the Turkes for prosecuting as 
powerfully the course of Justice, and would not shrink for no 
respect." (98) 
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When the term of Glover's appointment was almost up, the Levant 
Company seems to have been amenable to his continuance as 
ambassador, although the manner of their correspondence was 
somewhat cold. He was extremely unpopular with the merchants: 
"no merchant has will or love to speak to you." 
In 1611 his involvement in §tefan Bogdan's affairs was such that it 
occupied so much of his time he neglected the merchants affairs. (99) As 
we shall see in a later chapter, his recall was on purely political grounds. 
It is worth noting that Glover was again considered for appointment as 
Ambassador to Constantinople in 1619, but at the instance of the King, 
not the merchants. (100) 
Many of Glover's contemporaries regarded him as a 
thoroughly unpleasant man. His patron and mentor, John 
Sanderson, wrote him numerous letters which urged him to curb 
his overbearing manner with those who came to petition him: 
"Be affable, humble and meke in your high place; all heare report 
the contrary of you, some saying that your humore is so dangerous 
and carriage so haughtie that they never dare writt, deliver you 
what written by others, nor speke to you." (101) 
For a long time after Lello's departure Glover refused to visit the French 
Ambassador, a breach of protocol; Sanderson warned him not to allow 
private grievances to interfere with his official duty. (102) The frequency 
with which Sanderson offered Glover advice suggests that such advice 
was usually ignored; those who followed the progress of Glover's 
embassy developed the impression that he regarded the embassy as his 
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private domain and was unwilling to accept guidance from others about 
how he should conduct the embassy's affairs. As we shall see in Chapter 
VII, the Crown and the Company held reservations about Glover's 
willingness to obey direct orders and his tendency to exceed his 
mandate. In fairness to Glover his responsibilities frequently necessitated 
taking major decisions about which there was no time to wait for advice 
from England; furthermore, the Crown and the Company appear to have 
been ignorant of the way in which the Ottoman state operated. Glover 
was a man impulsive and extravagant in character and when he became 
tired of waiting for his orders or considered that the advice he was given 
was useless, he chose to act in ways which he considered sensible but 
which others considered to be destructive of the embassy's reputation 
and to exceed the authority granted him. 
Sir Thomas Glover's vicious temper brought accusations of 
cruelty: he was reported to have beaten the Master of his Household, 
George Coxden, many times on the soles of his feet before throwing him 
into prison. John Roberts, a servant, was said to have been beaten about 
the head and body and Edward Abbott, an English factor accused the 
Ambassador of striking him. On one occasion, during dinner, Glover 
struck his wife in front of witnesses, whom he also threatened with 
violence. The Levant Company was greatly concerned, although Glover 
strenuously denied all these reported incidents. (103) There were also 
complaints that he lived so extravagantly that he claimed more 
Consulage dues than he was entitled to. Glover was noted for his 
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hospitality, which was considered an asset: 
"When time and occasion is presented, no-one more royall in 
expenses, nor in apparell more somptious, nor in ceremonies 
more copious; no-one ever so gratiouse in this Porte for obteyning 
of favours, nor ever wilbe more magnanimous in defending of 
injuries. And these thinges, thus moderated, I thinke are great 
virtues." (104) 
Sanderson continued to support Glover at Company meetings, advising 
others that their best course would be for him to remain ambassador; in 
reply he was told that if Glover continued in office it would be upon the 
understanding that he would moderate his lifestyle. (105) Many of 
Glover's financial problems were due to the burden of supporting Stefan 
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Bogdan and his retinue, as we shall see in Chapter VII. Despite his often 
less than pleasant temperament, Glover retained the respect, loyalty and 
even liking of many people. A major theme of the correspondence 
between John Sanderson and John Kitely, the Embassy physician, was 
the need to curb the excesses of Glover's explosive nature and indeed to 
protect Glover from himself. Sanderson had a somewhat fatherly attitude 
towards his protege tinged with apprehension of falling foul of his temper. 
He wrote tactfully to rebuke Glover for his numerous faux pas, for despite 
his sojourn at the English court, Glover lacked any knowledge of basic 
protocol: Sanderson rebuked him for addressing the Archbishop of 
Canterbury as "Reverend Sir" : 
"My Lord Grace of Canterbury takes place ... [Le. precedence] 
above a duke and is a most sufficient wise and excellent consoler, 
not to be offered reward of inferiours, nether to be titled under his 
degree." (106) 
Glover's friends hoped that his wife might exercise a moderating 
149 
influence. She was born Anne Lambe, daughter of M. Lambe of Padley 
in Suffolk and had been provided with a ''vertuous and religious" 
upbringing by Lady Wentworth, the wife of Sir John Wentworth, a 
powerful landowner in the county. She appears to have married Glover 
shortly before his departure as Ambassador to Constantinople: 
"he is matched with a most discreet, wise, mild, and very gentill 
gentillwoman, a lambe by her father, and no lesse in her owne 
nature, a lady worthy to be ever most beloved." (107) 
She does not seem to have had any success in moderating her 
husband's excesses, although she was not a submissive woman; on 
occasion she was said to have been constant, bold and courageous and 
more resembling a lion than a lamb. Her life in Constantinople would 
have been extremely restricted. Few of the factors were married and 
there were few women in Constantinople with whom she was in a 
position to mix, firstly because as an ambassador's wife she had to be 
conscious of her status and secondly because she was required to live a 
secluded life in accordance with Ottoman ideas of decorum. It was only 
when the Embassy household and the Factors retired to the countryside 
to escape the summer heat or the plague that she would have been 
allowed greater freedom. Lady Glover died of plague on 2nd November 
1608: 
"The Saturday she eat, she dranke, she was merie and pleasant, 
the Sunday morning being the thirtieth of October 1608 she 
sickened, the Wensday following, being the second of November 
she dyed" (108) 
Sanderson wrote that Glover was too manly and heroic a spirit to have 
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been overcome by grief at the death of "one wife". (109) Lady Glover had 
apparently expressed the desire to be buried in England; her husband 
refused to bury her in Constantinople and laid her body in a cellar. This 
scandalised many people who accused Glover of doing his wife a great 
wrong in not according her a Christian burial. (110) After he was 
succeeded as ambassador by Paul Pindar, Glover determined to take his 
wife's body back to England, but eventually decided to bury her in 
Constantinople, using the excuse of funeral arrangements to delay his 
departure. He invited the other Christian ambassadors to attend the 
funeral but the French, Venetian and Dutch Ambassadors excused 
themselves on the grounds that disputes over precedence would not 
allow them to attend. The funeral ceremony took place on 14th April 
1612. (111) 
Glover had no children from his marriage but had sired several 
illegitimate offspring. Upon his arrival as ambassador, the embarrassing 
presence of a woman by whom he had had two children awaited him. 
Glover found the woman a husband, warning her that she should not 
attempt to come near him again. The boy was sent to Germany at the first 
fitting opportunity and the girl seems to have died. In a letter of of 1608 
there is also the mention of a three year old bastard son of Sir Thomas 
Glover by a Greek woman; this boy was sent to be brought up in Venice 
on the orders of Richard Staper. The presence of an illegitimate child of 
an English Ambassador in Constantinople was considered an 
embarrassment to the Levant Company, particularly if Glover was failing 
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in his responsibility towards the child, hence Staper's intervention. The 
boy had inherited his father's linguistic skills: he spoke fluent Greek and 
had a passable knowledge of Turkish and Italian. He was later 
apprenticed to an apothecary. (112) There is also a report that one of 
the English maids in Glover's household had been made pregnant by 
him. (113) There were further rumours that his sexual preferences were 
not confined to adult women: 
"And more to me [John Sanderson] reported that you kepe ther a 
poore boy, which you have putt up in fine aparrill, and that you lie 
with the said boy ... " (114) 
This report may may been slanderous; it is, however, worth noting that 
Glover's enemies when seeking to undermine his reputation did so not 
through accusations of incompetence, which would have been hard to 
substantiate, but through reports of cruelty, greed and sexual libertinism, 
which were likely to be believed. 
Mention has already been made of Glover's carelessness of his 
friends and supporters. Although extravagant in maintaining himself in a 
manner he considered suitable to his exalted station, he was not 
generous to those whom he disliked. His sister in England, Mistress 
Peacocke, whose husband had abandoned her and then died, was 
reduced to petitioning the Levant Company and Henry Lello for money to 
support herself and her children. (115) 
Glover was an intelligent man who could be extremely charming 
when it suited him; he certainly did not lack courage and audacity. After 
his removal from the embassy, although clearly apprehensive at his 
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probable reception in England where he was expected to answer serious 
charges concerning his dealing with Stefan Bogdan and allegations that 
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his Embassy had been used to conduct espionage on behalf of Spain, 
Glover determined to return home in splendour "like a comet". His 
progress to England was reported in the letters of the English 
Ambassador to Venice and there was widespread interest in his 
reception on his arrival. Glover was confident that he would be cleared of 
all charges; his confidence was rewarded and he was soon in great 
favour with the King. As we know there was even consideration of his 
reinstatement as Ambassador at the instance of the Crown; however he 
was not sufficiently popular with the Company for this to happen. In 1624 
his advice was sought concerning the status of Scottish merchants in 
Constantinople under the Capitulations in comparison with those of the 
English. (116) He was often at Court and was a well-known character 
there. 
He had left Constantinople with enormous debts owed him by 
Stefan Bogdan, at least half of which were never repaid. He seems to 
have had considerable financial difficulties because he petitioned for the 
grant of several offices which were accompanied by financial 
renumeration. He found to his dismay that these offices had already been 
granted to others. (117) The manner of Sir Thomas Glover's death hardly 
fitted his inflated opinions of himself. In 1624 he was employed as a 
Court messenger. In this capacity he was sent to communicate a 
message to an envoy from Algiers: before he had spoken two words he 
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collapsed and died. He was at this time so poor that the Levant Company 
was expected to pay to bury him, although I have found no record of such 
a payment. In the register of St. Olaves Church in Hart Street, London, a 
church with close connections with the Levant Company, there is an entry 
for April 25th 1625: "Thomas Glover a knight" with the word "church" 
written in the margin. If this is our Sir Thomas, the Company did not pay 
for a memorial plaque. (118) 
In the Dictionary of National Biography there is a comprehensive 
account of Paul Pindar's activities after his return from Constantinople in 
1620 (119), however the entry devotes little space to his career with the 
Levant Company which for our purposes is more important. Pindar 
comes across as a pleasant personality and an efficient ambassador. He 
was born at Wellingborough in Northamptonshire in 1565 or 1566, the 
second son of Thomas Pindar and the grandson of Robert Pindar of 
Yorkshire. His family had intended that he should receive a gentleman's 
education: University, the Inns of Court etc.; but Paul Pindar preferred to 
enter the world of commerce. He was apprenticed at the age of sixteen to 
Mr Parvish, a London merchant involved in the Italian trade, who sent 
him to Venice at the age of eighteen to act as his factor. The young Pindar 
was greatly impressed by Venice and throughout his employment as 
Ambassador in Constantinople he showed great sympathy for Venetian 
interests. 
An article in The Gentleman's Magazine of 1787 reports that 
Pindar resided fifteen years in Venice: 
''trading on his own account, and on commission both from his old 
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master and divers other of the most trading kingdoms, by which he 
got a very plentiful estate." (120) 
Pindar was highly ambitious and had his sights on advancement through 
a career with the Levant Company. In 1599 he obtained employment as 
secretary to Henry Lello. He was present at the ceremony of presentation 
of the musical instrument constructed by Thomas Dallam, whom he had 
accompanied from England, to the Sultan in 1599 and greatly impressed 
the Sultan's mother. When Dallam returned to England Pindar went with 
him on commission from Lello to acquaint Elizabeth I with the 
proceedings of the French over the Merchants-Forestiers, taking gifts and 
letters from the Sultan and his mother. (121) Whilst in England he had 
great difficulty in obtaining reimbursement of his expenses from the 
Crown and the Company. His expenditure was felt to have been 
somewhat extravagant and it was expected amongst some members of 
the Company that he would not be sent back to Constantinople at the 
Company's expense. John Sanderson had a good opinion of Pindar's 
abilities and character: 
"He is a sensible, wise jentallmanlike man and one that hear hath 
much credited out nation, I protest to you I am sory of his departure 
for hear he will be mist." 
The Venetian Ambassador, Girolamo Capello, described Pindar as 
having an acute mind and considered that it was he who really governed 
the ambassador. (122) Pindar was replaced as secretary by Thomas 
Glover, nevertheless he had his sights on greater preferment. Whilst in 
England he petitioned the Secretary of State, Sir Robert Cecil, to advise 
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the Queen to appoint him to a new position as Consul of Venice, whose 
presence there would be invaluable in preventing non-members of the 
Levant Company from breaking the Company's monopoly of trade in the 
Levant. This was also a matter of concern to the Venetians, for many of 
those trading illegally were pirates. Pindar was concerned that the 
Venetians might prohibit English use of the port of Venice: 
"The consul authorised from her Majesty, may execute forfeiture of 
goods and ships of all that trade of her subjects not being of their 
freedom." (123) 
Pindar was confident of his ability to fulfill such a commission due to his 
long experience of Italian commerce. (124) He was also aware of the 
importance of Cecil's favour and remarked that if Cecil wanted to help 
him in his suit he would bring it about. Pindar hoped to by-pass the 
Levant Company to procure this post because, he thought, they were 
bound to object to the idea on the grounds of the cost involved, whereas 
if they were told that the Queen had already resolved to create the 
position, they would be forced to agree to it. (125) 
Pindar renewed his petition to the Crown after the death of Queen 
Elizabeth, confident that Cecil's influence with the King would be 
sufficient to ensure his success, since it would cost the Crown nothing 
and the merchants would see the advantages of a Consul in 
Venice. (126) Once again he was unsuccessful. Pindar seems to have 
taken the refusal of his petition as a personal affront to his abilities rather 
than a matter of policy: he remarked that he would be discouraged 
forever from making a petition at court. His ambition, however, got the 
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better of his sense of grievance. In the meantime he continued to trade 
on his own account, becoming involved once again in commerce with 
Venice. (127) He maintained his acquaintance with the Secretary of 
State, offering his services whenever they were required. In 1602 it was 
rumoured that he was acting as a banking agent for Cecil, who: 
"feared to have so much money in England lest matters should not 
go well." 
this refers to the succession of James VI of Scotland to the English 
throne.which was Cecil's project; if it had failed England might have been 
plunged into civil war. (128) The rumour was probably true, for a letter of 
1603 written by William Hicks, hints at Pindar's usefulness to Cecil in 
unspecified matters abroad. Hicks gave Pindar the following 
recommendation: 
"He is exceedingly industrious, of great understanding and 
experience; he writes well and speakes well; he is secret, and 
would do you [Cecil] very good service in many ways, on that side 
not only without your charge, but to help to discharge some of your 
charges in those parts." (129) 
Eventually Pindar's abilities were recognised and he was 
appointed Consul at Aleppo in November 1606, which was the most 
important of the Levant Company factories after Constantinople. This was 
a salaried post, accompanied by around 2,500 dollars per annum. The 
function of the Consul was in many ways similar to that of the 
ambassador, without the attendant diplomatic duties. In internal matters 
he was the representative of the Ambassador's authority, exercising 
control over the factors' behaviour; in external matters he was 
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responsible for the maintenance of the English Capitulations, the 
protection of the English "nation" from oppression by Ottoman officials 
and subjects, unlawful financial exactions, false imprisonment and so 
forth. He was also the centre of the factory's social life, expected to offer 
hospitality to English and sometimes foreign travellers and exchange 
hospitality with other consuls and local dignitaries. 
The Consul was allowed to trade on his own account; Pindar 
made great profit out of his residence at Aleppo. (130) In 1608 John 
Sanderson advised Sir Thomas Glover to keep on good terms with 
Pindar in order to use him for his own profit, at the same time he advised 
him to be wary, implying that Pindar was ambitious to take over Glover's 
position. (131) There appear to have been a number of complaints about 
Pindar's activities as Consul. In 1608 Ottavio Bon, the Venetian 
Ambassador, told Glover that Pindar was charging consular dues on 
Venetian goods arriving on Flemish vessels on the basis of England's 
supposed authority over the Merchants-Forestiers. 
Glover agreed that Venetians could not be included in this 
category, remarking that Pindar was acting on his own initiative in order 
to ingratiate himself with the Levant Company. Glover seems already to 
have felt his position threatened by Pindar. A letter to Aleppo, ordering 
Pindar not to meddle in affairs that were not part of his remit, elicited the 
polite assertion that the ambassador had no power to command the 
conSUl, implying that the two positions were of equal status. Glover was 
clearly concerned that Pindar was trying to resolve the problem of the 
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Merchants-Forestiers himself, thereby usurping the authority of the 
ambassador, making Glover seem superfluous and incompetent in order 
to obtain the Embassy for himself. (132) In 1610 a Mr Hagged was sent 
secretly overland to take over as Consul at Aleppo and to ''take account" 
of Pindar's activities. This was probably in response to complaints about 
Pindar's lavish spending: he had presented bills to the Company for 
reimbursement of 40,000 piastres, which the Company challenged. (133) 
In 1611, there was a further suggestion of Pindar's aspirations towards 
the embassy, when Sanderson heard of an unnamed man who promised 
to provide a present for the Sultan at his own expense if he were 
appointed ambassador. This man may have been Pindar who was by this 
time in London; Sanderson viewed this challenge sufficiently seriously to 
mention it to Glover. (134) 
When Pindar returned to England he satisfied his debts. He also 
brought with him a collection of Arabic, Persian and other Oriental 
manuscripts, twenty of which were presented to the Bodleian Library in 
1611. (135) He was called upon to give advice on commercial matters in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with regard to the importance to 
the Levant trade of good relations with Venice, to enable English 
merchants to make use of the port there. His arguments were eloquently 
put and demonstrate his knowledge and experience; he showed himself 
to be a man of intelligence and common-sense; he knew that he could be 
useful for England's trade policy; in his practical and uneffusive way he 
was as ambitious as Glover and Lello: he seems to have aspired to the 
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status of merchant "aristocrat" rather than that of career diplomat, 
perhaps modelling himself on the Venetian patrician houses. Antonio 
Foscarini, the Venetian Ambassador in England, wrote to the Doge and 
Senate 
"Pindar is a person of growing importance and very dear to Lord 
Salisbury, with whom he has long interviews in which, as I hear 
from himself and others, he has advanced various views ... which 
are highly appreciated by Lord Salisbury. The election to the post 
of Ambassador at Constantinople will soon take place, and it is 
thought certain that the choice will fall on Pindar." (136) 
Salisbury was influential in the election of Pindar to the embassy 
which took place in September 1611. The Venetians welcomed the 
appointment because of Pindar's self-professed good will towards 
Venetian interests. He left England secretly with only a small retinue; 
Glover was not informed in advance of his recall and great trouble was 
undergone to ensure that he was not aware of Pindar's journey. The 
reasons for this stealth will be discussed fully in the relevant chapter, 
suffice it to say now that concern as to Glover's loyalties was such that it 
was feared that rather than return to England, he might elect to stay in the 
Levant and even, it was feared, convert to Islam. The presence of a 
trustworthy individual such as Pindar was necessary to prevent such a 
scandalous occurrence. (137) 
The Venetians were anxious to cultivate Pindar's goodwill; to 
oblige him they waived the export duty on goods he was transporting to 
Constantinople "on his Majesty's service" that is to say to use as gifts. 
They were also careful to gain the goodwill of Pindar's secretary, who in 
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the event of the ambassador's illness would take over his position. (138) 
One reason for this trouble was the need for co-operation between 
France, England and Venice to frustrate Dutch plans to set up an 
embassy in Constantinople and open up Dutch trade in the Levant. 
There were genuine reasons for all three nations to be concerned: 
" ... it is feared that as the Dutch have begun to trade in almost all 
parts of the Mediterranean, they will absorb the whole traffic, as 
they are content with very moderate gains; their ships are light and 
do not cost half as much as English ships cost; owing to their 
lightness and the skill of their crews they can sail with half the 
number of hands, and though they last a shorter time they can 
offer freights at half the price of an English ship." (139) 
Co-operation was needed to oppose the issue of Dutch Capitulations. 
Another question of concern to the Venetians was the rumoured English 
project to establish an alternative trade route to the East Indies which 
would by-pass the Ottoman Empire. The Venetians hoped that if this 
materialised, English involvement in the Levant would decline and their 
trade in that area could be taken over by Venetian merchants, provided 
the Dutch were prevented from becoming established in the area. (140) 
The Doge and Senate advised the Bailo, Simon Contarini, to keep a 
watchful eye on Pindar, to note his actions on anything that might be 
worth knowing and send them as detailed an account as possible. (141) 
The French Ambassador contented himself with insulting Pindar in 
front of Sir Thomas Glover, perhaps hoping to provoke a dispute similar 
to that which broke out between Lello and Glover; he alleged that Pindar 
was a bankrupt merchant and implied that his letters of credence were 
false. To his credit, Glover loyally defended his successor and vouched 
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for the validity of his letters. (142) Contarini paid a formal visit: 
"he seems to me very courteous and desirous of a closer 
connection with your Serenities' Ambassadors. On my departure 
he told me that his Master had said, '/ have nothing to do with 
the King of the Turks; I send my Ambassador to him so/ely for 
the protection of the Merchants my subjects residing in his 
state.'" (143) 
The new Ambassador's remit was purely commercial, the embassy 
having got into trouble over Sir Thomas Glover's non-commercial 
activities. Pindar had been given specific instructions to that effect. Since 
his abiding interest was commerce and the promotion of Eng/ish trade he 
was probably content to limit his activities thus and not become involved 
in the affairs of the Sultan vassal states as his predecessors had done. 
Pindar also impressed Contarini with his calm and reasonable behaviour 
when informed of the French Ambassador's insults: 
"The Englishman replied that he was the Ambassador of a great 
and highly honoured sovereign and should be recognised as 
such; and in any case he would value others precisely as they 
valued him. And here the conversation ended, and the episode in 
the hands of anyone less temperate might have led to a more 
violent resentment." (144) 
Opposition to the establishment of a Dutch Embassy was 
somewhat uncoordinated. Pindar was initially confident that the Dutch 
had no chance of success; when he eventually offered his co-operation it 
was too late. The Dutchman Cornelius Haga spent large sums of money 
to secure a grant of Capitulations to Dutch merchants. (145) Despite the 
opposition of the other ambassadors to his reception, he soon 
established amicable relations with them as colleagues. The position of 
foreign residents in Constantinople had always been somewhat 
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insecure, dependent as they were on the goodwill of the Sultan and 
highly placed Ottoman officials to ensure that their privileges were 
observed. During Pindar's administration they found their privileges 
under attack and this situation brought the embassies into closer co-
operation. The Grand Vizier had ordered that all letters leaving 
Constantinople be intercepted and their contents read and a declaration 
was issued telling all foreign subjects to pay the Casaplik, a tax which 
contributed to the upkeep of the Janissaries, whose numbers were 
increasing. The ambassadors put forward stern resistance. It is to 
Pindar's credit that he was prepared to waive the question of precedence 
which usually prevented the English and French Ambassadors from 
meeting together in public in order that they could put forward a united 
defence of their privileges. Pindar's confidence in his own abilities and 
status meant that he felt less need to constantly insist on the full 
observance of his dignity when the foreign embassies were under such 
serious threat. All the ambassadors declared that the above protocols 
were contrary to their Capitulations. The Vizier threatened to prohibit 
imports of foreign cloth and silk if they caused trouble and to re-examine 
their various Capitulations, which implied that changes would be made to 
them. He also threatened to force all the embassies to move from Pera, in 
the suburbs of Galata on the Asian side of the Bosphorous, to the city of 
Istanbul itself, where they could be kept under close surveillance. The 
proposals to make foreigners pay the Casaplik appear to have been 
defeated. (146) However the attacks on the Capitulations continued. 
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In 1614 several clauses in the English Capitulations were 
removed, including the right to protect non-English foreign nationals; 
~tefan Bogdan had been protected under this clause. The French 
Capitulations were similarly curtailed, whilst the Venetian Capitulations 
remained intact. The Ottomans had a legitimate case for removing this 
right of protection or "extra-territoriality" because subjects of hostile rulers 
could come to the Sultan's dominions, perhaps to act as spies, and 
conduct their activities whilst under an Embassy's protection. On the 
other hand the removal of this right of protection would decrease the 
foreign ambassadors' standing and influence and also interfere with their 
right to obtain the freedom of Christian hostages and slaves. It also 
removed their right to protect their own servants and Dragomans who 
were regarded under the Capitulations to be dependents of the princes 
whom they served. In this last case pressure might be exerted on 
Dragomans to divulge secrets or act as spies, without right of redress for 
the Ambassador. The English and Dutch were later able to acquire a 
special right of protection for their Jewish Dragomans. (147) 
The concern of some Ottoman officials for the ambassadors' rights 
was minimal. In 1617, without warning, three Dragomans and the 
secretary of the French Ambassador were thrown into prison and the 
French Ambassador was accused of assisting the escape of a slave. His 
residence was surrounded and his servants interrogated; when he 
refused to admit his guilt, he was forcefully removed from his house and 
held prisoner. When the other ambassadors protested, they were 
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informed that the Vizier had contemplated attacking all their houses and 
if their French colleague did not give up the slave he would be hanged. 
They replied that the Ottomans could not have treated the ambassador 
worse if they had been at war with France. The Vizier, after reflecting on 
this, released the Frenchman. (148) 
Another threat to the embassies' special status came with a 
census of the "Franks" (West Europeans) resident in Constantinople and 
a prohibition on "Franks" passing from one district of Constantinople to 
another, which would make commercial activity very difficult. The man 
responsible for this, the Cadi Moro, published a declaration that all 
foreigners staying in Constantinople for more than a year should be 
subject to a Carazo, (this was not an innovation, merely an attempt to 
enforce an existing law) a tax devoted to the upkeep of mosques. It was 
suspected that this idea, which had been defeated before, had the 
support of the Sultan. Although a promise was received from the Vizier 
that all bachelor merchants and all Dragomans would be exempt, the 
Cadi did not suspend his attempts to force these individuals to pay. 
Dragomans were interrogated and mistreated and the French 
Ambassador complained of ill-treatment of French merchants; he 
threatened that all the foreign ambassadors would be forced to leave the 
Ottoman capital if the Capitulations were continually disregarded in this 
manner. If the ambassadors left, the merchants would leave too and the 
Sultan would lose customs revenue. The Venetian Bailo wrote: 
"I fear that harm will come to some of our Dragomans, as they can 
find no safe way of escape from this dog." 
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A major problem was that the Cadi, with his own channel of 
access to Sultan Mustafa I [1617-18], refused to accept the authority of 
the Vizier. Corrupt and greedy officials could carve out their own lucrative 
schemes for extortion, with little hope of redress for those at the receiving 
end. Nani also suspected that the Vizier had a secret understanding with 
the Cadi to turn a blind eye to his excessive zeal. When the 
ambassadors tried to act together in defence of their own interests, the 
Vizier would only see them separately on different days. They foresaw 
little hope of resolvi ng the matter quickly. 
Furthermore, in order to protect the interests of their own "nations" 
they often found themselves at cross purposes. When Pindar was 
threatened with violence against his merchants and Dragomans he 
agreed to pay the Carazo on their behalf, which undermined the efforts of 
the other ambassadors to present a united front. Nani believed that as a 
last resort the ambassadors should be recalled and merchant ships from 
their respective countries should be forbidden to come to the Ottoman 
Empire. This might force the Sultan's ministers to allow matters to resume 
their former course. Eventually bribery and threats by the ambassadors to 
leave bore fruit and an order to lift the tax was issued. Nani knew that the 
Vizier's orders were of little use against the Cadi and therefore pressed 
for an Imperial decree that the tax could not be imposed as the Cadi 
wished. His success in obtaining this decree greatly increased his 
reputation. However, the ambassadors remained convinced that the 
question of protection of foreign residents would not be allowed to 
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rest. (149) 
The perennial problem of piracy was much discussed. The 
Ottoman Viziers took the attitude that piracy was the fault of foreign ships 
and would not admit that the Sultan's subjects were also involved in such 
activities. In 1616, Pindar complained to the "Captain of the Sea" (the 
Kapudan of the Navy) that in the space of one year, one hundred English 
ships had been captured at the Straits of Marmora by Ottoman subjects; 
between 1609 and 1616 the pirates of Algiers had captured 466 English 
and Scottish ships and reduced their crews to slavery; despite numerous 
complaints on this point, which in return received numerous promises of 
action, there had been no improvement. Pindar threatened that if the 
Ottomans were unwilling or unable to conduct effective police operations 
in the Levant seas, the various Christian nations which were suffering as 
a result of this piracy would launch a united fleet to avenge themselves; 
furthermore, he threatened, if this fleet should, in the course of its police 
operation, take possession of an Ottoman seaboard the Ottomans could 
have no cause for complaint to the Christian ambassadors since their 
inaction had resulted in the victims of piracy taking matters into their own 
hands. (150) 
English pirates were also active in the Levant and were the cause 
of many complaints with which Pindar had to deal. At one stage the 
Grand Vizier claimed 300,000 zecchini in damages from Pindar. The 
English Ambassador proposed to the Levant Company that all ships 
should be sent out well-manned and heavily escorted but they were not 
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impressed, due to the expense involved. By 1617 the problem of English 
piracy was so acute and so embarrassing that there were proposals 
mooted for an English fleet to be sent against the pirates in the Levant. 
The Venetian Ambassador pointed to a major flaw in this proposal by 
asserting that the pirates only had to withdraw into safety and hide when 
the fleet arrived, then wait until its departure before they resumed 
operations. In the meantime they might take the opportunity to plunder 
towns and villages in Ottoman territories. This would make the problem 
even worse. (151) 
Pindar became impatient to leave Constantinople. However, when 
he asked the Grand Vizier for permission to depart, leaving behind a 
deputy, he was refused. The Ottomans did not want him to depart until a 
successor was provided because they had, so it is alleged, heard 
rumours of joint naval preparations by Spain, England and Holland 
against the Barbary coast to rout pirates operating there. The presenceof 
a fully-fledged English Ambassador in Constantinople would : 
"give them assurance that their Masters will not make trouble 
anywhere, under the pretext of pirates or of anything else." (152) 
Pindar, furious at the Ottoman's arrogance in detaining him, reluctantly 
agreed to remain. Yet despite their ill-treatment of him, Pindar had won 
the respect and friendship of important members of Sultan Ahmet I's 
government, including the Grand Vizier Halil Pasha, who sent Pindar a 
description of the Ottoman expedition, which he had led, into Persia, on 
his return to Constantinople in April 1618. It began thus: 
''To the courteous Lord and Nation of the Messias both Great and 
Honourable among the people of Jesus, and the true determiner 
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of Christian Affaires. Our good friend the English Ambassador, 
whose latter days bee felicitie, to whose noble presence (after our 
many kind salutations tending to all god affection and 
manifestations of Joy, worthy and beseeming our Friendship:) Our 
loving advice is this ... " 
and ended thus: 
"And this our present Letter is written unto you, for the respect and 
preservation of our Friendship: and even as our Amitie hath beene 
hithertoe sincere and firme, so likewise by the Grace of God at our 
arrival in the happie Porte, it shall bee in like manner maintayned 
and continued, that cannot possible bee ... " (153) 
Pindar was eventually allowed to depart in 1620, when the Levant 
Company recalled him, intent on replacing him with an agent. He 
returned to England via Spalato and Milan, where he received hospitality 
of the Count of Spalato and the Duke of Jena. The Count of Spalato 
described him as a person of merit and prudence, deserving of public 
favour. On his arrival in England he was knighted on 18th of January 
1620. (154) His favour at Court was considerable and he enjoyed the 
King's patronage on several occasions. This part of his career was 
described at length in the Dictionary of National Biography, articles in 
The Gentleman's Magazine and Northamptonshire Notes and Queries. 
He continued to be involved in commercial matters: in 1624 or 1626 he 
received, in company with one William Junor, a grant from King Charles I 
of the "farm" of revenue from the alum, the manufacture of which he had 
helped introduce into England with an Italian friend in the reign of 
Charles I. He had invested a large amount of money in the East and had 
brought home some splendid jewels. He lent both jewels and money to 
the Crown: around March 1639 it was estimated that his recent loans 
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amounted to 100,000 pounds: 
"for this Sir Paul never fails the King when he had most need." 
In 1643 and 1644, Pindar sent large sums in gold to the King in Oxford 
for the transportation of the Queen and her children abroad. At his death 
on 22nd August 1650, he was owed large sums of money by the Crown, 
various noblemen, the Exchequer and Dutch East India Company. Few of 
these debts were ever recovered. It seems that he used his wealth to 
gain entry at Court and to find respect and favour there. He must have 
loved the magnificence of Court life and enjoyed being in the position of 
creditor to the most powerful in the land. These powerful men took 
advantage of his generosity and ultimately took advantage of him. 
In his will, dated 24th June 1646, he left one third of his estate to 
the children of his nephew Paul, according to the Dictionary of National 
Biography which states that he never married. However, an article in 
The Gentleman's Magazine says that he had a son Thomas, the son of 
whom, Paul, was created a baronet in 1662. This is almost certainly 
mistaken, since the pedigree in the Visitation of London confirms that our 
Paul Pindar was not married. His estate was valued in 1639 at 236,000 
pounds, "exclusive of desperate and bad debts". (155) 
Pindar had been a great patron during his life. Whilst ambassador 
in Constantinople he had taken upon himself the care and education of a 
number of English youths, including a Master Robert Withers: 
"after his ten yeeres observation at Constantinople, where he was 
educated by the care and cost of the late honourable 
Embassadour from his Majestie Sir Paul Pindar and weel 
instructed by the Turkish schoole Masters in the Language, and 
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admitted also to further sight of their unholy Holies then is 
usual." (156) 
There was also one Lawrence Speght who was buried in Clapton in 
Northamptonshire on 7th March 1674 whose monument includes the 
following inscription: 
"And me [sent] to Turkey where the noble Care 
Of Sir Paul Pindar Lord Ambassador 
Did feed me, cloathe me breed me and provide 
A large subsistence for me till I dy'd 
Which I enjoyed contentedly 
As he did give me affectionately." (157) 
Pindar's provision of Robert Withers' education probably has a parallel in 
that provided by Edward Barton for Thomas Glover. 
Pindar also indulged his taste for patronage by giving 
benefactions to several churches: St. Botolphs in Bishopsgate, London, 
Wellingborough Church, Northamptonshire, St. Paul's Cathedral and 
Peterborough Cathedral. In his will he left legacies to various hospitals 
and prisons in and near London. (158) He had built for himself a 
magnificent house in Bishopsgate Street Without which was described, 
with illustration, in Thornbury's Old and New London. In the late 18th 
century the house was used as a tavern called "Sir Paul Pindar's Head", 
the sign of which was probably based on Pindar's portrait which was 
painted during his residence in Constantinople and an engraving of 
which is featured in The Gentleman'S Magazine of 1787. This house was 
pulled down in 1890 but its frontage is preserved in the Victoria and 
Albert Museum. (159) 
Pindar was buried with great ceremony at St. Botolph's Church 
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Bishopsgate on 3rd September 1650 in a gigantic leaden coffin in a vault 
adjoining the crypt. The funeral oration was preached by Nehemiah 
Rogers, Rector of that church. (160) The funeral was such an important 
occasion that three pages of its particulars are contained in the Domestic 
State Papers of that year. His epitaph was engraved on a stone of black 
marble; it read as follows: 
"Sir Paul Pindar. Ambassadour to the Turkish Emperour, anno 
1611, and resident there nine years, faithful in negotiations, 
foreign and domestic, eminent for piety, charity, loyalty and 
prudence. An inhabitant twenty-six years in this parish. A bountiful 
benefactor, deceased the 22nd of August; aged 84 years." (161) 
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CHAPTER IV: EARLY CONTACTS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND 
THE PRINCIPALITIES OF MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA 
Prior to the establishment of an English Embassy in 
Constantinople, English diplomats and Crown servants had paid some 
attention to events in the principalities. The Crown became involved with 
Petru Cercel, a pretender to the throne of Wallachia before the 
establishment of the embassy, and afterwards with loan Bogdan, a 
pretender to the Moldavian throne, the latter quite independently of the 
Levant merchants or the embassy. (1) By the 1590's, however, the 
success of the embassy and the status of the English Ambassador made 
England a major potential source of support for aspiring princes; this 
explains why Aron Voda and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) 
presented themselves to Ambassador Edward Barton in the hope of 
recruiting his influence to their cause. This chapter will re-examine the 
source material concerning English involvement with the aforementioned 
pretenders which took place over a period of thirty years. Historical 
background will be included only where strictly necessary. In order to 
elucidate the motives for England's involvement with these pretenders I 
shall compare the careers of Petru Cercel and loan Bogdan and Edward 
Barton's support of Aron with his support of Mihai Viteazul. 
The rise of the Ottoman Empire created a perception of the 
countries of Eastern Europe as the front line defence of Christendom 
against Islam; news of the military success of Vlad the Impaler in the mid 
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fifteenth century was sent to England by William Wey, an English pilgrim, 
who had heard about it in Rhodes; in 1510, during preparations for an 
anti-Ottoman alliance, the English envoy in Vienna, Sir Robert Wingfield, 
informed Henry VIII that he hoped to meet emissaries from Eastern 
Europe, including some "Vallakkys" (Vlachs), by which he probably 
meant Wallachians or Moldavians (2); in 1527 Sir John Wallop, Henry 
VIII's emissary to Hungary, met an envoy of Petru Rare~ of Moldavia. 
English diplomats in Padua and Venice kept the Lord Chancellor of 
England, Thomas Cromwell, informed of such events as Suleiman the 
Magnificent's expedition into Moldavia and the expulsion of Petru Rare~ 
from the principality. In addition to news of the shift of power in South-
East Europe in favour of the Ottoman Empire, information about internal 
pOlitics in the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania and 
the relations between the princes and their close neighbours was sent to 
England. A letter of 1561 noted that initially the Moldavian prince 
"Jacobus Heraclides Despot" enjoyed: 
''the consent of the cheife of the nobility"; 
another of 1563 sent from Vienna contained news of his murder. In 1572, 
news of Bogdan Lapu~neanu's flight to refuge in Poland was received in 
England and in 1572 of the rebellion against Petru §chiopul by the 
pretender loan Potcoava supported by the Cossacks. (3) 
The late 16th century was, for the principalities, a period in which 
the boyars assumed an increasingly powerful position in internal politics, 
appropriating land to their own control, and thereby being able to 
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exercise their political and military might in favour or against the ruling 
prince. (4) This was also a period, as we have seen, in which the 
Ottoman government had taken upon itself the right to appoint the prince. 
The turnover of ruling princes was high, some of them lasting mere 
months in power. The were also considerable numbers of aspiring 
princes awaiting the opportunity and the means to ascend the throne of 
either principality. A further development was that hereditary right to the 
throne counted for less when the Ottomans made their choice of prince. 
All of these factors afforded copious opportunities for other states or 
individuals to attempt to influence the principalities' affairs in accordance 
with their own political or religious perspectives. The English Crown's 
support for Petru Cercel and loan Bogdan, as we shall see, was 
motivated by less specific considerations than this because at this point it 
had little knowledge of, or interest in, the principalities' internal affairs; on 
the other hand Edward Barton seems to have been persuaded to 
become involved with Prince Aron and Mihai Viteazul because he had 
very particular ideas of his own about how their foreign policy should 
operate. 
The backing for Petru Cercel's accession to the Wallachian throne 
was almost exclusively French, (5) the English Crown had only a minor 
involvement; loan Bogdan initially enjoyed French support, turning to 
England for help when that failed; he was eventually reduced to 
wandering the courts of Europe in a vain search for another patron. The 
involvement of Edward Barton was instrumental in obtaining the throne of 
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Moldavia for Aron Voda; in the case of Mihai Viteazul, Barton's backing 
was important but not crucial. What all these pretenders have in common 
is that they actively sought English support. 
Cercel claimed to be the son of Patra9cu the Good (Cel Bun), a 
former Prince of Wallachia [1553-57]. He alleged that at the age of ten he 
had accompanied his elder brother (also called Patra9cu) to the Ottoman 
capital as a hostage to his father's good behaviour. After their father's 
death both boys were apparently sent to Rhodes at the request of the 
new Prince Mircea Ciobanul. In 1568 Petru was transferred to Aleppo in 
what is now Syria and the following year to Konieh in Anatolia, from 
where he escaped to Constantinople. He then moved on to Wallachia 
and attempted to regain his father's throne, before fleeing to Bra§ov. In 
1572 he was in Poland, where he enjoyed the support of Zygmund 
August [1548-72] and his elected successor Henri Valois [1573-75]. He 
was forced to flee to Vienna when Henry Valois returned to his native 
France, having incurred the enmity of Stefan Bathory, Prince of 
Transylvania, who was elected King of Poland in Valois' stead [1578-86]. 
Between 1575 and 1577 he was canvassing support amongst the 
German princes and from the Papal Legate, Cardinal Morone. Having 
achieved nothing in these quarters he moved to Genoa; he was now 33 
years old. He apparently intended to join the Christian army in Malta, but 
was persuaded instead to seek a Papal recommendation to the King of 
France. The Pope hoped to use him to further the Counter-Reformation in 
Wallachia and Petru was happy to give any impression which might 
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further his cause. In January 1579, upon his arrival in France he courted 
the favour of various influential nobles who sent letters on his behalf to 
Constantinople. (6) 
At the same time, no doubt having heard of England's intention to 
establish a diplomatic presence in Constantinople, he set about 
cultivating the English Crown as an additional source of support. He sent 
an envoy, Francois de St. Bonnet, to London, probably in January 1580, 
to present his case. St. Bonnet's efforts appear to have awakened the 
interest of Lord Burghley, the Lord Treasurer and Sir Francis 
Walsingham, the Secretary of State, although Cercel's statement that he 
was too busy to attend in person is unlikely to have pleased the Queen. 
St. Bonnet's mission was also intended to assess England's willingness 
to support him. (7) There is in existence a Latin document written in 
Burghley's own hand concerning Cercel's genealogy, probably based on 
St. Bonnet's exposition. (8) By April a decision had clearly been made to 
investigate Cercel's intentions and his chances of success with a view to 
according him some support. Cercel was in contact with Sir Henry 
Cobham, England's Ambassador in Paris, and was probably under 
investigation by Captain Jacomo Mannuci, one of Walsingham's spies. 
Once Cercel had received news from the Sultan that he might safely 
proceed to Constantinople, Queen Elizabeth offered to write on his 
behalf to the Sultan. (9) He maintained contact with Cobham throughout 
1580 to ensure England's continuing interest, even though he had been 
informed that no financial support would be forthcoming: 
ushowing him clearly the sundry causes sufficiently known by 
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which her hyghness hath ben constreyned to bestow her treasure, 
and has signified Iykwise how her Majesty must uppon the 
immynent danger compelled to procure of her subjects supply of 
great summes for to sustayne her extraordinary charges of the 
Realm." (10) 
On some occasion in 1580 Petru Cercel visited England in person, 
residing in London at the house of an Italian, Bonifaccio, in Fenchurch 
Street. This visit is most likely to have occurred soon after St. Bonnet's 
visit to London, since the Queen would undoubtedly have wanted to 
meet Petru before officially according him her support, and therefore took 
place before April. He wrote a number of letters to the Queen whilst in 
London, asking for her replies to be sent to the address in Fenchurch 
Street (11), probably first to sue for audience and then to petition, 
unsuccessfully, for financial support. 
In September 1580 Petru Cercel was given permission by the 
Ottoman Sultan to return to Constantinople. He left Paris in February 
1581, travelling first to Venice where he was received by the Senate, 
then Ragusa before arriving in the Ottoman capital where he lodged in 
the house of the French Ambassador. Despite a continual flow of letters 
of support emanating from the French Court addressed to the Sultan and 
his Ministers, Cercel became very pessimistic of his chances of success 
and considered abandoning his ambitious plans in order to return to 
France. The French Ambassador, de Germigny, continued to work 
energetically on his behalf and Petru was persuaded to remain. William 
Harborne, the English Ambassador, alleged that de Germigny had a 
particular motive for wanting for wanting Petru to remain under his 
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protection because the pretender had maintained the entire embassy 
establishment by borrowing money at interest during his three year stay; 
after his investiture as Prince of Wallachia Petru showed his gratitude by 
showering the French Ambassador with gifts. (12) 
In November 1582, Cercel took the initiative on his own behalf by 
forcing an audience with the Sultan to argue his claim to the Wallachian 
throne, in doing so he attracted the attention of the latter's principal heir 
who became an enthusiastic supporter and a powerful channel of / 
influence with the Sultan. In June 1583 Petru Cercel was nominated as 
Prince of Wallachia and presented with the symbols of his rule; he 
arrived in Wallachia in September of that year. His rule was turbulent and 
short-lived, like that of many other Wallachian princes. (13) On July 15th 
1585 William Harborne reported that Petru Cercel had escaped from 
Wallachia with money and jewels worth 116,000 ducats, but was 
apprehended by the Prince of Transylvania who confiscated his treasure 
but allowed him to escape. In January 1589 he was seen in Venice by 
one of Lord Burghley's agents; the English Crown maintained some 
interest in his fortunes until his death which seems to have occurred 
around 1590. (14) 
As the status of the English Embassy in Constantinople increased, 
the Court of Queen Elizabeth became the focus of interest amongst a 
number of leading figures in Moldavia. Thus in 1587, as we saw in the 
Introduction of this thesis, Bartolomeo Brutti offered his services and 
those of his Master, Prince Petru 9chiopul, to the Queen of England, 
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whilst at the same time pursuing friendly relations with her Ambassador 
William Harborne. This was followed in 1588 by Petru 9chiopul's grant of 
commercial privileges to the English merchants. (15) As noted in the 
Introduction, Petru 9chiopul and Bartolomeo Brutti hoped to make use of 
Queen Elizabeth's personal prestige and the influence of her 
Ambassador in Constantinople to strengthen their respective positions in 
Moldavia against the ambitions of those who pretended a claim to the 
Moldavian throne. From the point of view of the English, apart from the 
commercial advantages thereby gained in Moldavia over their 
competitors, they could expect the Prince and Brutti in particular to act as 
friendly agents of the English Crown to complement the presence of their 
Ambassador in Constantinople. 
In 1587, at the same time as Brutti and Petru 9chiopul were 
conducting their own diplomacy with the English Crown, Queen 
Elizabeth's Chief Ministers, Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham, 
came into contact with a pretender to the Moldavian throne, loan Bogdan, 
who was supposed to have been the son of Prince §tefani!a, another 
grandson of 9tefan Cel Mare. loan, who carried his genealogy with him 
on his travels, claimed that his throne had been usurped during his 
minority by Petru Rare9' ~tefan Cel Mare's son. loan's brother loan-Cel-
Cumplit, had ruled Moldavia for a short time before meeting his death in 
1574, when he was tied by his limbs to four camels which pulled at him 
tearing his body apart. Some years after this happened, loan Bogdan 
decided to go to France to seek the support of the King for his petition to 
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the Ottoman Sultan to be granted the Moldavian throne. loan 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain letters of recommendation to the 
French King from the Habsburg Emperor. Pope Gregory XIII was more 
obliging and loan arrived in France with letters addressed to Henry III 
(Henry Valois who had supported Petru Cercel). loan sent his son, whose 
name is not known, to England to seek further support there and wrote to 
Sir Francis Walsingham in August 1587. (16) Walsingham appears to 
have interested himself in loan's predicament and received his son with 
great kindness and courtesy. Queen Elizabeth did not share his 
enthusiasm, as we shall see. 
At the end of 1588, loan Bogdan left France with Henri Ill's backing 
for his attempt to persuade the Ottoman Sultan to nominate him Prince of 
Moldavia, he travelled to Venice in the company of Harlay de Sancy, the 
King's envoy. Burghley and Walsingham's spies in Venice had been 
instructed to watch him, they sent word of his arrival in the same report 
that noted the presence in Venice of the deposed Petru Cercel. (17) 
loan's good fortune ran out in Venice: Henri III was murdered and in the 
confusion caused by the interregnum, de Sancy was unwilling to 
accompany him further. Bogdan was told to continue the journey to 
Constantinople on his own and to stay in the French Ambassador's 
house whilst awaiting de Sancy's coming. The death of his patron left 
loan with no status in Constantinople. The French Ambassador (de 
Germigny) refused to welcome him, presumably not wishing to be seen 
supporting a protege of Henri III until he had been confirmed as 
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Ambassador by the new King; according to the report of the English 
Ambassador, Edward Barton, de Germigny gave his tacit approval to his 
servants' ill-treatment of the pretender and their demands for money 
which he was unable to repay. They were allowed: 
''To breake open his chamber dores, his chests and waletts and to 
take away all he had, even to his beddinge ... " (18) 
loan fled to Edward Barton's house for safety, hoping to use his 
friendship with Sir Francis Walsingham to gain help to return to Western 
Europe. Barton agreed to dispatch him as soon as possible to Venice 
from where he could travel to England, with Barton's recommendation to 
try his luck again: 
"for the obteyning of her Highnes letters to the Grand Signior in his 
favour." (19) 
Barton warned Walsingham that Bogdan's poverty meant that he had 
little chance of obtaining the Moldavian throne because of the large sums 
of money necessary for such an undertaking. Thus warned, Walsingham 
evidently decided not to give his backing to loan Bogdan; any 
enthusiasm generated by their earlier contacts had been undermined by 
the cementing of good relations with Petru 9chiopul and Bartolomeo 
Brutti, which he did not wish to destroy by backing a rival prince. His 
previous interest in loan had probably been awakened because, with 
Henry Ill's support, the pretender had had a good chance of ascending 
the Moldavian throne and Walsingham had wished to 'hedge his bets' so 
that whether loan or Petru had ruled in Moldavia, England could maintain 
its friendship with the principality's rulers. Therefore, although he was 
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kindly received, loan did not obtain any major help for his cause. 
Nevertheless he managed to cultivate the French Ambassador in London 
and with his help returned to France in 1591 to try and win the backing of 
Henri IV. The financial support he sought was not forthcoming from King 
Henri and so in July of the same year loan returned to London. Queen 
Elizabeth was not anxious to listen to his pleas and merely granted him a 
safe conduct out of England in August 1591. (20) 
loan does not appear to have been able to return to 
Constantinople, instead he was reduced to wandering the princely courts 
of Europe trying to raise money to support his cause but only being 
granted sufficient money to continue his humiliating journey to exhibit his 
genealogy and letters of recommendation. The last record of him is that 
of his attempt to raise a loan from the banker Octavian Fugger in 
Augsburg in November 1599. (21) 
A comparison of these two careers demonstrates that loan Bogdan 
probably, and Petru Cercel definitely, sought initial support from powerful 
figures in states neighbouring their principalities, in particular from 
Poland and Austria, in order to obtain some form of protection and status 
with which to approach the Sultan. These states were also regarded as 
sources of practical support such as provision of money and soldiers; 
they were close to Wallachia and Moldavia, had considerable 
experience in dealing with the Ottoman Empire and had a potential 
interest in maintaining clients on the thrones of these principalities. As we 
saw, Cercel was initially successful in gaining favour in Poland, but when 
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the balance of power in this area of Eastern Europe shifted in favour of 
Stefan Bathory, Cercel thought it wise to flee. This illustrates the 
problems inherent in involving oneself with the major protagonists in a 
region, where questions of allegiance and enmity came into play. 
Practical support from such states was, in any case, dependent on the 
state of their relations with the Ottoman Empire. Stefan Bathory was 
preoccupied with a campaign against Muscovy; any major interference in 
the affairs of one of the Sultan's vassal states would sour relations with 
the Sultan and might provoke retaliation. Bathory was himself, as Prince 
of Transylvania, a vassal of the Sultan and was therefore obliged to 
maintain cordial relations with the suzerain power. He was not interested 
in involving himself unnecessarily with an itinerant prince who could offer 
him nothing besides a genealogy and a tale of usurped rights. As Prince 
of Transylvania, Bathory must have developed a cynicism born of 
experience towards such individuals. 
Both pretenders approached the Papacy which apparently 
accorded little in the way of practical help, but which upheld the idea of a 
Christian alliance against the Ottoman Empire and hoped to extend the 
Counter-Reformation to areas where Catholicism was not the majority 
religion. France was seen as a natural ally in this, thus both men sought 
and received the Pope's recommendation to the King of France, a useful 
patron because he maintained a permanent Ambassador in 
Constantinople. The major factor in Cercel's success was that he 
enjoyed the unqualified backing of the French King through his 
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Ambassador in Constantinople. 
The election of Henri Valois to the throne of Poland had been 
intended to establish an outpost of French influence in Eastern Europe 
which would strengthen France's diplomatic and strategic position 
against her chief rival in mainland Europe:the Habsburg Empire. This 
was thwarted when Henri Valois left Poland and returned to France to 
safeguard his succession to the throne; although he continued to title 
himself King of Poland, Stefan Bathory was elected to rule in his place. 
His initial support of Cercel, whilst he was still in Poland, was motivated 
by a desire to extend French influence into Wallachia which would 
complement the position of the French Ambassador in Constantinople. 
His continued support of Cercel and his patronage of loan Bogdan was a 
continuation of this policy. Cercel was given a solid base in 
Constantinople, the French Ambassador's house, from which to operate; 
he was furnished with money to help him pursue his claim, and was in a 
pOSition to forge alliances with the Sultan's ministers and favourites; loan 
Bogdan was to have accorded the same treatment; the loss of Henri's 
support spelt the death of his ambitions to obtain the Moldavian throne. 
Neither Cercel nor Bogdan were mere passive instruments of other 
princes' foreign policy; both men were extremely active in their own 
causes, seeking protectors and arranging financial support for 
themselves. It was they who approached foreign powers, making 
promises in order to gain their help. When sources closer to the 
principalities were unwilling to help West European support was sought 
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in order to place the pretender in a position where he could acquire the 
favour of the Sultan, his Ministers and favourites. These were the people 
who would be his real masters once he gained the throne. 
I shall now turn to England's interests in the affairs of these two 
men. The patronage of Queen Elizabeth was seen as useful by both 
Cercel and loan Bogdan, but was of secondary importance to that of the 
King of France. Cercel addressed himself to the Queen via Lord 
Burghley, the Lord Treasurer, loan Bogdan via Sir Francis Walsingham, 
the Secretary of State: these were men to whom Elizabeth had delegated 
the conduct of her foreign policy. A summary of St. Bonnet's mission to 
England has survived. (22) It concentrates on putting forward the 
"legitimacy" of Cercel's title to the Wallachian throne as guaranteed by 
treaty, which had been undermined by the vindictive intrigue of the 
Ottomans; the thrust of the argument which Petru had charged St. Bonnet 
to assert was that the hereditary right of a Christian prince had been 
undermined by the infidel. This was probably carefully calculated to 
appeal to the prejudices of West European monarchs who were sensitive 
to matters of legitimate title. It outlines the process whereby tribute was 
imposed on the rulers of Wallachia and Cercel was presented as the 
rightful heir to a valiant tradition of opposition to Ottoman subjection: 
"The Princes of Valaquie in defence of their libertie opposed 
themselves aghainste the continuance of this exaction and so, 
cravinge of the aid of other princes, their neighbours and 
speciallie of the King of Hungarie have manie yea res withstoode 
this clayme aghainste those Turkish Emperors." (23) 
The Queen was reminded that the Moldavian and Wallachian princes 
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defence of their lands had for a long time prevented Ottoman penetration 
deep into Europe and that other European rulers behind the front line 
should be grateful for their efforts. 
St. Bonnet argued that Patra~cu was treacherously murdered in 
favour of Michael, a servant of Rustem Pasha, Vizier to Suleiman the 
Mag nificent: 
"The Emperor [Sultan] alledge the k. [Cercel] yong yeres and other 
great reason whye it was more conveniente to send a man of more 
age and of good experience and therefore resolved that MicheL .. 
should be their [i.e. The Wallachians'] governor duringe the 
minoritie." (24) 
Prura1cu's son, Petru Cercel, remained as a hostage to ensure Michael's 
good behaviour; however Wallachian nobles sought, according to 
Petru's story, to have the young prince restored. Upon hearing this Cercel 
escaped to Transylvania where he was sheltered by Prince Louis who 
attempted to restore him to the Wallachian throne. After Louis' death 
Petru escaped to Poland to the protection of Palatine Laski, who helped 
him gain the favour of Zygmund August, the King of Poland. Zygmund did 
not wish to get involved in the affairs of the principality and advised him 
to look to the princes of Germany for help. When Michael died, Petru was 
informed that the Sultan had refused to invest Michael's son as prince 
and anyone else with a hereditary claim to the Wallachian throne; Petru 
therefore turned to Zygmund August's successor as King of Poland: 
Henri Valois. 
From the Ottoman point of view, military imperatives at this time 
dictated that hereditary claims to the thrones of the principalities were of 
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little moment in comparison with the necessity of keeping these frontier 
buffer zones subservient and orderly. The hereditary principle was set 
aside in favour of appointment by the Sultan in order to make the ruling 
prince beholden to those who had placed him there. This was reinforced 
by the practice of keeping hostages to good behaviour; the presence of 
pretenders potentially worked in the Ottoman's favour because it 
reminded the incumbent prince that he could be replaced. The presence 
of a boy on the throne of either of the principalities presented many 
potential difficulties because the child would be vulnerable to the 
influence of relatives, advisers and others whom the Ottomans did not 
control, unless they were prepared to place their own troops in the 
principality which would provoke much opposition. The presence of a 
boy would mean that there was no-one with military experience on the 
throne to lead the defence of the principalities or to organise the raising 
of levies in time of war. The support of boyars was no longer the most 
important factor involved in gaining the Moldavian throne, it was however 
important for the prince if he were to rule successfully. 
Cercel's story as revealed in this document contains certain 
omissions, notably he neglected to mention the role of the Papacy in 
obtaining the favour of the King of France, since this is likely to have 
been disapproved of in England, Queen Elizabeth having been 
excommunicated in 1578. Nor did Petru mention his elder brother who 
was a hostage of the Sultan and would have a prior claim to the throne if 
he were still alive. Burghley was given no reason to doubt that Petru 
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Cercel was indeed the son of patra~cu. ~tefan Pajcu's biography of the 
pretender, based on the narrative of his servant, Francisco Sivori, (25) 
points out that he was accepted as genuine in every court he visited and 
that Sivori, who spent years in Petru's company, did not entertain the 
possibility that his master was a fraud. Rumours that Cercel was not who 
he said he was surfaced only after he was elected Prince of Wallachia. 
William Harborne reported that Petru was said to be one Alexandru, the 
son of an Orthodox priest: 
"of an obscure familie in the morea ... [who] coulde so long 
shaddow his base birth under the princelie Iynage of the 
anncyente Voyvodes of the Wallachia, and through an aspiringe 
mynde endowed with singular guiftes of knowledge in sondry 
tongues abuse both Sigismonde and the French Henrie, late King 
of Poland." 
Alexandru was said to have been a servant of a former prince of 
Wallachia's adviser who had been forced to look for a new livelihood 
after he had dissipated the fortune which had come to him after the death 
of his wealthy wife; he had hit upon the plan to present himself as the true 
Prince of Wallachia. Harborne reported that this story emanated from 
those closest to Petru although not Sivori: 
"a certain Genovaies long time in service to his predecessors 
banished and now in chief credit with him." (26) 
William Harborne was not a man to have been easily taken in by 
malicious gossip and it is likely that he repeated this story of Petru's 
origins only because it was widely reported and believed. However he 
may have been unaware of Burghley's interest in the matter and 
therefore reported the facts as he heard them without further 
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investigation. It is possible that this story was put about by those who had 
a grudge against Cercel, perhaps having fallen out of favour with him, or 
having been passed over in the new prince's affections in favour of 
Sivori, in an attempt to ruin his reputation in Constantinople and 
adversely effect his reception in Wallachia. This would explain why these 
rumours emerged after his investiture. It is also possible that Harborne 
was predisposed to believe them since, as he repeated frequently, 
Cercel was a protege of the King of France and his Ambassador in 
Constantinople and could be expected to forward French interests. There 
is a note of glee in his correspondence at the idea of the French being 
taken in by a charlatan. The French Ambassador's successful backing of 
Petru Cercel seems to have provoked some jealousy in William 
Harborne. In any case the genuineness of Cercel's claim, or the lack of it, 
did not prevent his investiture. 
Prior to according Cercel his nomination as Prince of Wallachia, 
the Sultan and his advisers had objected to his claim on the grounds that 
he was a bastard son of Patra§cu by one of his many concubines. P.P. 
Panaitescu has, however, argued that Petru must have been legitimate 
because his three sons were recognised as kinsmen by the Baleanu 
family. Furthermore, he states that the Vornic Iva~cu Baleanu and the 
Ban Udrea Baleanu must have been Petru's cousins because Voica 
B~ileanu, their aunt, was Patra9cu's one and only wife. (27) If Petru and 
his sons were recognised and acknowledged inside Wallachia as 
legitimate descendants of Patrascu then the rumours reported by 
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Harborne were probably malicious gossip. Moreover, the Ottomans' 
questioning of Petru's mother's marital status was merely an excuse to 
block Cercel's claim, since, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was 
extremely common for an illegitimate son of a prince to be nominated to 
the thrones of the principalities. The significant pOint here is that Petru's 
acceptance as a kinsman by the Baleanu family, makes it highly unlikely 
that Petru was an impostor, as his enemies claimed. 
Cercel's brief reign was most notable for the greed and corruption 
of the prince. According to William Harborne he strenuously promoted 
French interests in South-East Europe at the expense of English ones. 
When the English Ambassador tried to court Cercel's favour the prince 
appeared to respond with friendship but was obliged to put French 
interests first because he needed the continued support of the French 
Ambassador in Constantinople if he was to remain in power. This 
resulted in what Harborne regarded as treachery: he accused the prince 
of working maliciously against the interests of English merchants. 
Harborne did not report what Petru was supposed to have done but he 
asserted that: 
"[Cercel's] ... services our contraries have used to the uttermost of 
our prejudice" 
The phrase "our contraries" probably refers to France and Harborne was 
probably referring to the treatment of English merchants in Wallachia; 
however, another explanation of this phrase is that Cercel had contacts 
with other rivals of England such as Venice and the Habsburgs who were 
anxious to prevent an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Spain: princes in 
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Cercel's position could not afford to be exclusive in their associations. 
Harborne's verdict upon Cercel contains a certain grudging admiration: 
"A commendable worldly wit, refined by experience of continual 
exercise, notwithstanding greatly spotted with vicious actions of 
his life... From which Janus two-faced sectaries, God deliver 
us ... " (28) 
People who struggle against great odds to win power often 
develop strengths which others abhor; Petru Cercel had shown political 
skill and intelligence in his search for patrons; he was knowledgeable 
about the current state of Sultan's household and government and was 
able to instruct Queen Elizabeth to whom she should write: 
" ... unto the Mother of the Great Turke by whom he is much 
governed as aliso to his Firste Bassa Ahmato and to the Admiral of 
the sea Lucialli, by whom all this Prince's affairs must be 
managed." (29) 
Cercel had also ensured that he presented himself to the consideration 
of those in the Queen's government who were most influential in foreign 
affairs, that is Burghley and Walsingham, and in doing so he had 
deliberately offered himself as an instrument of the Queen's affairs 
abroad. This introduced Burghley and Walsingham to the idea of 
pursuing relations with potentially important individuals such as Cercel 
and loan Bogdan to complement the activities of the embassy in 
Constantinople. 
Two letters affirm the favourable reception in England of loan 
Bogdan's son when on a mission to obtain Queen Elizabeth's patronage 
for his father: 
"he affirmeth his sonne to have been formerlye favourablie 
entertayned by your Honnour ... Walsingham]." (30) 
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In a letter of 1587 from loan Bogdan to Sir Francis Walsingham, the 
former referred to the greats benefits already bestowed upon him at 
Walsingham's intercession and "by his means", he also mentioned 
previous correspondence and referred to the Secretary of State as a 
friend. Walsingham monitored loan Bogdan's progress with a view to 
making use of him in the future. If Bogdan been placed on the Moldavian 
throne he would have tried to make use of his friendship with the Queen 
of England through the English Ambassador, his own ambassadors and 
by using his son as an intermediary. Initially loan Bogdan chances of 
success were probably similar to those of Petru Cercel; circumstances 
changed as we have seen, and Edward Barton advised Walsingham not 
to support loan Bogdan unless he could persuade Queen Elizabeth to 
make a large financial commitment to the pretenders cause. 
In his previous correspondence Barton had remarked upon the 
poor status of pretenders to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia and 
their vulnerability to the deception of unscrupulous Ottoman officials as 
well as to the vengeance of their rivals: 
"The three Grekish gentlemen I formerly certified your Honnour to 
have affected the government of Wallachia, Bogdania and 
Moldavia had the same success I had forfeared: the one dieng in 
the waie, being poyzoned by his friends to shunne the discreadit 
might come to his parents by his ignominious death: the second in 
Bogdania boored through the nose with a hot iron, a part of his 
eares cutt off and kepte in chaynes, the thirde handled after the 
same sorte, but put to certaine taylors to learne to sewe ... " (31) 
It is not clear why Barton referred to Bogdania and Moldavia as if they 
were separate princedomes, when we saw in Chapter I that the term 
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Bogdania was usually used to refer to the Principality of Moldavia as a 
whole, although it was sometimes used to refer to some portion of what 
later came to be called Bessarabia, which was part of the principality of 
Moldavia. This suggests in 1589, the time of Barton's writing, he was 
somewhat ignorant of the principality's affairs. 
Burghley and Walsingham maintained their interest in the 
principalities but no longer wished to become involved in the affairs of 
pretenders to their thrones. Jacomo Manucci, Walsingham's spy, visited 
Moldavia and Wallachia in 1585, the year of Cercel's overthrow, on his 
way home to England from Constantinople, having been granted a safe 
conduct and letters of introduction by the Sultan. The two ministers also 
followed Edward Barton's activities on behalf of Aron and Mihai 
Viteazul. (32) There were possible commercial advantages to be accrued 
from establishing friendly relations with rulers in the area but their chief 
motivation was a more general desire to extend England's influence in 
Europe. The late sixteenth century was a period in which the Crowns of 
Western Europe were extending their influence eastwards; the English 
Crown was jockeying for position with other states, both politically and 
commercially. In attempting to do this rulers maintained agents, both 
official and unofficial, to supply information, assist in negotiations or 
merely facilitate good relations with the most influential powers; they 
could also be expected to give assistance to the ruler's subjects 
travelling abroad on business. Bogdan and Cercel were intended by the 
French to act in this capacity; Burghley and Walsingham were persuaded 
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by the idea of assisting these two men to prevent the French from 
excluding English influence from the principalities altogether. 
England's major rival in Europe was Spain. The two pretenders 
were not in a position to support the English against Spain and it was not 
for this purpose that Burghley and Walsingham were interested in them. 
However, they were in a position to be of some use in confounding the 
interests of the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty on its eastern 
borders: 
"Wherefore, if occasion serve, no opportunitie is to be ommitted to 
compound all discontents with neighbours abroade, so as the 
same may be with the honnour of God and benefitt of the Realme 
and to procure as much friendshipp as may beilest by sufferinge 
thinges to runne on carelesslie at randome, our enemies prevent 
us of the meanes and they cannot be recovered when we would 
wish it." (33) 
As we already know loan Bogdan promised to send ambassadors 
to England once he ascended the Moldavian throne. It is unlikely that 
Cercel and Bogdan were expected to act as spies or agents; they might 
however be useful i~ less specific ways: friends of England, perhaps 
providing the English Ambassador with information on the activities of 
Poland, Austria and the Ottoman Empire, and forwarding English 
diplomacy in Eastern Europe by showing favour towards the English 
Ambassador's agents who passed through Moldavia and Wallachia. 
William Harborne concurred with such a policy; therefore he pursued 
good relations with Bartolomeo Brutti and Petru 9chiopul. Edward Barton 
also tried to cultivate favourable relations with the princes of Moldavia 
and Wallachia and enjoyed friendly relations with Bartolomeo Brutti. 
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However, both Harborne and Barton were cautious about the extent of 
their involvement in the affairs of the Sultan's vassals because the 
success of their embassies was dependent upon their host's goodwill 
and favour. 
Bartolomeo Brutti did not confine his ambitions to maintaining his 
influence in Moldavia. As we have seen he was instrumental in the 
accordance of commercial privileges in Moldavia to English merchants in 
order to attract the attention of the Queen of England and offer her his 
services; he was in good odour with the King of Poland, Zygmund III Vasa 
[1587-1632] and used his service of Poland's interests to attract the 
attention of Queen Elizabeth once again. In 1590 it was reported that 
Brutti might travel to England on behalf of King Sigismund and that, 
whilst serving his Master, would: 
"behave himself verie wisely, both in word and deed maynteyning 
the honour and credit of her Majesty." 
A few months after this report, Brutti wrote from Warsaw to Queen 
Elizabeth, reaffirming his readiness to serve her; she replied to thank him 
for his services but did not, as Brutti may have hoped, suggest that he 
serve her further in any capacity. (34) Brutti wrote as Chief Minister to the 
Prince of Moldavia to express his gratitude at the favour shown him by 
Edward Barton particularly with regard to his successful negotiations to 
maintain the peace between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. One may 
surmise that Brutti was trying to draw the Queen's attention to England's 
shared interest in keeping the peace between these two states. The 
Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia feared war because they would be 
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obliged to become involved and furthermore any occupation of their 
princedoms by Ottoman forces might result in them being taken under 
direct rule. 
As we saw in Chapter II, Queen Elizabeth also wished to prevent 
the Sultan going to war against Poland. It is certain that Brutti was used 
as an intermediary with the King of Poland in the negotiations to maintain 
the peace. Friendship with men such as Brutti, Petru Schiopul and later 
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Prince Aron made it possible for Barton's agents to travel safely via 
Moldavia to Poland, where they could conduct the Ambassador's 
business and take ship in the Baltic to England in greater safety than was 
possible in the Mediterranean, where attacks on merchant shipping were 
a major hazard. For a short period, until war broke out between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs, the route home to England via 
Moldavia and Poland became a preferred route home for the 
ambassador's staff and for private business men with small amounts of 
baggage to return to England in safety. Thomas Wilcox, Barton's agent, 
dealt on the ambassador's behalf with both Bartolomeo Brutti and Prince 
Aron in just this way, whilst travelling to England on his Master's 
business; it was into his care that Brutti entrusted his letter to Queen 
Elizabeth. 
Queen Elizabeth was content to take up offers of service and allow 
her ambassadors to pursue good relations with the princes of Moldavia 
and Wallachia only to the extent that she was not required to commit 
herself to any financial expenditure. She was prepared to give letters of 
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recommendation to Petru Cercel and loan Bogdan because she 
expected that if they were successful their gratitude to her might be of use 
to her subjects or her embassy in the future. She expected them to 
arrange the financial backing for their campaigns from other sources, just 
as she expected the Levant Company to pay for her Ambassador in 
Constantinople although she intended to use him to conduct her own 
diplomacy. She paid for gifts for the Sultan and the Queen Mother 
because this was standard protocol and she expected results in the form 
of Ottoman co-operation against Spain. Expenditure upon schemes to 
support the election of the Sultan's vassal princes, of whose usefulness 
to her foreign policy she had yet to be convinced, was of little interest to 
her. 
Edward Barton's involvement in the elections of Aron to the throne 
of Moldavia and Mihai Viteazul to throne of Wallachia was not directed 
from London. Barton enjoyed the favour of both the Sultan's who ruled 
during his embassy; as we saw in Chapter III, he also had the respect 
and liking of the Mufti Mehemed Bostanzade and the Viziers Ferhad 
Pasha and Sinan Pasha; he was also friendly with Cigalla, the Kapudan 
of the Ottoman Navy and Sadeddin the "Hoggie" [Khoja Efendi sa'd al 
Din], Imperial tutor and Ottoman historian, as well as being a friend and 
patron of Meletius Pigas, at that time Patriarch of Alexandria and later 
Patriarch of Constantinople. Barton's position of influence In 
Constantinople made him ideally placed to be approached by 
pretenders. Nevertheless out of the numbers of pretenders said to haunt 
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the courts of Europe, Barton only lent his support to two, both of whom 
already had powerful backing. Barton had neither reason nor inclination 
to lend his weight to causes which did not already have a good chance of 
succeeding, since to do so would not have enhanced his reputation. On 
the other hand were he to be instrumental in the investiture of a prince of 
either Moldavia or Wallachia, his prestige in Constantinople would 
increase and he would place himself and his embassy in a position 
whereby he could be even more useful to the Sultan as a man of 
influence with one of his vassals, thereby serving to increase his favour 
with Sultan Murat III. Barton's enthusiasm for the causes of pretenders 
should not be over-estimated and he clearly attempted to avoid 
becoming financially involved with any of them. In the cases of both Aron 
and Mihai Viteazul he was approached by their supporters who 
persuaded him to lend his assistance to their causes and the desired 
result were achieved swiftly. He was never in a position where he had to 
pursue the matter with the persistence of De Germigny in the case of 
Petru Cercel, or of Sir Thomas Glover, in the case of 9tefan Bogdan. 
As we know, Barton and Meletius Pigas considered that the 
Protestant and Orthodox churches shared a common cause against 
Roman Catholic proselytising. Both Barton and William Harborne had 
been concerned at the successes of the Counter-Reformation in 
Moldavia. Under the patronage of Bartolomeo Brutti, Jesuits had been 
invited into Moldavia in 1588 after their expulsion from Transylvania. 
Brutti had allowed the Jesuits a free hand to convert Petru 9chiopul's 
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subjects, particularly in those areas with Hungarian and Saxon 
majorities. The so-called "Hussites", who were in fact followers of several 
Protestant churches, had been expelled from their churches and their 
liberty to practise their own religion was curtailed. Petru, probably under 
Brutti's influence, ordered his Catholic subjects to obey the Jesuits and 
encouraged Catholic propaganda from Poland. Pigas had lent himself to 
the campaign to convince Barton to support Aron as an anti-Jesuit 
candidate. Aron promised Barton that he would restore the "Hussites" to 
their churches and liberties when he became prince. 
Barton successfully petitioned the Ottoman Divan to invest Aron 
as Prince of Moldavia, only to find that the Greek merchants backing him 
could not furnish the money they had promised. The English 
Ambassador now found himself in a difficult position; gratuities were 
expected by those who had engineered the choice of Aron; Barton would 
be made to look ridiculous if, after all that had been done, Aron could not 
be invested because those who had appointed him were not paid the 
money they had been led to expect. If this were to happen the next time 
Barton offered a gift or bribe he would not be trusted and his favour with 
people of influence close to the Sultan would be diminished. Therefore, 
when other merchants interested in backing Aron came forward with 
offers of finance, Barton was persuaded to stand surety and also to invest 
some of his own money; other Englishmen, including Thomas Wilcox and 
Richard Babington, also raised money so that the sums required to 
purchase Aron's princedom could be reached. Aron purchased a 
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diamond ring for the Sultan and an emerald girdle for the Sultana Isachi, 
valued at 25,000 Crowns, from one Charles Elman, with Barton standing 
surety, a sum which was never repaid. Barton thus became much more 
involved in the pretender's affairs than he had originally intended. (35) 
Aron ascended the throne already burdened with debts. Not only 
was he required to reimburse his creditors, he was also expected to 
honour the debts of his predecessor. Furthermore, continued Ottoman 
support had to be bought. None of this made his task of maintaining 
himself on the Moldavian throne any easier. No doubt Aron, like many of 
his predecessors and those who occupied the throne after him, made 
provisions for his inevitable overthrow: no prince of Moldavia, cognizant 
of the fact that the average reign in that principality lasted less than ten 
years, could afford to be overthrown only to find himself penniless. 
Meanwhile, in order not to become responsible for Aron's debts, Edward 
Barton had to support his protege in Constantinople to ensure that he 
remained on the throne. Aron's costly present to the Sultan was paid for 
by Barton; in Moldavia extra taxes were levied which were said to have 
demanded an ox from every family in the land. (36) Aron managed to 
alienate so many of his boyars that those of their number who fled 
Moldavia to take up residence in Constantinople secured his overthrow. 
He was replaced in June 1592 by Alexander the Bad (Cel Rau). 
Aron's overthrow was a blow to Barton's standing in 
Constantinople which had reached new heights when his protege was 
invested; it also left him exposed financially since he had stood as Aron's 
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surety. (37) It was therefore imperative that the prince was restored. 
Barton canvassed the support of the commanding officers of the 
Janissary Corps and that of the Prince of Transylvania, Sigismund 
Bathory. The good relations built up between Barton and Bathory was to 
result in the latter approaching Barton to support his own candidate to the 
throne of Wallachia, that is Mihai Viteazul. The English Ambassador's 
gratitude for Bathory's intervention was called upon and Barton provided 
a quid pro quo by giving his support to MihaL Aron was restored to the 
Moldavian throne in October 1592 through the support of Ottoman and 
Janissary forces. Barton was determined to ensure that Aron now fulfilled 
the promises made before his first investiture. Not only had he failed to 
pay his debts, he had also neglected to restore the liberties of the 
UHussites". Thomas Wilcox and Richard Babington accompanied Aron to 
lasi as Barton's representatives in order to put pressure on him to carry 
out his obligations to his protectors. Wilcox managed to extract a 
promise: 
Uthat everyone of the credytors accordinge to the quantitie of thear 
debts receave part of their payments dewringe my abroad in 
Bugdania" (38) 
Wilcox was still attempting to recover his and his Master's money when 
Aron was deposed for the second time in May 1595. He owed Edward 
Barton more than 30,000 pounds He was much more successful in his 
second task to ensure that Aron kept a promise to reinstate the 
UHussites": 
UAron present Prince of Bugdania, her Majesty's servant upon 
motion made by Barton in her Majesties name hath restored the 
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libertye of custoumes to the Hussites and redilivered their 
churches to them ... as formerly thaey had there ... " (39) 
Barton was convinced that he was acting in England's interests 
and did not consider that he was obliged to await official approval from 
London before proceeding: 
"this maie be compassed without suspition of her majesties 
knowlage or practise therof, for that the Ambassador needeth no 
other mediator then himself ... " (40) 
Barton's diplomatic activities, undertaken on his own initiative, were 
presented as evidence by his enemies that he exceeded his authority as 
ambassador. His friendships with high-ranking Ottoman officials and the 
interest and admiration with which he studied oriental customs and 
religion were regarded with suspicion and in Constantinople and in 
London, a city he had not visited since the English Embassy was first 
established. Furthermore, his concentration on affairs of state and 
information gathering caused him to employ people skilled in these 
matters, whose outside associations lead to accusations that they were 
involved in activities hostile to the Ottoman Empire. 
It was a frequent complaint of the English mercantile community in 
the Levant, under Barton and his successors, that time spent in 
conducting business unconnected with their commercial interests was 
neglectful of those interests. After his death Barton was held up to his 
successors as an ideal ambassador in his devotion to the interests of 
English merchants; he was not universally regarded so during his own 
embassy. Barton found himself open to attack from those who wished to 
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destroy his favour with the Queen and the Lord Treasurer. Charges were 
brought against Barton by three merchants accusing him of unduly 
increasing embassy expenses by employing agents such as Wilcox and 
several foreigners including Paolo Mariani, who was alleged to have 
confiscated the property of English Merchants. Paolo Mariani was the 
prime mover behind Aron's campaign. Mariani had substantial contact 
with the Levantine business world and acted as intermediary between 
Barton and Aron's brokers. Aron had the backing of a consortium of 
Levantine merchants who had promised to furnish the money necessary 
to purchase the support of influential figures close to Sultan Murat. 
Mariani was a highly influential man in Constantinople who acted as the 
joint Anglo-French Consul in Cairo for some years and was now 
employed as an agent and spy by the English Embassy where he 
enjoyed immense influence over Edward Barton. John Sanderson, who 
had been appointed his vice-consul in 1585, described him, with his 
customary lack of generosity, thus: 
"Paolo his witt was a maker of Patriarcks and Princes, a setter up 
and puller down of them and ambassiators, a poysoner and filthy 
liver, a wars and peace maker, a garboyler ... [i.e. a maker of 
tumults]." 
Barton owed much of his success as patron to the efforts of 
Mariani who acted as "fixer" behind the scenes for the ambassador. , 
Sanderson remarked upon Mariani's great influence with Edward Barton, 
referring to him as the Ambassador's counsellor and adviser. Mariani, 
Aron and Meletius Pigas, now Patriarch of Constantinople, approached 
Barton for his support in the campaign to secure the election of Aron to 
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the Moldavian throne. One may surmise that it was Paolo Mariani who 
persuaded Barton that Aron might be useful to English interests, 
apparently presenting the pretender to him as a man: 
"better effected in religion then the rest and that was supposed to 
be less Spanishe." (41) 
The three merchants, Gabriel Whettenhall, Thomas Belk and 
Thomas Butterworth, alleged that Barton was totally enthralled by Mariani 
and was unable to control his activities or those of other members of his 
household. Barton's supporters countered these aspersions upon his 
good name with the explanation that Mariani was employed because he 
was a man of great judgment and experienced in dealing with the 
Ottomans. His usefulness to the embassy in providing intelligence and 
facilitating embassy business had been of great service to the English 
nation. Furthermore Barton trusted his loyalty and did not think that he 
was a Spanish agent as his enemies alleged. 
Barton's enemies accused Gabriel, the servant of his agent, 
Thomas Wilcox, of putting the embassy in great peril by forging coinage 
which had subsequently been used by Barton to pay his expenses. 
Barton defended himself and Wilcox by pointing out his endeavours to 
protect English trade and in the service of the Queen to procure an 
Ottoman Armada against the Spanish fleet. He had also done much to 
assist the King of France, Henri IV, by procuring the Sultan's recognition 
of the new King's Ambassador and the detention of the ambassador's 
predecessor who had been sympathetic to the Holy League. The 
expense of employing Wilcox was more than justified by his services in 
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procuring the Ottoman peace with Poland in 1590, assisting the King of 
France and obtaining the expulsion of the Spanish agent in 
Constantinople and imprisonment of his spies. Furthermore Wilcox was 
in great favour at the Polish Court and had also been honoured by her 
Majesty the Queen. 
Barton's supporters alleged that Belk, Butterworth and Whettenhall 
had made these accusations against Wilcox out of jealousy because 
.they were angry that Barton chose to employ foreigners at his embassy 
and ignore them. Barton alleged that they lacked judgment and 
discretion and were in any case of little use to him because they did not 
have the requisite language skills. They were also, he said, lazy and 
unco-operative they had refused to travel to Poland to inform the King of 
the peace which Barton had negotiated with the Ottomans. Wilcox went 
to Poland in their place. Being unable to attack Wilcox directly because of 
his favour with the King of Poland and Queen Elizabeth, the three 
merchants decided, Barton said, to attack him through his servant Gabriel 
with the accusation of "stamping false coin". 
The three merchants assisted a bitter enemy of Barton, Don 
Solomon, the Duke of Mylilene (also known as Alvaro Mendes, a 
prominent Portuguese Jew), carrying letters from him to the Queen's 
physician, Dr. Lopez. These letters alleged that Barton had been 
recruited as a Spanish agent by Mariani. Don Solomon also spread word 
in Constantinople that through his friendship with Dr. Lopez he had 
procured Barton's dismissal from the embassy. Don Solomon intended to 
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discredit Barton through his associates; the English Ambassador was 
labelled a fool who had been duped by Aron's supporters, amongst 
whom were David Passi and Moshe Benevisti. Both Passi and Benevisti 
seem to have been on the embassy payroll; Don Solomon alleged that 
they were both agents of the King of Spain. The timing of this attack on 
Barton suggests that it was part of a campaign to prevent Aron's 
reinstatement in Moldavia by discrediting his patron. (42) 
On March 22 1592, Lord Burghley wrote to Don Solomon on 
Queen Elizabeth's instructions to assure him of her high regard and 
inform him that it was not through her desire that Barton employed and 
protected Mariani and David Passi, alleged enemies of the Ottoman 
Empire, and allowed them to act against him. These allegations may 
have damaged Barton's reputation in Constantinople and they were 
taken sufficiently seriously in England for Barton to dispatch Wilcox to 
England on a mission to explain the reasons for his involvement with 
Aron and Mariani. The Fugger bankers in Germany received news of the 
extent of the Queen of England's disapproval of her Ambassador's 
involvement in affairs unsanctioned by her: 
"Letters came to the Queen of England's agent here [Le. in 
Constantinople] in which she bitterly reproaches him for 
neglecting her affairs and those of her merchants with the Porte, 
and working for his own advantage. Thus he tried to install the 
Wiowodes of Moldavia and Transylvania [presumably Wallachia 
was meant here here] as Patriarchs exactly as though she was 
unable to pay him decently for the services he performed and 
provide him with a livelihood." (43) 
Revelations about Barton's embassy's activities did not disappear. 
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In 1594 the French Ambassador alleged that Mariani was a Spanish 
agent. At first the charges were ignored, but in 1595 he produced enough 
evidence that he was passing information about Turkish forces to Spain 
to have Mariani hanged. (44) Another of Aron's supporters was a 
Monsieur de Planca, whom John Sanderson later came to suspect 
Mariani of having murdered. 
Some of the charges against Barton were precipitated by his 
involvement with Aron. It is possible, viewed in the context of Aron's 
subsequent behaviour, that the pretender was selected a protege by 
Mariani and other alleged Spanish agents because he could be 
persuaded to rebel against the Sultan if war broke out between the 
Ottomans and the Habsburgs. If Barton had remained aloof from the 
pretender's affairs as he had intended, he could have prevented himself 
becoming closely identified with Mariani's less than scrupulous 
associates. However, Barton was not greatly discouraged by the 
criticisms made of his conduct; he was confident of his abilities as a 
diplomat and succeeded in riding the storm. As we know, in 1596 he 
once again incurred criticism in England by accompanying the Sultan to 
war against the Habsburgs; he did so because he knew that his 
negotiating skills could be of use in negotiations between the opposing 
sides and the goodwill and respect of the Sultan, earned by his 
endeavours, could only make his other duties as ambassador easier. 
To return to Aron: Barton seems to have been deceived by Mariani 
as to the pretender's usefulness to his own plans. Barton's set out his 
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own conception of the drift of events in Eastern Europe: 
"The Austrians daily practise to make breach of the peace 
concluded betwixt the Pole and the Grand Seignieur, for that the 
Emperour of Germany seeketh all meanes possible to place his 
younger brother King of Poland, which would be much preiudiciall 
to her Majesties' well-wishers." (45) 
Barton's principal policy objective was to oppose Habsburg influence in 
the principalities and Poland. England currently enjoyed good relations 
with Poland and Barton had established himself in the favour of Jan 
Zamoyski, the anti-Habsburg Chancellor of Poland, who had successfully 
opposed the election of a Habsburg candidate to the Polish throne on 
three occasions. Barton considered that a Habsburg King of Poland 
would not favour diplomatic or trade relations between England and 
Poland; he was also aware that if the Ottoman Empire went to war with 
Poland, the Habsburg Empire would inevitably involve itself in any 
conflict. Two possible outcomes of this eventuality were equally 
undesirable: Moldavia and Wallachia might be annexed either by the 
Ottomans or the Habsburgs, thereby destroying the buffer zones, made 
up by these two principalities and Transylvania, which existed between 
them; if this happened, relations between the two power blocks would 
remain constantly unstable. 
Barton probably hoped to use his influence with Aron as a means 
to maintain peace between Poland and the Ottomans in the same way as 
he had made use of his good relations with Bartolomeo Brutti. Barton 
probably also intended to procure the aid of Moldavia and Wallachia and 
to oppose the election of an Austrian candidate to the Polish throne. 
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Barton outlined his concerns and asked the Queen for further instructions 
and for her authority to proceed in this way. If Zamoyski or the Prince of 
Transylvania asked him to win the assistance of Aron or Mihai Viteazul 
against the Habsburgs he would not have time to send to England for 
advice or wait for an answer. (46) It was for this reason that Barton built 
up good relations with Sigismund Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania, 
and the two men co-operated with each other in support of Aron and 
Mihai Viteazul. With the latter he was careful to limit his involvement and 
thus avoid the mistake he had made when he became financially 
involved with Aron. Barton merely added his recommendation to that of 
Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and Mihai's relatives lancu and 
Andronicus Cantacuzine. Mihai acknowledged himself indebted to 
Barton through his entertainment of Edward Bushell and William 
Aldridge, who travelled through Wallachia in April 1594. (47) 
If Barton had expected to use either prince as a tool of his own 
policies, he was greatly mistaken. It should be noted that out of the many 
pretenders who claimed the thrones of the principalities only the most 
courageous, cunning and persistent were ever likely to realise their 
claims. Once the princes mounted the thrones they knew that their 
chances of remaining in place for any length of time were small unless 
they were prepared to do all in their power to protect their positions. Both 
Aron and Mihai conceived that once war broke out between the 
Ottomans and the Habsburgs, their best chance of breaking away from 
Ottoman suzerainty lay in aligning themselves with the Habsburg 
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Emperor. Much has been written about Mihai's revolt against Ottoman 
rule and the extent to which this revolt was either planned or 
opportunistic. Whatever the truth is, Edward Barton was not involved. 
Indeed in 1597 he tried to reconcile Sigismund Bathory of Transylvania 
and the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Sultan after all three 
had aligned themselves with the Habsburg Emperor. 
One may conclude that, whatever Edward Barton's ambitions, the 
English Crown did not conceive of the English Embassy's role in 
Constantinople as being that of a major power-broker. However, the 
English Crown and its representatives became involved in European 
affairs in order to increase English influence throughout Europe to rival 
that of Spain, France and Austria. Barton, on the other hand, successfully 
established himself as an intermediary and mediator between the great 
powers in Eastern Europe and could therefore make informed 
judgments about where England's interests lay. This policy was 
essentially an opportunist policy, since in all cases outlined in this 
chapter, the English Crown and the English Embassy were responding to 
overtures made to them because they were in a position to offer help, 
initially because of Queen Elizabeth's reputation in Europe and later 
because of the presence of the English Embassy in Constantinople and 
its increasing importance in the region. France had been in the same 
position in previous decades. 
Thus England set up precedents of involvement in one of the more 
distasteful aspects of Balkan politics and in the affairs of a number of 
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highly unscrupulous individuals, which culminated in the patronage of 
9tefan Bogdan. It would not be unfair to state that Petru Cercel and 
Aron's main motivation for ascending the thrones of their respective 
principalities was that in doing so they were in effect purchasing the 
highly lucrative right to levy taxes. Barton expressed his disillusionment 
with Aron: 
''the present most ungrateful Prince of Bugdania who, having been 
twice preferred by my meanes, and once saved from the gallows, 
and owing me sixty thousand duckets, not onely hithertoe hath not 
paid me one penny, but seeketh to fly into Hungary when he 
should be deposed." (48) 
The example of Barton's involvement with Aron contained lessons for his 
successors which were appreciated by both Henry Lello and Sir Thomas 
Glover when they were presented with letters of recommendation on 
behalf of 9tefan Bogdan. As we shall see, neither man welcomed the 
task of making representations on behalf of a pretender whose chances 
of success were not great and who, even if he did succeed in persuading 
the Sultan to invest him as prince, would remain a burden upon the 
embassy's resources for at least as long as he remained on the throne. 
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CHAPTER V: IANCU SASUL, HIS SON BOGDAN AND 
IEREMIE MOVILA: CONCERNING THE INSTALLATION OF 
PRINCES ON THE MOLDAVIAN THRONE IN THE LAST 
QUARTER OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 
Bogdan Sasul, who later became known as §tefan Bogdan, laid 
claim to the throne of Moldavia as a direct descendent of three former 
rulers of the principality: as great-grandson of ~tefan Cel Mare; grandson 
of Petru Rares and son of lancu Sasul (the Saxon). lancu's own career is ) 
relevant to this chapter because he acquired the Moldavian throne, 
which he ruled between 1579 and 1582, using methods similar to those 
later employed by Petru Cercel and Aron Voda. In effect the last decades 
of the sixteenth century saw the emergence of a standard route to the 
thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Sultan's appointment. In some 
respects Mihai Viteazul's (Michael the Brave) efforts to unite the 
principalities under his own rule by military force and leremie Movila's 
installation by the force of Polish arms were attempts to break Moldavia 
and Wallachia out of this pattern. 
In the period 1545-1593 the rulers of both prinCipalities changed 
with great regularity. In Moldavia nine princes occupied the throne in 
eleven reigns; in Wallachia there were eight princes and ten reigns. No 
prince managed to maintain his rule longer than nine years, the more 
usual length of reign in Moldavia was between two and five years, in 
Wallachia between four and six years. The large sums of money involved 
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in securing a prince's appointment to the throne encouraged the Sultans 
to change the princes frequently; this meant that the position of the 
reigning prince was extremely insecure and bound to the continuing 
favour of the Sultan and those closest to him. This situation also made it 
difficult for other states to build up and maintain influence with the 
reigning prince which could threaten the Ottoman hegemony. 
lancu Sasul was the bastard son of Petru Rare§ by a Saxon 
woman from Bra§ov. Rare§, was himself illegitimate, the son of ~tefan 
Cel Mare by Maria Rare§. (1) lancu appears to have been brought up as 
a German, indeed Saxon chroniclers claimed that he was truly the son of 
a leathercutter and harness-maker from Brasov, called either Georg 
Weiss or Meissen Hannes, by a Romanian woman. After lancu's 
investiture, an observer reported to the Habsburg Emperor: 
"I have my doubts about all this ... [Iancu's claim to the throne] and 
consider loan [Iancu] really to be a German from Transylvania for 
he speaks German better than any other language." (2) 
His religion was Lutheran and whilst on the Moldavian throne he 
maintained contacts with Transylvanian Germans, including one Colonel 
Rueber with whom he made preparations to facilitate flight should the 
Sultan Murat III attempt to overthrow him; Reuber helped him remove a 
fortune from the Moldavian treasury to the fortress of Kesmark in the 
county of Zips in Hungary. lancu also built up diplomatic contacts with the 
Pope and the Habsburg Emperor in the hope that they might support him 
against those who tried to secure his removal. Under the influence of his 
Chief Minister, Bartolomeo Brutti, a major aspect of lancu's policy was to 
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support the spread of Roman Catholicism in Moldavia to the detriment of 
the Orthodox Church hoping thereby to win the Pope's favour. Both the 
Ottoman Divan and the anti-Habsburg party in Poland-Lithuania were 
suspicious of lancu's German contacts, for these people were seen to 
take advantage of lancu's favour and attempt to establish themselves in 
positions in Moldavia from which they would be difficult to dislodge. The 
gains made in Moldavia by the Catholic Church were continued during 
the second reign of Petru 9chiopul [1582-91] under the auspices of 
Bartolomeo Brutti who maintained a correspondence with a number of 
prominent Roman Catholics and Papal Emissaries, such as the 
Archbishop of Lwow, Jan Dimitri Solikowski, and the Papal Envoy in 
Poland, Annibale di Capua. (3) 
Despite his claimed descent from the Moldavian princely dynasty, 
lancu's lack of close identification with the principality, emphasised by a 
native language different to that spoken by his subjects, did not inspire 
loyalty amongst the boyars with whose co-operation he had to rule. 
Questions of lineage were important to the Moldavian political community 
and deep-seated discontents surfaced in 1595 with the installation of 
leremie Movila, when the Polish Chancellor Jan Zamoyski voiced what 
must have been current concerns amongst Moldavian boyars in a 
carefully argued justification: 
"I have not installed for you as prince some imaginary offspring of 
Moldavian voievods, like many who ere now aspired to the 
succession; nor any other of Wallachian family, but a nobleman of 
Moldavian lineage [Ieremie Movila] ... " (4) 
lancu's son Bogdan changed his name to Stefan Bogdan perhaps 
) 
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to distance himself from his Saxon father and closely identify himself with 
his Moldavian lineage by taking the surname Bogdan, the name of the 
Voivode who, around 1363, revolted against his Hungarian overlord to 
establish a state around the river Moldova which was to form the basis of 
the Moldavian principality. (5) 
lancu had apparently consented to be excluded from the 
Moldavian succession, perhaps under pressure from supporters of the 
Lapu~neanu family which wished to restrict the succession to its own 
branch of ~tefan Cel Mare's descendants (and which recognised him as 
a potential rival). (6) Any such agreements aimed at building up the 
power of one family in Moldavia were not considered by the Ottomans to 
be binding; lancu showed his political astuteness by repairing to 
Constantinople to try and obtain the throne through the direct intervention 
from the Sultan, ignoring his previous agreement. Several interesting 
points arise from this: firstly, illegitimate birth did not exclude a male 
descendent from the princely line from the succession, nor was there any 
right of primogeniture. By custom a prince was required to be "bone of 
princely bone" which appears to have meant that he had to be 
descended directly through the male line, and could not claim descent 
through a woman. In the sixteenth century the Ottomans adhered to this 
custom. Between the reign of 9tefan Cel Mare [1457-1504] and the 
installation of leremie Movila in 1595, there was in fact a preponderance 
of illegitimately born princes succeeding to the throne. Moldavian 
princes, as we know, rarely managed to maintain their rule for long, 
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consequently the chances of a legitimate son of an age to rule 
succeeding his father peacefully after the latter's death were reduced, 
since princes rarely died of natural causes whilst still on the throne. Once 
a prince was overthrown, his family would retreat into exite and his sons 
would join the ranks of pretenders to the throne. This pattern can be seen 
in the case of both of lancu's sons, Alexandru and Bogdan. 
lancu's renunciation of his rights to the succession, followed by his 
journey to Constantinople, shows that arrangements made without the 
agreement of the suzerain power were of little account. The power-
brokers were in Constantinople, not Moldavia; the Ottoman capital was 
therefore the place for an aspiring prince to argue his claim. lancu was 
exiled to Rhodes probably at the instance of the incumbent Prince of 
Moldavia, (either Bogdan Lapu~neanu or loan-Cel-Cumplit) in order to 
prevent him becoming a focus of intrigue conducted by the prince's 
enemies. Whilst in Rhodes lancu married Maria Paleologus, who will be 
discussed briefly later. In 1574 lancu was promised the Wallachian 
throne instead of Alexandru Mircea [1567-77]; the latter, however, 
managed to maintain his rule and successfully persuaded the Ottomans 
that lancu was a trouble-maker and should be sent once again into exile, 
this time to Aleppo. Wallachian boyars rebelling against Alexandru 
pressed the Sultan to appoint lancu as their new prince; despite the fact 
that Wallachia was the richer of the two principalities lancu preferred to 
occupy his father's former throne. lancu showed himself in later life to be 
a greedy and unscrupulous man, apparently this did not prevent him 
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entertaining a keen regard for his own Moldavian ancestry, despite his 
later tendency to regard the principality merely as a limitless source of 
income. 
1 n 1579 lancu made the acquaintance of Bartolomeo Brutti, a 
former agent of Philip II of Spain, exiled in Rhodes at the instance of 
Giovanni Marigliano, Philip II's Envoy to the Sultan. Brutti had worked for 
Marigliano in 1577, during negotiations for a peace treaty between Spain 
and the Ottoman Empire, but had incurred his bitter enmity. Having lost 
his powerful Spanish protectors, Brutti cultivated the patronage of lancu, 
who now enjoyed the favour of the Sanjac-8ey of Magnesia, later to 
become Sultan Mehemet III. Brutti had been saved from the galleys by 
the intervention of Koja Sinan, known to the foreign ambassadors as 
Sinan Pasha, who was to become Grand Vizier in 1580. Brutti 
determined to build up on the interest this Vizier had shown in him, by 
securing his support for lancu's claim to the Moldavian throne and bribed 
Sinan's servant, Joseph Nasi, to obtain his support and through Nasi 
obtained a channel of influence close to the Sultan. Sokullu Mehemmed, 
the current Grand Vizier, was Sultan Murad's brother-in-law; his support 
seems to have been obtained through Sinan's intervention and soon 
afterwards the Sultan was persuaded to nominate lancu as Prince of 
Moldavia. The new prince showed his gratitude to Bartolomeo Brutti by 
bringing him to lasi, the Moldavian capital, as his Chief Minister. 
The Brutti family, Albanians from the Istrian peninsula, had once 
held the Lordship of Durazzo, eventually ceding it to Venice. Various 
218 
members of the family had acted as envoys, Dragomans and spies on 
behalf of Venice and Spain. Anti-Ottoman espionage conducted by 
Spain and Venice had intensified after the Ottomans' naval defeat at the 
battle of Lepanto when the idea of a Christian crusade against the 
Ottomans in the Mediterranean received support from many quarters, 
particularly amongst the Roman Catholic powers. A large network of 
spies seems to have been built up in Ottoman territory with established 
links to Rome, Madrid and Venice. In 1575, whilst serving his 
Dragoman's apprenticeship, Bartolomeo Brutti obtained the release of 
Christian prisoners of the Ottomans; he appears to have been recruited 
by Spain as a spy because he left Constantinople in 1576 apparently to 
go to Spain. When he returned to Constantinople in December 1577 he 
did so in the entourage of Giovanni Marigliano. Although incensed at the 
ill-treatment he received at the hands of his Spanish protectors, Brutti did 
not abandon his support for the Roman Catholic powers in Europe; he 
did much to encourage the spread of the Roman Catholic faith in 
Moldavia. (7) 
Sokullu held the office of Grand Vizier between 1565 and 1595; 
when he died, between this date and 1616, there were some seventeen 
different Ottoman Grand Viziers holding office, some of whom held office 
three, four or five times: for example Koja Sinan, an Albanian, whose first 
period as Grand Vizier ran from August 1580-December 1582; his 
second ran from August 1589-August 1591; his third, January 1593-
February 1595; his fourth, July-November 1595; his fifth, December 
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1595-April 1596. The period during which the tenure of office for Grand 
Viziers was at its shortest was the period 1593-1606, particularly whilst 
the Ottoman Empire was at war with the Habsburg Empire and whilst 
Mihai Viteazul was conducting his rebellion against Ottoman hegemony. 
However even before this the Vizier rarely spent more than two years in 
office before he was ousted; this situation was to make the predicament 
of the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia worse, for every time the Grand 
Vizier was changed the prince had to establish friendly relations with his 
successor; this inevitably involved gifts and bribes from the prince in 
addition to the other customary gifts, tribute etc. The opportunity was also 
provided for a pretender to ingratiate himself with the new Vizier or his 
potential successors. (8) 
lancu had cultivated the favour of Doamna Chiajna, a daughter of 
Petru Rare~ and wife of Mircea Ciobanul (the Shepherd) Prince of 
Wallachia [1545-54; 1558-59] and therefore his own half-sister. Chiajna 
was a good friend of the powerful Sultana Safiye, Sultan Murad's wife, 
and had contacts amongst the Greek bankers of Galata from whom lancu 
was able to borrow money. lancu was said to have paid the Sultan 
800,000 galbeni (ducats), the Sultana 20,000 and the Grand Vizier 
50,000 galbeni to secure his appointment to the Moldavian throne. 
Bartolomeo Brutti had attached himself to lancu's cause and had made 
himself sufficiently useful to the pretender for the latter to show his 
gratitude, as Brutti had no doubt intended he should, by taking him into 
his service in Moldavia. As we know, Brutti had been a Dragoman in 
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Venetian and Spanish service and was knowledgeable about the 
modus operandi of negotiations with the Ottoman Divan, as well as 
probably acting as lancu's interpreter. In Moldavia he was rewarded with 
confiscated lands left vacant by the execution for treason of a powerful 
boyar. He was given the command of infantry and cavalry forces and the 
right to collect revenues to the value of 3,000 ga/beni per annum at the 
port of Galati. He was eventually appointed Poste/nic (Marshall of the 
Prince's Household), one of the leading officials at the prince's court 
whose major functions included receiving those who craved audience 
with the prince and conducting the prince's business with foreign courts 
including the Ottoman. A knowledge of foreign languages was a distinct 
asset in this position, because of the volume of correspondence and 
diplomacy between the Prince of Moldavia and the Ottoman Divan, as 
well as diplomatic relations between Moldavia and its neighbours. (9) 
The office of Poste/nic also conferred powers of jurisdiction over areas 
under the holder's control. By the time lancu was overthrown, Brutti had 
become one of the most powerful men in Moldavia, so successful was he 
that he remained Poste/nic under lancu's successor Petru 9chiopul, 
whom he had previously helped to overthrow when working for lancu's 
own installation as prince. 
Brutti's service of lancu and ~chiopul can be seen as a successful 
"career-move" which did not stop with his achievements in Moldavia; as 
we know from the previous chapter, he used his position and experience 
in Moldavia to enter the service of the King of Poland, collaborating with 
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Edward Barton to negotiate a continued peace between Poland and the 
Ottomans in 1590 and made numerous attempts to enter the service of 
the Queen of England through his contacts with her ambassadors. He 
was a forerunner of men such as Paulo Mariani and Gaspar Gratiani who 
were also to begin their careers as Dragomans. These men were 
politically adept and thrived through intrigue, making their fortunes 
through manipulating the Ottoman system on behalf of businessmen, 
embassies and even pretenders to the thrones of Wallachia and 
Moldavia. They took advantage of contacts made and favours done to 
amass large amounts of money and, even more importantly, positions of 
influence and power. 
To return to lancu Sasul: once invested as Prince of Moldavia he 
was dispatched from Constantinople at the head of an army to ensure 
that the Sultan's orders were executed without opposition from inside the 
principality. He was immediately faced with the need to raise enough 
money to satisfy his creditors that they would be repaid all that he owed 
them, as well as the tribute and gifts to his political overlords. Therefore 
he levied heavy taxes, requiring an ox from every household. These 
taxes were not levied merely to fulfil his financial obligations; lancu was 
also preparing for his inevitable overthrow; during his reign of three years 
lancu dispatched 100 wagons out of Moldavia, forty of which were full of 
money. After three years of rule he had paid out 200,000 galbeni to his 
supporters in Constantinople; in March 1580 he sent a gift to Sinan 
Pasha of 150 horses. (10) The Chronicler Grigore Ureche, who was not 
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one of lancu's admirers, described him as a man of incredible greed, 
someone who murdered men in order to seize their land for his own use. 
He also accused him of fornication, although judging by the numbers of 
illegitimate sons born to Moldavian princes, lancu was not particularly 
unusual in this respect. He also continually disregarded the liberties of 
the Orthodox church in favour of Roman Catholicism; Bartolomeo Brutti 
had considerable influence in his attitude towards the majority faith in 
Moldavia, persuading lancu that such a policy might best attract the 
sympathy of the Catholic powers through the mediation of the Pope. (As 
a Lutheran lancu might otherwise have looked to German Protestant 
princes for support.). lancu was partly successful in this policy although it 
did not save him from his eventual fate: after his overthrow the Pope, not 
having heard of lancu's execution, attempted to persuade the Ottomans 
to restore him to the throne, petitioning through the medium of the King of 
France and his embassy in Constantinople. (11) 
In Moldavia all State functions Uudicial, legislative, executive and 
military) were invested in the prince, who. exercised his powers through 
his officials sitting in the Divan or Prince's Council. The Divan discussed 
important matters of state in order to advise the prince; the Divan 
members were rewarded with a proportion of taxes and fines levied by 
them on his behalf through local bodies such as the "Council of Great 
and Aged People" which assisted the leaders of free villages with 
unimportant judicial matters, questions of land-use and apportioning 
taxes, and the elected bodies which administered towns. This structure 
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remained in place whoever was prince and, because reigns were short, 
the princes rarely had time to entrench their authority before they were 
overthrown; the boyars who held office and their families were extremely 
influential in the Divan and in political life in the principality. It required a 
particularly forceful prince to stamp his authority on the state which he 
ruled. 
The hierarchy of officials does not appear to have been rigidly 
fixed. As well as the Po 5 teln ic, at Court the leading officials were the 
Vornic (Court Marshall or Palatine), the Logofat (Chancellor) and the 
Vistier (Treasurer) there were also a number of territorial officers: the 
Prrcalab (Castelan), The Starost (Infantry Commander), the Hatman 
(Cavalry Commander). Many of these officials, such as the Vornic and 
the Postelnic, developed other functions in particular rights of jurisdiction. 
The Postelnic appears to have increased his importance in the late 16th 
and early 17th centuries. During lancu's reign, some of the most 
important offices were held by the Movila family, which was itself to found 
a princely dynasty: leremie the Vornic reigned as Prince between 1595 
and 1600 and 1601-1606 when he died; his sons Constantin and 
Alexandru reigned between 1607 and 1611 and between 1615 and 1616 
respectively. Simeon the Pltcalab ruled Wallachia from 1601 to 1602 
and Moldavia from 1606 to 1608; his sons Mihai, Moise and Gabriel 
reigned for brief periods, Gabriel 1618-20 and Moise the youngest 1630-
31. Under lancu, 8alica Movila was Hatman and Gheorghe Movila a 
bishop; lancu's religious policies attacked the position of the latter. The 
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Movila were leading figures in a rebellion against lancu which was to 
lead to his replacement by Petru ~chiopul; they were one of the most 
powerful boyar factions in Moldavia having at their disposal wealth, lands 
and manpower, in addition to strong connections with Poland, which will 
be dealt with later in this chapter. leremie Movila was so unhappy with 
lancu's rule that he took refuge in Poland. (12) One may speculate that 
many boyars found the Ottoman Empire's imposition of princes without 
reference to Moldavian political society extremely galling, particularly 
when these princes spent their brief reigns plundering the resources of 
the country to buy support in Constantinople and embezzling a fortune to 
support them in their retirement. In this period when the influence of the 
great boyars was at its height, it is no surprise that many belonging to this 
group felt they would be better suited to governing the principality and 
would have considerable more success in doing so. (13) 
lancu also succeeded in alienating those who had supported him 
outside the principality including Doamna Chiajna who returned her 
allegiance to Petru 9chiopul and began using her influence to 
undermine lancu's reputation at the Divan in Constantinople, perhaps 
cultivating Ottoman suspicions concerning lancu's diplomacy conducted 
with powers ill-disposed to the Sultan. The Prince of Moldavia's relations 
with his Wallachian neighbour Mihnea deteriorated; such a situation was 
unfortunate for both principalities for, despite inevitable minor rivalries in 
matters of status and neither state's desire to be dominated by the other, 
their shared predicament, common language and similar customs and 
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systems of government, in addition to dynastic ties, which gave 
enormous potential for co-operation in areas of mutual interest. A major 
advantage to the Ottoman Empire of Poland's installation of leremie 
Movil~ in 1595 was that it divided the principality from Wallachia at the 
time of Mihai Viteazul's rebellion. Moldavia under leremie's predecessor 
Aron Vodahad made common cause with Mihai. 
lancu either tolerated or was unable to prevent raids into Polish 
territory and particularly into the Ukraine; the Cossacks, whom King 
Stefan Bathory was trying to bring under the control of the Polish Crown 
by setting up the Cossack register, inevitably retaliated by raiding 
Moldavia. (14) After lancu fled from Moldavia, Stefan Bathory wrote to 
Sultan Murad III to explain the circumstances of a Cossack raid into 
Moldavia, a potential cause of tension with the Ottomans: 
" ... some of the Cossacks had set out against lancu Sasul, who 
caused them damage when he was Prince. Finding that he had 
been removed, they then left. Some of them have since entered 
into service of Petru Schiopul, but if these commit any reckless 
actions he would take care of them." (15) 
Moldavia's geographical position ensured that the Polish Crown and 
Polish magnates considered they had a legitimate interest in the 
principalities internal affairs: lancu's behaviour made him highly 
undesirable as the ruler of a sensitive area. Cossack raids into Moldavia 
were an encroachment upon the Sultan's prerogative, retribution would 
not normally involve an Ottoman expedition but might take the form of a 
punishing raid by the Tatars acting on Ottoman instructions which would 
inevitably result in a cooling of relations between Sultan Murad and the 
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King of Poland. lancu was also suspected of intercepting 
correspondence between Bathory and the Sultan; such hostile behaviour 
was another potential threat to Turco-Polish relations which Bathory, 
having pressing business against Muscovy, was intent upon keeping on 
a friendly basis. Finally lancu's courting of the Habsburgs was a potential 
threat to Bathory's own principality of Transylvania. 
Despite his difficulties with other states, lancu's downfall was 
precipitated by a rebellion led by boyars supporting the Lapusneanu 
family's claim to the throne who attempted to place loan Lungul (the 
Long) on the throne as their alternative candidate to Petru Schiopul who ) 
had Ottoman support; prominent amongst the leadership was the Movila 
family. The rebellion was defeated on lancu's behalf by Bucium, the chief 
Vornic, and Bartolomeo Brutti, although they were not necessarily acting 
out of loyalty to lancu. Brutti had maintained his contacts in 
Constantinople and may have been in secret contact with Petru 
9chiopul, knowing that lancu was not likely to remain long on the throne. 
Brutti was anxious to secure his own powerful position in the principality 
by facilitating Petru Schiopul's return to the throne; this would explain , 
Brutti's continuation as Postelnic and his favour with Petru. The rebels 
were dispersed and fled from the principality; a group of them went to 
Constantinople to petition the Sultan to have lancu replaced, although 
they were surely aware that that Petru ~chiopul would be preferred to 
loan Lungul. It would seem that the major thrust of the rebellion had been 
the removal of an unpopular ruler but at least some of those involved 
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wished to reassert the right of Moldavian boyars to elect their prince. The 
Sultan was amenable to the request for another prince and sent an 
envoy to escort lancu to Constantinople: 
"Iancu, prince of Moldavia, brought great damage to his subjects 
and did not carry out our orders; so now that the great boyars of 
Moldavia have written to me [the Sultan] pleading and informing 
us about their losses, and about what they wish us to do. Finding 
this to be true, we have dismissed him from his rule and placed 
there Petru Voivod who was lancu's predecessor." (16) 
lancu fled in time to avoid being brought to Constantinople by 
force and thereby escaped prison or death at Ottoman hands. He hoped 
to reach Hungary, where preparations had already been made for his 
exile; to avoid capture by his former subjects he intended to travel via 
Poland. However, he had miscalculated the degree of annoyance he had 
caused Stefan Bathory because the latter ordered his capture. Bathory 
man-handled and beat lancu personally, berating him for his hostile 
behaviour towards Poland; his treasure was confiscated and lancu was 
beheaded at Lwow. (17) Bathory was not a man who shrank from 
summary justice (18); he may have feared that lancu would merely be 
imprisoned by the Ottomans and might even find a way to ascend the 
Moldavian throne once again. Furthermore, Bathory, although the 
Sultan's vassal as Prince of Transylvania, had no obligation as King of 
Poland to return the former prince to Constantinople; since lancu had 
permitted attacks on Polish territory and on Polish interests, Bathory 
preferred to deal with him personally and his execution served as an 
example to other who might consider similar actions. 
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lancu's wife Maria Paleologus stayed in Poland with her children: 
two sons and three daughters. The Paleologus family were descendants 
of the former Byzantine Imperial house; a marriage between the daughter 
of a noble Byzantine dynasty and a son of a Moldavian prince was a 
dynastic alliance which suggests that one and a half centuries before 
Phanariot rule was established in Moldavia and Wallachia, powerful 
Levantine families in the Ottoman Empire were aware of the political, 
social and economic advantages of establishing their influence in the 
principalities. The Sultan's vassal princes had considerable status in the 
Empire, conferred with the insignia presented by the Sultan, although 
this status was diminished by the venality which had become an integral 
part of a prince's succession. The prince's autonomous status allowed 
him to exercise an important influence in the affairs of the region; the 
economic advantages of ruling either principality have been set out, it is 
hardly surprising that there were a large number of people who had their 
sights on acquiring some foothold in the principalities. 
There was considerable Greek involvement in the principalities; it 
was not unusual for princes or pretenders to marry Greek women. 
However the 'Phanariot' oligarchy which emerged in the course of the 
seventeenth century was not descended from the old Byzantine 
aristocracy, although the Phanariots went to great efforts to invent 
illustrious genealogies for themselves. The Phanariot rise to prominence 
was due primarily to service within the Ottoman administration and their 
dominance of the Orthodox hierarchy in Constantinople. The first 
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Phanariot is held to have been Panayotis Nikousios (1613-73) who rose 
to the position of Grand Dragoman of the Porte; this position came to be a 
prerogative of the Phanariots until 1821, when the Greek revolt caused 
the Ottomans to lose confidence in the Phanariots. The use of the post of 
Dragoman to obtain influence in the Ottoman Empire was not an 
innovation of the Phanariots, as we know from the discussion of 
Bartolomeo Brutti, Paulo Mariani and Gaspar Gratiani, and it is these 
individuals who were more properly the forerunners of the Phanariots. 
Gratiani even obtained the rule of Moldavia (1619-21), just as a century 
later the first Phanariot Prince, Nicholas Mavrocordatos, was to do, using 
influence already obtained through service to the Ottoman 
administration. 
The Brutti family, and other families connected to it by marriage, 
prospered through Bartolomeo's position in Moldavia; Bartolomeo and 
his brother Benedetto owned property and ·customs farms' there, another 
member of the family, was a retainer of Petru Schiopul, then an emissary 
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of Mihai Viteazul and returned to Moldavia as secretary to Radu Mihnea. 
Cristoforo Brutti, another brother of Bartolomeo, was sent as emissary to 
Warsaw by Petru ~chiopul in 1589. On his return to la§i he became a 
member of the Divan; later he returned to Constantinople as Dragoman 
to the Venetian Ambassador to Constantinople. Bartolomeo's nephew 
Marc Antonio Borisi also worked as Dragoman to the Venetian 
Ambassador in Constantinople and his daughter appears to have 
married Gaspar Gratiani in 1620. Marital alliances between various 
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Levantine families were pursued deliberately in order to reinforce their 
social and political influence in the Ottoman Empire: Bartolomeo Brutti's 
wife was the niece of the Imperial Ambassador's Dragoman and the 
sister of a prominent Venetian merchant. The Phanariot families of the 
eighteenth century were to build up political and marital alliances to 
reinforce their preeminence in the Christian society of Constantinople in 
a very similar manner. (19) 
To return to Maria Paleologus: her cunning and determination on 
behalf of her family matches lancu's efforts on his own behalf. Her 
husband's embezzled fortune lost to her, she set herself to obtain Stefan 
Bathory's forgiveness despite the fact that a number of Polish magnates 
were intent on sending her and the children to Constantinople; she was 
eventually taken under the protection of the Polish Crown, was granted 
some land and went into business as an importer of lUxury goods from 
the Ottoman Empire to be sold in Lwow. (20) Her eldest son Alexandru 
went to Constantinople soon after lancu's death to petition for the 
Moldavian throne. He was aged between fifteen and seventeen but his 
youth did not prevent his imprisonment in the fortress of "Seven Towers" 
(situated on the Asian shore of the Dardanelles, which held political 
prisoners of some importance) probably because he had no-one of 
influence to protect him. There is no further mention of him, so he 
probably died in prison. (21) 
Bogdan was considerably younger than his brother. He was born 
In Poland, presumably after his father's death in 1582. (22) He first 
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staked his claim to the Moldavian throne in 1593, when he would have 
been ten or eleven years old. He spent his early years in Lwow in 
southern Poland which has been described as a particularly unruly area 
of a country where private wars, banditry and brigandage were 
commonplace, where the law was as often broken as kept and a 
wronged party would often set out to exercise justice on his own initiative; 
this environment would have been one of the earliest influences upon 
him. (23) 
His mother would have brought him up as far as possible in a 
manner to suit his status as a prince. He appears to have had some 
education: his signature, to be seen on letters in the Public Record Office 
in Chancery Lane, suggests a man who was used to writing; unless he 
had a secretary to accompany him wherever he went, even in prison, he 
could write in Italian (he spent several years in Italy when his sister lived 
there) and Latin and no doubt acquired some knowledge of Greek from 
his mother. Other activities would have included the traditional skills and 
pursuits which befitted a nobleman: elaborate social manners, hunting 
and entertainments and most importantly marksmanship and 
swordsmanship. In Constantinople he carried a sword seven hands long 
and three fingers wide, which was said to have been the true sword of 
Atilla, found in Moldavia. (24) 
His distinguished ancestry was a powerful influence upon the 
young Bogdan; in his later wanderings in Europe he carried his 
Romanian genealogy, which he probably knew by heart and which, for 
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purposes of regaining the throne, he considered most important. Through 
his mother he had a Byzantine inheritance, so no doubt he was brought 
up to think of himself as an heir to two noble traditions: in his letters, after 
1600 when he had changed his name, he signed himself "Stefan 
Despot". Just as Maria Paleologus would have absorbed a somewhat 
glorified perception of Byzantium, there was also a 'Byzantine' tradition 
within Moldavia. This tradition was reflected not only in the Orthodox 
church in Moldavia and Wallachia in art, customs and liturgy but also at 
the princely court. The great state offices in both principalities had been 
modelled on those of the Byzantine Empire, transmitted through 
mediaeval Bulgaria and Serbia, and the court preserved elaborate 
ceremonies which helped to bolster the prestige and grandeur of the 
prince's rule. Bogdan hinted at this tradition by use of the word "Despot" 
to describe himself which may have been adopted as a reaction to 
leremie Movila's cultivation of a Byzantine genealogy for himself, as will 
be discussed later. (25) One may speculate that the young Bogdan was 
brought up on stories of his illustrious ancestors, Stefan Cel Mare and 
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Petru Rare§, and of South-east Europe before the advent of the Ottoman 
Empire. The "glorious" history of the Balkans was transmitted through 
chronicles and through oral tradition. 
During Bogdan's youth, Maria had been working hard to establish 
contacts which would be useful to her son. She maintained good 
relations with the Polish Crown and the friendship of the Archduke 
Maximilian. The King of Poland, Zygmund Vasa, supplied Bogdan with 
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letters-patent to prove his claim to the Moldavian throne, Maximilian 
recommended Maria with her son Bogdan to the Doge of Venice: 
" ... Maria Vidua Joannis Janculae, olim Palatini Moldovae, Bohdan 
eius filius." (26) 
She was probably anxious that the fate that had befallen her eldest son 
should not be repeated with her youngest. On 6th March 1593 she was in 
Venice with her family and retinue; she now pushed her son to the fore 
and it was Bogdan who wrote and signed the letter to the Doge asking for 
financial help and a recommendation to the Ottoman Sultan: 
"I, Bogodan, son of the well-remembered Giancula, legitimate 
successor in the Principality of Moldavia, and the Princess Maria 
my mother desiring to go to Constantinople in order to recover the 
realm which is mine by right; I wished to come to this most serene 
city to make reverence to your Serenity ... " 
He stated his wish to travel to Constantinople via Ragusa 
(Dubrovnik) and asked for letters to the rulers there to ensure his safe 
conduct; he promised to show his immense gratitude to Venice once he 
was established on the throne of Moldavia. (27) The diplomatic and 
commercial advantages of having a Venetian protege upon the 
Moldavian throne were not lost on the Doge; he wrote to the Venetian 
Commander at Ragusa asking him to facilitate the passage of Bogdan 
and his family to Constantinople and ordered 25 galben; (ducats) to be 
presented to Bogdan. (28) The young pretender probably returned to 
inform the Doge that his financial situation was so dire that he required 
more money, for he was granted a further hundred ducats. Instructions 
were issued to the Venetian Bailo in Constantinople to take Bogdan and 
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his mother under his protection and to take a hand in their affairs, for if 
Bogdan were installed on the Moldavian throne he would be greatly in 
Venice's debt. (29) 
One hundred and twenty five ducats was hardly a sufficient sum to 
support a serious attempt to secure Bogdan's appointment; clearly the 
Doge intended to supply diplomatic aid but steered clear of major 
financial involvement; however Venetian support would facilitate 
Bogdan's efforts to obtain financial backing once he arrived in 
Constantinople. Bogdan gave the impression that his installation in 
Moldavia would be achieved easily and without major expenditure. Many 
of the strengths which served Bogdan well in later life were already in 
evidence: a forceful but charming character and the ability to persuade 
those in positions of authority that he was a man whose efforts to become 
prince were worthy of support. 
Maria Paleologus occupied herself further in negotiating a 
successful marriage for one of her daughters with Giovanni Zane, a 
Venetian nobleman and a member of a family which supplied a number 
of Venetian diplomats, including Marco Zane, the current Bailo in 
Constantinople. This marriage, apart from its importance in providing for 
the future of one of her daughters, created an alliance between a major 
Venetian family and her son and thereby a potentially important source of 
support and influence in Venice. The speedy conclusion of the marriage 
arrangements shows the eagerness of the Venetians to acquire a 
position of influence in Balkan politics, following the example of the 
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French and English and perhaps reflects an anxiety to prevent Bogdan 
going to France or England for support. 
Edward Barton's close involvement with Aron Voda and Mihai 
Viteazul had lead indirectly to a close involvement with the Ottoman 
Empire's own foreign policy. Since the Ottomans did not maintain 
permanent ambassadors in foreign courts Barton was sometimes used 
by the Ottoman Sultan in diplomatic matters; in this way he became a 
figure of great influence in their dealings with their Romanian vassals 
and with the Habsburg Empire and this influence was useful in his other 
areas of responsibility in Constantinople. In the same manner the French 
had in previous decades tried to promote the importance of their own 
embassy, for example with their support of Petru Cercel; Venice was 
intent on emulating this tactic, to improve its political and commercial 
position in the Ottoman Empire. Venice was particularly keen on 
maintaining good relations with the Ottoman Empire because the 
Republic was heavily dependent on the export of foodstuffs from the 
Ottoman Empire. (30) 
In July 1593 Bogdan left Venice for Constantinople; he was 
preceded by his mother anxious to prepare the way for him. If the young 
Bogdan failed in his bid for the throne, the family would be condemned to 
a backwater at best and very likely a life of poverty, insecurity and danger, 
since so much appears to have been staked on the young pretender 
gaining the Moldavian throne. Maria approached the Bailo, Marco Zane, 
with the Doge's letters of recommendation; the latter was not over 
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enthusiastic to have this task thrust upon him and attempted to explain to 
the Doge that the operation upon which he was embarking was not a 
straightforward one: 
"The fact that he is the highest of the descendants of the Princes 
and is trying to gratify the people who would like to see the end of 
goverment of Sanjaks and Beylerbey and others of the Empire that 
does not take any account of the Ministers, due to the importance 
of gifts which they receive as tradition." (31) 
Zane expressed himself reluctant to interfere in internal matters of the 
Empire and unlike Edward Barton does not appear to have relished a 
major diplomatic role for himself because he did not think it prudent to 
attempt to take on such a role. The Bailo tried to distance himself from 
close association with Bogdan but promised to find an opportune time to 
give Maria and her son satisfaction. He advised her to pursue her 
campaign herself with approaches to Sinan Pasha and Ferhad Pasha, 
another former Vizier and the Commander of the victorious Ottoman 
forces in the war against Persia, both of whom were acquainted with 
Maria through their involvement with lancu Sasul; they allegedly owed 
her favours which would be performed in return for gifts. Sinan's 
friendship was judged to be particularly important and Bogdan was 
advised to approach him personally with gifts. Zane was no doubt aware 
of the numbers of pretenders who approached the Divan and suspected 
that if Maria and her son were supplied with Venetian money to support 
them in comfort they might be less anxious to persevere; in other words 
he suspected them of being gold-digging charlatans of whom the 
Venetian State should be wary. (32) On the other hand the impression 
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Bogdan appears to have given the Doge and Senate is of a young prince 
unjustly deprived of his father's throne, for whom the people of Moldavia 
were clamouring and who could be restored to his rightful position if his 
case were taken up by some generous foreign power. 
Zane avoided the expense of supporting Bogdan in his own 
establishment, the young Pretender taking up residence in the 
household of a wealthy banker, Ludovico, who became his patron and 
took control of his money, some 10,000 zecchini, and a number of 
precious objects. Ludovico kept Bogdan in the style of a "man of good 
manners" and won his loyalty which subsequently turned out to be 
misplaced. (33) 
Bogdan won the support of Ferhad Pasha who decided to place 
him on the throne of Wallachia; the pretender was willing to accept this 
alternative offer despite his previous protestations of being the true and 
rightful heir to Moldavia. This opportunism is a demonstration of how 
beholden many princes were to their Ottoman patrons. Had he 
succeeded in mounting the Wallachian throne, Bogdan would have 
owed his position entirely to the whim of Ferhad Pasha; no doubt Bogdan 
feared that had he refused the offer of Wallachia he would alienate 
Ferhad Pasha and lose any chance of gaining the Moldavian throne. The 
ambition to rule was the abiding principle in Bogdan's life. Ferhad's 
plans for his protege were opposed by his rival Sinan Pasha, who 
supported the candidature of Radu Mihnea, son of Prince Mihnea. The 
need to replace the incumbent Prince of Wallachia, Mihai Viteazul, had 
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become urgent because Mihai was in revolt against Ottoman authority 
and had sided with the Holy League against the Sultan. The support of 
the Capi-Aga cli nched the choice of Bogdan as the new Pri nce of 
Wallachia. (34) 
Mihai's initial act of rebellion was an attack on his creditors who 
accompanied tax-collectors around the country making illegal exactions 
in addition to the enormous sums they were demanding from the prince; 
Mihai invited them to assemble in a building which he then set on fire. He 
then joined in alliance with Aron, Prince of Moldavia and Sigismund 
Bathory, Prince of Transylvania in revolt against the Ottomans. As 
previously mentioned, there is little agreement amongst historians as to 
what exactly led Mihai to revolt: whether he had made plans even before 
becoming prince, or whether conditions within the principality were the 
major cause of his rebellion. Certainly Mihai faced an aggressive and 
proprietary attitude from the Ottomans, who regarded the prince as an 
Ottoman official in all but name, and excessive demands for military 
support including forced sales of foodstuffs, as well as the customary flow 
of wealth from the principality to Constantinople. Mihai seems to have 
received considerable encouragement for the idea of revolt from Bathory 
and the "Apostolic visitor of the Latin Churches in the European part of 
the Ottoman State", one Komulovic, who had toured the area in 1593. 
The Tatars were send to Wallachia to put down the revolt in November 
1594, since the Sultan's soldiers were said to be unwilling to suffer the 
cold weather; the Ottomans viewed Mihai's revolt with great disquiet, 
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since the alignment of Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia with the 
Holy League cut off a valuable source of support and supplies for the 
Ottoman forces and placed the theatre of war in hostile hands. 
Furthermore, their defection constituted a serious menace to supply lines 
running from Istanbul to Belgrade, Buda and Gran. The Danube's 
importance as a water route for the transport of guns and munitions to 
the front in Hungary ensured that part of the Ottoman war-effort was 
directed towards defence of the Danube, therefore: 
" ... to show that the Grand Signior hath a care of the said exploite 
hee hath appointed generall. .. on[e] Mustafa Bassa, sonne-in-Iawe 
to Sinan Bassa the Visier ... in whose compamy goeth twoe young 
Princes of the said provinces, in whose ayde allsoe are appointed 
to be in readiness the Beglerbies of Bendir, Akerman and Silistria, 
confiners to Wallachia and Bugdania." (35) 
The young Princes in question were Bogdan and Stefan Surdul,to 
.1 
be placed by force of arms in Wallachia and Moldavia respectively. 
Bogdan was therefore presented with a major opportunity to attain the 
status of Prince; however, Edward Barton suspected that the military 
operation underway to install him was a prelude to the installation of an 
Ottoman Beylerbey, since the Sultan's military campaign in Hungary was 
proceeding well, and he predicted that Poland would take some action to 
prevent this: 
"I thinke the King of Poland would look about him for where now 
having the Bugdans Christian confiners, his subjects rest secure 
fron the tyranny of the Turkes, if a Beylerbey should be sett in 
Bugdania, he should have the like troubles and dayly 
discontentment as the Emperour of Germany and all the Grand 
Signior his neighbours have, and therefore I thinke the newes 
thereof will either make him enter league with the Emperour of 
Germany, or to send hither continuall expostulations to divert the 
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Grand Signior from that designe." (36) 
Barton's suspicions may have been justified, for Bogdan and 
§tefan Surdul had no guarantee that the Ottoman troops would withdraw 
from the principalities once they been installed; if Ottoman troops were 
present in the principalities the young princes would have found 
themselves so restricted as to be little more than puppet rulers. This may 
have been Ferhad Pasha's logic of attempting to place two young and 
inexperienced individuals in the principalities, in place of the likes of 
Mihai Viteazul, an experienced soldier and administrator and a former 
governor of the Wallach ian province of Oltenia, who had proved himself 
a dangerous choice of prince from the Ottoman point of view. 
Orders were sent to the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia to 
accept their new rulers and the Tatars were told to make: 
"a generall incursion into these provinces, to kille, sacke, incaptive 
and indammage the inhabitants without pity or respect as much as 
they may." (37) 
The inhabitants would have paid a high price for their prince's defiance, 
but Aron and Mihai maintained a state of readiness to defend 
themselves. Bogdan's expectations of a throne were dashed when Mihai 
undertook a daring raid across the Danube to attack the Ottoman camp at 
Rusciuk in February 1595: 
"in one night [MihaiJ ... passed over to the number of five thousand 
souldiers, and marched directly to the Turquishe campe, whoe 
seeing them a farre off thought first they had been Tartars, but after 
perceiving them to be Christians, put themselves in order of battell 
soe well as the tyme would permit them, and ioyninge with the 
enemy for a while resisted, but soone were overcome and the 
Generall himselfs slaine, whose head the Christians cut off and 
carryed away with them, making also great search for the new 
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Prince whom the Grand Signior had preferred to that province, but 
hee was fled upon a light Turkish horse." 
That this prince was Bogdan is confirmed by several sources including 
Balthasar Walther's Chronicle which records the same incident. (38) 
Bogdan was despoiled of all his goods and escaped with a small force 
which scattered on the way back to Constantinople, whence Bogdan 
returned almost alone. He went into hiding with his mother and sister. 
Rusciuk was looted and plundered and the remainder of the Ottoman 
forces were robbed by Mihai's Hungarian soldiers: 
"The Turkish soldier above all other souldiers goeth richly attired 
in so much that even the poorest hath his sinister garnished with 
silver, or hath a long coate ... of Venice cloth." 
Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, retaliated and captured Bucharest 
suggesting that native rule be replaced by direct Ottoman rule. 
Meanwhile §tefan Surdul, Bogdan's proposed counterpart in Moldavia, 
returned to Constantinople. 
" ... [Stefan] being departed [to Moldavia] and not finding himselfe 
strong enough to try masteries with Aron or to take possession of 
Bugdania, lingered about the confines untill the arrivall of Vizier 
Bassa at Adronople who, seeing his residency there needles, but 
especially by report, havinge comission from the grand Signor to 
gett a Beglerbey over the said province, that it be noe more 
governed by Christians deposed the said Stephano and sent him 
backe hither." (39) 
Sinan Pasha further dashed Bogdan's hopes of obtaining the rule of a 
principality by ordering the strangulation of his patron and protector 
Ferhad Pasha; the young pretender found himself 'back to square one', 
nevertheless he exhibited a continued determination to achieve his 
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ambition to rule and resumed his efforts as before. He appears to have 
been embarrassed about the fiasco of his attempted installation in 
Wallachia and in the following years tended to gloss over or ignore this 
evidence of a streak of opportunism in his character. When he related his 
story to the Venetian Bailo Zane's successor Venier, he left him with the 
impression that the Ottomans had pressured him into accepting a 
principality to which he had no claim by descent. (40) 
Sinan, meanwhile, was not able to annex either Moldavia or 
Wallachia; in November 1595 he was forced to leave Bucharest, leaving 
his army and equipment behind. Furthermore, Sigismund Bathory of 
Transylvania had replaced Aron with a lieutenant of his own. Of the two 
alternative scenarios on offer concerning the rule of Moldavia, neither 
was considered acceptable to Poland, nor to the Khan of the Crimea, 
Gazi Giray [1588-96; 1596-1608]. The Tatars had considered Aron as a 
"forsworne traitor" (41) and had intended to install Ahmed Bey the 
Sanjak Bey of Bender (Tehine) and Kilia in Moldavia, but concluded 
instead an agreement with the Polish forces (camped at the juncture of 
the rivers Tutora and Prut), that the Khan would support the appointment 
of leremie Movila in Moldavia in return for a Polish undertaking to stop 
Cossack raids on Tatar territory. (42) It was envisaged that Poland and 
the Tatars would exercise a joint protectorate over the principality; the 
appointment succeeded in relaxing tension between Poland and the 
Ottoman Empire and prevented Poland being dragged into the conflict 
between the Ottomans and the Holy League on the Habsburg side. 
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Edward Barton described leremie Movila thus: 
"I, a Bugdan borne, and though nott of the Princely bloode yett of 
discretion and humanity sufficient to governe the sayed Province ... 
for whose fidelity and integrity towards the Turke they both gave 
their warranty [Le. the King of Poland and the Tatar Khan]." (43) 
Neither Poland nor the Ottomans wished to see Moldavia under 
Transylvanian control; the Ottomans were prompt in their acceptance of 
an accomodation with Poland which ensured that Moldavia remained 
aligned to Constantinople: 
"[the Sultan] instantly created the sayed leremie Prince being 
absent and sent him a cape [cap] of maintenance according to the 
use of that contry, an enieweled sword, a horse with his furniture 
and fifteen garments of brocade ... " (44) 
The new regime was welcomed by Edward Barton in Constantinople 
who established friendly relations with leremie and maintained his 
previous contacts with Jan Zamoyski. (45) He seems to have been 
particularly glad that Sigismund Bathory of Transylvania, who had Jesuit 
sympathies, had no further opportunity to exert influence over Moldavia. 
Whilst this was happening, Bogdan was renewing his appeals to 
the Venetian Bailo Venier, engaging his sympathy with carefully 
calculated pleas of ill-luck and ill-treatment at the hands of others. Venier 
described the pretender as a "poor unlucky youth" in a letter to the Doge 
in which he reminded the latter of previous Venetian promises to the 
pretender; he expressed his intention to help Bogdan investigate the 
embezzlement of his money by Ludovico. This was a major setback for 
Bogdan; not only was he without the means to support his mother and 
sister but he now lacked the means to buy protection against leremie's 
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attempts to have him imprisoned; having made himself conspicuous as a 
major candidate for the Moldavian throne: 
" ... now he hides together with his mother and young sister in fear 
of [Razvan and leremie] in case they find him ... Now this young 
man has sent to me crying of his miserable state... I wish to 
represent to you this and other issues which move the 
compassionate to compassion." (46) 
Bogdan's strong and attractive personality proved at this time and on 
many other occasions to be his greatest asset; he was saved from a 
desperate and seemingly hopeless situation by the generosity and pity of 
the Venetian Bailo who accorded him his protection and succour. 
Bogdan began a new approach to obtaining the throne: the Polish 
envoy in Constantinople was now a major influence in affairs relating to 
Moldavia, therefore Bogdan concentrated his efforts in this direction. In 
September 1597, having borrowed money for gifts and gratuities, he 
approached Stanislaw Golski, the Polish Envoy, requesting him to use 
his influence with the Vizier Damad Ibrahim (April-October 1596; 
December 1596-November 1597) to secure his appointment as leremie's 
successor. Bogdan had either come to the conclusion, or had been 
advised, that it was pointless to attempt to secure leremie's overthrow 
whilst the Ottomans were obliged to adopt a policy of co-operation with 
Poland. According to Edward Barton, Golski pretended to support 
Bogdan's petition, taking his money and gifts whilst arranging for the 
pretender to be arrested on suspicion of plotting to murder Movila: 
" ... he hath caused the sonne of Yancolo, whose father 17 years 
seince was prince of Bugdania and nowe the sonne sought and 
sued for the same princedome, to be taken and imprisoned, 
though first he had promised him all favour and furtherance to his 
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preferment to that Princedome in which action what himselfe 
thinketh himselfe I know nott, but under collour of friendship to 
imploye the authority of his kinge in the first action of his 
Ambassadorie to deceave a poore child and thereby beinge in the 
hands of the Turkes to put him in danger of his life or fayth (for no 
doubte one must succeede eyther death or to turne Turke) is 
generally heer misliked of all Christians." (47) 
This appears to have been the first occasion on which Barton took 
a serious interest in Bogdan. Balthasar Walther accepted that the 
pretender had been involved in a plot against Movila; on the other hand 
the French and Venetian ambassadors believed that he was entirely 
innocent. The Polish ambassador apparently first asked the Vizier to 
have the young pretender mutilated by cutting off his nose and ears and 
send him into exile in Tripoli. Bogdan was imprisoned when news came 
of the plot to murder Movila; the allegations could have been concocted 
by Golski or brought to his ears by an informer who exaggerated rumours 
about Bogdan, on the other hand Bogdan could have spoken of his 
desire to have leremie removed, without making any specific 
arrangements. Equally the pretender may have been guilty; it is really 
impossible to say whether or not Bogdan would have had the resources 
necessary to breach leremie's security and murder him. Barton's outrage 
at Bogdan's treatment at Poland's instigation, which was shared by his 
fellow ambassadors, suggests that the evidence against Bogdan was 
slight. This incident demonstrates the resolve with which Chancellor 
Zamoyski intended to maintain Poland's grip upon Moldavia. (48) 
Zamoyski was not content merely to see a pro-Polish ruler in 
Moldavia replaced by another after a short term Ottoman candidate; he 
246 
wished to ensure a much greater degree of stability in the principality by 
ending one of the major causes of instability:the uncertainty over the 
succession. Zamoyski's solution was to grant a privilege to the direct 
descendants of leremie Movil~. The chronicler Miron Costin, quoted in I. 
Miclescu-Prajescu's article 'New Data Regarding the Installation of 
Movila Princes', refers to the Sultan's grant of eternal sovereignty to 
leremie, his sons and grandsons, and a privilege granted by the King of 
Poland on 25th March 1597: 
"Therefore will his Highness leremie Movila hold the sovereignty 
of Moldavia to the end of his days and after his death, his issue in 
the male line will be raised by us to that throne" (49) 
A letter of March 1617 from the French Ambassador to the King of France 
refers to this grant: that leremie was promised that his children would 
always succeed him from father to son and the Sultan would never invest 
anyone else in Moldavia. (50) Having obtained this major change in 
Ottoman policy, the Poles were ill-disposed to pretenders such as 
Bogdan setting themselves up in opposition to the Movila dynasty in 
Moldavia. Bogdan had probably been unaware of these agreements 
when he approached Golski, but these considerations explain the latter's 
harsh reaction to Bogdan's approaches. 
Bogdan escaped death in prison due to the intervention of Damad 
Ibrahim, the Grand Vizier, who was attracted by his cheerful spirit and 
good looks and took him into his household as a page; he became: 
"more and more beloved of the Pasha, being received into his 
private chamber, because talents of this type were delightful to the 
Turks." (51) 
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The immediate threat to his life was removed, but Bogdan was effectively 
a prisoner in Ibrahim's household, dependent upon him for protection 
and was in no position to resist the Viziers attentions. There was 
considerable concern about his position among the foreign embassies 
and the Greek Orthodox community, as well as the grief to his mother, 
particularly since it was felt that Bogdan would be unable to resist the 
pressure to convert to Islam, which would render him ineligible to rule 
Moldavia. (52) The Venetian ambassador expressed his concern at the 
pressure which Bogdan was believed to be under: 
"of this prince it is said that Bassa is of the opinion to have the cure 
and the protection to keep him in a state whereby he [Bogdan] will 
always be dependent on his authority and that he would become 
Turk." (53) 
Bogdan was aware of the damage being done to his cause by his 
captivity, particularly as rumours were circulated that he had succumbed 
to pressure; indeed Ibrahim's entire household believed that he had 
embraced Islam. However Bogdan always maintained that he had not 
and never would convert. He was particularly concerned that no rumours 
should reach the ears of his sister in Venice, with whom he appears to 
have had a close relationship, for what he referred to as "her own 
interests". The scandal for her, a Venetian noblewoman, of having a 
renegade brother would greatly damage her reputation in Venetian 
society; it would also ruin Bogdan's own chances of receiving further 
support from Venice. 
The pretender was rescued from this situation when Ibrahim was 
disgraced for, amongst other things, withholding from the Sultan the 
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news of an Ottoman defeat in Hungary (November 1597). The former 
Vizier left Constantinople to take up residence in a fortress in Scutari 
where he had built a palace. Bogdan and another pretender (possibly 
Radu Mihnea) were set free. They retreated to the protection of the 
Venetian Embassy and appear to have taken up residence in the English 
Embassy. Bogdan would here have made the acquaintance of Thomas 
Glover, John Sanderson and Henry Lello. The first two men became 
quite friendly with him and later on referred to him warmly as their friend 
in their correspondence. Bogdan was by now extremely conspicuous as 
leremie Movila's rival for Moldavia. The latter's agents saw him as such a 
threat that they, no doubt with Movila's approval, begged the new Vizier 
to have him killed, offering a gift of 4,000 Hungarian ducats. Maria 
Paleologus pleaded on her son's behalf and persuaded the Vizier, 
probably by offering a bigger bribe, to trick Movila's agents into thinking 
that the pretender had been killed. They were shown the body of a man 
suspended on a hook which was then thrown into the waters of the 
Golden Horn. This body was then buried in a sack as Bogdan Sasul; the 
real Bogdan remained, of course, alive and in hiding. (54) 
The pretender was a young man of enormous courage; he had 
escaped death at least three times and must have realised that his 
chances of attaining the Moldavian throne were not good, yet he was 
determined to persevere. His upbringing had convinced him of his right 
to rule and, having no land or money of his own, he was fitted for no other 
purpose in life. He was reliant on the favour and compassion of others to 
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assist him towards his goal and protect him from his enemies; he had 
learned to manipulate the Ottoman system through bitter experience, and 
had learned that many of those with whom he came into contact were not 
to be trusted. Nevertheless he had no option but to trust people. His 
personality and his wide experience gained at a young age made him an 
interesting character: he had lived in Poland and Venice, in an Ottoman 
household, in that of a Levantine banker in Constantinople, as well as 
the residences of the Venetian and English Ambassadors. Furthermore 
he had a talent for attracting the interest of others and making them like 
him and concern themselves about his fate. 
He cultivated the favour of lusef Bey, a renegade Venetian living in 
Constantinople, (formerly called Cievatelli) and brother-in-law of Omer 
Aga, the Cheif of the Seraglio. lusuf Bey had a daughter, Elena Cievatelli, 
a postulant nun in the convent Corpus Domini in Venice. lusuf paid her 
an allowance and had promised to supply her with a dowry for the 
convent when she took her final vows. Instead he offered Bogdan 
Elena's hand in marriage and his own support to gain Moldavia, the latter 
proposition being dependent on the former going ahead. Bogdan agreed 
to the proposal and began negotiations with the Doge whose permission 
was necessary. He went to Venice to court Elena whom he said 
considered him a more than suitable husband and thanked him for 
offering her this unexpected chance of marriage. Elena later said that she 
had not wanted the marriage which had been forced on her by lusuf-Bey, 
who threatened to discontinue her allowance and cancel her dowry. 
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Bogdan may appear cynical about his marital future, but for princes 
marriages were normally undertaken for political or diplomatic 
advantage. There was, however, considerable opposition to this union 
amongst the Venetian Senate and from the Pope. (55) 
Unfortunately for Bogdan his reputation had proceeded him. He 
was considered to be ''tainted'' by the religion of his Ottoman patrons and 
it was feared that Elena's immortal soul would be endangered if she 
married Bogdan and went to Constantinople where she might be under 
pressure from lusuf to convert to Islam. In desperation Bogdan offered to 
place her in the care of his sister in Venice until he was crowned Prince, 
but the Pope was clearly suspicious of the pretender's own faith and in 
December 1599 refused permission for Elena to abandon the veil and 
marry. Having once again reached a 'dead-end' in his campaign Bogdan 
did not hurry back to Constantinople. (56) The Venetian Bailo in 
Constantinople, Girolamo Capello, had been sympathetic towards 
Bogdan and had attempted to dispel the rumours of the pretender's 
conversion, arguing that they were put about by his enemies to discredit 
him. He said that Bogdan had lived in his house for two years and he 
knew him to be a Christian. The rumours were carefully disseminated by 
leremie and the Polish Ambassador in Constantinople. Capello's 
assurances of Bogdan's adherence to the Christian faith were not 
believed. 
Events in Moldavia took a course unconnected with Bogdan's own 
efforts, meanwhile, for leremie Movila had been overthrown in May 1600 
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by Mihai Viteazul who offered to establish Bogdan as his military 
governor in the principality. The pretender's successful self-publicity 
served him well in this event: 
"Michael ever persuadeth the Grand Signior by his letters that all 
he doth is for him, and if he please may appoint a Governour for 
Bugdania, whereof he is partly persuaded through the great Vesier 
he hath to make peace with him." (57) 
Unfortunately for Bogdan the Vizier did not trust Mihai: 
"The long expected peace between Michaell and the Grand 
Signior ... is out of hope by these. The Viceroy having found some 
double dealing in Michaell his promises, for revenge therof hath 
cut of the legs and arms of the messenger sent to him, as also they 
have put his agent In prison." (58) 
Mihai left his son as governor of Moldavia. In autumn 1600 the 
Poles mustered a large force and restored leremie, who had taken refuge 
in the Polish border fortress of Hotin. Moldavia now became the centre of 
leremie's attempts, backed by Poland, to install his brother Simeon in 
Wallachia. The Ottomans initially supported Radu Mihnea to rule in 
Wallachia since they were disinclined to allow Polish infiltration of the 
principalities to extend further, however they changed their allegiance to 
Simeon when Radu Serban, a lieutenant of Mihai Viteazul, launched his ) 
own, eventually successful, bid to take Wallachia. 
Bogdan probably spent his time in Venice pursuing his cause with 
his usual energy. However he seems to have exhausted the 
opportunities there and was no longer confident of further support from 
Venice. He returned to Constantinople where he threw himself upon the 
sympathy of the English embassy which hid him and gave him protection 
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from his enemies. Initially Henry Lello, who was ambassador at this time, 
appears to have had some some sympathy for Bogdan's predicament, 
but later on, after a longer acquaintance, he developed a considerable 
animosity towards the pretender. It should also be remembered that 
Bogdan appears to have been regarded as leremie Movila's unofficial 
chief rival and a front-running candidate for the Moldavian throne if 
Movila: were to be removed by the Ottomans. It may have been argued 
within the embassy that it might be in England's interest to be on friendly 
terms with Bogdan and to have his gratitude. It was at this time that 
opposition to leremie's rule crystallised into a request, by boyars hostile 
to the increased Polish involvement in the internal affairs of Moldavia and 
of those personally hostile to Movila, to the Ottoman Divan to replace 
him with Bogdan. The latter even had the support of the Kapu-kihaya of 
Moldavia (the Prince's permanent Envoy in Constantinople). 
Unfortunately for Bogdan he was outbid by Movila's supporters. (59) 
Encouraged by his kind treatment at the hands of the English 
Embassy staff Bogdan decided to travel to England to seek the 
patronage of Queen Elizabeth I. Lello may have made it clear to Bogdan 
that he would not support his suit on his own initiative because it might 
be considered that he was extending his remit as ambassador by 
becoming too closely involved in Ottoman affairs to the detriment of his 
duties on behalf of the English mercantile community in the Levant. As 
we saw in Chapter III, Lello appears to have considered the role of the 
embassy in the same light as did the Levant Company, that is to promote 
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and protect the Company's trade. Bogdan therefore probably intended to 
force Lello to support him by obtaining the support of the English Crown, 
something which Lello could not ignore. The pretender left 
Constantinople in 1601 and arrived in England well informed enough to 
approach the Earl of Salisbury in the first instance; perhaps he had been 
so informed by Glover or John Sanderson. Ironically in his absence he 
was said to have been offered the Moldavian throne in November 1601. 
The previous year, around February 1600, he had changed his 
name to 9tefan Bogdan; this was probably as a response to leremie's 
more and more extravagant claims of an illustrious ancestry and, as was 
explained earlier in this chapter, the pretender wished to strengthen his 
own claim to be a descendent of the original princely family in Moldavia. 
I have already discussed the traditional method of succession in 
Moldavia. leremie Movila deviated from this custom because he was not 
of "princely bone". His installation and the establishment of a right of 
succession exclusively for his sons and grandsons, confirmed but not 
upheld by the Ottomans, was an attempt to establish a new procedure 
explicitly based on primogeniture which overrode the old principle of 
election by the boyars. Succession based on primogeniture did not take 
root in the principalities until 1866 when Carol of Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen was invited to ascend the throne of Romania. The Ottomans 
probably never intended to maintain the arrangement agreed with 
Poland; after leremie's death they installed his brother Simeon because 
his son Constantin was too young to rule in his own right. Constantin 
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attained the throne in his own right in 1608 but was removed by the 
Ottomans in 1610, with the excuse that he was late in paying his tribute. 
By this time Ottoman interests no longer dictated the need to maintain 
good relations with Poland. A major consequence of leremie's 
installation was to introduce a new family with a claim to rule since it was 
descended from former princes. 
It was untrue to suggest that leremie was a mere puppet of the 
Polish Crown. He and his family were leaders of a strong faction in 
Moldavia which had aligned itself to Poland and which had held high 
office in the principality, where the Movila were also major landowners; 
leremie enjoyed considerable respect amongst his fellow boyars both at 
home and in exile. He was put forward by King Zygmund IJI. of 
Poland as an honest and capable ruler who would rule justly and, it was 
hoped, bring order to the principality thereby preventing it becoming a 
centre of disturbance in the region. Miron Costin described him thus: 
"He was a man of integrity in all ways, not proud, not bloodthirsty, 
kind, God fearing." (60) 
He was wealthy in his own right and could draw on his own resources to 
support his household etc., rather than impose excessive taxes; his 
family were connected by kinship with influential individuals at home and 
abroad, including the Lapu§neanu family. He was a soldier and later 
showed himself as a skilled diplomat when he negotiated peace 
agreements between the Tatar Khan and Poland. It was hoped he might 
restore Moldavia to prosperity and greater peace than had been enjoyed 
for the last quarter century. 
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Nevertheless, admirable qualities did not give leremie a right to 
rule, although many of Moldavia's great boyars probably considered 
themselves more fit to rule than those whom the Ottomans had previously 
imposed on them, the "imaginary offspring of Moldavian Voievods". 
leremie was therefore presented as: 
"an upright man who is blood of blood, the illustrious and 
magnificent Prince leremie Movila." (61) 
His princely descent was through the female line, for his father had been 
loan Movilc( Grand Logoflit of Hude?ti in the district of Dorohoi, none of 
whose ancestors were the sons of princes. His mother was Maria, the 
daughter of Petru Rare9' and granddaughter of ~tefan Cel Mare. (62) 
leremie was raised to the throne in 1595, probably with the 
consent of a considerable proportion of the boyar estate who may have 
expected a greater role in governing the principality and also a re-
establishment of their influence in choosing a prince. The ideas inherent 
in the 'Noble Democracy' which existed in Poland-Lithuania were 
popular in Moldavia amongst many boyars because they embodied the 
concept of the King ruling only so long as he enjoyed the consent of the 
noble estate. The nobility also elected their ruler and had a 
comprehensive set of rights which the king could not violate without 
forfeiting his right to rule. However neither leremie nor King Zygmund 
had any intention of allowing the introduction of any such system in 
Moldavia, hence the promulgation of the Movila succession in 1597. The 
hereditary system was intended to ensure Moldavia remained in 
Poland's orbit because the prince's position would be closely bound to 
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friendship with the state which guaranteed the succession and therefore 
his right to rule. In the interests of regional stability Moldavia briefly 
transferred the right to confirm rulers from Ottoman hands to Polish 
hands. 
The expansion of Movila power to Wallachia (1601-02) was part of 
an expansionist policy undertaken to strengthen Poland-lithuania's 
position with relation to the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, as well as to 
make the Movil~ family's tenure in Moldavia more secure. Mihai Viteazul 
had tried to secure his own position as a power in Eastern Europe by a 
personal union of the principalities of Wallachia, Transylvania and 
Moldavia, leremie attempted to strengthen his position through a dynastic 
union of Wallachia and Moldavia. 
Although leremie's interests were bound up with Poland's foreign 
policy, he did exert himself against the heavy-handedness of his Polish 
masters. He was particularly concerned at the activities of the Jesuits in 
his principality; he requested Meletius Pigas, the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, to come to Moldavia in person to strengthen the 
resistance of the Orthodox church. His brother Gheorghe, the 
Metropolitan of Moldavia, engaged in correspondence with Pigas, with 
some suggestion that the Metropolitanate be raised to a quasi-
Patriarchate, which would not only strengthen the Church's position but 
also increase the prestige of the prince. This may be seen in the light of 
the Movila's alleged Imperial descent from the Flavian dynasty of the 
Emperors of Constantinople. leremie regarded his rule as having been 
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established through the will of God. (63) Herein lies the reason for 
Bogdan's name-change and his insistence of direct historical links 
between himself and the house of Bogdan. 
By the time he arrived in England in 1601, Stefan Bogdan had ) 
established himself as leremie's foremost competitor. His previous 
experience had shown him that success was not guaranteed by an 
impressive genealogy and money for bribes. His difficulties in 
establishing himself as a prince stemmed from the wider political context 
of relations between the major powers in Eastern Europe and the 
particular circumstances of the war between the Ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires. His fate was dependent on larger considerations than his 
alleged right to rule. 
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CHAPTER VI: STEFAN BOGDAN AND HENRY LELLO 
BETWEEN THE YEARS 1601 AND 1606 
~tefan Bogdan left Constantinople late in 1600 with the intention 
of recruiting another foreign sovereign to his cause. The patronage of 
various Venetian baili since 1593 had failed to gain him the Moldavian 
throne, therefore a new approach was needed. At this time he still 
enjoyed good relations with the Doge of Venice but the energetic backing 
which his cause required seems no longer to have been forthcoming 
from that direction. The most useful backers for Bogdan's purposes were 
those sovereigns who maintained a permanent diplomatic presence in 
Constantinople. As Bogdan had already exhausted the possibilities of 
Venetian backing, France or England were the only likely candidates. As 
we know from Chapter IV, France had previously been the most attractive 
proposition for itinerant princes in search of a protector, however England 
under the ambassadorship of Edward Barton had superseded France in 
that respect. Even after Barton's death, Queen Elizabeth's reputation in 
the Ottoman capital still rode high. Bogdan was still optimistic about his 
chances of success; as we shall see, Henry Lello considered this 
optimism to have been extremely unrealistic. 
Bogdan had in his possession letters of recommendation from 
various princes to pave his way to the Queen of England's presence, 
including a letter from the Doge of Venice, who attested to his princely 
status and to Venice's good opinion of him and confirmed that Bogdan 
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enjoyed the honour and respect of the Ottoman Sultan. On reaching 
Western Europe, Bogdan was presented with a further opportunity to win 
the Queen's favour, by serving in her forces in Flanders: he probably took 
part in the English defence of Ostend in July 1601. (1) This action seems 
typical of Bogdan, combining a sense of chivalry, an eye to what might 
forward his interests and a willingness to take decisive action even 
though considerable risk was involved. He was able to present himself to 
Queen Elizabeth asking for a favour with claims upon her gratitude. 
During his audience with Elizabeth he no doubt used all his charm to 
impress upon her the "unjustness" of his situation and his claim to the 
Moldavian throne: 
" ... descended of the Despots, ancient governours of that 
province ... descende[d] from the auncient familie of Paleologies 
sometimes Emperours of Constantinople ... " 
Queen Elizabeth stated that she was moved to offer him help out of 
respect for a fellow prince in distressed circumstances and made him a 
gift of a thousand crowns. 
Bogdan had originally intended to stay in England throughout the 
winter of 1601-2, but received letters from his mother asking him to return 
to Constantinople as soon as possible. The letters from Bogdan's mother 
probably refer to an offer of the Moldavian throne made in his absence, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter. In order to reassure Secretary of 
State Cecil that England was supporting a likely cause, Bogdan stated 
that he was confident that some agreement could be reached which 
would yield him the throne of Moldavia. (2) In reality he does not appear 
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to have been optimistic about his chances of reaching such an 
agreement and did not hurry his departure; he remained in England until 
after the Christmas festivities, leaving on 29th December, nearly a month 
after he had made certain of English support. Being a cosmopolitan 
individual he probably found the extravagant court festivities greatly to 
his taste and may even have been genuinely keen to linger in England 
just as he had lingered in Venice during his visits there; furthermore 
London offered a welcome respite from the dangers of Constantinople. 
The pretender's intelligence, forceful personality and his extraordinary 
experiences probably made him a popular figure at the English court. He 
was aware of the importance of making himself visible and of making as 
many friends as possible who might be useful to him later. Bogdan left 
England on December 29th 1601, travelling to Venice where his arrival, 
on March 5th 1602, was reported to Cecil by Anthony Tracy; this 
suggests that he broke his journey to Venice somewhere, since the 
quickest journey to Venice, by sea, did not take two months. Similarly he 
appears to have lingered in Venice, since he did not arrive in 
Constantinople until July 1602. (3) This gives rise to the suspicion that 
Bogdan was not anxious to return to Constantinople because he was 
extremely nervous of his reception there and furthermore that he could 
have been acquiring the support of parties whom he subsequently kept 
secret. 
Robert Cecil's letter to Lello, requesting him to accord Bogdan his 
assistance, is very revealing of the nature of the support accorded to 
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Bogdan. Cecil was not fully convinced of the pretender's true status or 
claim to the Moldavian throne. He set out the pretender's credentials with 
the qualification: 
" ... this nobleman Stefan Bogdan, son as he pretendeth of 
Janicula Bogdan ... "; 
the phrase "as he pretendeth" is used in the sense of "as he claims", 
nevertheless Cecil was determined to proceed with the utmost caution in 
this matter. The reference to lancu Sasul as "Janicula Bogdan" suggests 
that Bogdan's explanation of his genealogy was deliberately confusing in 
order to reinforce his claim to be a true descendent of the house of 
Bogdan, the original ruling house of the principality. 
Cecil set out the preCise terms of Queen Elizabeth's favour 
towards Bogdan. The pretender had asked for the Queen's letter of 
recommendation to Lello: 
''To the end that under youre [i.e. Lello's] favoure and proteccion 
he might there remaine in better safetie during the time of his 
expectancy." 
In other words Bogdan had convinced the Queen that his success was a 
foregone conclusion and he merely awaited the time of his preferment. 
We also know that Elizabeth agreed to help him out of sympathy; there 
was no question of a major English diplomatic undertaking to engineer 
Bogdan's appointment to the Moldavian throne in order to improve 
English commerce. Bogdan had approached the Queen having 
performed her a service and she had responded by according him 
protection whilst he awaited his preferment to his throne. Bogdan 
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probably presented himself to the English Court as a man who shared 
religious sympathies with the Queen of England and may indeed have 
led the Queen to believe that he was a Protestant. The fact that leremie 
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Movila was supported by the King of Poland, Zygmund III Vasa, a devout 
Roman Catholic, may have been presented by Bogdan as an additional 
argument for the Protestant Queen of England to support him. Cecil 
made it very clear to Lello that the English Embassy was not to get 
involved in tricky negotiations or in matters which were the internal affairs 
of a friendly state. Lello was told to investigate Bogdan's circumstances 
and proceed according to his own jUdgment, based on his knowledge 
and experience of Ottoman affairs. He should look after the prince's 
person and his affairs only: 
"in suche sorte as the true state of them shall uppon due 
consideration had by you seeme to require and be fittinge for you 
as her Majestye's Agente to deale in." (4) 
Cecil and his colleagues in the Privy Council interpreted the Queen's 
instructions to her Ambassador to ensure that Anglo-Ottoman relations 
were not harmed by interference in matters which were none of 
England's business. 
Only a small number of people in England were in any way 
concerned with foreign affairs. The importance of foreign travel in this 
period should not be exaggerated. Before 1604 the civil war in France 
and England's enmity with the Habsburgs reduced the prospects of 
private travel and most of those who did travel were unlikely to venture as 
far as the Balkans: men such as John Newberie or William Lithgow were 
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exceptionally adventurous travellers; the more usual destinations for 
those wishing to broaden their horizons were France and Italy, therefore 
very few people in England would have had any knowledge at all of 
Moldavia or indeed of the Ottoman Empire. Those professionally 
involved in foreign affairs were a small group unrepresentative of the 
English political community as a whole. Decisions were usually made by 
a small inner group of the Privy Council, which had no fixed rules to 
guide the transaction of business or to dictate who should take decisions. 
Day to day business and correspondence was dealt with by the 
Secretary of State, at this time Robert Cecil. It was to Cecil that the 
Ambassador in Constantinople sent his reports, therefore one expects 
that he was aware of the complicated status of the principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia. He seems to have suspected that ~tefan 
Bogdan's assessment of his chance of being elected to the Moldavian 
throne did not accord with the true state of affairs, hence his cautious 
approach to involving the English Embassy in the pretender's affairs and 
his instructions to Lello to use his own judgment. (5) Thus while 
reiterating the Queen's keenness to help an unfortunate Prince, Cecil 
explicitly warned Lello that the Privy Council wished to maintain the 
utmost caution and suggested that it would not be appropriate: 
"for you to followe or prosecute any of his [Bogdan's] desires that 
you find to be distastefull to the state where you remaine or in any 
sorte prejudicaill to her Majesty's honor, nor to be at any 
extraordinary charges other than to protect him for a time from any 
violence that might be attempted against him by the malicious 
practise of his competitor." (6) 
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This passage is particularly revealing: firstly it made clear that the 
protection accorded to Bogdan was intended only to be an aside to the 
normal business of the embassy and should not be allowed to interfere 
with that business or sour relations with the Ottomans. Secondly it shows 
that Cecil did not trust Bogdan. Furthermore, Lello was assured that 
whilst he was expected to offer Bogdan hospitality and protection at the 
embassy, he was not expected to support Bogdan's campaign with any 
money belonging to the embassy. He was expected to protect Bogdan 
against attempts against his life at the instance of leremie Movila, but 
there was no duty to intervene between Bogdan and the Ottoman 
authorities. Finally protection was not accorded indefinitely. Essentially 
Cecil's letter was carefully worded so as to minimise the English 
Ambassador's obligations towards ~tefan Bogdan. 
The phrase which advised Lello not to indulge in activities 
distasteful to the Ottoman Empire was particularly important to the 
English Ambassador; he drew attention to it in much of his 
correspondence concerning Bogdan and used it to justify his failure to 
secure the pretender's release from prison which was used by his 
enemies to cast doubts upon his integrity. Henry Lello acknowledged the 
Queen's desire to help an unfortunate and, although he would have 
been aware of the pretender's former identity as Bogdan Sasul, he was 
assiduous in referring to him as ~tefan Bogdan. There does not appear 
to have been any hostility between Lello and Bogdan but Lello was 
already intent on remaining aloof from the pretender's affairs; indeed in 
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his first communication on the matter, Lello made clear that Bogdan was 
unlikely to succeed in securing the throne of Moldavia. There was, 
therefore, from the very beginning, the potential for strained relations 
between the pretender and the ambassador because their respective 
perceptions of the embassy's projected role in Bogdan's campaign were 
fundamentally different: the pretender expected Lello to take on his suit 
as a major plank of English policy in the region. On the other hand Lello 
immediately wrote to Cecil of how he intended to proceed: he would 
assist Bogdan because the Queen's patronage was the unfortunate 
man's only hope, and he could do no less. However, as instructed, he 
would proceed only so far as he considered was compatible with the 
embassy's current priority of maintaining good Anglo-Ottoman relations; 
therefore, if he discovered that the Sultan did not wish to prefer Bogdan, 
which was considered the most likely scenario as we shall see, the issue 
would not be persevered with and he would consider his duty to extend 
only to obtaining the Sultan's assurance that Bogdan would be in no 
danger of the molestation and violence which had so troubled him 
before. England's diplomacy on behalf of Bogdan was therefore intended 
to be a very low-key affair, the whole matter was to be dealt with 
tentatively and Bogdan was not considered to be of great importance. 
We must assume that Cecil was aware of the delicate balance of 
power in South-East Europe, since this had been dealt with quite 
comprehensively in previous correspondence from Constantinople, and 
his main concern was not to add to the difficulties of the Ottoman Empire 
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by provoking Poland to abandon her neutrality and join the Holy League 
against the Ottomans. England was not in favour of Ottoman expansion 
but equally she was not in favour of an expansion of Habsburg influence 
eastwards into Moldavia and Wallachia. Furthermore, whilst English 
merchants were in a favourable trading position in the Sultan's 
dominions their interests were best served by the maintenance of the 
status quo in the region. Therefore one may conjecture that the Privy 
Council's instructions to Lello, asking him to use his superior knowledge 
of the Ottoman Empire to decide how to proceed, were intended to elicit 
information which would justify a very guarded approach to the Queen's 
intention to support ~tefan Bogdan; if this was indeed their intention, they 
were successful. 
Lello explained the difficulties facing Bogdan and asked that the 
Queen be informed of them in order that he might be protected from 
blame in the event of Bogdan's failure. He warned that the pretender 
had: 
"made choice of a time very adverse to his said sute and 
preiudiciall to his person," 
because the Ambassador of the King of Poland was pressing for the 
confirmation of Simeon Movila's occupation of the Wallachian throne and 
of leremie's rights as Prince of Moldavia. (7) 
Mihai Viteazul had been executed on the orders of Georgio Basta, 
the Habsburg field commander in Hungary, on August 19th 1601, being 
considered guilty of treachery by offering to change his allegiance to the 
Sultan. The Ottomans intended to replace him on the throne of Wallachia 
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with Radu Mihnea, thereby returning the principality to the Ottoman orbit. 
Poland and leremie Movila had other plans and when Radu attempted to 
enter the principality in December 1601, he was prevented from 
obtaining "quiete possession" of the throne and was driven out of 
Wallachia by Simeon Movila. The Sultan was very aggrieved at this turn 
of events but was unwilling to risk a breach with Poland and appears to 
have prevaricated rather than impose Radu, who was eventually 
captured by Polish forces (February 1602). The Sultan was thus forced to 
accept Simeon as the prince and asked for Radu to be allowed to return 
to Constantinople. Simeon was not popular with many of the Wallachian 
boyars who attempted to overthrow him. (8) 
In addition to demands for leremie and Simeon's confirmation, 
Poland was pressing the Sultan to relinquish control of four fortresses in 
Moldavia: Akerman, Killej (Chilia), Bender and Ismael. This demand was 
unacceptable to the Sultan who responded with delaying tactics. He 
refused to allow the Polish Ambassador to leave Constantinople with an 
answer whilst he awaited the outcome of the summer's campaign after 
which he would either be in a position to risk Poland's hostility and strike 
against the principalities to restore them to Ottoman control or be forced 
to accede to Poland's demands. For the moment the Ottomans were 
hardly likely to prefer Bogdan: 
"being ... in many bryars [Le. having many problems] having their 
hands full on all sides, and therefore no reason further to 
intreague themselves," (9) 
and if they were to overthrow leremie, Bogdan would not be assured of 
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success because he would be faced with the perennial problem 
encountered by all pretenders, that is of raising sufficient money to 
secure the nomination to the throne. 
Bogdan's lack of financial support was likely to offer a major 
problem; the Polish Ambassador knew of his return to Constantinople 
and was spending a great deal of money in bribes to ensure that leremie 
was confirmed in Moldavia and that Bogdan was sent into perpetual 
exile. This outcome was deemed extremely likely by Lello because, 
whilst his competitors were "rich and mighty", Bogdan was poor and 
distressed, having lived three years in virtual banishment and narrowly 
escaping with his life. (10) Lello may have been over pessimistic about 
Bogdan's chances of success because he wished to distance himself 
from the project. Nevertheless for Bogdan the acquisition of English 
patronage was a step forward because it protected him from leremie's 
enmity rather than because it significantly improved his chances of 
gaining the Moldavian throne. 
Lello's second communication with Cecil enlarged on the inherent 
problems in the pretender's suit: Bogdan had some support for his claim 
to the throne but none of his supporters were in a position to offer him 
useful assistance. Bogdan's anonymous supporters may have included a 
great many disgruntled Moldavian boyars and Lello informed Cecil that 
the pretender was in danger of becoming involved in dangerous 
intrigues against the Movila princes and turning the English Embassy 
into a centre of intrigue; such behaviour would do much to hinder rather 
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than further his cause. The Ottomans apparently suspected Bogdan of 
assembling a coterie which plotted a course of action which would upset 
the Ottoman's current understanding with Poland. Such proceedings, if 
true, would be immensely damaging to Bogdan's protectors, including 
Lello, because they could also be suspected of being involved in 
Bogdan's plottings; any such involvement would be detrimental to the 
English commercial community's interest. Lello objected to having 
Bogdan's problems thrust upon him and began preparing the way for the 
pretender to be quietly persuaded to quit the Ottoman capital 
permanently. 
It is likely that Bogdan was indeed flirting with the idea of 
subversive action against leremie Movila: Lello reported that the 
pretender was pinning all his hopes on a breach occurring between the 
Ottomans and Poland which would allow him to press his claim to the 
Moldavian throne. Lello considered it more likely that such a breach 
would give the Ottoman army an opportunity to take the principality under 
direct rule. Lello's suspicions were probably well-founded: Moldavia and 
Wallachia had caused the Sultan so much trouble in the previous 
decade and direct annexation would ensure that the principalities could 
no longer form centres of intrigue. In any case Lello did not agree that a 
breach between Poland and the Ottoman Empire would take place: he 
reported that the fortresses which the King of Poland had requested the 
Sultan to cede were now in Habsburg hands and Poland would have to 
take them by force. 
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Meanwhile the Movila brothers faced difficulties in their respective 
principalities, Wallachia was not willing to accept the: 
"tyranny of Simion their prince nor willing any longer to be 
protected by 16 [the King of Poland] expelled Simion their cuntry 
and accorded with Georgio Basti: it is dayly expected that 
Bugdania will revolt allsoe ... " 
These developments threatened to allow the Habsburgs to infiltrate both 
principalities which would threaten both Poland and the Ottomans; such 
circumstances made it exceedingly unlikely that the Sultan would 
provoke Polish hostility in order to accommodate Bogdan; accordingly 
the Sultan confirmed leremie and Simeon on their respective thrones 
subject to their payment of tribute. (11 ) 
Lello may have been guilty of overstating his case against Bogdan 
and, with hindsight, he was unwise to express his disquiet about Bogdan 
in such strong terms. When the pretender was imprisoned by the 
Ottomans, Lello was suspected of neglecting his orders to protect 
Bogdan; the latter accused his erstwhile protector of having betrayed 
him. The case against Lello was articulated in England by Gaspar 
Gratiani, Bogdan's servant and a man with considerable negotiating 
experience and formidable powers of persuasion, and Thomas Glover, 
who had much to gain from Lello's disgrace. Lello was forced to justify 
his conduct at length and his dislike of Bogdan, obvious from his letters, 
did not help his defence of his actions. 
Relations between Lello and Bogdan had begun badly and 
deteriorated. The two men viewed the Queen of England's patronage in 
completely different terms. Bogdan expected to remain in the 
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ambassador's house until he was preferred to the Moldavian throne and 
expected his host to devote a large proportion of his time and energy to 
obtaining that object; Lello, however, considered that his primary duty 
was to protect Bogdan from attack or imprisonment at the hands of 
leremie Movila and, although he had been ordered to help Bogdan's suit, 
his duty to do so only extended so far as his other duties as ambassador 
were not interfered with or hindered; therefore he went through the 
motions of pressing the Queen's recommendation upon the Sultan but 
was probably awaiting an opportunity to persuade the pretender to leave 
his residence, his protection and the Ottoman dominions for his own 
safety. 
In a letter to the Earl of Salisbury Lello gave a detailed explanation 
of the circumstances which lead to Bogdan's imprisonment in the "Castle 
of Asia" on the Bosphorous.(He may have been referring to the fortress of 
Anadolu Hissar, although several castles were known as the "Castle of 
Asia"). It is unfortunate that Lello's version of these events is the only 
substantial source available; Bogdan's accusations against Lello only 
deal with the specific matter of his imprisonment. Lello's letter was written 
in November 1605 (some eighteen months after Bogdan's imprisonment, 
which took place in February or March 1604) after he had been given 
details of the accusations against him and after his receipt of Cecil's letter 
requesting an explanation of his conduct. It was a carefully prepared and 
extremely detailed justification of all his behaviour towards Bogdan, 
presenting the pretender in the worst possible light, as an unmitigated 
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scoundrel who had brought his imprisonment upon himself by his own 
foolish actions. 
It should be noted that Thomas Glover, one of the chief 
protagonists in the campaign against Lello, was still in Constantinople 
when these events occurred. He left in December 1604, his arrival in 
London coincided with that of Gaspar Gratiani, indeed they probably 
travelled together, and it was at this juncture that rumours of Lello's ill-
treatment of Bogdan surfaced. Glover and Lello parted on bad terms; 
Glover had not troubled to hide his contempt for his former master and he 
was aware of the hostility between Lello and Bogdan; if he had any 
suspicion that Lello's behaviour in the matter had been dishonourable he 
would surely have laid a complaint himself. It was Gratiani who testified 
that the ambassador had betrayed the late Queen's protege; it seems 
likely that Glover seized on the opportunity presented to launch a 
campaign to secure Lello's removal from the embassy so that he could 
be his replacement. He was able to make use of his personal knowledge 
of bad relations between Bogdan and Lello to cast suspicion on the 
ambassador's behaviour, whilst making no accusations of misconduct 
himself. One should also take into account the fact that none of Lello's 
letters of 1603 contain any mention of his allegations concerning 
Bogdan, nor did he bother to inform Cecil of the pretender's 
imprisonment, which the latter had a right to expect. It appears that Lello 
had been careless as to the success of Bogdan's suit or as to what 
happened to him when he left the custody of the embassy. This is not to 
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say that Lello's whole version of events was a tissue of lies, but however 
much Bogdan may have abused Lello's protection, the latter's treatment 
of him left something to be desired. 
One may infer from Lello's account of his dealings with Bogdan 
that his hostility stemmed from great irritation at the pretender's attempts 
to involve the English Embassy in his suit more than he wished it to be 
involved. Lello was adamant that he had done his best to press for 
Bogdan's installation in Moldavia, however his efforts followed strictly the 
instruction to proceed only so far as he did nothing to cause the English 
Embassy either to be distrusted or incur extra expense. Therefore one 
may conclude that Lello presented Queen Elizabeth's letters on 
Bogdan's behalf and upon bei ng told that for the moment the Sultan was 
content to allow leremie to remain prince, he was content to leave the 
matter in abeyance, telling Bogdan that he should accept the situation. In 
any case, Lello knew that his advocacy of Bogdan WOUld, on its own, 
achieve little, as he pointed out to Cecil: 
IIneither I nor no other Prince assigned her can obtain any sute 
without money or rewards, therefore they are farr from the truth that 
suppose any soliciting will obtain any business here without 
money ... " (12) 
Bogdan was also aware of this fact and, to his protector's annoyance, 
began offering money which he did not have to those closest to the 
Sultan: 
"an in my [Lello's] absence he would not spare to pmyse his Matie 
[Le. James I, (this must be after 4th June 1603 when Lello reported 
having heard of Queen Elizabeth's death)] should pforme yt and 
practised many devices to bring me in as confirmer of the same ... " 
(13) 
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Bogdan and Lello found themselves greatly at odds; the former 
was obviously doing all he could to obtain loans of money elsewhere, as 
Aron had done years before. Many of those who might have been 
prepared to lend the pretender money would not be keen to do so when 
his chances of ascending the Moldavian throne were so bleak. Bankers 
in Constantinople would undoubtedly have been well-informed about the 
progress of the Sultan's war-effort and the situation in the principalities 
and therefore would have considered Bogdan a bad risk, particularly as 
leremie had the resources to outbid Bogdan. The pretender had 
suggested that the English Crown would act as guarantor of any loans 
and would also be prepared to pay bribes in return for its protege's 
election to the Moldavian throne. Lello knew that this would never 
happen and was particularly concerned about these rumours because of 
his orders not to involve the embassy financially in Bogdan's campaign. 
Furthermore, Lello was aware that Edward Barton had become heavily in 
debt because he had been forced to act as guarantor of loans made to 
Aron Voda, who had neglected to reimburse his creditors. Sensibly Lello 
soundly rebuffed Bogdan's suggestions that he stand surety. 
Bogdan's counter-move was, so Lello alleged, to write letters and 
send agents into Moldavia to stir up the boyars to complain of the present 
prince. According to Lello's previous letters, there were plenty of 
disaffected Moldavians and Bogdan considered it advantageous to be in 
contact with them; Lello was seriously concerned that the man under his 
protection would be seen by the Ottomans as a troublemaker and a 
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subversive influence; he was strongly opposed to his embassy becoming 
embroiled in stirring up dissent in Moldavia, and seems to have 
attempted strong measures to curb Bogdan's actions. 
Upon discovering what Bogdan was doing, the incumbent prince 
of Moldavia, leremie Movila, asked the King of Poland to write to the 
Sultan and request him to banish Bogdan from Constantinople. However, 
the Vizier apparently wanted too much money to bring this about, so 
leremie instead asked for the pretender to be imprisoned; the Vizier was 
agreeable and arranged for a small force to remove Bogdan from Lello's 
house. Lello could not tolerate such an action since it was a violation of 
the privilege and status of the embassy and an insult to the memory of 
Queen Elizabeth who had ordered him to guarantee Bogdan's safety, 
therefore Lello warned the Vizier that his force would: 
"find an unfriendly welcome." 
Lello was justifiably concerned at this state of affairs. Whilst living in his 
house Bogdan had taken advantage of his protection to conduct 
negotiations which threatened the integrity of the English Embassy. His 
presence there was no longer a mere irritation and it placed Lello and his 
staff in extreme difficulties in conducting their ordinary business. Lello's 
warning to the Vizier bore fruit because the latter was unwilling to carry 
out an attack on the English Embassy. leremie's plot to have Bogdan 
imprisoned was abandoned when the Vizier was deprived of his job. 
Lello felt that the incident justified him in abandoning his support for 
Bogdan's cause because to proceed would place the embassy at odds 
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with the Ottomans. Therefore he tried to persuade Bogdan that it would 
do best to leave Constantinople because his presence placed them both 
in danger. The Venetian Ambassador supported Lello's advice with his 
own:that Bogdan could expect trouble if he remained in Constantinople. 
He advised the pretender that his most sensible course would be to retire 
into Christendom. Lello anticipated that leremie would not desist in his 
efforts to avert Bogdan's challenge to his own position; he also argued 
that his own remit did not allow him to act in a manner which aroused the 
wrath of the Ottomans. However, Bogdan refused to leave: 
"He answered me as thoughe I were bound to pvide for him, he 
could go no wheare unles I would give him money, houlding my 
counsell rather to be an excuse in respect of the charge I was at of 
him that otherwise." 
Bogdan then offered to quit the ambassador's house, saying that 
he would endure whatever happened rather than have Lello suffer any 
blame or trouble because of him. This appears to have been a ploy to 
excite Lello's pity so that he would persuade him to remain under the 
embassy's protection; if so this did not work. Bogdan remained in the 
embassy and Lello expressed himself very disappointed that the 
pretender did not keep his promise. Lello was hardhearted in his 
indifference to Bogdan's welfare. If Bogdan had indeed left as he had 
promised to do, he risked perpetual imprisonment or murder at the hands 
of leremie Movila's agents. Lello was endeavouring to wash his hands of 
Bogdan's affairs and abandon him when he was extremely vulnerable. 
Bogdan, on the other hand, revealed a somewhat childish streak in 
threatening to put himself in danger in order to persuade Lello to treat 
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him with compassion, yet he was not so proud as to carry out his threat 
and remained in the English Embassy where he was patently 
unwelcome. 
From the pretender's pOint of view, he could not afford either to 
leave Lello's protection, for obvious reasons, or to leave Constantinople, 
since this would have meant abandoning his hopes of obtaining the 
Moldavian throne. He had endured enormous hazards and difficulties 
during the previous ten years, suffering numerous disappointments. He 
therefore determined to cling to the only hope left which was to remain 
under Lello's protection. Lello later claimed that he wrote numerous 
letters to England asking for instructions, but received no reply; these 
letters, if they existed, have not survived in the State Papers. 
Soon after this the old Sultan died, to be succeeded by his 
fourteen year old son Ahmet I [1603-1617] whose officers received new 
petitions from leremie. The Vizier approached Henry Lello asking him to 
deliver Bogdan to him so that he might: 
"honour him and prler him for the Queenes sake, for the 105 [the 
Sultan] is determyned to deprive Jeremia." (14) 
The English Ambassador did not trust the Vizier, thinking that this was a 
stratagem and: 
"Desired him to deal playnly with me for yt would be to his 
dishonour and myne to execute any other designe upon him 
(being in my howse) he swore by God, his law and his Kings head 
(wch is there solempnest othe) that he determyned to prefer him." 
(15) 
Despite the Vizier's oaths, Lello had little confidence in what he was told; 
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he returned to his house, where he recounted the Vizier's proposals to 
the pretender, advising him that he expected the Vizier to practise some 
deception, and suggested that Bogdan should escape to safety in 
Christendom, leaving him to pacify the Vizier. Bogdan refused, saying he 
was prepared to go to the Vizier whatever happened to him. 
Nevertheless the pretender did nothing for seven or eight days. It 
seems likely that Bogdan was in a quandary, afraid for his own safety, yet 
afraid also that he would regret not taking a chance, however small, to be 
preferred to the Moldavian throne. If he escaped from Constantinople he 
would lose any chance of gaining what he had been brought up to 
believe was his right. He spent a further week in Lello's house 
considering what to do, probably steeling himself to face possible 
imprisonment, whilst hoping that the Vizier was in earnest when he 
proposed to help Bogdan to the Moldavian throne. During Bogdan's 
difficult week of indecision the Vizier constantly pressed Lello for an 
answer and Lello in his turn called on Bogdan asking him what he 
intended to do. Eventually Bogdan decided to take hold of his courage; 
he told his protector that when the Vizier sent for him he would go. 
According to Lello, Bogdan left the safety of the English Embassy of his 
own accord, he was not led away as a prisoner and did not leave 
expecting to be ill-treated. One can imagine, however, that Lello's 
demeanour towards Bogdan left the latter in no doubt that his choice was 
between the Vizier's offer and exile in Christendom and that continued 
residence in the embassy was not on offer; it seems likely that Bogdan 
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was under great pressure to make a rapid decision. 
Lello insisted that Bogdan was not ill-treated by the Vizier nor was 
he dragged out of the embassy and thrown into prison. He was lodged in 
the Vizier's house, although he was requested not to leave, and the 
Vizier daily promised that he would be preferred to the Moldavian throne. 
Lello insisted that he had devoted considerable time and energy to 
ensuring that the Vizier kept his promise. He argued that if the pretender 
had had any misgivings about his own safety, he had plenty of 
opportunity to quit the Vizier's residence. Bogdan was eventually sent to 
prison as a result of leremie Movila's agents' bribery. Although Bogdan 
had been guaranteed English protection by Queen Elizabeth against the 
scheming of Movila, Lello considered that his duty towards him had 
finished; Bogdan had brought his imprisonment upon himself. As we 
shall see, King James and Secretary of State Cecil disagreed with this 
interpretation of the ambassador's duty of protection 
Lello appears to have been glad that the matter of Bogdan's long 
residence in his house had finally been resolved and he wanted nothing 
more to do with his former charge, therefore he did nothing to obtain 
Bogdan's release: 
"And by cause himselfe hath now no meanes to excuse his former 
follyes and releve himselfe I recovered him not after he was 
imprysoned, wch was no tyme for me, in regard I had too many 
contencions wth the Vizerey about our corsaires ... and other divers 
sutes of the marchants ... " 
The death of Queen Elizabeth had brought further difficulties, when the 
Ottomans refused to recognise the embassy; besides this he had been 
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ordered to do nothing which might damage relations with the host 
country. Lello considered that to interfere with the Vizier's conduct of 
policy towards one of the Sultan's vassal states at a time when the 
English community was not popular due to the activities of English 
pirates in the Mediterranean would only add to the Ottoman ill-feeling 
already in existence. Furthermore he had been requested not to put the 
embassy to great expense on Bogdan's behalf: 
"wch I could not avoid beeing 2 yeeres and a half in my house wth 
4 svants and daley recourse to him wch he supposed I was bound 
unto. " 
Therefore he considered his time would be best spent: 
"to preferre the business wherein I am here imployed then 
following the said Princes sute." 
Lello apologised for thus having misunderstood his government's 
instructions. 
Almost immediately upon his imprisonment, Bogdan wrote to his 
protectors in England. We must assume he was fully aware that Lello 
was unlikely to make any efforts to obtain his release. The careless 
attitude of his former protector towards his safety fuelled the pent-up 
hostility which had evidently been burning in Bogdan during his two-year 
sojourn in the English Embassy. Furthermore, years of ill-treatment at the 
hands of others appears to have filled the pretender with paranoia, 
convincing him that he must have been betrayed by Lello; therefore in his 
letter of 7th March 1604, Bogdan launched a forceful attack on Lello, 
accusing him of plotting with leremie Movila and his agents to obtain his 
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imprisonment: 
"I am a prisoner in the castle of Asia, because of Henry Lello who 
had become close friends with my mortal enemy, Jeremia ... " (16) 
Bogdan alleged that leremie had sent agents to Constantinople to 
negotiate with Lello for his help against Bogdan and induced the 
ambassador to accept a sum of money in return for betraying Bogdan to 
the Vizier. Bogdan suggested that the ambassador was guilty of high 
treason: he argued that Lello had gone to the Vizier and offered to deliver 
Bogdan into his custody. He alleged that Lello had decided to act on his 
own initiative instead of following orders from the late Queen and justified 
his actions on the grounds that Bogdan was involved in a conspiracy with 
rebels in Wallachia against the Sultan's authority. The Vizier then, it is 
alleged, contacted leremie's agents who confirmed Lello's words. Soon 
afterwards, the Vizier sent three men to remove Bogdan from Lello's 
house, bursting into his quarters and beating him. Bogdan said that he 
had pleaded with Lello not to abandon him but his erstwhile protector 
had wished to know nothing about him. Bogdan was then placed in the 
Vizier's custody and was lodged in his house for many days before being 
sent to prison. 
If Cecil received this letter soon after it was written he did nothing 
to help Bogdan. It is possible that he did not believe the accusations 
contained therein until he met with Gaspar Gratiani a year later and 
consulted Glover about Lello's attitudes and behaviour towards Bogdan. 
This scenario is possible since one may infer from Cecil's 
correspondence on the matter that he did not believe the English 
282 
Ambassador had been bribed by leremie Movila to betray Bogdan; 
however it seems highly unlikely that Cecil would not have written to 
Lello on receiving this letter to ask for an explanation of the pretender's 
imprisonment. (17) Furthermore the tone of Cecil's letters to Lello after 
Gratiani's visit suggest that the charges of misconduct were completely 
new to him. Therefore it is most likely that Cecil was not aware of 
Bogdan's imprisonment and his disputes with Lello until June 1605 when 
Gratiani visited England, probably conveying Bogdan's letter with him. As 
we shall see below, Cecil initially believed that Lello had indeed 
delivered the pretender to the Ottomans. 
Gratiani arrived in England some time before June 26th 1605 and 
wrote to Robert Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury, as an initial approach. In this 
letter he outlined the fate of his master, 9tefan Bogdan, reminding Cecil 
that Bogdan had received the express favour of Queen Elizabeth I and 
had been specially recommended to her Ambassador in Constantinople. 
Bogdan, and therefore Gratiani, were probably unaware that Cecil had 
been anxious that Bogdan's campaign be supported only with great 
caution. Gratiani refers to the Secretary of State as having been the 
pretender's "first protector". This statement suggests a certain ambiguity 
about Cecil's previous relationship with Bogdan, for he appears to have 
given Bogdan the impression that he was in favour of supporting his suit 
for the Moldavian throne, whereas Cecil's correspondence with Lello 
suggests that it was Queen Elizabeth who had decided to support 
Bogdan and that Cecil had great reservations about the project but had 
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been ordered to deal with the matter on her behalf. All this shows that 
Bogdan had misunderstood Cecil's behaviour towards him:no doubt the 
pretender had been treated kindly by him. Cecil had probably expressed 
his best wishes and ensured that Bogdan gained an audience with the 
Queen in order that, if Bogdan were to be successful in gaining the 
Moldavian throne, he would be well-disposed towards England's 
interests in the region. However, Cecil was more concerned to protect the 
English Embassy's standing in Constantinople and as we have seen 
recommended Lello to proceed in a manner which did not involve the 
embassy in such intrigue as would disrupt the Ottomans' relations with 
other states. Nevertheless, because Bogdan was confident of Cecil's 
friendship, Gratiani approached Cecil privately; this may be why 
Bogdan's letter is to be found in Cecil's private correspondence and not 
in the State Papers. (18) 
Gratiani did not, in this letter, allege any improper conduct by Lello 
towards Bogdan: 
"The latter [i.e. Lello] afforded him protection in his house from 
which the Prince was removed to the danger and damage of his 
Crown and to his personal damage." 
There is no suggestion here that Lello had betrayed Bogdan; 
furthermore, Gratiani did not request Cecil to continue the campaign for 
Bogdan's election to the Moldavian throne; he merely asked that Lello be 
told to do all he could to ensure that the pretender was restored to health 
and liberty. (19) There followed a meeting between Gratiani and Cecil in 
which the former gave his assurance that Bogdan had not been plotting 
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against the Sultan, apparently the pretext upon which he had been 
imprisoned, and had therefore done nothing to justify his treatment. 
Bogdan was, so Gratiani alleged, delivered to the Ottomans by the 
practice of his enemies whilst under Lello's protection. Cecil did not at 
this time know of Lello's contention that Bogdan had left the English 
Embassy of his own accord and was naturally concerned as to how 
Bogdan had been removed from the embassy without Lello attempting to 
prevent this. Cecil ordered Lello to do all he could to obtain Bogdan's 
restoration to liberty: 
"which he had when he was delivered by you out of your 
house," (20) 
but, probably in order not to disrupt the work of the embassy, did not 
attempt to have Lello recalled. This is another indication that the project 
to support Bogdan was not a major undertaking in the eyes of the English 
Crown. 
It is likely that Cecil consulted Thomas Glover, who had been 
employed at the embassy whilst Bogdan was there. There is no record of 
what Glover might have said but we know that he was privy to Cecil's 
suspicions about his conduct because he wrote to Lello to inform him of 
Cecil's displeasure. (21) It is unlikely that Glover would risk appearing 
disloyal to his former master by making his own allegations, but he did 
nothing to dispel the impression that Lello had been negligent of his duty. 
His previous employment at the English Embassy ensured that he would 
have been well-placed to testify of the hostility between Lello and 
Bogdan; any such testimony provided a powerful case against Lello. 
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For Salisbury and the English Crown the dispute over the 
circumstances of Bogdan's imprisonment was potentially damaging to 
the good name of the English Embassy: if Lello had indeed been party to 
the pretender's forced delivery he might have to be recalled in disgrace, 
having betrayed the late Queen's trust. If Lello were innocent of the 
allegations the implications for the status of the English Embassy were 
profound, for it meant that the Ottomans had scant regard for the rights of 
protection belonging to the English Crown. 
King James I was informed of Bogdan's imprisonment and 
determined to intervene to secure the pretender's release, partly out of 
Christian charity and "princely commiseration" towards a Christian 
prince: 
"who comes somewhat near to him in his proffession of the 
GospeL" 
Bogdan had been brought up and formally followed the Orthodox rite. On 
his visit to England he may have persuaded Queen Elizabeth that the 
Orthodox and Protestant faiths had much in common, but it is much more 
likely that he had allowed Queen Elizabeth to believe that he had 
adopted his father's Lutheran faith. In any case, religious faith was not, as 
we shall see, an important influence in Bogdan's life; he is unlikely to 
have allowed religious scruples to hinder him in furthering his own ends. 
A second reason for the King's intervention was that Bogdan had 
placed himself under the protection of the English Crown and during the 
lifetime of Queen Elizabeth had not been disturbed: 
"he [King James] holds himself a little engaged in reputation that 
any person, who upon confidence of safety from his Majesty's 
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predecessor put himself into the hands of that state, should 
presently upon her decease become a miserable prisoner: a 
matter wherein the world may justly notre] an apparent difference 
of that respect towards his Majesty which was yielded to the late 
Queen." (22) 
The King had succeeded Elizabeth not only in her rights and dominions 
but also in her friendships with other princes, he therefore had a moral 
duty to continue England's protection of §tefan Bogdan. King James 
wrote a letter in his support, which has not survived but which, according 
to Cecil, showed how serious was the Crown's concern over Bogdan's 
imprisonment. A copy of Gratiani's minute was enclosed in Cecil's 
communication and Lello was warned that he was expected to do all he 
could to help Bogdan. 
In a letter of 27th October 1605 Lello informed Cecil that he had 
received letters on the subject of Stefan Bogdan and another prisoner, ) 
Sir Thomas Sherley. Lello did not take the allegations against him very 
seriously; he pointed out that he was at present greatly occupied with the 
matter of an English merchant captured by the Ottomans in Cyprus and 
therefore intended to wait until this matter was resolved before taking up 
Bogdan's case. He insisted that Bogdan had placed himself in the hands 
of the Vizier of his own accord and that the pretender's allegations were 
completely untrue. Furthermore he could not foresee success in 
obtaining the pretender's release, (23) since it was Ottoman policy to 
hold hostages to the incumbent Prince's good behaviour: 
"yf I recover him, they will expecte I should be pledged he shall 
geve th other no disturbe, and lastly he is the 105 [the Sultan's] 
subiecte and hath his pension and pay for many yeares." 
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He was angry that "sinister" reports by Bogdan had damaged his 
reputation: 
" ... [Bogdan had been] embouldened to informe a prince and 
monarke such as his Matie is, wch untruthes wch he hath the 
rather apprehended because he obtayned her Mates deceased 
gracious Ires wth the Iyke by saing he was the son of one Despote 
and his mother of the Palliologies, and how the 10 [Emperor] sent 
for him, all untruthes." 
Lello thus showed his venom towards the pretender by casting 
aspersions upon the genealogy of which he was so proud. His attack on 
Bogdan's claim to the Moldavian throne was not justified, there is plenty 
of evidence that Bogdan was the man he claimed to be; this serves to 
show how bad the relations between the two men had become. 
Nevertheless Lello was compelled eventually to do his duty, but it 
was not until January 1606 that he delivered the King's letters pertaining 
to Bogdan's imprisonment. He received the following answer: 
"he is a turke and therefore he is not to be license[d] to go out of 
the Countrey." (24) 
This was not an overt refusal to release Bogdan, but merely a delaying 
tactic; Lello continued to press for the pretender's release, but was able 
to achieve nothing further because the Ottomans made the excuse that 
they were occupied with the defence of Hungary against the Habsburgs 
and with further troubles in Persia. (25) No progress had been made by 
May 1606, when Lello was told that the Ottomans would not release 
Bogdan and that the Sultan was writing to King James about the whole 
affair. (26) Lello concluded that the more he tried to obtain Bogdan's 
release, the more determined the Ottomans were to keep him in prison. 
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Thomas Glover, on his arrival in Constantinople as Lello's 
successor, conducted an investigation into Bogdan's imprisonment and 
his subsequent escape. He implied that Lello's failure to protect Bogdan 
had nearly resulted in the latter's death: after two years in prison leremie 
had procured an order for his execution by strangulation. Two men were 
sent to the fortress to carry out the execution. Bogdan appears to have 
received advance warning because he had escaped two days before 
they arrived, dressed in the clothes of a Turkish woman probably 
supplied by the prison keeper's wife. The whole operation was very 
dangerous to all involved. Bogdan's powerful and manipulative 
personality enabled him to persuade people to help him at risk to their 
own safety. (27) Another facet of Bogdan's character is revealed by his 
subsequent behaviour. He displayed a sense of obligation to protect 
those who had helped him whilst also trying to lay a false trail for those in 
pursuit, an intelligent move which was also to cause immense difficulties 
for Henry Lello, the man he believed to have betrayed him: 
"and after he was some 40 myles ... out of danger wryteth a letter to 
the keeper of the castell, that he should not trouble any of his 
people for his escape, for none were consenting thereto, and yf he 
would have anything to say to him he should come to the Englishe 
Ambassadors house in Constantinople where he should find 
him." (28) 
It is inconceivable that Bogdan would have been so stupid as to return to 
Constantinople; in actual fact he escaped to Wallachia. He was making 
the most of the opportunity to wreak his revenge on Lello. The 
pretender's letter was brought to the Grand Vizier who sent for Lello, 
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having been incited to take action by leremie Movila, and ordered him to 
deliver Bogdan. He would not listen when told that Lello knew nothing of 
the escape: 
"when I sawe no reasion would prevaile wth him, byde him goe 
looke him for I was not his Jaylor." (29) 
The investigation of the pretender's escape was wide-ranging and 
severe; many people were questioned and some tortured to death. Lello 
suspected that if Bogdan were caught he would be executed. One of 
those tortured to death revealed the true manner of Bogdan's escape; 
unfortunately Lello did not see fit to dwell on this, preferring to enlarge on 
his own difficulties caused by the pretender. The Vizier now accepted that 
Lello had had no part in the escape, but still thought that he was hiding 
the fugitive in his house. Lello was told to deliver him over: if the Sultan, 
who had been kept in ignorance, should hear of it he would ransack the 
embassy to find Bogdan, being a "furious youth". Lello's extreme irritation 
at the trouble he had been caused spilled over into his writing in a 
manner which is uncharacteristic of his correspondence: 
"This I hope is the last trouble I shall have for him and yf I wheare 
wourthy to give advice herein his Matie should do well not to 
harken to these compterfitt and [dominating?] fellowes that give 
themselves names of Princes: they ruynated my predicessor and 
my self they have much troubled and hindered me in business: the 
Queenes Matie decease, his highness and Queene now is wth 
your honor not well used wth there sinister informacons wch god 
willing at my retorne I will make more manifest to yor honor." (30) 
Allegations about Lello's behaviour towards Bogdan were still being 
made a year later when he was recalled to England and forced to defend 
his conduct; by this time the affair had become part of the dispute raging 
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between Glover and Lello described in Chapter III. Lello's unsolicited 
advice above implies that the English Crown had little understanding of 
the realities faced by its Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan. Furthermore, 
in Lello's view, involvement with pretenders damaged rather than 
furthered England's interests. This affair demonstrates that the Crown 
was prepared to ignore advice from those who had greater knowledge of 
Ottoman affairs and used the embassy for diplomatic purposes which did 
not further the commercial interests of the Levant Company. 
Lello had been able to improve his relations with the Grand Vizier 
once it was realised that he was not sheltering Bogdan. Moldavian 
politics were further complicated, meanwhile, by the death of leremie 
Movila, which initiated a dispute between Poland and the Ottomans over 
authority to choose his successor: the King of Poland sent a Chief 
Palatine in charge of an army to establish leremie's son Constantin in the 
Principality, warning the Ottomans that the authority to do so belonged to 
him. As we saw in the last chapter, the principle of securing a hereditary 
succession in Moldavia guaranteed by the King of Poland was central to 
the maintenance of Polish influence in the principality. The Sultan 
responded by creating Simeon Movila, Constantin's uncle, Prince of 
Moldavia and sent him his authority. This was clearly intended to assert 
the Sultan's continued right to choose the Prince of Moldavia, whilst not 
being unnecessarily provocative, since Simeon was still a member of the 
Movila dynasty and could be expected to maintain good relations with 
Poland. Meanwhile the Council of Austria decided to continue in arms 
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against the Ottomans; the result of this was that the Sultan could not 
afford to take a strong line against Poland in support of Simeon. The 
matter of the Moldavian succession was adjourned until the next year 
when a twenty-year peace between the Ottomans and the Austrian 
Empire was concluded, to take effect on 1 st January 1607. The Ottomans 
were at last able to risk the King of Poland's hostility and stand firm 
against the succession of Constantin Movila. Eventually Simeon 
ascended the Moldavian throne, thereby negating the principle of an 
hereditary succession by primogeniture. (31) 
Meanwhile, §tefan Bogdan had not given up hope of winning the 
Moldavian throne. He had escaped to Wallachia, relying upon the mercy 
of Prince Radu gerban (1602-11); he is unlikely to have done this unless 
he was aware that Radu would be willing to help him: they may have 
been in contact before Bogdan was imprisoned. Radu had replaced 
Simeon Movila as Prince of Wallachia, after the latter had been 
overthrown by force, he and the Movila did not enjoy good relations, 
therefore Radu treated their enemy Bogdan in a manner befitting a 
prince. However, agents of leremie Movila operating in Wallachia sent 
word to the Sultan as to the pretender's whereabouts: it must have been 
this news that persuaded the Grand Vizier that Lello was telling the truth 
about his lack of involvement in Bogdan's escape. The Sultan sent Radu 
orders that Bogdan should be returned to Constantinople in chains, an 
enormous humiliation, otherwise he would incur the Sultan's extreme 
displeasure. Radu's own agent in Constantinople was able to send 
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advance warning of the Sultan's intentions. Bogdan would have faced 
death if he had returned to Constantinople and Radu was willing to outwit 
the Sultan: he sent the pretender to the border of Podolia with a 
substantial guard and advised him to seek the help of one "Kniaz Vasil 
Palatinus Wollynie" and thereafter to shift for himself as well as he 
could. (32) 
Radu laid plans to trick the Ottoman envoy into thinking that he 
had been holding Bogdan in custody ready to hand him over, but that the 
pretender had escaped in secret. In doing so he: 
"called the walles of the wynde in the chamber where Stephano 
did lodge to be raggedlie broken". 
This was the scene shown to the Sultan's messenger when he arrived. 
To further establish his innocence of the escape, Radu issued a 
proclamation throughout Wallachia: 
"that who soever should intertayne, succour, hide or give any 
assistance for the escape of the said Stephano, such persons soe 
offendinge should be without any commiseration deprived of life, 
and their howses and faculties confiscated to the Prince, and to 
such as should find him out alive or dead should have fowre 
thousand chicquins for their rewards." (33) 
The Ottoman messenger returned to Constantinople. Word came from 
Simeon Movila, now ruling Moldavia (Ieremie having died), that Bogdan 
had collected a force of 30,000 men, including Cossacks, with the 
assistance of the Knez Vassilius and his adherents and friends in Poland, 
and intended to march on Moldavia. Simeon craved immediate Ottoman 
assistance, otherwise he said he would be forced to flee. 
According to Sir Thomas Glover the Ottomans were not greatly 
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worried about Bogdan's planned campaign: 
"[they] greatly doubt that the sayed Stefano will prove onto them 
another Michall Voyvoda ... " 
The Ottomans sent word to the 8ey/erbeys and Sanjakbeys on the 
Moldavian border, in particular those at Silistria, Akerman and Nicopolis, 
to stand by in case the invasion materialised; it did not. Glover was 
writing when the invasion was expected (May 1607). In April of that year 
Bogdan had solicited the aid of the Habsburg Emperor suggesting a 
campaign against the Ottomans. The Emperor, having just concluded a 
treaty with the Ottomans, rebuffed Bogdan's plans and the alliance with 
the Knez and his followers fell apart. In June 1607 the pretender was 
soliciting financial help from the Elector of Saxony for another journey to 
England. 
There was nothing unusual about a man such as the Knez 
Vassilius becoming involved in an independent military operation: Polish 
magnates frequently conducted their own foreign policy. A well known 
example of this was the attempt by a private consortium of Polish and 
Lithuanian magnates to place pretenders on the Muscovite throne during 
the IITime of Troubles". (34) However, foreign adventures such as this 
affair of the "False Dimitris" were only briefly successful and such 
success as was enjoyed was due largely to the protagonists being 
afforded the opportunity to exploit internal problems and were pressed to 
intervene by factions of powerful Muscovite boyars. (35) It would appear 
that Knez Vassilius and his adherents were not even able to expect help 
from boyars in Moldavia; Bogdan probably hoped for an uprising in the 
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principality in his favour; when this did not materialise his Polish 
supporters decided not to proceed. 
Bogdan's brief sojourn in Wallachia under Radu's protection 
emphasises a point about the relationship between the Ottomans and 
their vassals: Radu was obliged and expected to obey the Sultan's 
orders or face the consequences of his displeasure; this shows the 
degree to which the princes in Wallachia and Moldavia were beholden to 
the suzerai n power, for Radu was forced to concoct an elaborate charade 
to explain Bogdan's departure from his custody. It also demonstrates the 
extent to which the principalities and the princes' governments were 
penetrated by spies and conversely the efficiency of the Prince's own 
intelligence networks in Constantinople. Despite the fact that Radu's 
freedom of action was very much restricted by the Sultan's authority over 
him he was nevertheless prepared to defy the Sultan's authority in an 
attempt to undermine the position of his counterpart in Moldavia. He was 
not, of course, in any position to take up arms in Bogdan's favour, even if 
he had wished to: Bogdan did not have the resources, nor the military or 
organisational experience, which Mihai Viteazul had enjoyed. Moreover, 
Mihai's revolt took place during the war between the Ottoman and 
Habsburg Empires which had allowed him to playoff the various 
protagonists against each other to his own advantage; the Habsburg 
Emperor was not prepared to restart the conflict with the Ottomans merely 
to satisfy the ambitions of a wandering prince. 
Bogdan was not i ncli ned to accept defeat and decided to start his 
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campaign again with a journey to England where he hoped to obtain 
confirmation of the English Crown's support of him. Opinion in England 
was, to some extent, on his side: his version of his relationship with 
Henry Lello, in which he was cast as the injured party, was becoming 
well-known at the English Court, the story embroidered as it was retold; a 
letter noting Bogdan's arrival in London contains the following passage: 
"There is also a Prince of Moldavia arrived wch was here in the 
Queens time to request her mediation to the Gran Sigr for his 
restitution to his inheritence. The Queen sent him to Sir Ambr Lello 
who during her life used him kindly and kept him at his owne table 
but as soo (some say) as he heard of her death, he sold him to 
some Turkes for 3000 checkins: fro whom since breaking prison 
he is now come wth the Emperors letters to gett himselfe 
righted ... " (36) 
The suspicion that Henry Lello had betrayed Bogdan was shared by 
Salisbury and King James. For a long time Lello was not in a position to 
defend himself, being on the other side of Europe, whilst his enemies in 
London had ample opportunity to turn opinion against him. The whole 
affair was used by Thomas Glover in his campaign to have Lello 
removed from the embassy and once Glover arrived in Constantinople as 
the new ambassador the dispute between him and Lello ensured that the 
campaign intensified. It was for this reason that Glover took it upon 
himself to ensure that Bogdan was not forgotten by investigating what 
had happened to him following his escape. Glover was careful not to 
make his own direct accusations against his enemy, instead he used the 
device of reporting what was "generall reporte" in Constantinople: 
"The Prince of Moldavia who I think is known unto you Lordship for 
that he has bin in Englande two or three years agoe ... was by Allie 
Bassa, then Vizerey takne out of my predecessor M. Lellos 
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house ... whoe in lieve therof [of his duty as recommended by the 
Queen] as the said Prince hathe lefte a generall reporte her 
betrayed him to the agent of his adversary Jeremie ... delivered him 
out of his house to the sayed Vizerey who imprisoned him ... wth 
certain poor allowance for his sustenance whoe beinge so 
betrayed (as he thought by Mr. Lello) ... sent his man of purpose 
into Englande not onlie to complaine of Mr. Lellos tradition but 
humblie craved his Maties favour ... etc." (37) 
When Bogdan arrived in England in August 1607, before the arrival of 
Lello in September, he was in a strong position to press his case for 
further English support because he was well-known and regarded with 
considerable sympathy, despite the fact that Ki ng James was well 
acquainted with Poland's reasons for opposing him so vigorously. 
At the time of writing to the Sultan about Bogdan's imprisonment, 
King James had written a letter to the King of Poland, the text of which 
has been lost, in which he probably gave his reasons for endeavouring 
to procure the pretender's release. King Zygmund III Vasa of Poland 
replied in a letter dated 23rd May 1606 which arrived in England in 
August of that year. The English and Polish Crowns had regular and 
friendly relations at this time and maintained a correspondence on large 
number of matters. (38) Zygmund's letter was extremely courteous but 
endeavoured to explain at length that Moldavia was an area in which 
Poland was entitled by precedence to play an influential role and that the 
English Crown had been deceived by Bogdan. One may discern the 
tenor of King James' letter from this reply, for Zygmund refuted two 
arguments in favour of England's patronage of Bogdan. Firstly that it was 
the duty of a Christian Prince to help another prince in distress and 
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secondly that Bogdan was a legitimate claimant to the Moldavian throne 
denied his ancestral right by an usurper maintained on the throne with 
Polish help. The first section of Zygmund's letter argued that England 
was mistaken in perceiving Christian duty to point in the direction of 
supporting a pretender when political reality dictated another course: 
both Moldavia and Wallachia had in the past been under Polish 
protection and although these principalities had been annexed by the 
Ottomans, Polish patronage of leremie Movila was recognised by the 
Ottomans and between them these powers had maintained peace and 
mutual trust in the area which was of great benefit to Christendome; 
furthermore, it was maintained that leremie was himself of princely 
lineage and therefore not an usurper. 
Zygmund then went on to attack Bogdan's own claim to the throne 
through direct descent from ~tefan Cel Mare and Petru Rare~ by claiming 
that lancu Sasul had been an usurper. Bogdan had deliberately 
emphasised his descent from §tefan and Petru as opposed to claiming a 
right to rule merely as a son of a former prince (Iancu) because this made 
his claim stronger. Furthermore, he had hoped to distance himself from 
his father's reputation. lancu was the weak link in Bogdan's lineage 
because there had long been doubts cast on lancu's claim to be the son 
of Petru Rare§; Zygmund revived these doubts by alleging that lancu was 
a man of humble birth from a Saxon area of Transylvania and not of 
Moldavian blood at all; he accused Bogdan of being a fraud who made 
false claims about his ancestry. (39) Zygmund also revived the rumours 
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about Bogdan's conversion to Islam, arguing that not only was the man 
whom the English Crown supported a fraud but he was not even a 
Christian; this nullified any Christian duty to support him. 
James I's letter probably included some reference to King Stefan 
Bathory's treatment of lancu, for Zygmund dismissed the latter as a man 
of criminal tendencies, whose behaviour towards both Poland and the 
Ottomans resulted in an order for his removal and his subsequent 
execution, both of which were exactly what he deserved. Zygmund 
argued that now James was acquainted with the truth about Bogdan he 
could not consider him a worthy recipient of his favour. Furthermore he 
repeated his assertion that the appointment of Princes in Moldavia 
belonged by right to Poland and not to the Ottomans and if England 
continued to press the Ottomans to remove the Prince installed by 
Poland, this would damage the good relations between the two Crowns. 
King James ignored this intervention: when the pretender arrived 
in London he was not dismissed as a fraud but received into the King's 
presence. Either King James and the Earl of Salisbury did not believe 
these allegations or else did not care if they were true. Nor were they 
worried that relations with Poland might cool over this issue. In addition 
to a perceived Christian duty to help a fellow prince in his campaign 
against usurpers, the King of England seems to have been keen to see 
Polish influence in the principalities reduced. King Zygmund was a 
devout Roman Catholic, closely associated with Polish Jesuits and 
anxious to promote the aims of the Counter-Reformation. He was in 
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dispute with the Swedish nobility, who were not keen to accept a Catholic 
proselytizer, over his claim to the Swedish throne. It is conceivable that 
the English Crown was disposed to be sympathetic to a pretender who 
opposed the continued influence of the Polish Crown over Moldavia, in 
order to impede the progress of the Roman Catholic Church in exerting 
influence and control over parts of Eastern Europe. 
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CHAPTER VII: STEFAN BOGDAN AND SIR THOMAS GLOVER: 
1607-1612. 
Towards the end of his involvement with ~tefan Bogdan, Henry 
Lello expressed the hope that the English Crown would not in future 
commit the English Embassy in Constantinople to supporting men such 
as Bogdan, whom he regarded as a conniving deceiver, because they 
brought only trouble to the ambassador and only served to hinder his 
dealings with the Ottoman State. This chapter will show that not only did 
the King and his ministers fail to heed this advice, but they had learned 
nothing from the experiences of Edward Barton and Henry Lello. 
Furthermore, they did not sufficiently comprehend how business with the 
Sultan and his officials was conducted and the complexity of involving 
the embassy in affairs which were none of its direct concern. Despite 
King James I's previous insistence that the English Embassy only existed 
to look after the English merchants' interests he was persuaded to renew 
Queen Elizabeth's support for Stefan Bogdan. This was largely due to ) 
the persuasive skills of the pretender, who convinced King James, his 
wife and various members of his court that his failure to gain the 
Moldavian throne could be attributed to Henry Lello's lack of commitment 
to his cause and the intriguing of the Polish Crown and that, with proper 
backing, his attainment of the throne would be a relatively simple matter. 
He also successfully persuaded King James of the great benefits for 
England of having a client upon the Moldavian throne, to such an extent 
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that the King was persuaded to go further than his predecessor in 
supporting the pretender by lending him money. 
The extent to which the English Crown could be hood-winked by 
somewhat exotic individuals is illustrated by the reception in England of 
one Mustapha, who claimed to be a chiaus or envoy from Sultan Ahmet I 
[1603-1617], when in fact he had no such status. Mustapha had left 
Constantinople in November 1605, accompanying de Breves, the French 
Ambassador, who was returning to France via Jerusalem and Egypt. He 
had managed to procure letters of recommendation from the Sultan to 
the French and English Kings whom he expected to reward him for his 
visit. At the time Henry Lello had protested that the Ottomans should send 
someone worthy of an Embassy to the King of England, (1) instead of 
such a "pettey fellow". Sir Thomas Glover also warned the Earl of 
Salisbury that the man was a charlatan. However, since Mustapha had a 
letter of recommendation from the Sultan and had also been received by 
the King of France, King James was not willing to risk offending the 
Ottomans by refusing to receive the man: 
"we have here one Mustafa Aga an Ambassador from the Great 
Turk who hath this great while remained at Marseilles, his errand 
to his Majesty was to deliver some letters from the Great Turk to his 
Matie and to congratulate with him, of his Maties coming to this 
Crowne, wch as he said, though he came somewhat late to 
performe that office ... that the principall cause of his stay was by 
default of the French king and his ministers who had almost 14 
monethes detained him at Marseilles; he pretendeth to have some 
other things in charge, and to that purpose desireth another 
audience of his Matie; he is here defrayed by the merchants and 
the better used because the merchants might oblige him the more, 
at his return to doe good offices for them." (2) 
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The Levant Company did not welcome the burden of supporting 
Mustapha and his retinue, complaining that he was costing them nearly 
five pounds each day and he expected them to pay for everything, even 
the cost of mending his clothes. They requested that he be given an 
audience quickly so that he could be dispatched home as soon as 
possible. The Company Court acknowledged that it was to their 
advantage to ensure that Mustapha was entertained properly so that he 
would give the Sultan a good report of his reception in England. (3) 
When he finally left England on one of the Levant Company's own ships 
he was apparently angry that he had not managed to extract a present 
from either the King or the Company. It seems that by this time the 
English Court and the Levant Company were aware that Mustapha was 
not an official Ambassador from the Sultan but were still anxious that he 
should give a favourable account of his treatment in London. Therefore, 
because Mustapha would have no automatic access to Sultan Ahmet on 
his return to Constantinople, as an official Ottoman Ambassador would 
have had, the Earl of Salisbury instructed Sir Thomas Glover to ensure 
that Mustapha obtained an audience with the Sultan. Glover reported 
that Mustapha's account of his treatment in England and his report of the 
wealth and greatness of the English Court had created a very good 
impression amongst the Ottomans. 
Mustapha's visit added a new word to the English language as the 
expression ''to play the Chaush" or "to chouse" became a popular 
expression to describe an impostor, for the Levant Company had been 
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hoodwinked into entertaining a man of no importance as an Ambassador 
from the Sultan for several months at great expense. (4) He certainly 
created an impression in England: 
"For the person of this Mustafa, hee seems to me and others that 
have visited him a man of goodly presence and a gallant spirit, 
sociable, affable and full of intertainment to all comers, and one 
who to give content to those that come to see him, is content to 
dispense with come of his Turkish fashions and to accustome 
himself to ours ... for his own person he hath many changes of 
garments, very rich, and several turbants, and hath brought with 
him, either for presents or for a pledge in time of necessity, 21 
pieces of cloth of gold and silver, valued at 1,000 marks." 
He had also pretended that he had been sent as an envoy before by the 
Sultan, twice to France, once to Persia and once to the Tatar Khan. (5) 
The arrival of Mustapha and Stefan Bogdan provided a diversion ) 
for the English Court when it was in a state of "complete quiet" as the 
Venetian Ambassador reported: 
" ... this is the sole topic which occupies their thoughts. A prince of 
Moldavia came to this court a few days ago. He is one of those 
many persons who claim a right to the government of that country ... 
and it is thought he is now come here because of the cavass [Le. 
Mustapha]." (6) 
News circulated about Bogdan was usually linked to news about 
Mustapha. In fact Bogdan's arrival in England had nothing to do with the 
presence of Mustapha and indeed Bogdan must have been somewhat 
'put out' to find Mustapha had already established himself in the 
affections of those whose support he hoped to gain since this 
'ambassador' diverted attention away from himself. Indeed Mustapha's 
presence received more note; for our purposes, too, this is unfortunate 
304 
because there are no descriptions of Bogdan, his apparel or activities 
comparable to those devoted to Mustafa. 
Bogdan nevertheless received attention from the moment of his 
arrival; the purpose of his visit was well-known and he became a familiar 
figure in London: he probably dressed in oriental-style robes, and as we 
know, he was a charming and handsome man, cultivated and of wide 
experience; tales of his adventurous and dangerous life must have made 
fascinating listening. His visit to London was remembered for years 
afterwards; indeed the playwrights Beaumont and Fletcher (7), requiring 
an exotic location for their play "The Knight of the Burning Pestle", set 
one scene in the Court of the "King" of Moldavia. The play is a parody of 
the heroic adventure plays popular at the time; part of the complicated 
plot concerns Pompiona, the King of Moldavia's daughter, who falls in 
love with the Knight of the Burning Pestle but is rejected by him. (8) As 
will be discussed later, there is also a reference to the Prince of Moldavia 
in Ben Jonson's play "The Silent Woman" written in 1610. 
Whilst Mustapha was enjoying his social life Bogdan was 
energetically cultivating those who might be useful to his cause and 
working hard to persuade the King and his favourites to support him. 
Also, apparently unbeknownst to the Earl of Salisbury, Bogdan had 
approached representatives of the King of Spain for support. Before 
undertaking his journey to England, Bogdan had visited Don Guillen de 
San Clemente, the Spanish representative in Prague, seeking his 
recommendation to the King of Spain and offering his services in return. 
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Don Guillen wrote to Phillip III about Bogdan and gave Bogdan a letter of 
introduction to the Spanish Ambassador in England. Bogdan proposed a 
naval attack on the port of Larissa leading to the conquest of Greece and 
the eventual overthrow of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. He told the 
Spanish Ambassador that he had supporters in Greece who would help 
with the invasion and promised a force of 10,000 soldiers. He also 
promised that when he had control of Moldavia he would be prepared to 
place in Spanish hands two important fortresses at the mouth of the 
Danube; fortresses which were crucial to the safety and security of the 
Ottoman capital. He presumably referred to the fortresses of Kilia and 
Akkerman (Cetatea Alba) which, although on Moldavian territory, were 
garrisoned by Ottoman troops, such was their strategic importance. The 
pretender also wrote of his plans to the Viceroy of Naples, Don Juan 
Alfonso Pimentel de Herrera. When in London Bogdan contacted the 
Don Pedro de Zuniga, Spanish Ambassador to King James, to acquaint 
him with his proposals. The pretender's offer was taken seriously enough 
by the Spanish to be discussed at the Council of Councils in Madrid in 
January 1608. (9) 
Bogdan still looked to the English Crown to be his main source of 
patronage because, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this thesis, the 
English Crown was much better placed to petition for the Moldavian 
throne on Bogdan's behalf since it maintained a permanently established 
embassy in Constantinople and had enjoyed good relations with three 
Ottoman Sultans. Bogdan's negotiations with representatives of the King 
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of Spain demonstrate that the pretender aspired to liberate Moldavia 
from Ottoman suzerainty, regarding himself as an heir to Mihai Viteazul. 
This may have been partly motivated by bitterness at his ill-treatment and 
imprisonment at Ottoman hands, but also probably had its roots in a 
vision of a restored Christian Empire centred on Constantinople, perhaps 
inspired by tales of Byzantium's glory told him in childhood. Stefan 
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Bogdan was aware that if he managed to obtain the Moldavian throne 
through the Sultan's favour he was unlikely to remain prince for many 
years whilst the throne remained in the Sultan's gift. 
It is highly unlikely that Bogdan hinted at his intentions whilst 
pressing his suite to the King of England or mentioned his involvement 
with the King of Spain. Although England and Spain were now at peace 
and King James was endeavouring to improve Anglo-Spanish relations, 
Spanish shipping was a rival to English sea power in the Mediterranean. 
Moreover a plan which would rouse the Sultan's enmity WOUld, without 
doubt, destroy England's favourable trading position in the Levant and 
probably result in the exclusion of the English merchant fleet from the 
entire area. Such a plan would not even have been considered and 
England's support of Bogdan would not have been renewed. 
Bogdan appears to have been well-treated in England, although 
he did not receive the hospitality enjoyed by Mustapha. He seems to 
have supported himself out of his own pocket and the Earl of Salisbury 
expressed concern that the pretender's sojourn in England was a great 
burden upon his obviously limited financial resources. Bogdan probably 
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conducted much of his business with the Earl of Salisbury, who arranged 
for him to receive audience with the King, although he had to wait nearly 
a month for this to be arranged because of the monarch's frequent 
absences on hunting expeditions. Bogdan was eventually received by 
King James on September 20th 1607 and presented a very sanitised 
version of his difficult and dangerous campaign to be granted the 
Moldavian throne which impressed those who heard it very much. 
Despite James' often stated view that the English Embassy at 
Constantinople existed purely to promote the welfare of English 
merchants in the Levant, Bogdan managed to persuade him to give his 
support for a cause not directly related to England's commercial interests. 
Bogdan had prepared himself well for this audience: he offered to hold 
the principality of Moldavia "of his highness and to pay tribute", and had 
drawn up two versions of a model letter to be written by the King to 
Sultan Ahmet I; he also presented a petition for a grant of 1,000 
pounds. (10) 
The offer of allegiance and tribute was set down in writing; if 
Bogdan had succeeded in obtaining the Moldavian throne this document 
would have been of no use to the English Crown since it would have 
been unacceptable to the Ottoman Sultan to have his vassal owing 
allegiance and paying tribute to another sovereign. In any case it would 
be unenforceable. The pretender's petition placed great emphasis on his 
promises of gratitude and loyalty towards the English Crown when he 
became Prince of Moldavia and such an offer was a good method of 
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expressing this; it might also plant some sense of obligation in the 
conscience of King James so that his Ambassador would continue to 
support Bogdan whilst he was on the Moldavian throne. Bogdan set out 
his case by arguing forcefully for the legitimacy of his claim to the 
Moldavian throne by pointing to the genealogy showing his descent from 
9tefan Cel Mare through Petru Rare~ and lancu Sasul; secondly he 
argued that he had already been appointed prince by a previous Sultan, 
only being prevented from attaining the throne through the actions of that 
Sultan's enemies. (11) He neglected to tell the King and Queen that this 
previous appointment was to the throne of Wallachia not to that of 
Moldavia. The model letters which Bogdan had prepared concentrated 
upon this point: that he had been granted the prinCipality and had been 
sent to the Danube to overthrow the Sultan's enemies, Mihai Viteazul 
and Aron, and had been prevented from prosecuting the Sultan's service 
by the bad generalship of Mustapha Pasha and Sinan Pasha which had 
resulted in his defeat in battle and near loss of life. Bogdan cunningly 
made use of the presence of Mustapha by arguing in his letter that the 
King's hospitality towards this man was the evidence of the friendship 
and affection between King James and the Ottoman Sultan, which could 
be reciprocated by granting the English monarch's request that Bogdan 
be placed on the Moldavian throne. 
Bogdan requested a grant of 1,000 pounds to provide for his 
journey to Constantinople because he did not wish to be indebted to any 
other than the King of England: 
" ... I hope in God that Your Majesty will remain most satisfied with 
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my service, with the view that one day that which I have promised 
to your Majesty will bear fruit without doubt." (12) 
It does not appear that this request was granted in full, but the Earl of 
Salisbury disbursed 300 pounds to Bogdan on the order of the King. (13) 
Bogdan's audience with the King was fruitful, the only bone of contention 
being a further request that the Levant Company should furnish Bogdan 
with 10,000 French Crowns to further this business. It appears that the 
Crown was to reimburse the Company because in all the 
correspondence in connection with this money it is referred to as the 
King's money. The Company seems to have been reluctant to become 
involved in any expenditure on Bogdan because they were not confident 
that they would be reimbursed. The matter was eventually resolved, after 
discussions with the Company and the Earl of Salisbury, and it was 
agreed that Bogdan should be provided with 10,000 Crowns under strict 
conditions; these conditions were to cause Sir Thomas Glover immense 
trouble. The papers concerning Stefan Bogdan were ordered to be sent 
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to the Earl of Salisbury who was to handle the business on the King's 
behalf. They were dispatched to the Earl the day after the audience in 
order that he was fully aware of the King's decision in the matter. Bogdan 
also left Theobalds immediately for London in order to speak with the 
Earl and to ensure that the proper arrangements be made for his letters 
of recommendation to be drawn up. (14) The business proceeded slowly 
and Bogdan, whilst pressing for matters to be speeded up as much as 
possible, appears to have bided his time in London enjoying himself. 
During his stay in England he made the acquaintance of Lady Arbella 
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Stuart, King James' cousin, with whom he was greatly impressed, 
conducting some form of flirtation with her, possibly with the suggestion of 
marriage if he obtained his principality. (15) Lady Arbella (she always 
signed her correspondence as Arbella not Arabella, a latinization of her 
name) was a well-educated and intelligent woman who had led a very 
lonely and sheltered life. She appears to have been attracted to the 
pretender and, moved by his accounts of his usurped "birthright", 
promised to support him. Her brief involvement with Bogdan was to 
cause her much unhappiness in the future. 
In order to provide for ~tefan Bogdan's passage as far as Venice, 
the Earl of Salisbury appointed a member of the Levant Company, Jonas 
Aldrich, to accompany him. Aldrich had business to conduct in Venice on 
behalf of the Company concerning the capture by Florentine galleons of 
three English ships. (16) Aldrich was involved in a dispute with the 
Levant Company; Cecil asked him to settle it quickly by arbitration, so 
that his departure would not be delayed and: 
''the prince be not driven to protract his tyme any longer here, to 
his further charge then the present condition of his estate is well 
able to beare. Whereof not doubting but you will have due regard 
considereing that his Maties service dependeth on it." (17) 
Two weeks later Bogdan had his second audience with the King in his 
private chamber, this time in the company of Mustapha, but it was not 
until over a month after Cecil's request to Aldrich and the Levant 
Company, that the pretender was finally able to depart. He left on a ship 
belonging to the Levant Company, but did not travel directly to Venice 
because he had business to deal with in Berlin with the Elector of 
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Brandenburg. Zorzi Giustinian, the Venetian Ambassador in England, 
reported his departure: 
"The Prince of Moldavia has left. He takes with him letters of 
recommendation from the King both to assist him to recover a debt 
from the Marquis of Brandenburg, and to support his claim to be 
restored to his state. Before he left he professed great devotion to 
your Serenity." (18) 
The above mentioned debt consisted of 200,000 galbeni owed to 
Bogdan's ancestor Petru Rare~ since 1542. The Elector refused to give 
Bogdan any money. Neither Salisbury or the King troubled to make any 
arrangements for Bogdan upon his arrival in Venice; essentially he was 
expected to make his own way to Constantinople; this and the somewhat 
leisurely attitude to issuing Bogdan with his credentials suggests that 
whatever Bogdan thought about his own importance, this project was not 
a major undertaking of the English Crown. 
The pretender arrived in Venice in February 1608 and immediately 
provoked the dislike of the English Ambassador there, Henry Wotton: 
"At his first abord, he caused himself to be landed at my house, 
and in my absence took possession of it with a portmanteau or 
two." 
In England Bogdan did nothing that might jeopardise his chances of 
gaining English support; once he had secured the King's letters of 
recommendation, he developed an arrogant manner which did nothing to 
endear him to those with whom he came into contact. Wotton reported 
that Bogdan was using the King's name very freely around Venice: 
"And although he had in this town of his own parentage [Le. his 
sister] and also did not despair of honourable reception by the 
state which was acquainted both with his cause and with his 
person, yet being under his Majesty's support, and wholly his, he 
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thought it fitter to lodge in my house till the departure of the next 
frigate for the Levant." 
Wotton was astounded at this and did not at first know how to reply: 
"I protest to your Lordship I knew not whether I should take it for a 
species of frenzy or Cozenage." 
Instead he replied that he was not in the habit of taking men into his 
house on such small acquaintance and therefore unless Bogdan could 
produce a letter of introduction from the King he would have to make 
other arrangements whilst he was in Venice. Bogdan was surprised and 
puzzled that no instructions or arrangements for his entertainment had 
been made in advance by his supporters in England, mentioning the Earl 
of Salisbury and Lady Arbella Stuart in particular. 
Bogdan left Wotton's house upset that those whom he had thought 
to be his friends did not think him sufficiently important as to concern 
themselves with his welfare once he left England; however he soon 
recovered his composure. Wotton was disposed to treat the whole 
incident as a "carnival accident" and related it to the Earl of Salisbu ry to 
entertain him; he went on to offer the following advice: 
"Since, I have understood that he is not altogether a counterfeit, in 
the generality at least of his pretence to the Princedom, though 
void of all hope both by way of Poland and Turkey who have 
undertaken the backing of several pretendants." (19) 
Sir Henry Wotton was familiar with the politics of the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe and, thus confronted with one of the pretenders about 
whom he had heard so much, seems to have been unable to disguise his 
contempt for a man whom he considered a charlatan and a figure of fun. 
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This last attitude was common amongst many of the Englishmen who 
came into contact with Bogdan: Henry Lello developed an extreme 
distaste for the man whom he was charged with supporting and Sir 
Thomas Glover and his friend John Sanderson came to regard the 
unfortunate prince in a very unflattering light. 9tefan Bogdan's 
experiences do not appear to have brought out the best in him. His 
continually thwarted quest for position and status led to behave in a 
manner which turned his supporters against him, whilst the experience of 
being used by powerful nations and officials for their own purposes and 
dropped when they no longer foresaw success, undoubtedly made 
Bogdan bitter, sly and grasping. Bogdan had obtained English support 
largely by deceiving King James into thinking that it would be a simple 
matter to obtain his elevation to the Moldavian throne; the need to 
deceive stemmed from desperation. A pretender in Bogdan's position 
could do little else: he had no status, no money and few friends and had 
little choice but to make his way by using his wits and charm if he were 
not to end his life in poverty. English support which gave him so much 
hope of success declined when the difficulties and expense of supporting 
him became apparent. The English Crown eventually lost interest in the 
progress of Bogdan's suite. 
Bogdan's conduct during his stay in Venice incensed Henry 
Wotton; the latter had no further personal contact with the pretender but 
was bombarded by news of him. Bogdan's presence in Venice prompted 
a great deal of comment, particularly when, on the strength of his letters 
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of recommendation, he attempted to exaggerate his own status by 
making up stories about his true reason for being in Venice. His 
behaviour scandalised many Venetians, including his sister's family: 
" ... I [Henry Wotton] understood he had at Chioggia assumed the 
title of Ambassr sent from his Matie to treat wth this state very 
secret affayres. This voyce bredd many constrictions uppon the 
place heere wth no small scandale of my poore credite; 
whereuppon if it had not been denied unto me by the Duke (who 
in favour of some Venetians wth whome the sayed pretendant is 
linked in affinitie was contented to conceale what the Potesta of 
Chioggia had written hither before his arrival) I should have 
preceeded somewhat uncivilly wth him." (20) 
Thus the prospect of a public row between the English Ambassador and 
Bogdan was prevented; now Wotton's amused contempt had been 
converted into unconcealed dislike and suspicion. On the grounds that 
most of what the pretender said in public was untrue, he suggested that 
Bogdan had forged the letters of recommendation and letters of 
exchange for forty thousand dollars which he had in his possession to be 
given to Sir Thomas Glover upon his arrival in Constantinople. There 
was a further series of scandalous rumours which Wotton felt compelled 
to report: the pretender had been hinting at a promise of marriage made 
to a woman in England; Wotton denied that he knew what manner of 
promise had been made or to whom, but it is likely that Bogdan was 
either hinting at, or mentioning the name of, Lady Arbella Stuart in this 
connection, for unless Bogdan's prospective betrothed was a woman of 
status, the ambassador would not have considered the matter sufficiently 
important to be mentioned. Wotton would naturally have hesitated to be 
the source of any speculation in England around the King's cousin. A 
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further rumour concerning Bogdan caused outrage: 
"notwithstanding haveing besydes other places one wife at the 
least in this towne and some say twoe." (21) 
There is no evidence to confirm that Bogdan was a polygamist, but it is 
certainly true that he already had a wife in Venice. The question of his 
marital status was to surface on two occasions during the course of his 
involvement with the English Crown and will be discussed further later 
on. The pretender's volubility and lack of discretion seems unfortunate in 
a man who above all must have known the importance of secrecy and 
discretion: either he spent much of his time in Venice drunk or he was an 
habitual liar. To the relief of Wotton and probably his sister's family, 
Bogdan left Venice in March 1608, travelling overland to Constantinople, 
where he presented himself to Sir Thomas Glover. 
Glover hid him in the English Embassy, trying to keep his presence 
secret until a suitable occasion occurred to begin the suit to obtain the 
Moldavian throne. (22) Glover had been informed of Bogdan's arrival in 
England by the Levant Company and John Sanderson (23) and both he 
and Sanderson expressed themselves very well-disposed to the 
pretender and his suit: 
"Nowe for the Christian Prince before named I wish all good and 
kind welcome of his Majestie; whereof he cannot faile if all his 
friends be feNent for him ... " 
Glover replied thus to Sanderson: 
"I hope ere this our good friend the prince Jancolo hath obteyned 
his sute of our kinge and I doe longe to heare the issue ... " (24) 
Sir Thomas Glover was soon to change his mind about the wisdom of 
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supporting the pretender when he contemplated the difficulties involved: 
"I am overburdened with [a] serious and a very tedious business, 
earnestly recommended unto me by his Majestyes own letter, the 
Queenes, the Earl of Salisburies and many of the Honourable 
Privy Counsells, and others his Majesties favourites in the behalf 
of the Prince of Moldavia." (25) 
The impressive body of support collected by Bogdan made it imperative 
that Glover succeed, since if he failed to promote Bogdan's cause his 
failure would be public knowledge in the most influential circles at Court. 
Furthermore, his old adversary Henry Lello had been vocal in expressing 
doubts at Glover's ability to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. 
Of particular difficulty to Glover was the decision to pay the 10,000 
French crowns in support of the pretender's cause. He sent an angry 
letter to Sir Thomas Lowe, Governor of the Levant Company, asking why 
the Company had allowed itself to be pressured into promising this 
money. He told Lowe that the whole affai r mig ht have come to nothi ng 
had the Company refused to make the money available, as it was he was 
now burdened: 
" ... [with] the inconvenience, trouble and expense which the 
Prince ... [will] bring upon his place." 
of which he claimed he had warned the Company in advance. Sir 
Thomas Lowe replied in the Company's defence that whereas Glover 
had written that they could have prevented the promise of money as well 
as the decision to support the pretender, in fact they were in no position 
to do so because: 
"these matters were kept secret from us as a thing yt did not 
concern us and so it was impossible for us to prvent it, soe that 
what trouble and chardge soever shall happen thereby unto you 
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p'ceedeth from the King's pleasure wherein you may take what 
course you shall think fitt for you pleese. Ffor from us you are not 
[to] expect anything as a matter yt doth in no waye touch us." (26) 
The Levant Company thus disassociated itself from any involvement with 
Bogdan because the project would bring them no advantages and would 
probably cost them money. The fact that the Crown did not discuss its 
support of Bogdan's cause with the Company until a decision was made 
suggests that the matter was not considered as being of the Company's 
concern. Glover's friend and adviser John Sanderson had also changed 
his mind about Bogdan, warning the ambassador: 
" ... Beware of Prince Yancolo. Ingadge yourself ther for no 
Prince ... " (27) 
and advised him not to enter into intrigue on the pretender's behalf. 
Unfortunately Sanderson did not mention what he had discovered about 
Bogdan to make him change his mind nor what dangerous intrigues 
Glover could expect to be embroiled. The question of the money to be 
advanced by the English "nation" in the Levant upon King James credit 
and to be reimbursed by him (28) afforded Glover an opportunity to delay 
proceedings until he received exact instructions as to how it should be 
spent. Furthermore, he outlined in a letter to the Earl of Salisbury the 
great risks involved in attempting to purchase the throne for Bogdan, 
suggesting to Sir Thomas Lowe that these "casualties": 
"by yor wisdome may be so amplified and aggravated unto the 
Earl of Salisburie, that he maye happelie cause to withdraw this 
commission, as my self will doe what in me lies for the detration ... " 
Glover's strategy was to persuade Salisbury that if the money were paid 
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over to Sultan Ahmet, his Ministers and favourites, once Bogdan was 
appointed there was still a considerable risk that he would not succeed in 
taking possession of the throne: he might be overthrown by his enemies 
when attempting to enter the principality or he might meet with some 
accident upon the journey; then again the Sultan might change his mind 
and decide to replace him with another prince: 
"as is often incident unto manie of his function by the inconstancie 
and instabilitie of theis. In such case whither his Matie will 
be contented to adventure this sume of ten thousande Crownes or 
not without any further caution or limities, I desier to be 
resolved ... " (29) 
If this situation were to arise before Bogdan had a chance to raise the 
money to reimburse the King, the 10,000 crowns would be lost. 
Glover requested Salisbury to advise the King of the difficulties 
involved in presenting what he called ''this extrordinarilly recommended 
service", indicating that it was outside the normal embassy brief. He was 
careful to assure the Earl that he would conscientiously and dexterously 
handle the matter and had great confidence in his own abilities as a 
diplomat to do that which he had been requested. Meanwhile he 
concentrated his hopes on the investment of money in this cause being 
abandoned due to the pressure of the Levant Company and the revised 
judgement of the Earl of Salisbury, convincing the King that the risk of 
financial loss was too great. As we saw, the Levant Company refused to 
oppose the King's decision and risk his displeasure and the Earl of 
Salisbury neglected to reply to Glover's urgent request for further 
instructions. Glover had to proceed with the suit as ordered; his main 
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concern was that if the King's money were to be lost, he would be held 
responsible and fall into disfavour with the King; this could damage his 
prospects of advancement at Court after he retired from the 
Constantinople Embassy. 
Glover viewed the whole business with increasing distaste; he 
was aware that close financial involvement in an affair of this nature had 
ruined Edward Barton financially and had led to severe criticism from the 
merchants, from Queen Elizabeth and her ministers that Barton had 
neglected his duties towards the English 'nation'. Yet knowing this he 
had still expressed his hope that Bogdan would succeed in his petition to 
King James and Sanderson had expressed similar sentiments. Glover'S 
misgivings had surfaced only after the pretender's arrival at his house: 
one likely reason for his change of heart was that Bogdan had altered 
from the man he and Sanderson had known and liked when they were 
last in Constantinople. They showed the same antipathy towards the 
pretender as Lello had revealed; they had criticised Lello's hostility 
towards the pretender to great effect in previous years. Furthermore, 
once Glover had embarked on the task of pleading the pretender's case 
with the Ottoman Divan he must have realised what a difficult 
undertaking it was. This was something which he had not acknowledged 
before, having been so confident of his own superior abilities as a 
diplomat. 
Glover began by approaching Ahmet I's principal ministers and 
favourites so that when the time came to presen't the King's letters he 
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could be confident of a favourable reception: 
"in my opinion they beinge cheife persones that rule the Gran 
Signor and this Empire they will not fail to perform it. .. " 
However, in gaining the support of these individuals Glover had 
promised gifts and rewards in return, yet suspected that once they had 
been paid they would no longer bother to support Bogdan. Therefore 
once again he requested exact instructions from the King about when the 
money could be used in order to give him the necessary authority to 
negotiate from a position of strength. Ahmet I's favourites promised to 
advise Glover of a suitable opportunity to present the King's letters to the 
Sultan and accordingly they made arrangements for him to meet the 
Sultan on his barge and deliver the King's letters translated into Ottoman 
Turkish. Glover made a speech in which he concluded that it was the 
religious duty of James I to protect and aid a distressed prince in 
obtaining his hereditary right. Ahmet replied that it was not yet a suitable 
time to change the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, but promised that 
when such a time arose he would grant the Moldavian throne to none 
other than Stefan Bogdan. This promise gave Glover some cause for 
optimism, but he was aware that delaying tactics were being employed 
and made enquiries in private of Sultan Ahmet's favourites as to when a 
suitable opportunity to change the Prince of Moldavia might occur. He 
was told that the suppression of a rebellion in Anatolia took priority and 
that the Sultan wished to wait until the tribute of thirty-two thousand 
zecchini had arrived from Moldavia. 
As soon as an opportunity to invest Bogdan as Prince of Moldavia 
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arose, those close to the Sultan who had promised him their support in 
return for money would expect to be paid; they would not tolerate delays. 
Glover again reported that the prompt delivery to Bogdan's Ottoman 
supporters of the money promised by the King would be crucial to the 
success of the project, for this reason he needed exact instructions on 
how it was to be raised and spent. In the meantime he could obtain 
nothing but promises. (30) The progress of the pretender's suit was 
observed by Spanish adherents in Constantinople and reported to 
Madrid. As we shall see at the end of this chapter, Bogdan's clandestine 
contacts with Madrid continued possibly with the assistance of Gieronimo 
Meoli, Glover's secretary, in a manner which was to implicate the English 
Embassy in espionage. 
Glover's letter which set out his doubts about the wisdom of 
supporting Bogdan was very slow in reaching the Earl of Salisbury. 
When he did reply, Salisbury gave few specific answers to Glover's 
questions; nevertheless he wrote of some of his own doubts, which 
appear to have been based on his reading of Glover's predecessors' 
comments on the Ottoman modus operandi : firstly that corruption might 
lead to Ottoman ministers taking money from Bogdan's supporters and 
from his adversaries: 
''to procure his suppression or to cause him to be recalled again or 
even to put some practice against his person on his way to 
Moldavia or once he arrives there ... " 
Salisbury therefore suggested that the whole sum should be paid only 
when Bogdan had confirmed his possession of the principality. To ensure 
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the success of this provision Glover should send a trusted servant to 
travel with Bogdan who would bring back news of his success; then the 
money could be paid over. If Ahmet's ministers were unwilling to deal 
upon these terms without some ready money, then Glover could 
compromise by paying 2,000 Crowns upon the delivery of the "helmet", a 
ceremony which would mark Bogdan's elevation to the status of prince; 
the rest of the money would only be paid upon news of Bogdan's 
reception in Moldavia. In order for this to be carried out, he had issued 
instructions to the Levant Company to allow Glover to take up this money 
when it was needed, upon the aforementioned conditions. Salisbury 
reported that, whilst the King was willing to risk his money he was loath to 
suffer any "affront" by it, meaning that he wished to avoid being tricked 
into parting with his money to no purpose; furthermore, he was anxious 
not to place Bogdan in any danger. (31) 
In October 1608, Glover was still awaiting the arrival of these 
instructions: 
"It is above three monthes since wee had any letters out of 
England or of Venice ... [the Sultan's officers] earnestlie followe the 
prince of Moldavia his business and still put in verie good hope to 
see a good ende therof, wich, by this tyme [they say] had bin 
finished to our desires it the monies according to promise were put 
in deposito." (32) 
In the meantime he had energetically petitioned the Vizier "Logotemente" 
to do his best to procure the appointment of Bogdan before the arrival in 
Constantinople of the General Murat Pasha who was to replace him as 
Vizier, informing him that he would receive his fee of 20,000 dollars if he 
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brought this off. However, Glover confessed that he was not confident of 
the current Vizier's ability to bring about Bogdan's election: 
"my hope is at the arrivall of Murat to accomplishe this business 
wth more facilitie then this ignorant. .. " (33) 
Glover's efforts in this direction came to nothing. He finally received 
Salisbury's instructions in December and wrote back promising to do his 
utmost to follow the King's wishes. He pointed out that the reason for his 
failure thus far was that Constantin Movila was, with the backing of the 
King of Poland, able consistently to outbribe him. Thus despite the fact 
that Glover had obtained the Sultan's promise to prefer Bogdan, Movilas 
supporters blocked progress towards his appointment with bribes 
amounting to 50,000 zecchini. 
Although Movila was undoubtedly investing heavily to maintain his 
position as prince, it does not automatically follow, as Glover suggested 
to justify his failure, that Bogdan would have been preferred had Movila 
not been spending this money. The Sultan's advisers were clearly 
unenthusiastic about appointing §tefan Bogdan to occupy a position of 
such strategic and economic import as the Moldavian throne, although 
they were quite prepared to take his money. Similarly the threat posed by 
Bogdan to Constantin Movila ensured that the latter would payout a lot of 
money in bribes to counter this threat; therefore many of those close to 
the Sultan had a vested interest in ensuring that Bogdan's campaign was 
as protracted as possible. Glover's interpretation of his own failure to 
obtain Bogdan's appointment was one which cast no doubts upon his 
ability to carry out the appointed task. He ascribed his difficulties to 
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Bogdan's lack of sufficient financial backing. Glover expected a decision 
to be reached upon the arrival of Murat Pasha; in the meantime he was 
certain that he and his protege were in danger from their opponents: 
"There hath bin many conspiracies wrought underhande, boathe 
to apprehend him [Bogdan] by stratagem, and to make an ende of 
him or myselfe by ministry of poysonne ... " 
These alleged conspiracies had been thwarted in time, but Glover said 
that he was forced to take more precautions than he ever had before to 
protect his own life and property and the person of 9tefan Bogdan. (34) 
By December 1608, Glover had turned his attention to Murat 
Pasha, requesting him to use his influence to favour Bogdan's cause. 
Murat undertook to do his best but asked Glover to wait some twenty or 
thirty days while he settled other more important business. Glover 
decided that his efforts should not be thwarted by delays in laying his 
hands on the money required for gifts and bribes; he began collecting the 
money authorised by the King to be raised from English merchants in 
Constantinople: 
" ... that it may be in readiness in all assayes and not when urgent 
need requireth I should stand in want thereof, wch might utterlie 
preiudice and overthrow the suite, for our adversaries doe 
extremely labour underhand, with great sumes of monies ... " 
He feared that despite his careful diplomacy and promises of reward, the 
financial resources available to Bogdan's opponents were much greater 
and were ready at hand whereas he could only make promises. He now 
invested all his hopes in Murat Pasha being an honourable man who 
would keep his promises and one who would not be persuaded by 
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Polish-backed bribery to oppose Bogdan's appointment. (35) 
The Levant Company had issued instructions to its Treasurer in 
Constantinople, Anthony Abbdie, to furnish Sir Thomas Glover with 
10,000 Crowns as the latter directed him. Abbdie was told to send bills of 
exchange to James Higgins in Venice who had been ordered to accept 
and pay them. It was this question of the raising of money which caused 
most difficulty for the Company which appears to have expected not to be 
called upon to provide a large sum of money until Bogdan had been 
installed as prince, or at least received his "helmet". However, as we saw 
above, Glover needed funds ready at hand. He called for 6,000 of the 
10,000 Crowns immediately and the rest to be brought to him four days 
later. Having been advised of Salisbury's instructions to Glover, the 
Company had budgeted for the provision of only 2,000 Crowns at this 
juncture; they had planned to make the rest of the money available six 
months later, which they had been advised was the earliest possible date 
for Bogdan's installation as Prince of Moldavia. 
This situation arose because the Crown and the Company did not 
appreciate the difficulties facing Glover, in particular that he needed to be 
able to act swiftly if the Ottomans indicated a readiness to replace 
v 
Constantin Movila with 9tefan Bogdan. The Crown and the Company 
were mainly concerned to minimise the risk of losing their money and 
avoid any expense until Bogdan had achieved his object, therefore they 
expected Glover to proceed with the utmost caution: 
"Now yf you should not be able to effect it, judge you what an 
imputacion you have cast upon yourself and what a wrong you 
have done to us, his Majestie considering the money is not 
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otherwise to be [paid?] having [given] us noe other security of ye 
repayment of theis money then that they be disbursed but 
according to such cautions as his Majestie hath prescribed 
you ... " (36) 
In December 1608, the Company warned both Glover and Abbdie that 
they could be held liable for the repayment of the money taken up so far if 
Bogdan's suit should fail because they had deviated from their express 
instructions. The Company appears to have suspected that Glover had 
already paid bribes to the Sultan's ministers. 
The Levant Company feared that its credit in Venice would be 
damaged. Abbdie's bills of exchange had been sent as instructed to 
James Higgins, who informed the Company that he might not be able to 
honour them given the shortage of money in Venice due to the 
devaluation of the zecchini. The Company was forced to hastily provide 
the 10,000 Crowns from its own reserves because of what they described 
as: 
"[Glover's] speedie and unnecessary take up of soo great a some." 
Abbdie was the victim of the Company's conflicting instructions; he had 
been sent a copy of Salisbury's order to Glover which had specified that 
no more than 2,000 Crowns should be raised for the moment, but which 
also instructed him to raise 10,000 Crowns according to Glover's 
direction. Glover clearly bullied Abbdie into providing the entire sum 
immediately. The Company leadership had based its judgment of how to 
conduct the affair on the supposition that no more that 2,000 Crowns 
would be required for at least six months by which time it would have 
made additional arrangements. Abbdie was informed that in the 
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Company's opinion Sir Thomas Glover had exceeded his orders and, by 
implication, his authority as ambassador. (37) 
The Company Court wrote to James Higgins in Venice to 
apologise for what had occurred and to ask him to accept Anthony 
Abbdie's bills of exchange; Higgins was sent a letter of credit which 
would enable him to do so. The Levant Company's chief concern was 
that the whole affair had damaged its reputation for trustworthiness in 
financial matters, because it had neglected to make proper arrangements 
to underwrite the King's financial support of 9tefan Bogdan. 
Considerable damage had been done to Anthony Abbdie's 
creditworthiness and reputation when it became public knowledge that 
his bills of exchange had been questioned; therefore to spare him any 
further risk to his reputation the Company decided to raise money to 
support 9tefan Bogdan in a different manner. Glover was instructed to 
raise money upon goods belonging to all the English merchants present 
in Constantinople and to give them in return bills of exchange 
guaranteed by the Levant Company which were recoverable in London. 
By devising this alternative method of payment the Company transferred 
the burden of raising money for Bogdan onto the merchants in 
Constantinople. Glover was told that if some merchants were willing to 
invest more money than they were asked for, they should be allowed to 
do so and others might be excused taking part. The Company had 
received information that there were men in Constantinople who were 
willing to invest money in Bogdan's suite in the hope of handsome 
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returns if he was successful. John Sanderson was interested in the 
investment possiblities and instructed John Kitely in Constantinople to 
look after his interests for him: 
"for your [ ... ] interests I will procure you to be rewarded with some 
of the first fruit of Moldavia ... " (38) 
In another letter Sanderson referred to his acceptance of a voluntary 
offering of: 
"The Princes frutes when God shall have preferred ... him in that 
place; for his Lordship [probably Glover] I procured the 1/2 of all 
wch i1 good have may be recovered by his means of the said 
Prince of Moldavia and have advised thereof in sondry letters are 
at his Lps comand." (39) 
It would seem that Bogdan had been buying support with promises of 
repayment out of the taxes he would levy as prince. Considering the 
amount of money he would be expected to pay the Ottomans in gifts and 
tribute once he was installed, the tax burden which Bogdan expected to 
impose upon the principality was enormous; he clearly intended to 
exploit the principality's resources to the full. 
In addition to finding himself in bad odour with his superiors in 
England Glover found his reputation amongst the Ottomans damaged by 
a set of unfortunate occurrences which he considered set Bogdan's 
cause back so far as to be nearly irrevocable. Glover had sought the 
support of the Tatar Khan who was ill-disposed to the King of Poland: 
" ... wherein he ferventlie exhorted the Gran Sigr wth all speed to 
sende from his Porte another Prince for Moldavia, for that 
Constantyne ... did not yeeld that obedeince he ought but ruynated 
the province in such manner that in shorte tyme if the Gran Sigr 
did not give speedie remedie, the same presentlie would be soe 
exhausted that it will never be able to yeeld him any profine, and 
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concluded that it did not stande with his Mgties [Le. the Sultan] 
honr that contrarie to former customes the Princes of that province 
should be placed by the Powles wch Ire indeed much furthered 
our suitee." (40) 
This argument carried great weight not only because it was offered by 
one of the Sultan Ahmet's's most important vassals, but also because, as 
touched upon in Chapter I of this thesis, the principalities were a major 
source of raw materials for the Ottoman core provinces. 
In the meantime Stefan Bogdan had not been idle: he had 
arranged for two Moldavian noblemen, former office-holders in the 
principality (Great Treasurer and Gentleman of the Horse), to come to 
Constantinople with two hundred followers at Sir Thomas' expense and 
to demand a new prince. In particular, they intended to complain about 
Constantin's agent (kapu-kihaya ) to the Porte, whom they alleged was 
chiefly responsible for the ruin of the Moldavian peasantry and the 
destruction of the land. Such destruction was probably a result of 
Constantin'S need to pay bribes to the Ottomans in order to remain in 
power. The two noblemen, or Barons as Glover called them, were 
admitted to a public audience with the Viziers where the case on both 
sides was be examined. The Barons managed to procure a verdict of 
guilty from the Grand Vizier and it was decided that the Moldavian Agent 
be taken to the house of a Cadi where he would be held until it was 
decided whether imprisonment or execution should be his punishment. 
Glover was furious at what occurred next: 
"Theis slllie Barones wth the rest of their two hundred ignorant 
villanes, wthout witt discretion or any consideration; whether of 
ioye, that had convicted him, or greefe of harte for extraordinary 
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damadges recd by his meanse from the Powles, had not pacience 
to carrie him awaye quietlie to the cheefe iudge, but as soone as 
he was delivered into their handes in the verie presence of the 
Vizeries in the place of iustice and in the King's [Le. the Sultan] 
house ... all in generall fell a buffetinge and beatinge him, 
woundinge his hande, pulde of most of his beard, and would have 
pulled him in peeces if they had not bin parted by the Turques." 
This incident was a particularly great insult to the dignity of the Porte 
because it occurred in the presence of the Sultan. The Barons were 
committed to the Seven Towers fortress and a dozen of their noble 
followers and 40 of their attendants were sent to the galleys; the Agent 
was released and set to work to ensure that his enemies were put to 
death. Three of the Barons were sentenced to be thrown in the sea and 
drowned, Glover reported that he was doing all he could to obtain their 
pardon. 
Bogdan's attempt to use a feud amongst the Moldavian nobility to 
his own advantage had backfired disastrously, when all the pent-up 
hostility, which had nothing to do with his suit, burst out into violence. He 
was, as Glover reported, appalled and dejected by the behaviour of 
those whom he had hoped to use; such an outrage committed in the 
presence of the Sultan not only warranted death or the galleys for the 
perpetrators but could cause Ahmet to turn against the whole idea of 
replacing Constantin. The pretender cheered up somewhat when Glover 
secured the release of the men sent to the galleys and obtained a 
promise that the Barons would be released. 
The Grand Vizier Murat Pasha assured Glover that he would abide 
by his promise to install Bogdan in Moldavia but asked not to be pressed 
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further at this time. Rumours of the Emperor Maximillian's projected 
expedition against Poland reduced the likelihood that Constantin would 
be removed; the Ottomans would not wish to destabilise the area if this 
might lead to the Danubian Principalities falling to the Habsburgs. Glover 
informed Salisbury that he was attempting instead to obtain the 
principality of Wallachia for Bogdan: 
"wch if I can purchase it will be as good unto him (and rather 
better in theis turbulent tymes there) then his princedome of 
Moldavia." (42) 
This last statement shows Bogdan's protestations that he only desired 
restoration to his father's throne by hereditary right, to be mere devices to 
obtain sympathy, moreover they suggest that English support was 
motivated by more than sympathy for a distressed prince and probably by 
a desire to increase England's diplomatic influence in the Ottoman 
Empire. Glover also suspected that Constantin would eventually be 
bankrupted, which would bode well for Bogdan, for the profuse 
distribution of financial favours amongst those close to the Sultan by 
Constantin's agent must soon come to a halt unless financial assistance 
from Poland was forthcoming. Therefore Glover was not completely 
pessimistic, but he appears to have become increasingly weary of the 
whole matter. 
At the beginning of March 1609 the Tatars launched an incursion 
into Poland; whilst the Ottomans awaited news of the outcome they 
asked Glover to suspend his efforts on Bogdan's behalf, nor had Glover 
been given any further answer about the release of the Barons. He 
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suspected that the Ottomans would keep them in prison until Bogdan 
was preferred to Moldavia, probably in order to prevent any incidents 
with the Moldavian agent. He complained at the difficulties with which he 
was faced and the continual frustrations he endured: 
''they are altogether variable and inconstante without resolution 
and subiect to howerly mutations; I cannot insure yor honor in 
observance of their protestations untill I shall see the deede 
effected, which if not performed within this 20 or 30 dayes then 
there is small hope of presente installment, but the matter wilbe 
produced untill some insolent outrage of the Powles doe inforce a 
necessarie mutation." (43) 
In this letter Glover seems to have been extremely pessimistic about his 
chances of doing anything for Bogdan and was trying to prepare those in 
England involved in this affair for his failure. He laid his only hopes now 
upon a further deterioration in Turko-Polish relations, mentioning a 
Cossack raid upon three Ottoman vessels in the Black Sea, in which the 
booty obtained was divided equally between the Cossacks, the King of 
Poland and Constantin of Moldavia. This incident was said to have so 
enraged the Ottomans that they were to hold a general Council to decide 
upon retaliation. 
At the beginning of April 1609 Glover again went to Murat Pasha 
to demand an uabsolute answere of their determination" whether or not 
the Ottomans intended to install Bogdan in Moldavia. He also requested 
answers to King James' letters written to Sultan Ahmet on the pretender's 
behalf and appears to have told the Vizier that he could not continue to 
support Bogdan if the Sultan did not keep his promise and prefer the 
pretender soon. This seems a peculiar method of proceeding since in 
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normal circumstances any suggestion that Bogdan could not rely upon 
English support would weaken rather than strengthen his cause. 
Nevertheless, the Vizier assured Glover that ,when a suitable opportunity 
was presented, ~tefan Bogdan would have his desire, if not in Moldavia 
then in Wallachia; Murat Pasha asked Glover to be patient and to assure 
the King and the Earl of Salisbury of his good intentions. (44) This 
exchange suggests that Glover was aware of Bogdan's usefulness to the 
Sultan: the Ottomans were using Bogdan's presence in Constantinople 
as a rival to Constantin Movila to put pressure on Poland and Movila to 
make concessions, offer bribes and behave in a conciliatory manner. 
The King of Poland was extremely concerned that Bogdan might 
succeed in replacing Constantin Movila; he therefore dispatched an 
envoy, Kochanski, to Constantinople with instructions to break his 
../ journey in Moldavia and assure Movila of Poland's continued support. 
King Zygmund Vasa's orders to Kochanski emphasised the vital 
importance of maintaining peace inside the principality. Constantin was 
instructed to present gifts to Murat Pasha and others close to the Sultan 
in order to thwart the plottings of Sir Thomas Glover. Whilst in lasi, 
Kochanski consulted Constantin's chief ministers about Glover's 
methods for procuring favours in order to discover the extent of the threat 
Bogdan posed to Constantin's position. When he arrived in the Ottoman 
capital Kochanski sought audience with the Sultan's ministers to 
convince them of the importance to Turko-Polish relations of maintaining 
Movila on the Moldavian throne. He reminded them of the behaviour of 
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Bogdan's father lancu Sasul, dwelling on the latter's disloyalty to Sultan 
Murat III when he was prince, his ceaseless feuds with the Ottomans and 
with Stefan Bathory, King of Poland, and his plundering and 
embezzlement of the principality's treasure and resources in preparation 
for his escape from the Sultan's justice: 
"We cannot doubt that his son will not only be lower than his father, 
but will wish to imitate his pranks." 
Kochanski assured the Ottomans that the King of Poland's only concern 
to keep a good and peaceful man on the Moldavian throne, who would 
not create incidents which would damage the good relations between 
Poland and the Sultan. He argued that the interests of both states lay in 
the continuance of the current state of affairs which was guaranteed by 
treaty and maintained that, since Constantin and his father leremie had 
held the throne through the Sultan's favour, it would be neither fair nor 
constructive to cast him out so carelessly when his family had given so 
much to the Sultan's predecessors and had showed them every 
goodwill. He insisted that Bogdan's only desire was to cause trouble 
between Sultan Ahmet and the King of Poland in order to serve his own 
interests, something which could not be tolerated in a vassal, and he 
should therefore be banished or imprisoned before he could present 
further difficulties. He also suggested that Sir Thomas Glover's behaviour 
in supporting Bogdan was entirely inappropriate to an ambassador to the 
Ottoman Empire and was motivated purely by a desire for personal gain. 
Kochanski accused Bogdan of launching a conspiracy with the 
two Moldavian Barons, Barba Alba and lanache, to kill Constantin. 
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However, despite the supposed threat of assassination, Constantin's 
Polish guard, provided by the King of Poland to protect him from just this 
eventuality, was to be disbanded. This was a significant concession to 
the Sultan. Not only had the Polish guard been a major source of 
complaint amongst the Moldavian Boyars, it was also a continual 
reminder to the Ottomans that a rival power in Eastern Europe had a 
considerable influence over one of their own vassal states. The removal 
of the Polish guard from Moldavia shows that Stefan Bogdan's continued 
;> 
favour with Sultan Ahmet was regarded as a significant threat to 
Constantin Movil'a's rule. It also shows that the Ottoman policy of 
v 
maintaining Bogdan in Constantinople as Movila's chief rival was 
gradually reaping rewards. Frustrating as it was for Bogdan and Glover, 
the delay in making a final decision over the future of the principality 
allowed the Sultan and his Viziers to wait for an opportune moment to 
bring the principality under Ottoman control. We also learn from 
Kochanski's instructions that Gabriel Bathory, Prince of Transylvania was 
planning to intervene in support of Bogdan and had threatened to invade 
Moldavia. 
The King of Poland had already written to King James and asked 
him to order Glover to discontinue his support of Bogdan. According to 
Antonio Foscarini, the Venetian Ambassador in France, the Marshall of 
Poland had visited England to complain about Glover's activities and 
alleged that the English Ambassador was urging the Grand Vizier to 
attack Poland. This may refer to the fact that, if Bogdan were to receive 
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Sultan Ahmet's nomination as Prince of Moldavia, he would have to 
overcome Constantin's resistance and take the throne by force of arms 
using Ottoman troops, thereby bringing about conflict between Ottoman 
troops and Polish troops sent to protect Constantin. (45) The King of 
Poland's efforts to persuade King James to reconsider his support for 
Bogdan were partially successful. However, as we shall see, James' 
eventual abandonment of Bogdan was in all likelihood precipitated by 
anger at his cousin Lady Arbella Stuart's romantic association with the 
pretender. Furthermore, the protracted length of the campaign on 
Bogdan's behalf seems to have blunted the King's interest in maintaining 
a protege on the Moldavian throne. 
Kochanski's mission to Constantinople was not fruitful: not only did 
his suit fail but, whilst he was present in Constantinople, Glover managed 
to procure the release of the two Barons arrested for their attack upon 
~ 
Movila's agent. This gave Movila and his Polish supporters little 
confidence in the Vizier's friendly disposition towards them. (46) Upon 
being set free the Barons were warned to have no further contact with the 
English Embassy; they ignored this warning and continued to meet 
Bogdan on embassy property. The Grand Vizier was furious when 
informed of these visits by the prince's enemies; he ordered Glover to 
surrender the men at once; Glover denied that they were in his house at 
all : 
uWords ran so high that the Vizier said the Grand Signor would 
send the Ambassador in chains to England to have his head taken 
off and added a heap of insults so that the Ambassador returned to 
his house quite upset and melancholy; and in truth I [the Venetian 
Ambassador] fear that as the Porte is tired of this affair, something 
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worse than words may befall the Ambassador." (47) 
To make promises which they did not fulfil, whilst delaying making 
any decision, was a typical tactic employed by the Ottomans when they 
did not want to take action. They were prepared to allow foreign 
ambassadors to present letters on behalf of men such as Bogdan and to 
petition on their behalf. Indeed certain advantages resulted from allowing 
such interventions as we have seen. However, they did not intend to 
allow Bogdan to precipitate internal disorder in the principality. The 
pretender had become tired of waiting patiently for preferment and was 
endeavouring to stir up discontent amongst Moldavian boyars, using the 
Barons as 'provocateurs' in order to organise a revolt. The Ottomans did 
not wish to lose all control over decisions concerning the the 
principality's future. Glover was deemed to be in some way involved in 
secret plots against Movila, because he appeared to have done nothing 
to prevent contact between the pretender and the Barons. As we shall 
see, Glover's influence over the pretender was minimal, indeed it was 
Bogdan who was able to influence and indeed put considerable 
pressure on the English Ambassador by threatening to reveal certain 
information about him if he did not co-operate with all his schemes, 
however dubious. 
By May 1609 Glover had become profoundly pessimistic about 
Bogdan's chances of ascending the Moldavian throne. He wrote of his 
problems to John Sanderson; unfortunately only Sanderson's reply has 
survived: 
"I doe not yet thincke good to show to them [probably the Levant 
338 
Company] what your Lp. writeth concerning their hopes of 
recovery in Bugdania ... " 
Sanderson warned Glover that, despite his strenuous efforts on 
Bogdan's behalf, nobody would credit his efforts if the money invested in 
this project was lost: 
"I tell you they be [ ... ] incredulous and ungratefull. .. " (48) 
In the meantime, in his other correspondence with the Crown and the 
Company, Glover tried to appear optimistic about the pretender's suit, 
knowing that he must persist in his efforts because he would be held 
liable for financial losses; however successful he might have been in 
other matters his diplomatic career would be ruined over this question. 
Before the arrival in Constantinople of the Polish envoy 
Kochanski, Glover and Bogdan had been given new grounds for 
optimism in June of 1609 with the intervention of the Tatar Khan which 
Glover had procured through letters and presents. The Khan sent his 
Ambassador to Constantinople with presents for the Sultan and his 
favourites of slaves plundered from the King of Poland's dominions and 
with a commission to persuade Sultan Ahmet to install Bogdan in 
Moldavia. This development was important because the Tatars were 
powerful in the region close to Moldavia: 
"wthout whose [the Tatars] advise and counsell in those partes, 
these never inovate anything." 
Glover promised that extra presents would be forthcoming in addition to 
his standing offer of "rownde somes" if the Sultan appointed Bogdan 
Prince of Moldavia immediately; he concluded: 
339 
"this business is freshe, verie earnstlie waged by special! officers 
and cheefe favourites of the Grand Sigr." (49) 
As a consequence of the Khan's intervention Kochanski left 
Constantinople with no assurances of Constantin Movila's continuance 
as prince and no promise that Bogdan's suit would be rebuffed. However, 
Glover's apparent optimism was once again brushed aside with the 
usual promises that the opportune moment to appoint Bogdan prince had 
not yet arrived. On 9th of September 1609 Glover wrote: 
"Our suite about our Prince Stephano Bugdan Iyeth in suspence 
until! the Vezereys entrance to Constantinople, with assured 
promise ... of graunte of our desyres herin ... " 
His letter of two weeks later read thus: 
"After Murat Bassias entrance into Constantinople I am agayne 
assured and asertayned by the principal! magistrates that our 
Prince Stefano Bogdan shall obtayne his desyr ... " (50) 
Throughout October and November 1609 Glover received further 
promises concerning Bogdan's preferment; the excuse for further delay 
was now that the Sultan was awaiting the arrival of the annual tribute 
before he could replace the Prince of Moldavia. Glover continued to write 
optimistic letters to England. Amongst the State Papers there is a set of 
notes, probably in the Earl of Salisbury's hand, concerning the 
campaign's progress; this suggests that the matter was discussed in 
government committees in late October 1609. The tenor of both Glover's 
letters, and the notes written about them, suggest that by December of 
1609 those concerned believed the matter to be reaching a crucial point. 
On December 15th it was reported that a General Council of Mufti and 
340 
Viziers had decided that Constantin should be removed from the 
Moldavian throne. Although there was another candidate (~tefan Tom~a) 
protected by one of the Viziers (Georgi Mehmet Pasha, an eunuch) and 
lodged in his house, Glover did not consider him a serious rival to 
Bogdan. The Bey/erbeys, Sanjakbeys and Cadis stationed around the 
borders of Moldavia were alerted to assist the new prince sent from 
Constantinople, since it was likely that Constantin would not surrender 
his throne without resistance and support from his patrons in Poland. 
Notification of the proposal to remove Movila was sent to the Tatar Khan 
and the Prince of Transylvania; this gave Glover considerable cause for 
optimism since they had both indicated their support for Bogdan's 
candidacy. In letters to England Glover attempted to justify the length of 
time taken to bring Bogdan's campaign to this point, by pointing out that 
the role of the Prince of Moldavia in South-East European affairs meant 
that decisions concerning the principality could not be taken without 
great deliberation. He promised the Earl of Salisbury that once Bogdan's 
installation in Moldavia was achieved: 
" ... to what an exceeding glorie, honr and renowne of his most 
excelant Matie and the Crowne of England it will redowne ... " 
He assured Salisbury that he should not be angry about the Exchequer's 
temporary loss of 10,000 Crowns, since the greater part of this money 
was in deposit to be close at hand when the time came for it to be spent; 
much greater sums had already been spent by other friends of the 
pretender in Constantinople who were still confident of his success. (51) 
Soon afterwards Glover was called to the presence of the Grand 
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Vizier Murat Pasha and interrogated (Glover's own description) about the 
amount of money, apart from the tribute, the prince would be prepared to 
give the Sultan before his departure from Constantinople. This was 
indeed the crux of the matter, for if Bogdan did not offer enough money 
he would not be given the appointment. Bogdan and Glover, both being 
men experienced in dealings with the Ottomans, had anticipated this by 
raising money from the Levant Company in advance; because of his 
foresight Glover could reply immediately that, upon kissing the Sultan's 
hand, Bogdan would present 30,000 dollars to Sultan Ahmet and 40,000 
to the Vizier for his trouble. The Vizier objected that the Sultan's share 
was insufficient, Glover therefore replied that the Vizier could have 
80,000 dollars to divide up as he wished, either to give it all to the Sultan 
or keep it all himself if he so wished, so long as the business was 
concluded as soon as possible. He reported that Murat Pasha seemed 
pleased with this suggestion and had told him to prepare the money. 
Murat promised that Bogdan's wish would be granted once the financial 
matters had been dealt with. It was arranged that upon production of the 
standard and helmet, the symbols of a Prince of Moldavia's authority, 
100,000 zecchiniwould be furnished to pay the Sultan and Grand Vizier 
their rewards and the following sums of money to the other officials: ten 
thousand Crowns to the Treasurer; ten thousand dollars each to the 
second and third Viziers; ten thousand Crowns to the Mufti and the same 
amount to the Chancellor; one thousand Crowns each to the rest of the 
Viziers and five hundred dollars each to the secretaries and others. 
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Glover assured Salisbury that since this money had already been raised 
it was only necessary to await Bogdan's appointment. Glover could not 
resist pointing out to the Earl of Salisbury that: 
"where such great sumes muste be layed out towards the 
preferment of such an important suite as the preferment of a 
prince, the small sume of 10V Crownes, let it not be thought too 
much preiudiciall, or too longe to be keapt for some tyme out of his 
hignes Exchequer and espetiallie not beinge any way indangered, 
howsoever this business should come to passe ... " (52) 
In January 1610 Glover was able to report further good news 
when the Prince of Transylvania's Ambassador confirmed that his master 
was still ready to support Bogdan. Glover and Bogdan sent the two 
Moldavian "Barones" to meet with the Sanjakbey of Buda whose arrival 
was awaited in Constantinople. Glover had now been told that he must 
wait until this Pasha's marriage had been solemnised before the Sultan 
would proceed with the matter of changing the Prince of Moldavia. These 
delays were yet another frustration for Glover and Bogdan, since they 
had already made what they thought were definite arrangements for 
Bogdan's investiture. They tried to remain confident, hence the dispatch 
of envoys to court the Pasha of Buda's favour. The Pasha had known 
Bogdan in 1594 when he was appointed Prince of Wallachia, before 
being defeated in battle by Mihai Viteazul; (53) Glover and Bogdan 
chose to regard this as a cause for optimism. Aside from reminding the 
Ottomans of their promise to install the pretender in Moldavia and 
ensuring that the money necessary for bribes was ready to be handed 
over, there were no more steps Glover could take to promote Bogdan. 
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The latter's fate now rested with Sultan Ahmet's ministers, the Prince of 
Transylvania and the Tatar Khan. 
In England, meanwhile, the reputations of both Glover and 
Bogdan were suffering. As we saw in Chapter III, the Ambassador's 
enemies were spreading stories designed to blacken his name. When 
warned about this by John Sanderson, Glover wrote to the Earl of 
Salisbury to defend himself and regain Salisbury's good opinion. He 
knew that character assassination was particularly dangerous now that 
Salisbury had doubts about his competence in the conduct of Stefan 
Bogdan's affairs; therefore in the same letter he promised that he would 
soon be able to send his wife's brother to England bearing good news 
about the Prince of Moldavia. (54) 
Unbeknownst to Glover, he had been under investigation by Henry 
Wotton, the English Ambassador in Venice. In 1607 Wotton had been 
informed by the Florentine representative in Venice that Glover was 
conducting a secret correspondence with various Christian princes. After 
enquiries, Wotton discovered evidence that the embassy in 
Constantinople was being used as part of a spy network set up by the 
Spanish Crown and clearly suspected that Glover was implicated in this 
espionage 
"directly or obliquely". 
Glover employed Jeffrey Luther, an English resident in Venice, to deal 
with his correspondence as it arrived in Venice en route to other 
destinations. When questioned by Wotton, Luther admitted that Glover 
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occasionally sent bundles of letters to an apothecary in Venice which he 
had imagined were concerned with the drugs trade. Wotton made 
arrangements with Luther to intercept and open the next such bundle of 
letters which arrived. However, in January 1608 Luther died. Wotton 
acted quickly to ensure that Glover's letters were delivered into his hands 
before the latter was able to appoint a replacement for Luther. When the 
next packet of letters were given to Wotton, he received a visit from the 
aforementioned apothecary and an Italian merchant who begged to be 
present when the letters were read. 
Amongst Glover's letters were two written in cipher, probably 
written by Glover's secretary, Gieronimo Meoli, to one Battista Pratti and a 
man named Camillo Bacea; the rest of the letters were in plain writing. 
The entire packet of letters was dispatched unread to the Earl of 
Salisbury. It is clear that the letters contained nothing to implicate Sir 
Thomas Glover in espionage, but they almost certainly showed that there 
was a Spanish spy in his embassy, because soon afterwards it was 
reported that Glover had interrogated Meoli at gunpoint about his secret 
correspondence with Spain. Meoli is alleged to have boasted of being a 
kinsman of the Habsburg Emperor's Chancellor and of having powerful 
connections within the anti-Ottoman forces of central Europe. Reports 
were released to show that Glover had summarily dismissed Meoli, who 
insisted that his dealings with Spain had done nothing to damage 
English interests. There is no evidence to show that Glover had been 
aware of the infiltration of his embassy. What is clear from subsequent 
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developments is that Meoli was not the only spy within the embassy. As 
we shall see, someone inside the embassy continued to supply 
information to Spain. One may also conclude that from now on Glover 
must have been aware that his embassy was compromised, yet there is 
no evidence that he took any steps to prevent another spy from operating 
inside the embassy. Wotton, and others who disapproved of Glover, 
remained sceptical about his loyalty, although nothing could be proved at 
this stage. Allegations that Glover was involved in espionage were to 
surface again in November 1611, when a remark, alleged to have been 
made by 9tefan Bogdan, was widely reported in England. John 
Sanderson reported having first heard of this from one Ed. Abbott, a 
member of the Levant Company with whom he did business, and later 
from Henry Lello who had also heard of the said remark from a foreign 
source: it was said that Bogdan believed he could lead Glover by the 
nose and that the ambassador did not dare displease him. The whole 
matter did nothing to improve Glover's reputation, because, if true, 
Bogdan was clearly privy to some secret misdoings of Glover; that: 
"you have either reported some secrets or [did] in his sight som 
what that occasioneth him to use such speeches behind your 
backe; therefore counsell you [ ... ] wth all convenience that you 
may to your creditt ridd your hand and your house of him ... " (55) 
When this report reached the ears of the Earl of Salisbury it inevitably 
revived the previous allegations about Glover's secret correspondence, 
since it was taken to imply that Bogdan had discovered some evidence of 
Glover's disloyalty to the English Crown which was sufficiently damning 
to make him vulnerable to blackmail. These allegations became so 
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widespread that, when Glover was denounced as a Spanish agent by Sir 
Anthony Sherley, an immediate decision was taken to replace Glover 
with Paul Pindar who was sent out to Constantinople to investigate his 
conduct, as we shall see. 
The Earl of Salisbury does not seem to have believed that Glover 
was a Spanish spy. His prime concern in the whole Bogdan affair was to 
ensure that The King's money was spent wisely; he was not satisfied with 
Glover's explanations of the terms on which he had parted with the 
10,000 Crowns and continually pressed the ambassador to give 
assurance that the money was recoverable whether or not Bogdan was 
installed on the Moldavian throne. He expressed himself surprised and 
angry at Glover's "owne levity and vayne conceit" at acting contrary to 
instructions. On other matters however he was pleased with Glover's 
industry and diligence on behalf of the merchants, particularly in the 
matter of obtaining the Sultan's passport for merchants trading in the 
East Indies. (56) At the same time as Sir Thomas Glover's reputation was 
under attack a second scandal erupted in England. On 29th December 
1609 it was reported that James I's cousin, the Lady Arbella Stuart, had 
been committed to her chamber for "entertaining correspondence for 
marriage" to the Prince of Moldavia, 9tefan Bogdan. 
Born in 1575, Lady Arbella (57) was the only child of Charles 
Stuart, Earl of Lennox, younger brother of Henry, Lord Darnley the 
second husband of Mary, Queen of Scots. Lennox, through his mother 
Margaret, Dowager Countess of Lennox, was the grandson of Princess 
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Margaret, the eldest daughter of Henry VII. Arbella's mother was 
Elizabeth Cavendish, daughter of the famous Bess of Hardwick, by her 
second husband William Cavendish. (58) Arbella was in the line of 
succession to the throne of England, after Mary, Queen of Scots and 
James VI of Scotland who became James I of England. (59) This 
proximity to the throne proved to be a great disadvantage for Arbella. In 
1607, Nicolo Molin, the Venetian Ambassador in England described her 
as being: 
"without mate and without estate"; (60) 
this statement sums up Arbella's greatest difficulties throughout her life: 
she had little property to support her and was not allowed to marry. Both 
these problems derived from her birth and the attitudes of Queen 
Elizabeth and her successor James I; if Arbella married, an ambitious 
husband might press her claim or that of her offspring, to the English 
throne, thereby creating a focus of resistance against James I and his 
descendants. As for her 'estate', the Lennox estates in Scotland were 
seized by the Scottish Crown after the death of her father in 1576 and 
were never returned to her. (61) Throughout her life Arbella was 
dependent upon allowances from her grandmother, Bess of Hardwick, 
and from the Crown. This mattered particularly in the reign of King 
James. Whilst Queen Elizabeth was alive Arbella was rarely summoned 
to Court; during James' reign she was expected to spend much of her 
time at Court where the King could keep a close watch on her; she had 
no assets which could have brought her financial independence and life 
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at Court demanded money that Arbella did not have. She was constantly 
"penny-pinching", incurring debts and writing to Robert Cecil for an 
increase with her pension or the grant of a state monopoly (62) which 
would help her maintain herself and a household suited to her position 
as the King's cousin. 
A number of books have been written about Arbella Stuart and 
she is often presented as a romantic heroine, in the manner of a 
nineteenth century romantic novel. Lady Arbella seems to have led a 
particularly tedious and restricted existence and must have been deeply 
unhappy much of the time. She was never allowed to marry and her own 
attempts to remedy this situation resulted in serious trouble for her and 
further unhappiness. (63) 
She was brought up under the supervision of her grandmother, 
Bess of Hardwick, a particularly formidable woman, with the help of her 
aunt and uncle, Gilbert and Mary Talbot. There were various suggestions 
of possible suitors for her but all marriage plans came to nothing, largely 
due to the opposition of the Queen, or extremely bad luck. At some time 
before 1584, she was betrothed to Robert, Lord Denbigh, son of Robert 
Dudley, Earl of Leicester, but the boy died in 1584 at the age of four 
years. (64) In 1581, Queen Elizabeth had considered betrothing her to 
Esme Stuart, the newly appointed Earl of Lennox, but he died in 1583. It 
was even proposed that she marry her cousi n James VI of Scotland, but 
he married Anne of Denmark in 1589. Another rumoured suitor was 
Rainutio Farnese, son of the Duke of Parma, the Spanish Governor-
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General of the Netherlands, proposed with a view to improving relations 
between England and Spain, but as usual this suggestion was not 
seriously pursued. There were other rumours that Arbella was the target 
of a Catholic plot to kidnap her and marry her to King Phillip of Spain 
who would then set out to overthrow Elizabeth in Arbella's favour. She 
had in fact been given a strict Protestant upbringing but suggestions that 
Arbella was a Catholic occasionally surfaced, as we shall see. These 
rumours about her religious sympathies aroused suspicions in both 
Elizabeth and King James, her successor. There were numerous other 
suggested suitors and it was even whispered that Robert Cecil was 
intending to marry her in order to become King. None of these suggested 
suitors received any consideration by the Queen, who had little interest in 
finding a husband for her cousin. 
In 1600, at the age of 25 with her own household, she was still 
unmarried, and had no-one of her own age for company. Although 
Queen Elizabeth did not herself marry, in Elizabethan SOCiety unmarried 
women, particularly those without property, had little status. To Lady 
Arbella marriage seems to have represented a chance to escape from 
her tedious existence. In 1602, when she was 27 years old, Bess of 
Hardwick's chaplain James Starkey observed that she was very 
depressed. (65) In that year Arbella proposed marriage to Edward 
Seymou r, grandson of the Earl of Hertford, whom she had never met and 
who was at that time only 16 years old. Seymour also had royal blood, 
since the Earl of Hertford had married Catherine Grey, grand-daughter of 
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Mary Tudor, the youngest daughter of Henry VII: any issue of such a 
marriage would have a strong claim to the throne and for Hertford's 
grandson to enter into such an arrangement without the Queen's 
permission would be politically very dangerous for the Earl's family. 
Furthermore, Arbella's lack of property did not make her a very desirable 
match, particularly as the Queen seems to have disliked her. Hertford 
revealed the proposal immediately to Robert Cecil and Arbella was made 
to sign a confession and an apology for her behaviour. (66) 
Relations between Arbella and her grandmother became 
increasingly bad, but she was not allowed to leave the old lady's charge. 
Her behaviour became increasingly irrational as she made plans to gain 
her liberty. She invented a story of a secret lover who was high in the 
Queen's favour; she went on hunger-strike and finally tried to escape by 
enlisting the help of her uncle Henry Cavendish but was prevented. (67) 
When the Queen died (24th March 1603) James VI of Scotland 
was immediately proclaimed King of England. During his triumphant 
progress through England he was petitioned upon Arbella's behalf and 
requested that she be given her freedom: 
"from that unpleasant life which she hath lead in the house of her 
grandmother with whose severity and age, being a young lady 
[she] could hardly agree ... " (68) 
The new king liked to keep her near him at Court and recognised 
her as a princess of the blood, but only granted her a small pension. She 
lived much of her Court life in retirement. The new King did not regard 
her personally as a danger to his throne. Arbella did not enjoy her 
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attendance at Court; she made few friends there and regarded the 
games played by the Queen and her Ladies-in-Waiting as childish. 
Moreover, although her allowance from the King was increased she was 
not in a position to dress herself or furnish her quarters in a manner 
which could match that of those around her. She did, however, enjoy the 
Court entertainments such as plays and masques; she was a good friend 
of the Queen and found an ally in Robert Cecil: she was able to use her 
favour at Court to help her uncles: for example William Cavendish 
obtained a baronage. Nevertheless, although the king professed to hold 
her in high esteem and promised to restore her property, the Lennox 
estates, upon her marriage, no plans were made to find her a husband. 
In 1608 she bought herself a house in Blackfriars as a place to retire from 
the rigours of Court life. She bitterly resented her enforced spinsterhood, 
feeling that she was forced to live the life of a nun without having chosen 
that vocation. She wrote to her uncle Gilbert Talbot: 
"For want of a nunnery, I have foe a while retired myself to the 
Friars." (69) 
When 9tefan Bogdan visited England in 1607 he met Lady Arbella 
and was apparently greatly impressed by her. She had been described 
by the Venetian Ambassador in London as: 
"not very beautiful but highly accomplished." (70) 
She had fair hair, a wide-mouth and a round chin; she was witty and 
charming and had very refined manners; she was also highly educated 
and, having a great fondness for study she was very knowledgeable 
about the classics; she spoke Latin, Italian, French and Spanish and 
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could read Greek and Hebrew. The education of noble women of the time 
demanded that she learn to dance, play the virginals and lute, to 
embroider and to write a firm and elegant hand. Lady Arbella was also 
said to have had a love of beautiful and rich clothes and expensive 
jewellery, a taste which she was not rich enough to indulge to any great 
extent. Bogdan's good opinion of her was no doubt encouraged by the 
fact that she was the King's cousin and therefore of some influence over 
him. For Arbella, frustrated at her dull and restricted life, Bogdan was 
probably a very attractive man. Not only was he apparently handsome 
and exotic looking, he was also cultivated, charming and courtly. He was 
well-travelled and had led a life of excitement, danger and adventure. 
Arbella and §tefan Bogdan appear to have cultivated some sort of 
relationship in which marriage was hinted at as a possibility if Bogdan 
was successful in winning the Moldavian throne. That she took a 
personal interest in the pretender's petition is evident from his surprise 
upon reaching Sir Henry Wotton's house in Venice that neither Cecil nor 
Lady Arbella had sent Wotton any directions or instructions concerning 
his imminent arrival. That Bogdan mentioned Cecil and Arbella together 
suggests that she had been considerably involved in pressing the King to 
help Bogdan and had met the pretender on a number of occasions 
during which she had been friendly towards him. For Lady Arbella, the 
possibility of marriage to the prince of an exotic state on the other side of 
Europe promised escape and adventure. Furthermore, she does not 
appear to have been a woman who took Bogdan's cause nor her 
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friendship with him anything other than seriously. She is said have been 
serious by nature and was described as having a studious and 
"melancholic" character. Melancholy was thought of as a medical 
condition brought about by an excess of one of the major body fluids -
"Melancholic" - someone with this condition had a passion for solitude 
and in extreme cases could become mad. The poor woman seems to 
have been desperate to marry; marriage represented status, liberty, as 
well as offering some form of companionship and the possibility of having 
children. 
§tefan Bogdan seriously contemplated marrying Lady Arbella 
Stuart; in November 1608 Sir Henry Wotton reported to Sir Robert Cecil, 
the Earl of Salisbury, that Bogdan had written to the Archbishop of 
Philadelphia, head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Italy to obtain his 
permission to dissolve a marriage of long standing with a Venetian 
woman (71) on the grounds that since he had found King James' 
recommendation to be insufficient to obtain the Moldavian throne, he 
intended to go and live in Persia and did not wish to have the presence 
of a wife upon his conscience, preferring to leave her free to marry again 
if she wished. 
This excuse of Bogdan's was highly suspect, firstly because it 
would be completely out of character for the pretender to have 
abandoned his hopes so quickly, when before he had put up with great 
danger and persevered for years in the hope of achieving his desire. 
Secondly according to Glover's reports nothing occurred to warrant such 
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an attack of pessimism. Few people can have known better that Bogdan 
was undertaking a difficult and lengthy task and had only entered upon 
the first stage of petitioning for him. Wotton put forward an alternative 
explanation for the pretender's conduct: 
"The matter is come to the hearing of her friends who make no 
small noises at it and the matter for a certai n report scattered here 
by the said pretendant at his last passage this way ... of some 
motions that had passed between him and the Lady Arbella of 
marraige, to succeed when he should be settled in his Princedom; 
which now the friends of this woman affirm (out of conjecture) to 
have been not only the ground of that favour which he found in his 
Majesty's Court, but also the true cause of the letter written to 
written to the foresaid Archbiship, he may colourably prosecute the 
other." (72) 
Wotton was concerned that Lady Arbella's reputation might be damaged; 
this incident also confirmed his former dislike of the pretender whom he 
had dismissed as a charlatan and reminded him of the hints dropped by 
Bogdan in 1607 of a relationship with a 'high-born' noblewoman at the 
English court. He tried to procure a copy of the letter and spoke to the 
Archbishop who confirmed the story of its contents but told Wotton that he 
had burned the original out of disgust and indignation. Wotton also wrote 
to Glover to suggest that he reconsider his support for the pretender; in a 
letter to Salisbury he implied that the English Crown should also 
reconsider its association with Bogdan since his behaviour towards his 
wife showed him to be a deeply unsavoury character. 
Salisbury took no action upon this matter until over a year later 
when Lady Arbella was finally questioned about her association with 
Bogdan, nor did he send any alternative instructions to Glover nor ask for 
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an explanation from Bogdan. Glover knew of the relationship because 
the pretender had confided his marital ambitions upon his arrival at the 
English Embassy in Constantinople: 
" ... that if it shall please God to send him his place ... the firste 
thinge that he would soe, he would by his letters and Ambassr, 
wich he purposeth to send unto England, become a humble suitor 
for the sayed Ladie." (73) 
Glover said that he had been extremely surprised at this suggestion 
which he regarded as impossible, but upon questioning Bogdan assured 
himself that Lady Arbella had not behaved improperly in any way and 
had made no promises of engagement to him, therefore Glover did not 
feel the need to report the matter to his pOlitical masters. Salisbury was 
also unwilling to stir up unnecessary scandal and did not immediately 
pursue the matter: Arbella was the King's cousin and in his favour and 
Salisbury was fond of her. Since there was no possibility of the marriage 
taking place because Bogdan already had a wife and, although they had 
no knowledge of Glover's own investigations, there was no evidence that 
Arbella had compromised herself, Salisbury and the King no doubt 
considered that there was no need to embarrass Lady Arbella by 
questioning her about her dealings with Bogdan, particularly since to do 
so would provoke comment and speculation about her at Court. 
However, events show that her movements were watched. 
Matters came to a head at the end of 1609 when Lady Arbella was 
arrested on suspicion of attempting to escape from England to marry 
Stefan Bogdan; she was also accused of converting to Catholicism, 
through her association with Lady Skinner, whom one J. Beaulieu 
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described as "a great Papist". (74) A massive public scandal erupted with 
numerous versions of her arrest reported. The Venetian Ambassador in 
London, Marc'Antonio Correr, wrote: 
"Lady Arbella's troubles are caused by a consignment of money 
which her Excellency made at Constantinople for a Moldavian 
Prince and by Douglas [her servant] intention to go to the Porte 
with instructions on the matter. The Moldavian was many months 
ago at the English Court, and, as hear, with the King's consent 
negotiated about marriage with the Lady, the conclusion thereof to 
depend upon his making good his claim to his state ... After he left 
England, it is now asserted he married in Venice ... His Majesty has 
taken it all in good part and has order that she be repaid for the 
moneys remitted to Constantinople ... All the same she is not 
satisfied, she claims the restoration of her patrimony and asks to 
be married or at least to depart and choose a husband." (75) 
Suspicions against her were aroused not only due to the intended 
departure of Douglas, but also because another servant of hers was 
discovered: "seeking a ship to pass the sea" which was later officially 
reported to have been for his own private business and unconnected to 
Lady Arbella's affairs. Arbella had taken a house in Lincolnshire and was 
not often seen at Court; this was seen initially as a prelude to quietly 
disappearing from view in order to make her escape in secret; it was later 
publicly stated that the King had accepted that she had acted so in order 
to conserve her small financial resources, because she could not afford 
to cloth herself at Christmas according to her rank. Although it was 
offiCially accepted that she had not intended to do anything improper she: 
"confessed the fault of her womanish credulity in the matter of love 
with the Prince of Moldavia and in the people's opinion remains 
somewhat touched with the spot of popery. The discourse of her 
nearest servants would make one believe that she is rather given 
to the discipline of Geneva." (76) 
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It is possible that Lady Arbella had heard rumours that Bogdan's suit was 
nearing a conclusion and had indeed planned to travel to join him. King 
James was clearly concerned at the turn of events and wrote to Thomas 
Glover requesting him to question ~tefan Bogdan in private about his 
involvement with Lady Arbella Stuart. He was fearful that Bogdan might 
lie or embroider his version of events, to the detriment of Lady Arbella's 
reputation; he may also have been fearful at what might be revealed 
about his cousin. To his credit Bogdan said nothing to compromise Lady 
Arbella; he spoke to Glover of her thus: 
"findinge her a most virtuous and godlie Ladie, in his hate he 
wished she might be his wife, and rather she being of the blood 
royall and one forayne Princes adioyning here unto England he 
knew she should never be suffered to marrie for many respectes 
and therefore himselfe beinge a Prince and his hoped 
Princedome of that remote from England, he doubted not but to 
obtayne the same, at his Maties hands before any other Prince 
whatsoever, if shee were thereunto anyway aSSigned: soe yet noe 
other ingadgements than these and such like vayne imaginations I 
could find in him." (77) 
During his stay in England Bogdan had undoubtedly learned of Lady 
Arbella's difficult situation and had realised that she was attracted to him; 
he was attracted to her not only because of her personality and her 
accomplishments but it must also have occurred to him that if he married 
her when he became Prince of Moldavia the English Crown would be 
obliged to continue supporting him to ensure that he was not overthrown. 
Finally his mistaken view of the importance with which he was regarded 
in England led him to believe that his proposal of marriage would be 
acceptable to the King of England. Glover was of the opinion that Bogdan 
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laboured under a misapprehension of his own importance: 
"beinge indeed a man, though of a reasonable superficaill witt, yet 
of no deepe conceyte wisdome or substantiall inginitty 
[ingenuity] ... and therefore his presumption herin to be the lesse 
made out of or esteemed thus ... " (78) 
Lady Arbella was cleared of all charges and released from 
custody. She was restored to her former favour and given gifts and 
money to pay her debts. However this was not the end of her troubles. 
She tried to put a brave face upon her humiliating treatment and 
reappeared in public. However, only a few weeks later she was once 
again questioned about a proposal of marriage from the second son of 
Lord Beauchamp, William Seymour. He told his interrogators that he had 
understood that she had permission to marry whom she liked. The matter 
was resolved as quietly as possible with Arbella's promise not to proceed 
with any marriage plans without the King's permission. She was again 
reinstated at Court, although not without comment: 
''these Affectations of Marriage in her, do give some Advantage to 
the World of impairing the reputation of her constant and virtuous 
disposition ... " (79) 
Arbella's misery was not over. That same month Ben Jonson's play 
"Epicoene, or the Silent Woman" appeared containing an allusion to her 
as the mistress of the Pri nce of Moldavia. The play was suppressed but 
Arbella retired depressed and angry to her apartments and tried to seek 
retribution for those responsible through Parliament. (80) This further 
humiliation, after all she had suffered, persuaded Arbella to abandon all 
restraint; she must have been very shocked when told that Bogdan, 
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whom she had entertained hopes of marrying, had a wife whilst he was 
courting her favour; then after her interrogation on this matter, she found 
her main complaint, that she was forced to remain a spinster against her 
inclination, was still ignored. In addition to this she was now spoken of in 
an uncomplimentary manner and lampooned in a comedy play by a 
writer closely associated with the English Court. She took matters into 
her own hands and secretly married William Seymour on 22nd June 
1610. Their marriage was not discovered for seventeen days, after which 
William was sent to the Tower of London and Arbella was held under 
arrest at the house of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Thomas 
Parry, in Lambeth. The two were kept strictly apart. A great deal of 
sympathy was accorded to Seymour, whom Dudley Carleton referred to 
as a "poor gentlemen", and the whole matter was generally felt to have 
been entirely a result of Lady Arbella's scheming: 
"The ladies hot blood that would not live without a husband must 
be cooled in some remote place in ye countrie." (81) 
Lady Arbella was never forgiven for disobeying the King and her letters 
of defence were ignored; she insisted on signing all her correspondence 
Arbella Seymour, a deliberate act of defiance. It was decided to send her 
to Durham in order to make contact with her husband difficult but she was 
too ill to travel and so the journey was never made. On June 3rd 1611 
she escaped custody dressed as a man and tried to reach France where 
she had arranged to meet Seymour; he managed to get to France but 
she was captured in the English Channel. This time she was sent to the 
Tower of London where she was imprisoned without trial until her death 
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in September 1615. She appears to have loved Seymour: when he was 
in the Tower of London she expressed great concern about his health; 
upon her escape she delayed her departure from England in the hope 
that he might catch up with her so that she could be sure that they would 
be in France together, thereby bringing about her own detention. She 
supported him in exile with gifts of money although she had insufficient 
money to support herself; when she realised that there was no possibility 
of release she starved herself to death. Seymour was allowed to return 
from exile after her death and was forgiven by the King; in November 
1616 he was created a Knight of the Bath. He married a second time to 
the daughter of the Earl of Essex, the favourite of Queen Elizabeth I. He 
had been genuinely fond of Arbella and called one of his daughters after 
her. (82) 
King James' good opinion of Bogdan was soured by his 
involvement with his cousin and consequently he became disillusioned 
with the the pretender. This compounded his existing concern at the 
difficulty and expense involved in prosecuting Bogdan's campaign, his 
increasing awareness that it was uncertain of success and the 
implications for his relations with the Sultan and the King of Poland. He 
had anticipated a diplomatic triumph and instead was presented with an 
embarrassing and frustrating mire of complication from which he sought 
to distance himself. On 24th June 1610 he wrote to the King of Poland, 
Zygmund III, to apologise for giving 9tefan Bogdan letters of credence, 
arguing that it had only been his intention to help an unhappy prince and 
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not to cause displeasure to a sovereign friend. Since Zygmund's 
previous letters to King James requesting him not to support Bogdan had 
been ignored, this repudiation of the pretender represents a change of 
policy. Thereafter James lost interest in Bogdan. The only matter of 
importance in the opinion of the Earl of Salisbury was to ensure that the 
King recovered his money whether or not Bogdan was successful in 
gaining the Moldavian throne. It seems that King James had considered 
recalling Glover to England but was dissuaded by the Earl of Salisbury 
probably on the grounds that Glover should be given the chance to 
redeem the King's 10,000 French Crowns. No orders were given to 
Glover to cease his protection and support of Bogdan but James 
deliberately tried to disassociate himself from any trouble Bogdan had 
caused by pleading that he had only acted out of the most noble of 
motives. (83) 
In Constantinople during the early months of 1610, Glover was 
anxiously awaiting the outcome of Gabriel Bathory, the Prince of 
Transylvania's military campaigns against Wallachia and Moldavia. 
Bathory entered Wallachia where he encamped whilst awaiting the 
arrival of Radu gerban, who was to be the new prince there, from 
Constantinople, Bathory was determined to wait until Radu was firmly 
established in the Principality before moving into Moldavia. Glover was 
held in suspense awaiting news of the overthrow of Constantin Movila; 
he obtained a Hati-houmayoun or declaration from the Sultan on behalf 
of Bogdan, and wrote: 
"Nowe I must truste my infinit travayle about the Prince of Moldavia 
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ere long shall have one end, or other for if at this tyme this our 
longe suite be not obtayned, I must even cease to laboure in it any 
more ... " (84) 
One month later Glover still awaited news from Moldavia; by this time he 
appears to have been at the end of his patience: 
"if within this 30 dayes at the furtheste ... wee doe not obtayne our 
pretence herin, then I muste of necessitie give over my suite 
without any further protraction, for there shall remayne to us noe 
further hope of desiered succese ... " (85) 
Glover informed John Sanderson that he could no longer afford the great 
expense of supporting Bogdan. Yet Glover continued to support the 
pretender for another year despite threats to discontinue the suite 
altogether if no result were obtained soon. This was partly because he 
hoped to be able to recover the King's money, secondly Glover seems to 
have been unwilling to finally admit defeat. Glover's continued support of 
the pretender, despite his protestations to the contrary, was later 
interpreted by his enemies as evidence that Bogdan had some hold over 
him. 
In June 1610 yet another obstacle to Bogdan's attainment of the 
Moldavian throne was presented: the Tatar Khan died and the Hati-
houmayoun was recalled and the whole matter was once again held in 
abeyance until the new Tatar Khan had secured his throne. A further 
complication was anticipated in the shape of the new Khan's brother 
who, it was thought, would contest the throne. Glover and Bogdan could 
only await the outcome of the Tatar succession; if there was a conflict 
between the brothers Glover considered that Bogdan had no chance of 
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obtaining the Moldavian throne because Ottoman attention would be 
focussed on the Crimea and Sultan Ahmet would not risk destabilising 
Moldavia by making changes in its leadership. (86) 
John Sanderson was of the opinion that Glover should abandon 
Bogdan and look to his own problems: 
"Clear your hands of him by one meanes or other. Gather yourself 
together, that you may have welthe to defend you from your 
enemies, that malitiouse of the wourld ... Wourds will not be of 
weyght sufficient to repulse your adversaries for they are many." 
He informed Glover that the Earl of Salisbury had protected him when 
others had campaigned for his recall and warned him that he must work 
hard to retain Salisbury's patronage, suggesting that an expensive 
present would not go amiss. Glover was by this time deeply in debt and 
Sanderson regarded Bogdan's demands as the chief cause of Glover's 
financial difficulties and his bad reputation: 
" ... kepe [your consulage] from that lucklesse voyvods fingering ... " 
Whereas Lello had used his sojourn in Constantinople to amass a 
fortune from the Levant trade. Glover had little interest in involving 
himself in commerce. Glover insisted that he was a diplomat, not a 
merchant, and rarely acquired any goods in Constantinople to be sent to 
England and sold at a profit. (87) George Sandys, a visitor to 
Constantinople in 1610, reached the following conclusions about the 
cause of Glover's problems: 
"surely his chiefest guilt hath been his misfortune in the too violent 
chargeable and successless soliciting of the restitution of the 
Prince of Moldavia (whom adversity hath [made] rather crafty than 
honest) ... " (88) 
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This was a perceptive assessment of Bogdan's character: those who met 
the pretender in formal circumstances usually found him to be a 
charming man; after a longer acquaintance the less attractive side of his 
character was revealed. As we have seen, prior to his involvement with 
Bogdan, Sir Thomas Glover had liked him and wished him well; after the 
pretender and his family had been in residence at the English Embassy 
for only a few months, Glover had completely changed his opinion and 
ardently hoped that the King of England could be persuaded to change 
his mind and withdraw his support. Since this had not happened, Glover 
was obliged to support Bogdan until instructed to send him away. In his 
letters of 1610 he hinted that Bogdan was bound to fail and that his own 
financial circumstances would make it necessary to abandon the 
pretender. Glover found himself in a position where his diplomatic career 
and his professional reputation were in jeopardy in England and in 
Constantinople largely due to his forced involvement with 9tefan 
Bogdan. However, Glover could be said to have proceeded extremely 
foolishly in the matter of Bogdan's suit by not attempting to curtail the 
pretender's attempts at subversion in Moldavia as his predecessor, 
Henry Lello, had done. 
In the course of this narrative Bogdan has emerged as a man 
prepared to use all means at his disposal to gain the Moldavian throne: 
he attempted to dispose of a wife living in Venice in order to ally himself 
with a woman whose connections were more useful to him; he was a liar 
and probably a blackmailer; Bogdan was greedy and selfish, 
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appropriating Sir Thomas Glover's money to further his own suit, yet he 
must have been aware that the ambassador was incurring debts in order 
to support him. Sandys' perceptiveness lies in his suggestion that 
Bogdan had learned to be selfish as a result of his experiences: his 
future was dependent upon his enjoyment of England's protection; 
without this protection he would have been one of many vagabond 
princes roaming around the Courts of Europe in search of a patron: this 
was the state to which loan Bogdan had been reduced. Most of 9tefan 
Bogdan's life had been spent in dangerous circumstances; he had 
narrowly escaped death on several occasions, his treatment at the hands 
of the Sultan and his Ministers had made him suspicious and paranoid. 
His long spell in prison, whilst he was supposed to have been under the 
protection of Henry Lello, had left him bitter and unwilling to trust his 
protectors, hence his apparent attempts to blackmail Sir Thomas Glover. 
Furthermore, having devoted his life to one end and having been 
constantly disappointed, he was determined to use whatever means 
came to hand to achieve his object, regardless of who might be hurt in 
the process; he had learned the Realpolitik of the Ottoman Empire at an 
early age. 
Two other qualities emerged from Bogdan's behaviour: in the first 
instance, his unrealistic assessment of his own importance was attributed 
by Glover to his lack of real intelligence or wisdom; this had been evident 
in his relationship with Henry Lello. Bogdan had chosen to trust the 
Ottomans' veracity despite Lello's warnings and consequently found 
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himself imprisoned. On the other hand, at certain times he exhibited a 
sense of honour on occasions when honour was expected of a prince: 
this was true after his escape from the "Castle of Asia", when he sent. a 
message to the Ottoman Grand Vizier giving his assurances that none of 
his servants had had any knowledge of his intention to escape. Similarly, 
when he was called upon to explain his involvement with Lady Arbella 
Stuart, he exonerated her of any behaviour inappropriate to a woman of 
her position. (89) It was this noble and courtly manner and the 
pretender's immense charm which initially attracted people to him; but as 
his struggle to obtain the Moldavian throne proceeded this manner 
became something of a facade. 
In December 1610 Glover was still pressing Bogdan's case: 
"By representations and by money he won over the Lieutenant 
Grand Vizier to present a memorial to the Sultan; it was sent but 
came out again without effect. His Majesty [Le. the Sultan] 
remarked that this was not the time to raise such a question." (90) 
Another Polish Ambassador arrived in Constantinople to protest at 
Sultan Ahmet even entertaining possibility of placing a man such as 
Bogdan on the Moldavian throne; he reportedly quarrelled violently with 
Glover. This incident was widely reported in Poland and the English 
Ambassador there sent a special messenger to London to acquaint King 
James with what had occurred. Whereas England's representatives in 
Poland had no knowledge or understanding of the English Crown's 
patronage of Stefan Bogdan, the English Embassy in Venice was 
) 
extremely well-acquainted with developments in Bogdan's suit. This 
suggests that, when he first accorded Bogdan his support, the King of 
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England did not perceive his patronage as having a bearing on relations 
between England and Poland. Although King James knew of the King of 
Poland's opposition to his patronage of Bogdan, he had proceeded to 
support the pretender, because he wished to protect and encourage 
England's influence in areas of Europe which were important to the 
commercial position of the Levant and the Muscovy Company, (91) and 
probably also to prevent the spread of the Roman Catholic Church's 
influence in Eastern Europe. 
At the beginning of February 1611 events turned once again in 
Bogdan's favour when, according to Simon Contarini, the Venetian 
Ambassador, an order was issued which required the people of Moldavia 
to accept ~tefan Bogdan as their ruler. Bogdan still enjoyed the support 
of the Prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Bathory, and, as Contarini wrote, 
Bogdan's supporters anticipated that Bogdan would receive princely 
regalia and kiss the Sultan's hand as soon as the decision was taken to 
oJ 
dismiss Constantin Movila from the Moldavian throne. (92) The Prince of 
Transylvania reportedly made ready to invade Moldavia with 40,000 
Ottoman troops and overthrow Movila. In April 1611 Sir Thomas Glover 
reported that Radu Mihnea (1611-16) had been placed on the throne of 
Wallachia by force, whilst the former prince, Radu §erban, prepared to 
jOin with Constantin Movila in resistance. Gabriel Bathory withdrew into 
oj 
Transylvania to collect reinforcements for use against gerban and Movila 
and allowed his men to offload the plunder they had collected in 
V' 
Wallachia. Glover received news that Serban and Movila had taken a 
.;) 
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sacramental oath: 
"either to vanquish Transylvania or to leave theire corpses in the 
open feelde to be devoured by the foule of the Ayre." (93) 
Bathory decided against joining battle immediately and sent for Ottoman 
and Tatar reinforcements. An intense bout of diplomatic activity ensued: 
" ... the sayed Prince of Transylvania by his letters in particular 
adviseth both the Prince and myself [Glover] here of this his 
resolution and that he will the rather doe the same in respecte his 
Matie hath recomanded our Princes suite unto the Gran Signor, 
and beinge a Kinge of Orthodoxe religion [Le. Protestant] as 
himself is he will for his love and sake performe the same and I 
thinke ... to that end he writteth his lettre unto his Matie ... " (94) 
Supporters of Radu §erban sought the help of the Habsburg Emperor 
against Gabriel Bathory and the ''terreur des Turcs" promising to cede the 
principality to the Emperor in return for his support; the King of Poland, 
meanwhile wrote to King James I begging him not to encourage the 
violent overthrow of a prince. (95) 
It had not been King James' intention to contribute to the 
development of a potentially serious conflict in Eastern Europe; James 
had always preferred to see himself in the role of a peace-maker not a 
provoker of wars. Yet Sir Thomas Glover had interfered upon his orders 
in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe to such an extent that armed 
conflict between the three great powers in the area seemed increasingly 
likely. When confronted with the likely outcome of his policy, King James 
seems to have been shocked and sought to distance himself from the 
results of his policy. Glover's replacement Paul Pindar had explicit 
instructions to confine himself to matters touching the welfare of English 
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merchants in Constantinople. 
Bogdan's suit was now reaching its climax: Sultan Ahmet 
dispatched an army of 15,000 men under the command of Orner Pasha 
on May 20th 1611 and commanded all the 8ey/erbeys and Sanjakbeys 
on the borders of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania to have their 
forces in readiness in join with Orner on the Danube. He ordered the 
Tatars in the area of the Dobruja and those upon the Moldavian border to 
enter Moldavia and Wallachia to defeat Radu §erban and Constantin 
Movilc!. Radu ~erban was reported to be encamped at Bucharest with an 
army of Vlachs [Wallachians], Hungarians and Turks ready to join battle 
with Gabriel Bathory. He beat Bathory near Bra90v and the Prince of 
Transylvania barely escaped with his life. Glover, avidly following this 
conflict, received a false report that it was Serban who had been routed; 
9tefan Bogdan was overjoyed at this news, thinking that his time had 
finally come. Meanwhile Bathory had been forced to retire to 
Transylvania to regroup his forces; it was estimated that some 6,000 men 
had died at Bra~ov. (96) 
Another Polish Ambassador arrived in the Ottoman capital with 
instructions to complain to the Sultan about Gabriel Bathory's attempts to 
overthrow the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia. He alleged that Glover 
was supporting Bogdan contrary to the will of King James. As far as the 
Ottomans were concerned, Glover still had the full support of his King. 
Neither Glover nor the Ottomans were aware of King James' loss of 
enthusiasm for 9tefan Bogdan. The Polish Ambassador asked that 
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Bogdan be handed over to him for punishment, offering a large bribe to 
bring this about. The Poles regarded §tefan Bogdan as the only threat to 
Constantin Movila, whereas in fact Bogdan had his own rival in the 
person of ~tefan Tom~a. 
Not wishing to provoke direct conflict with Poland, the Ottoman 
government had tolerated the presence of Constantin Movila on the 
Moldavian throne. Movill1 had paid his tribute and the other financial 
exactions expected of him and had kept the peace in the principality, 
giving the Sultan no reason to replace him. The Sultan's reluctance to 
disrupt the status quo in Moldavia was the stumbling-block at which 
Glover and Bogdan's efforts always failed. However, when the Prince of 
Transylvania and the Tatar Khan put their authority behind the campaign 
to remove Movila, the Ottomans saw the opportunity to clear the 
principality of Polish influence without Ottoman forces becoming directly 
involved in Movila's removal. During his second audience with Sultan 
Ahmet, after the Viziers had discussed how to respond, the Polish 
Ambassador found himself: 
"So rebuffed and checked, not only for that his Mr. the King of 
Poland doeth ayde the Prince Serban, but alsoe for meddling with 
the Transylvanian and us, so that the Ambr was much amazed, 
and feared much to be that instant committed to the Towers ... " (97) 
The Polish Ambassador was allowed to leave Constantinople at the 
beginning of October 1611, certain that the Ottomans intended to 
proceed with the overthrow of Constantin and Radu gerban. On October 
20th 1611 H. Bilderbeck in Cologne mistakenly reported that Gabriel 
Bathory had secured the whole of Transylvania and most of Wallachia 
371 
under his control with Ottoman aid. Bathory sent an Ambassador to 
Constantinople demanding that Bogdan be proclaimed prince and 
installed in the principality. (98) This, and the false report of Bathory's 
military triumphs, persuaded the Ottomans to call a Council to consider 
whether it was convenient time to change the ruler in Moldavia. Glover 
lobbied Bogdan's supporters in the Divan; a dozen Moldavian boyars 
and a hundred "commoners" sent a petition to the Sultan in support of 
9tefan Bogdan. Orders were issued for the election of a new Moldavian 
prince. A council was called to discuss Constantin Movila's replacement; 
§tefan Bogdan and 9tefan Tom~a were both present. Tom§a had the 
support of the Grand Vizier and two other unspecified Ottoman officials; 
Bogdan had the backing of the rest of the Viziers, the Mufti and the Cadis. 
The election was hotly contested with the debate lasting ten days amid 
allegations that Tomsa's supporters used bribes and false accusations to 
turn Bogdan's supporters against him. The length of the debate in the 
Divan suggests that Bogdan very nearly succeeded in his campaign for 
election, nevertheless ~tefan Tom~a was elected Prince of Moldavia. 
This decision dealt a final blow to the hopes of Glover and Bogdan. Had 
he finally succeeded in obtaining the throne for Stefan Bogdan, Glover ) 
would have been hailed as a credit to his King and country and his 
tattered reputation in England and in Constantinople would have been 
restored; tarred by the brush of failure Glover now feared the loss of his 
job as ambassador and dreaded being called to account for the King's 
10,000 Crowns. Bogdan now realised that he would never obtain his 
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desire; he decided to follow Glover's advice and retreat into solitude: 
"not to seeke his promotion soe publicklie with drumes and 
Trumpets ... but to retire himselfe privatelie into a secret place (of 
whose aboad, none shall knowe but myself)"; 
so that it would be thought that he had left the Ottoman capital. Bogdan 
decided to approach the Grand Vizier privately to ask him for some 
assistance and advancement. If the Grand Vizier were to snub him he 
intended to retire to Transylvania under the protection of Gabriel Bathory, 
who, according to Glover, had promised to place him on the Moldavian 
throne by force, offering him his sister's hand in marriage. 
The Divan's decision in favour of §tefan Tom1a had several 
discernable motives: to have, after all Poland's opposition, installed their 
mortal enemy in Moldavia would have been seen as a provocative act. 
The declaration of Tomsa was intended to show that the principality was, 
as it had always been, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, whilst 
acknowledging that Sultan Ahmet did not wish to destroy his relationship 
with the Polish Crown. Bogdan had had the support of the Tatar Khan, 
the Prince of Transylvania and a number of Moldavian boyars; by 
ignoring their wishes the Sultan signalled that these people could not 
expect to make demands of him. Finally, and most importantly, the 
decision emphasised that Sultan Ahmet did not welcome interference 
from foreign princes in the affairs of his Empire. It was this that carried 
most weight when the decision was made, for although the Sultan 
recognised that Bogdan had a lawful claim to Moldavia, his lengthy 
periods abroad in the Courts of Christendom and his connections in 
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these foreign Courts caused many within the Ottoman administration to 
question his loyalty to the Sultan. Bogdan's opponents had successfully 
argued, that, if Sultan Ahmet went to war against Christendom, Bogdan 
might be persuaded to revolt against him. Tom~a was seen as altogether 
more suitable because he had no connections with foreign Courts, and 
was likely to be more malleable. He was, in Glover's opinion: 
"a syllie ould man, whollie brought up here in Constantinople and 
other parts of Turquie wthout any experience learninge, 
knowledge arte or language." 
Glover alleged that those who had backed Tomsa in the Divan were 
governed by bribes and spite. From the Ottoman point of view Tomsa was 
a particularly likely candidate for prince: he would owe his election 
entirely to his supporters within the Divan, he had no loyalties to foreign 
rulers and indeed had few connections outside the Ottoman Empire, 
therefore he could reasonably be trusted to remain loyal to the Sultan. 
Glover correctly predicted that Tom9a would not remain in Moldavia long: 
his reign lasted four years although he briefly regained the Moldavian 
throne in 1622. Glover also predicted that bloodshed would result from 
Tomsa's election and remarked that by giving aid to Stefan Bogdan 
England had begun a process whereby the choice of princes in Moldavia 
and Wallachia would be effected by the sword. (99) Although the 
Principalities had suffered a bloody history for many years and their 
princes were usually overthrown by force, Glover was correct in his 
observation that England's support of Bogdan had done nothing to 
promote peace in Moldavia and Wallachia. 
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Glover immediately reported the failure of Bogdan's suit; Bogdan 
also wrote to King James and the Earl of Salisbury to thank them for their 
favour, claiming that he had been frustrated by those whom he had 
supposed were his friends (i.e. the Viziers whom he had lobbied and 
bribed). He also expressed the belief that ~tefan Tom~a would not be 
accepted or recognised by the Moldavian nobility, the King of Poland or 
the Prince of Transylvania and said he hoped one day to have another 
chance to regain his patrimony. Bogdan was aware how much his suit 
had cost Glover and how the ambassador's reputation had suffered 
when the matter had been prolonged for so many years. He also knew 
that Glover would be called to account for the King's 10,000 French 
Crowns. Bogdan offered a plea on his former protector's behalf, 
emphasising that the ambassador had loyally carried out the King's 
orders to protect and promote his affairs, and that, due to his presence in 
the English Embassy, Glover had incurred a personal debt of 30,000 
zecchini ; Bogdan asked the King to pay this debt for him. He asked King 
James to take pity on him, a poor prince, since he could not repay the 
10,000 Crowns granted him. He pleaded that neither he nor Glover 
should be held responsible for this money and promised one day to 
repay the King for his kindness and generosity. (100) Bogdan knew that 
he could expect no more help from the English Embassy, therefore he left 
Glover's residence secretly, telling no-one where he was going. This was 
not to be the last that the English community was to hear of Bogdan; his 
departure from the embassy provoked outrage: 
"Yesterday as the Sultan was going to the old serraglio, Stefan 
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Bogdan, the man who was so much supported by the late English 
Ambassador, approached and in the formula these scoundrels 
use, he professed himself a Turke; a step which shows the kind of 
fellow he always was. The Sultan gave him the Sanjak of Pistrina 
in Albania." (101) 
Dudley Carleton enlarged upon the conversion of Bogdan and his three 
children to Islam. It was said that the night before his conversation he had 
spent an entire night in private discussion with Glover and continued to 
visit the ambassador afterwards. It was suspected that he was trying to 
persuade Glover to accept Islam and seek some preferment from the 
Sultan: 
"These temptations assailing a discontented man of a ruined 
fortune and perhaps not too wei grounded in ye faith [Glover had 
grown up in Constantinople] maye make us justly feare ye issue 
especially considering he useth no diligence neither in ye 
compounding of his debts nor providing for his departure." (102) 
Bogdan had the support of Ottoman officials in attempting to persuade 
Glover to abandon his country and religion. The Grand Vizier, who had 
supported 9tefan Tom~a, was said to have promised Glover a substantial 
reward if he agreed to convert. Bogdan, "observing his vanity", also 
suggested that Glover send to Venice for his bastard son. The pretender 
promised to adopt the boy and to campaign for his election to the throne 
of Moldavia. This report was later confirmed by Paul Pindar in 
Constantinople. These schemes, although far-fetched, were of great 
concern to Dudley Carleton and Paul Pindar, because of the enormous 
scandal which would ensue if a former Ambassador of the King of 
England defected to the Ottoman Porte. Everything possible was to be 
done to remove Glover from temptation; yet Carleton could not resist a 
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cruel joke at Glover's expense: 
"in the mean time ye young Prince is here in an Apothecaries 
shop, little thinking of such a fortune intended him, on who I shall 
always have a strict eye." (103) 
Sir Thomas Glover had emerged from his dealings with Stefan 
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Bogdan very unpopular with the English merchants in Constantinople. 
Not knowing that he was to be replaced he attempted to improve 
relations with his fellow countrymen: as soon as Bogdan had left his 
house he called the merchants before him to apologise for neglecting 
their affairs whilst fulfilling the King's orders on behalf of the Prince of 
Moldavia. Glover wrote a short speech, read to the merchants by the 
embassy Secretary, in which he asked them to write letters to the Levant 
Company explaining the problems he had experienced whilst 
undertaking Bogdan's suit: 
"and of his [Glover's] forwardness hereafter to do them any 
service, and that the Prince was the cause of much mischief, for 
that so long as he was here my lord never respected his 
merchants nor their affairs." (104) 
These attempts to make amends were too late; Paul Pindar was 
already on his way to Constantinople as his replacement. Pindar's 
departure and the reason for his journey were intended to be kept secret. 
The Levant Company was not informed of the reason for Glover's recall, 
only that he was to return to England, 
"upon some speciall occasion of service." (105) 
News of Pindar's journey reached Venice well in advance of his arrival. 
The English Ambassador in Venice, Dudley Carleton, was ordered to 
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prevent news of Pindar's journey reaching Glover's ears but in reality he 
could do very little, as he explained, for had he succeeded in preventing 
the departure of English ships bound for Constantinople in order to delay 
news of Pindar's journey, Italian ships would still have been available to 
convey letters. The only way to delay the departure of such vessels until 
Pindar had a "head-start" would have been to persuade the College of 
Senators to issue an appropriate order, and, as Carleton pointed out, this 
would be counter-productive because it would excite speculation about 
Pindar's journey to Constantinople. In the event it had become well-
known in Venice that Pindar was Glover's successor as Ambassador in 
Constantinople, indeed there was considerable annoyance that he 
neglected to pay a courtesy visit to the Doge, in an effort to keep a 'low-
profile'. Pindar's main task was to ensure that Glover returned to England 
as soon as possible. On arriving in Constantinople he told the Venetian 
Ambassador, Simon Contarini, that King James had decided to replace 
Glover at the request of the King of Poland because he was: 
"not pleased that his Ambassador here should make such long 
insistence at the Porte for the restoration of Prince Stephan 
Bogdan to Moldavia, as this disgusts the Grand Turk and his 
Ministers." 
This version of events was put about in order to disguise the real 
reason for Glover's recall, which was that he had been denounced by 
Sir Anthony Sherley as being, 
"more a Minister of Spain than of England." (106) 
Glover was unaware of the seriousness of the allegations against him: 
"he heares nothing of any matter conceyved hier against him, 
378 
feares only the calling to account of the King's money ... " (107) 
Glover was accused of being a Spanish agent: 
"[he] entertayned a correspondence with other princes that might 
easily produced dishonour to his Majestie from the wch he held 
place and aucthoritie and very important [augor] to the state and 
person of our nation residing, and trafficking into the Turquish 
dominions." (108) 
This was a charge for which there was considerable circumstantial 
evidence. Dudley Carleton and Paul Pindar were charged to investigate 
the extent of Glover's involvement with the King of Spain. A Dominican 
Friar had been detected making enquiries of Englishmen living in Venice 
as to whether Glover was to be replaced as Ambassador in 
Constantinople. When he was assured that Glover would remain, the 
Friar passed on a letter to be delivered to Sir Thomas Glover in 
Constantinople. Pindar, awaiting a ship to take him to Constantinople, 
gained possession of this letter and opened it to find that it contained 
Icertain information' about Glover's negotiations with foreign princes. 
Carleton also contacted the Dominican friar in the course of his 
enquiries; he discovered that the friar had been engaged in a 
correspondence with Glover and was also closely associated with the 
Spanish Ambassador in Venice. The friar was placed under surveillance 
and was seen visiting the Spanish Embassy in Venice daily to ask for 
news of Glover's secretary who was in Madrid. Glover's secretary was 
known as Gasparo; upon his arrival in Venice from Madrid he was also 
placed under surveillance. This Gasparo can almost certainly be 
identified as Gaspar Gratiani, a former servant of Stefan Bogdan, as we 
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shall see in Chapter VIII. (109) Investigators collected evidence proving 
that Glover been for some years secretly in correspondence with the King 
of Spain not only through the friar but also through Gieronimo Meoli, his 
former secretary, and Gasparo, his current secretary. 
A letter in the Venetian State Papers reported that Glover had 
been involved in initiating peace negotiations between Spain and the 
Ottoman Empire without the knowledge of King James at the request of 
the Grand Vizier in office at that time. (110) Glover had used Gieronimo 
Meoli and the Dominican friar to send letters to Spain through the 
Spanish Ambassador in Naples and had later sent his secretary Gasparo 
to Madrid to conduct negotiations directly. These secret negotiations 
were probably initiated in 1607, since this was when rumours of Glover's 
correspondence with other princes first surfaced in Florence; if the Vizier 
in question was acting on his own initiative and he risked Sultan Ahmet's 
disapproval should the plan misfire since great caution was needed in 
negotiations with an enemy of the Sultan. If this version of events is true 
then it is understandable that Glover was not anxious to allow news of his 
involvement with Spain to leak out, as he was involved, without his 
sovereign's consent, in clandestine contact with an enemy of his host 
country. Furthermore, King James is unlikely to have approved of his 
Ambassador appearing in any way to represent the Infidel in negotiations 
with a Christian State. However it is possible that this was not the extent 
of Glover's involvement with Spain. 
As we have seen Glover had sacked Meoli, whom he had 
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employed to establish a communication network with the King of Spain 
and his agents, for spying on behalf of Spain, but clandestine contacts, 
which were not connected with any peace negotiations, continued 
through Meoli's replacement Gasparo. Both Meoli and Gasparo were 
certainly Spanish agents. It seems unlikely that Glover was so 
incompetent as to have allowed his embassy to be infiltrated over several 
years without his knowledge; either he knew what was going on, but was 
unable to root out the spies in the embassy, or he had made a scapegoat 
of Meoli in order to divert attention away from his own activities. Sir 
Anthony Sherley's denunciation of Glover as a Spanish agent must have 
been based on enough evidence to convince King James, and the Earl 
of Salisbury, Glover's erstwhile protector, that he was sufficiently 
compromised to warrant his immediate removal. Paul Pindar was sent to 
Constantinople to sort out the embassy and conduct further 
investigations into Glover's activities. When informed of the allegations 
against him, Glover blamed Bogdan completely for everything of which 
he was accused. This gave credence to the allegations that Glover had 
been blackmailed by his erstwhile protege. 
Bogdan had strong connections with Spain, as we saw at the 
beginning of this chapter. He had remained in correspondence with the 
Spanish Ambassador in Prague and the Viceroy of Naples. In 1610 he 
had renewed his offer to co-operate with a Spanish attack on 
Constantinople once he was in possession of the Moldavian 
throne. (111) As we shall see in the next chapter, Gaspar Gratiani, 9tefan 
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Bogdan's servant, was to become involved in a "Christian Militia" which 
sought the removal of the Infidel from Europe: this "Christian Militia" was 
only one of numerous conspiracies in existence in the 17th century and 
9tefan Bogdan was an obvious target for recruitment to the anti-Ottoman 
cause. It is likely that Bogdan, with the assistance of Meoli and Gasparo, 
used the diplomatic channels, established by Glover to facilitate peace 
negotiations between Spain and the Ottomans, to pass intelligence 
about Ottoman naval defences to the Viceroy of Naples and the Spanish 
Crown. If this man was indeed Gaspar Gratiani, it would seem that he 
had been recruited by those working for the overthrow of the Ottoman 
Empire much earlier than historians have hitherto suspected. Pindar's 
investigations seem to have concentrated on discovering the grounds 
upon which Bogdan had blackmailed Glover into allowing his embassy 
to be used for nefarious purposes; that is whether Bogdan had 
discovered that the ambassador was already implicated in espionage 
and had used an already existing spy network for his own advantage or 
whether he had discovered something completely unconnected with 
espionage about the ambassador which was sufficiently serious to 
persuade him to assist Bogdan's espionage by allowing him to use the 
embassy's resources to build up his own spy network. 
Pindar discovered that Glover had been in correspondence with 
the Viceroy of Naples: the man who had acted as intermediary between 
them contacted the English Consul of Seio, producing letters addressed 
to Glover which were sent on to Pindar. Glover demanded the letters be 
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given him but Pindar refused, informing him that correspondence with 
other princes without the King's permission was a very serious matter 
and one which he had been directed to investigate; he suggested to 
Glover that he consider what excuse he might offer to answer 
accusations of disloyalty, and worse, and to throw himself upon the 
King's mercy. Glover did not admit to Pindar that he had done anything 
wrong, he merely asserted that he had a cipher in his possession which 
had been left in his custody by Gieronimo Meoli, his former secretary, 
which he thought might belong to the letters. The cipher and the letters 
were sent unread to London along with Glover's explanation of his 
embassy's involvement in espionage which has not, unfortunately, 
survived. Pindar did not open the letters because he suspected that they 
were related to a naval attack on the Ottoman fleet planned for the 
summer, (an attack on the Ottoman fleet had been one of 9tefan 
Bogdan's proposals to the King of Spain). If the attack materialised 
Pindar did not wish to have had prior knowledge of it or be accused of 
concealing the contents of the letter. 
The existence of this correspondence suggests that Glover was 
involved with supplying covert information to the Sultan's enemies. 
Pindar forbade the intermediary or spy to come to his house or to 
presume any acquaintance, telling him to leave the country as soon as 
possible. He told Glover to pretend that he was leaving Constantinople 
soon and made him tell the spy to meet him outside the Ottoman Empire 
to discuss these letters, in order that the spy would not know that they 
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had been intercepted. 
Pindar was anxious to prevent the Ottomans discovering the 
extent to which the English Embassy had been compromised by 
espionage. It was probably for this reason that Glover was never placed 
under arrest. Pindar was well aware that the pretender had some 
malevolent influence over the former ambassador. This explains his 
anxiety to send Glover away from the Ottoman Empire out of reach of the 
Sultan. Pindar also feared that Glover would succumb to Bogdan's 
pressure to convert to Islam, a fear which was compounded by some 
words uttered in Pindar's presence by the aforementioned Dominican 
Friar: 
"that Sir Thomas Glover was soe worthie a man as he discerned 
rather to be a Prince himselfe than Agent for another." (112) 
In addition to spending time with §tefan Bogdan, Glover received 
a number of visits from the Grand Vizier and various other "Turkes" who 
promised him that if he changed his religion he would be made a 
8ey/erbeyand later perhaps a Vizier! Pindar was convinced that Glover 
feared Bogdan and feared his eventual fate if he returned to England. In 
the meantime his enquiries had concluded that Glover had been 
implicated in espionage; Pindar reported that Bogdan told Glover that if 
he returned to England he would be hanged. Bogdan had also 
threatened that if Glover remained at the English Embassy his implication 
in espionage might be discovered and he would undoubtedly be hanged 
by the Ottomans. Bogdan's suggested solution was to convert to Islam 
and seek some preferment from the Sultan. Pindar was extremely 
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worried that Glover might decide to do this. He was thus extremely 
anxious to remove Glover from the influence of Bogdan and the 
Ottomans. He concluded that the former ambassador's soul, as well as 
his person, was in danger whilst he remained in the Sultan's dominions: 
"For assuredly had those thinges been discovered in tyme of his 
employment himselfe wth the whole state of our nation in these 
domynions had irredemablie miscarried. And now if anie notice 
should be geaven, I feare we should be incombred wth 
unsupportable charges and inextricable trouble." (113) 
The perceived danger to Glover persuaded Pindar to raise money from 
the English merchants without the permission of the Levant Company. 
In his letters to England Pindar was careful to express no opinions 
which might damage Glover's chances of defending himself against any 
charges brought. On the other hand he had a duty to report his progress 
in arranging Glover's departure and in particular that the former 
ambassador had no desire to go home. Pindar attributed Glover's 
behaviour to the evil influence of Bogdan, who had done the unthinkable 
and changed his religion for material gain. An alternative explanation is 
that Glover, confronted with the ruins of his diplomatic career, had 
become so depressed that he was unable to make any plans for his own 
future, preferring to remain in the English Embassy under Pindar's 
protection. 
Plndar's efforts to arrange Glover's journey home to answer the 
charges against him were hindered by the dire state of his finances. 
Glover may have prolonged his stay in Constantinople hoping to be 
reimbursed the rest of the money owed him. (114) Glover had incurred 
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enormous debts whilst Bogdan was under his protection: he had spent 
his entire capital, amounting to 30,000 zecchini, on the pretender as well 
as the King's 10,000 French Crowns: 6,000 Crowns had paid for 
presents for Viziers, the Prince of Transylvania and the Tatar Khan, their 
noblemen and ambassadors; other expenses included providing 
transport for Glover's daily journey into Constantinople to press Bogdan's 
case and porters' fees at the gates of the Viziers' and other officials' 
offices. Further large expenses were incurred in employing messengers 
to send to Moldavia to recruit boyars to Bogdan's cause and to 
Transylvania and the Khan to secure further support. Glover feared being 
called to account for the King's money with good reason: the Earl of 
Salisbury had prepared a letter in which he expressed his anger at 
Glover's failure to adhere to his instructions for the spending of this 
money and demanded restitution: 
"wch if you can assure me of, I shall have noe cause to say you 
have done contrary to your instructions, wch If you have I would 
knowe also what satisfaction you can make ... " (115) 
Salisbury had thought better of sending this harsh letter, perhaps 
because Glover's fear of punishment might cause him to take some 
action to avoid returning to England. 
Pindar hoped that the Levant Company would advance money to 
discharge these debts but characteristically the Company refused to help 
In any way: 
U[we] by no meanes conceive that the companie or the Nation [i. e. 
the English merchants in Constantinople] are any waies to be 
charged wth his debts either to Turkes, Christians or others neither 
will we disburse anie somes for the clearing him from hence ... " 
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Pindar suggested that a sum of 5,000 dollars would be sufficient 
although 15,000 dollars was owed; the Company was anxious not to set 
a precedent of bailing out ambassadors who had incurred financial 
difficulties. They were also of the opinion that Glover's creditors would 
not be satisfied with 5,000 dollars if they knew that more might be 
forthcoming and would demand the entire sum owed; the Company 
feared that they would then be expected to pay all Glover's debts and 
therefore ordered Pindar not to spend any of their money. The Levant 
Company had opposed the enterprise from the beginning and had only 
become involved upon the King's insistence; they therefore had some 
justification in refusing to help Glover. Eventually Pindar raised 5,000 
dollars, with the assistance of the English merchants in Constantinople, 
to pay part of Glover's debts. (116) Glover did little to assist these 
attempts to resolve his financial difficulties because he wished to delay 
his departure, consequently it took a full six months to settle his affairs 
sufficiently to allow him to leave. According to William Lithgow, Bogdan 
repaid half his debt to Glover before his departure. 
If one looks at Bogdan's conversion from his point of view one can 
see that for an ambitious man facing the alternatives of a life of poverty 
wandering Europe in search of a benefactor or being offered a position in 
the Ottoman Empire which would bring wealth, power, fame and 
influence, the latter course was an inevitable choice. We have seen that 
Bogdan had been prepared to accept the throne of Wallachia if he could 
not be enthroned in Moldavia, because his main concern had been to 
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gain wealth, power and status in life. We have also seen that Bogdan's 
quest for power and wealth did not leave room for considerations of 
appropriate religious or moral behaviour; on several occasions he 
probably presented himself as a Lutheran in order to win support. 
According to Pindar, Bogdan had admitted to being an atheist and 
explicitly denied the existence of God, angels or an afterlife. His lack of 
religiOUS conviction enabled him to proceed in ways which suited his 
purposes best. He also told Pindar that he had consorted with witches 
and sorcerers and had spoken with the devil, selling his soul with a 
contract written in blood. According to some people with whom Pindar 
had spoken he had taken part in ritual human sacrifice, murdering 
several people with his own hands and other, 
"moste execrable doynges." (117) 
Most of Bogdan's utterings did not bear even a nodding 
acquaintance with the truth. It is probable that the above statements were 
made largely to shock and annoy Pindar and the English community. 
However since Bogdan had always been prepared to explore every 
avenue to gain his ambition, it is not inconceivable that he sought 
supernatural intervention. In Paul Pindar's eyes this interest in the occult 
confirmed his fears about Bogdan's evil influence over Sir Thomas 
Glover. On the other hand, it is possible that, by the end of the campaign, 
Glover had begun genuinely to like his erstwhile protege and regretted 
his failure to secure his election. The tone of Glover's letters immediately 
after the decision to appoint 9tefan Tomsa as Prince of Moldavia suggest 
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that he was genuinely sympathetic towards Bogdan after their shared 
disappointment. Although he had previously resented the burden of 
supporting Bogdan's household, something in their relationship must 
have changed and the two men seem to have become friends. 
Pi ndar was shocked at Bogdan's proselytisi ng zeal as a new 
convert to Islam; he reported that two young Moldavians had been 
seduced into converting and Bogdan had even tried to persuade 
Pindar's dragoman to do the same whilst he was attending to embassy 
business at the Vizier's house. (118) It was not until April 1612 that 
Glover was freed from Bogdan's attempts to persuade him to defect by 
the latter's departure from the Ottoman capital. Bogdan had initially been 
granted the Sanjak of Pistrina in Albania but, not content with that, 
successfully obtained appointment as Sanjakbeyof Bursia in Asia Minor 
(Anatolia) and had finally left Constantinople. 
tyrant: 
In his new position as Sanjakbeyof Bursia Bogdan behaved as a 
" ... in Tyranny and oppression of the people hanging and killing 
and confiscating their estates under pretence of severity in Justice 
yt need be some fearfull end must befall him that hath led a life so 
wicked and abominable as is ever odious to be recompted ... " (119) 
Every damning report of Bogdan's wickedness was gleefully relayed to 
England. Had his suit succeeded, Bogdan would have been hailed in 
England as a great prince and protector of English interests in the East. 
This campaign against Bogdan served to help Glover defend 
himself against the charges levelled against him. He left Constantinople 
in August 1612 in an atmosphere of great disapproval but, "wthout 
389 
reproch to our nation." The accepted version of Glover's disgrace was 
that he had been led astray: 
"how vainly and weakly he had suffered himself to be abused by 
those wicked instruments about him ... " (120) 
He seized on this excuse for his behaviour and pleaded that his 
involvement in espionage was not of his own making but that he had 
been an unfortunate victim of other's intrigues. Fortunately for Glover, his 
plea that he was innocent of any ill-intent was accepted in England and 
the charges against him were eventually dismissed. (121) 
Bogdan's eventual fate is not known, although he was not 
completely forgotten by the English; there are references to him in 
Richard Knolles' Generall Historie of the Turkes published in 1621, in 
Thomas Gainsford's Glorie of England (1615) and William Lithgow's A 
most delectable and true discourse of an admired and Painfull 
Peregrination from Scotland to the most famous kingdomes in Europe. 
Asia and Affricke published in 1614. Lithgow had met Bogdan in 
Constantinople: 
"this Moldavian Prince stole earely away in the morning over to 
Constaninople; and long or midday turnd Turke and was 
circumsised, contenting himself onely for all his Dukedom, with a 
palace, and a yearely pension of 12 thousand chickens of gold 
during his life. Which when he heeard, the Ambassadour and we 
wre all amazed and discontented ... or my leaving Galata I went 
twice over with Sir Thomas and saw him, and found him attended 
with a number of Turkes, who when he saw me, tooke me kindly 
by the hand, for when we had been two monethes familiar in the 
Ambassadour's house before." (122) 
Lithgow clearly had no knowledge of the scandal surrounding 
Glover, nor is there any mention of this in any of the reports of his return 
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to England. Great care was taken to keep the accusations against him 
out of the public domain. Glover's departure from Constantinople marked 
the end of an era; henceforth the English Embassy avoided intervention 
in the affairs of the principality. Paul Pindar was now left to repair the 
damage that Glover's activities had done: 
"my predecessor endeavoured by such meanes as exceedingly 
distasted the whole state here, and not satisfied with such refusall 
as weare from tyme to tyme discreetlie insinuated unto him by the 
cheife of the government. .. continued his course of solicitatione in 
their despighte, wherby he procuered to himself there displeasure, 
and in the end deadlie hatred, and for his sake malicious enmitie, 
to our nation ... wch we still suffer much in our occasions." (123) 
Pindar reported that England's trade had been greatly damaged 
with the result that: 
"The Turke will permit us noe more to trade in the redd sea." (124) 
He clearly believed that this was a direct result of the Bogdan affair. 
Pindar had been instructed to do all he could to mend relations between 
the English Embassy and the Ottoman Porte, particularly with regard to 
the protection of English commerce in the Levant. Glover's preoccupation 
with Bogdan's affairs and the diplomatic business attached to it had led 
him to neglect the protection and promotion of the English community's 
privileged trading position. 
Glover's failure to pull of a diplomatic triumph had created many 
difficulties for the business of the embassy. Pindar was charged with 
improving the reputation of the King of England which had, it was feared, 
been compromised by too close an association with Ottoman affairs in 
opposition to the interests of a Christian prince, i.e. the King of Poland 
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and to some extent those of the Habsburg Emperor. Pindar spoke thus to 
the Venetian Ambassador: 
"Although I am not a Papist. .. I charge you to assist in every way 
the needs of Christendome." (125) 
In doing so, not only was he aligning the English Embassy with the 
interests of Christendome in opposition to those of the "infidel", he was 
also trying to persuade Contarini that if he were to interfere with the 
affairs of the troubled embassy in order to gain some brief advantage, he 
might provoke Glover to defect to the employ of the Sultan. To placate the 
Ottomans, Pindar pretended that Glover's actions in support of Stefan 
Bogdan had been undertaken entirely upon his own initiative. This was 
an exercise in damage limitation as the English Crown sought to 
distance itself from failure in order to protect its influence in Eastern 
Europe. England's support of 9tefan Bogdan was only one of a number 
of ingenious schemes designed to expand English influence in Eastern 
Europe. 
One such ambitious project, discussed in 1612, sought to 
establish an English protectorate over northern Russia and to place King 
James I of England on the Russian throne. As we have seen, England 
had since the 1550's enjoyed commercial relations with Russia and the 
prospect of Poland or Sweden conquering the country or placing their 
own candidates on the Russian throne was viewed with dismay. The 
project was presented as tending to England's commercial advantage, 
the maintenance of English naval power and the honour of the King. 
Furthermore, it was asserted that the people of Russia, facing hostility 
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from Poland and Sweden, were anxious to maintain and strengthen ties 
with England. 
For the Crown and Company the protection of English commerce 
in Muscovy was crucial because the goods acquired there were of 
immense use to the English navy. The project also offered opportunities 
of expanding English commerce into untapped areas. There were even 
possibilities that the Muscovy Company could even tap into the Eastern 
trade in lUxury goods, currently monopolised by the Levant Company: 
"which now we have by the way of Turkey at a deere rate and with 
infinite hazard of pirats and ennemies, especially yf we should 
have any differences with Spaine" 
The proposers of this project suggested that the Muscovy Company 
might become the "Staple" of Eastern commodities, controlling their 
supply into France, Germany and the Low Countries and Denmark. If 
Poland or Sweden conquered parts of Russia, England's privileged 
trading and customs position might be revoked in favour of the Dutch 
who had already made approaches and offers to the King of Poland for 
trading privileges there. A shift in the relative trading positions in Russia 
against England and in favour of the Dutch would effect not only customs 
receipts but also the relative strengths of their respective navies. This and 
the increased wealth which would undoubtedly follow from Dutch 
supremacy in the Baltic trade would make the Dutch very dangerous to 
their neighbours. 
The Muscovy Company merchants had long advocated strong 
political links with Russia, something which Queen Elizabeth had 
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neglected to take up. The appearance of foreign candidates to the 
Russian throne was a threat to the Company's commercial position and it 
occurred to them that the solution lay in bringing Russia into a position of 
dependence on England with James I ruling by means of a deputy. The 
plan was formulated not only to protect English commerce in Russia but 
also to expand the Muscovy Company's activities into new markets 
particularly at the expense of the Levant Company. 
James I was amenable to being put forward as a candidate for 
election and was fairly confident of success, however caution was 
needed in any such scheme. Sir John Merrick and Sir William Russell 
was sent as commissioners to the Russian nobility to propose: 
''that his Majestie would be their Emperor and protector, wich they 
in generall did imbrace with much thankfulnes and sent there 
ambassador with great presents unto the Kinge to negotiate all 
things with his Magestie for the further confirmacion therof." 
Merrick and Russell appear to have returned to Russia with instructions 
to treat on King James' behalf, arriving there in time to congratulate 
Michael Romanov on his succession as Czar. Sensibly they did not 
mention the original purpose of their visit. Anglo-Russian relations 
proceeded much as they had before. (126) 
In 9tefan Bogdan's case the English Crown had blundered into 
supporting him without understanding the difficulties inherent in such a 
project. Sir Thomas Glover was ordered to support the pretender but was 
not provided with the necessary financial backing to facilitate his efforts. 
Furthermore, the conditions set down for payment of King James' 
contribution of 10,000 French Crowns were so strict and so impracticable 
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that Glover was forced to ignore his instructions, thus incurring the wrath 
of his political masters. When Glover's support of Bogdan became 
politically embarrassing and began to damage England's relations with 
the Sultan, the King of Poland and the Habsburg Emperor, King James 
withdrew his support and responsibility was shifted onto Glover so that 
the Crown's reputation would not be besmirched. 
In 1607, when Glover took up Bogdan's case, the Ottomans had 
no intention of replacing the Prince of Moldavia. For this reason excuses 
were continually put forward which were intended to show Glover that he 
was wasting his time. Initially the ambassador conveyed these excuses 
to England hoping that the King would abandon the project but Glover 
was forced to proceed because he received no new instructions from 
England and gradually found that the cost of supporting Bogdan was 
placing him in more and more debt. The only way of recouping this 
money was to ensure that Bogdan was elected Prince of Moldavia, 
hence the increasing urgency of his solicitations. Glover even embezzled 
the money given him by "Turks" to redeem Ottoman sailors from the Duke 
of Florence. (127) 
For several years none of Glover's efforts succeeded in obtaining 
more than vague promises. It was the intervention of the Prince of 
Transylvania and the Tatar Khan which persuaded Sultan Ahmet and his 
Ministers to consider replacing Constantin Movila with 9tefan Bogdan 
and thereby strike a blow against the influence of the King of Poland in 
Moldavia. The intervention of Bathory and the Khan resulted in a Council 
395 
being convened to decide upon Constantin Movila's replacement and 
ensured that Bogdan was one of the candidates under consideration. 
Previously the desire not to provoke conflict with Poland had held the 
Ottomans back from overthrowing the Movila: dynasty. Although it is likely 
that the Ottomans would in any case have eventually removed Movila, it 
was Gabriel Bathory who preCipitated his overthrow with his letters to the 
Sultan, Ahmet I. 
Nevertheless, it was with Glover's support that Bogdan was able to 
recruit Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania, to his cause. 9tefan Bogdan 
came very close to obtaining the Sultan's nomination as Prince of 
Moldavia. The Council, lasting 10 days, gave his claim serious 
consideration. For Glover and Bogdan, however, the closeness of 
the contest was no compensation for their ultimate, very public 
failure. Furthermore, Thomas Glover's support of Bogdan indirectly 
contributed to a period of great instability and bloodshed in Moldavia and 
Wallachia. 
Pindar reported the likelihood of a breakdown in relations 
between Poland and the Ottomans over the right to nominate the Prince 
of Moldavia: 
" ... that this turbulent successe, upon the change of that prince 
[was caused by] the incessant solicitations of Sir Thomas Glover 
(as the Vizier pretendeth} ... " (128) 
The relationship between Poland and the Ottoman Empire remained 
tense throughout the rest of the decade, finally leading to a brief war in 
1620. At this time, Gaspar Gratiani successfully persuaded Poland to 
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support him in battle against the forces of the Porte on the grounds 
that internal difficulties would prevent the Ottomans from taking the 
field with all their forces. Unfortunately, the problems were overcome 
when the Ottomans were able to recruit Tatar support after all, with 
disastrous results for both Gratiani and the Poles. 
During Paul Pindar's embassy Ottoman treatment of the 
permanent foreign embassies, as we saw in Chapter III, became an 
increasing matter of concern for the major Western trading nations 
represented there. Conversely, Ottoman concern over the role played by 
the embassies in their dominions, particularly with regard to their 
dealings with the Sultan's non-moslem subjects, had some justification, 
as we have seen in this chapter. Using the authority of the English 
Embassy as protection, §tefan Bogdan, Gieronimo Meoli and Gaspar 
Gratiani have been clearly shown to have engaged in business which 
aimed at overthrowing the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Furthermore, 
again under England's protection, Bogdan attempted to stir up a revolt in 
Moldavia which, if it had succeeded, could have damaged the peace 
between the Sultan and the King of Poland. 
Sir Thomas Glover has also been shown to have abused his 
pOSition as ambassador by being involved in, or allowing his embassy to 
be used as a base for, plots by a third power to bring about the 
destruction of the Sultan's power in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. 
The special status of the ambassadors and the foreign embassies' rights 
of patronage and protection were vital if they were to carry out their duties 
397 
successfully but were clearly open to abuse, even as they are in the 
twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER VIII: GASPAR GRATIANI 
PRINCE OF MOLDAVIA (1619-20) 
DRAGOMAN AND 
The relevance of the career of Gaspar Gratiani to the purposes of 
this thesis is twofold: firstly as an example of how an ambitious man of 
relatively humble origins through service, cunning and skill managed to 
achieve what 9tefan Bogdan could not. Secondly, Gratiani's early career 
in Constantinople and his success in bringing himself to the notice of the 
Ottomans owes a great deal to the English Embassy in Constantinople. 
Furthermore he is of interest because he was a man whose career has 
many similarities to that of Bartolomeo Brutti, who also deliberately 
insinuated himself into the favour of the English Ambassador in the hope 
of gaining some further advancement. 
Gaspar Gratiani was not strictly a pretender to the Moldavian 
throne, since he made no claim to the principality by hereditary right and 
made no attempt to justify his ambitions towards the throne as anything 
other than the desire to receive a valuable reward for services rendered 
to the Ottoman Empire. He was a man of immense ambition, seeking 
advancement to the most powerful positions in the gift of those whom he 
chose to serve. As we shall see, it was his overweening ambition that 
gave rise to his ultimate downfall. He succeeded in gaining the 
Moldavian throne by making use of the trust he enjoyed amongst the 
Sultan's closest advisers and then betrayed that trust in an attempt to 
enlist foreign assistance to free himself from the Sultan's suzerainty. 
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Gratiani was not even of Romanian origin. He was a Vlach, that is 
to say a descendent of the Latin speaking population of the Balkan 
peninsula which predated the migration and settlement of the Slavs in 
the sixth and seventh centuries. He was born in the town of Gradatshac 
near Karlstadt in Croatia, of a family which had fled from an area 
inhabited by Vlachs in the borders of the Dalmatian mountains. 
Gradatshac may have been a centre of Morlahi and Uscoc peoples and 
so perhaps Gratiani belonged to one of these nations. Romanians regard 
these peoples as "Black Romanians of the Adriatic", which is to say they 
are claimed as being a branch of the Romanian nation, but at the time 
when Gratiani became prince he was not considered by Moldavians as 
anything other than a foreigner. The Chronicler Miron Costin referred to 
him as a "Frank", (1) that is to say a Western European. Nicolae lorga has 
pointed out that Gracac was the name of an old Morlahi town in Bosnia; 
therefore Gradatshac may have been derived from Gracac; Gaspar's 
surname, Gratiani. may have been a latinization of a name derived from 
Gradatshac, all of which may suggest that Gaspar was indeed a 
Mo rIa hi. lorga also pointed out that the Christian name Gaspar was a 
Slavonic name, suggesting that Gratiani's family may have intermarried 
with the local Slavonic population. (2) 
Gratiani was taken as a child from his village and became a 
servant to the Castelan of Sussed. According to Thomas Gainsford, 
Gaspar's brother and sister were enslaved by the Ottomans and 
converted to Islam. (3) This appears to have been a reference to the 
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Ottoman devshirme system whereby Christian children were selected 
and enslaved by the Ottoman authorities; the boys taken as part of the 
devshirme were educated to enter the Ottoman administration or the 
Jannissaries. Gaspar left service at Sussed and, it is said, went to Venice 
where he entered the service of an English diplomat, who has been 
identified by Paul Cernovodeanu as Sir Henry Wotton, accompanying 
him to London when he was recalled and then went to Constantinople in 
the company of Paul Pindar who arrived in the Ottoman capital in 
December 1611. He was employed there as Pindar's Dragoman. As we 
shall see there is evidence to show that Gratiani entered English service 
in Constantinople much earlier than this and not through employment by 
Henry Wotton. 
Unlike Bartolomeo Brutti or Marc'Antonio Borisi, the Chief 
Dragoman of the Venetian Embassy, about whom more later, Gratiani 
was not descended from a distinguished family of Dragomans. Since the 
fourteenth century the Venetians had recruited Dragomans from the 
Albanian community in Istria; the Brutti family had been long established 
in the region and had in 1361 ceded the the Lordship of Durazzo to 
Venice. The French and English Embassies organised themselves along 
the same lines as the long established Venetian Embassy when they set 
up in Constantinople. 
The Borisi family, from Antivari, was related by marriage to the 
Brutti family: Marc'Antonio Borisi was Bartolomeo Brutti's nephew. 
Marc'Antonio and his brother Bernardo were taken under the protection 
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of their uncle in order to be trained as Dragomans. Gratiani's family 
seems to have been a very obscure one in comparison with the Brutti 
and Borisi families. As we have seen, he left his village as a youth to 
enter the service of a provincial military and administrative governor but 
left this household when he was a young man and went to Venice. What 
he did between arriving in Venice and becoming Dragoman to Paul 
Pindar is less clear. It is very unlikely Gratiani was taken into Henry 
Wotton's employ, as Paul Cernovodeanu has suggested, before bringing 
him to England because this would mean that Gratiani did not visit 
Constantinople before 1611. This would have meant that Gratiani had 
been employed as Pindar's Dragoman having no experience of the 
Ottoman Divan and apparently no knowledge of the Court language. He 
would therefore have been of limited use as Dragoman to Paul Pindar. 
Furthermore the duties of a Dragoman were not limited to acting as an 
interpreter: he needed to understand Ottoman institutions, politics and 
• 
Islamic law and custom as well as diplomatic etiquette. In order to 
prosecute his duties successfully a Dragoman needed to know the 
balance of power in the Divan at any given moment, the ideas and 
policies most in favour there and which individuals were in favour at any 
given time. Therefore, Dragomans at one of the "Frankish" Embassies 
usually served a long apprenticeship or "giovane di lingue" during which 
they were immersed in all aspects of the embassy's business, learning 
through experience and example until they were experienced enough to 
take their place in the hierarchy of Dragomans at the embassy. (4) Many 
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"giovane di lingue" worked as the ambassador's secretary before 
becoming fully accredited as a Dragoman to the embassy. 
There is further evidence that Gratiani was in Constantinople long 
before 1611. Firstly, in 1605 he was in England petitioning for Bogdan's 
release and explicitly referred to himself as Jtefan Bogdan's servant; he 
must have entered the latter's service before his imprisonment in 1604 
because he was particularly knowledgeable about Bogdan's suit. 
Gratiani associated himself with Bogdan hoping for advancement, just as 
Bartolomeo Brutti had attached himself to Bogdan's father lancu Sasul. It 
cannot have been Henry Wotton whom Gratiani was said to have taken 
up with in Venice. Wotton spent a number of years in exile in Italy until the 
death of Queen Elizabeth I when he returned to England; he then served 
as English Consul in Venice between July 1604 and 1612. Thus when 
Wotton returned to England from Italy, Gratiani would have been in 
Constantinople and when Wotton went to Venice as Consul, Gratiani was 
preparing to go to England to secure Royal assistance to obtain 
Bogdan's release from the Castle of Asia. 
An account of Gratiani's life written by loan lancovici in 1655, 
suggests that he spent some time in Venice with an English diplomat with 
whom he went to England, after which he travelled to the Ottoman 
Empire as Dragoman to another English diplomat. (5) However, this 
account was written thirty five years after Gratiani's death and can be 
shown to be inaccurate The visit to England, undertaken by Gratiani, 
mentioned in this document was the one conducted on behalf of 9tefan 
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Bogdan in 1605; Richard Knolles' Generall Historie of the Turkes 
confirms that the English diplomat with whom he travelled was Thomas 
Glover, who left Constantinople in October 1604 with letters of 
recommendation from Henry Lello. Gratiani had been in Glover's service 
for some time and under his patronage had learned Ottoman Turkish. 
In Mayor June 1605, with Glover's assistance, Gratiani persuaded 
King James I to take up Bogdan's case because the pretender had 
enjoyed the protection of Queen Elizabeth and was thus entitled to the 
protection of her successor. Gratiani argued that the imprisonment of a 
protege of the late Queen was an affront to the King. His petition provided 
valuable material for Glover's campaign to obtain the embassy for 
himself, because Lello's indifference to §tefan Bogdan's imprisonment 
lent weight to allegations that he was not competent to remain at the 
Constantinople Embassy. 
Upon Glover's recommendation, Gratiani returned to 
Constantinople in 1605 as a servant of the English Crown, 
accompanying King James' letters to Henry Lello concerning Bogdan 
and Sir Thomas Sherley. According to Knolles, Gratiani was instrumental 
in obtaining Sherley's release from an Ottoman prison in December 
1605. Having secured Sherley's release Gratiani accompanied him to 
Venice, but upon hearing that Glover had been appointed ambassador, 
he left Sherley to enter Glover'S service in Constantinople where he was 
employed to obtain the release of Christian slaves. 
As we have seen Gratiani almost certainly became heavily 
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involved in secret negotiations with Spain whilst employed as Glover's 
secretary. Yet Gratiani remained in the service of the English Embassy as 
Paul Pindar's Dragoman, after his return from Spain in 1611, despite 
having apparently been implicated in espionage. Glover had placed all 
the blame for any charges against him and his servants at the door of 
Stefan Bogdan. In the meantime Gratiani's intelligence and skill were to 
J 
prove so useful to the English Embassy that he was held in great esteem 
and friendship there. However, for a man of Gratiani's ambitions, further 
promotion was something to be sought assiduously. He used his visits to 
Ottoman Viziers on embassy business to promote his own career. So 
impressed were they at his grasp of politics that eventually he was asked 
to accompany the Ottoman party to Vienna in 1615 and left Pindar's 
employ. Although he had no official position within the Ottoman 
government he was a man of immense influence in the Empire. He was 
able to travel to Vienna without exciting suspicion about his activities 
there and like Bartolomeo Brutti acted as a 'freelance diplomat' on behalf 
of a number of major figures in South-East European politics. He also 
used his favoured position in Constantinople to enrich himself to such an 
extent that eventually he was wealthy enough to make a successful bid 
for the Moldavian throne. 
Gratiani already spoke German and Italian and evidently taught 
himself Ottoman Turkish. His employment as Dragoman to the English 
Ambassador, Paul Pindar, brought him into contact with the Ottoman 
authorities who were impressed, according to the traveller Peter Mundy, 
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by the quickness of his wit and tongue. In 1614 Gratiani was also in 
contact with an agent of the Habsburg Emperor who trusted Gratiani to 
arrange the despatch of a report to the Imperial Court. In 1615 he was 
employed by the Ottomans to accompany the Ottoman Ambassador 
Achmet Kechasia, (a former Envoy of the Pasha of Buda) to the Court of 
the Emperor Matthias as Dragoman in order to renew the Treaty of 
Zsitvatorok. As Dragoman for the Ottoman delegation Gratiani playa 
much wider role than merely acting as an interpreter; he had full 
diplomatic credentials and played an influential part in negotiations. 
Gratiani signed letters addressed to the Emperor Matthias in the name of 
Ahmet, Envoy of the Pasha of Buda, and in the name of Sultan Ahmet I's 
Ambassador Kechasia. (6) William Lithgow met the Ottoman party in 
Vienna in 1616 after they had accomplished their mission: 
"At Vienne in Austria ... I found a Turkish Ambassadour, going 
downe the Campion Danubis of Europe, for Constantinople; and 
with him one Gratianus, a Greeke, his Interpreter, to whose familiar 
love I was much obliged and with whome I imbarked down the 
River to Presburge and from thence discending the River to 
Komoron, the Downe most Towne the Emperour retayneth on 
Danube I left my noble Interpreter, and traversed the Champagne 
Cou ntrey." (7) 
Gratiani performed so well during the negotiations that on October 12th 
1616 he was rewarded by Sultan Ahmet I with the Islands of Naxos and 
Paros. It would appear that Gratiani acted as an adviser to Sultan and his 
successors on foreign affairs and was a favoured courtier and 
intermediary involved in sensitive negotiations on behalf of the Divan. 
Whilst employed in this capacity, he acted as a double agent working in 
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the interests of Christian powers in central Europe. Upon his preferment 
as Duke of Naxos and Paros, Gratiani wrote to Charles Gonzaga, the 
Duc de Nevers, asking for his protection and assuring him of his 
friendship towards France; this correspondence with the Duc was to 
continue. De Nevers, a descendent of the Palaeologus dynasty, 
entertained the idea of restoring the Byzantine Emperor through a 
Crusade against the Ottomans; naturally he expected to be crowned 
Emperor in the event of this plan succeeding. (8) The same year in 
Constantinople Gaspar Gratiani acted as an agent for Radu Serban, 
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former Prince of Wallachia (1602-11), who was preparing a campaign, 
with the support of the Emperor Matthias, to regain the Wallachian 
throne. According to Constantin Rezachevici, Gratiani, Radu Serban and ) 
Nicolae Patra§cu, son of Mihai Viteazul, took an active, although 
necessarily extremely secret part in the creation, in 1618, of a Chivalrous 
Order known as the "Christian Militia" which aimed to throw the Ottomans 
out of Europe. According to Elvira Georgescu, when gerban and 
Patrascu met the Comte D'Altan, a prominent figure in this order, in 
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Vienna in 1618, Gaspar Gratiani was a member of §erban's party; 
furthermore on another visit to Vienna, in November 1618, Gratiani was a 
frequent visitor to the Comte's house where he dealt with emissaries of 
Father Joseph a servant of Count Richelieu. (9) Gratiani acted as an 
intermediary between Father Joseph and the Duc de Nevers. 
In 1618 Gratiani offered to lead an expedition on behalf of the 
Sultan against the Cossacks in Moldavia probably hoping that he would 
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be rewarded with the Moldavian throne if successful, but he could not at 
this time support his ambitions with money. He won the confidence of the 
all-powerful Vizier Iskender Pasha and it was with his support, in addition 
to a lavish distribution of gifts, that he was appointed Prince of Moldavia 
in February 1619. The first document dated as being during his rule is 
from 11th April 1619. 
Gaspar Gratiani was so ambitious, that he managed to alienate 
many people whose support he was attempting to enlist. It was always 
apparent that his primary motivation was the furtherance of his career. 
Marc'Antonio Borisi, the Chief Dragoman of the Venetian Embassy: 
"called Gratiani a false man, who was paid by other Princes and 
had done things against the Republic [Venice]." (10) 
He was probably referring to Gaspar Gratiani's connections with the 
Christian Militia and his apparently pro-Habsburg sympathies; with 
regard to his anti-Venetian activities, this could refer to a continued 
connection with Spain, a commercial rival of Venice in the Levant. 
According to contemporary information, Habsburg diplomats also 
pressed for Gratiani's nomination as Prince of Moldavia in the knowledge 
that they could enjoy friendly relations with him. Constantin Rezachevici 
has described Gratiani's history of good relations with the Habsburg 
Empire notably his involvement in peace negotiations and his friendship 
with Radu gerban, who had strong Habsburg sympathies. The 
Chronicler Miron Costin wrote that Gaspar obtained the rule of Moldavia 
enjoying the favour and trust of Sultan Osman III but mounted the throne 
with his loyalty towards the Christians. (11) 
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Gratiani had been quarrelling with Borisi but had reconciled the 
quarrel; he asked for the hand of Borisi's daughter in marriage. Gratiani 
requested Hassan Pasha and the Mufti to intervene on his behalf and 
they advised Borisi to accept the proposal. 
The desire to gain the support of the Venetian Embassy for his 
elevation to the throne of Moldavia was not Gratiani's chief motive for 
asking for a marital alliance with the Borisi family. The Borisi, nephews by 
marriage of Bartolomeo Brutti, had strong links with Moldavia and 
Wallachia. Marc' Antonio and his brother Bernardo had gone to Moldavia 
in the entourage of Bartolomeo Brutti. Bernardo served Radu Mihnea in 
Wallachia and Moldavia becoming Postelnic in Wallachia, between April 
1613 and July 1616 and in Moldavia from November 1616 to December 
1618, undertaking a number of missions in Transylvania and 
Constantinople on behalf of his master. In the meantime Marc'Antonio 
had become Dragoman and confidante to the Venetian Bailo. 
Marc'Antonio spoke many languages including Romanian, Albanian, 
Greek, Slavonic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish; his Ottoman was so good 
that it is said he was able to command the attention of the Viziers and all 
the dignitaries of the Porte. Furthermore, he had considerable social 
prestige in Constantinople as a descendent of a distinguished line of 
Dragomans. There could have been an element of 'social climbing' in 
Gratiani's wish to marry into the Borisi-Brutti family. Gratiani owed his 
success to his wits, having apparently humble origins. Borisi's daughter 
on the other hand was a member of a dynasty with extensive business 
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interests in South-Eastern Europe and the Levant and family 
connections, as we have seen, with many rich and influential people in 
the Levant and Eastern and Central Europe. It is possible that the Borisi 
and their associates regarded Gratiani as a 'parvenu' and an adventurer 
for all his apparent wealth and influence; if this were true he was 
probably trying to gain some social acceptance by marrying into an 
established family; this would also explain Marc'Antonio Borisi's 
reluctance to approve the match. Another obviously powerful motive for 
Gratiani's proposal was the influential presence of Bernardo Borisi in 
Moldavia; one may surmise that he hoped to cement Bernardo's loyalty 
in advance by marrying his niece. (12) When Gratiani became Prince of 
Moldavia it was to Bernardo Borisi, already a powerful figure in the 
principality, that he turned for support and loyalty, appointing him 
Hatman of Moldavia. 
News of the "engagement" between Borisi's daughter and Gaspar 
Gratiani was made public before Borisi had given his answer. Borisi had 
no wish to give his daughter in marriage to a man such as Gratiani, 
whom he despised. He made the excuse that, as a public servant of the 
Venetian Republic, he needed to seek the consent of his political 
masters. He informed Francesco Contarini and Almoro Nani of Gratiani's 
offer and asked them for advice on how to proceed. He felt sure that 
Gratiani's only interest in his daughter was a means to: 
"advance his pretension to the Principality of Bugdania." 
They decided that the matter was sufficiently important to be referred to 
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the Council of Ten and praised Borisi for telling them of Gratiani's 
advances. 
Gratiani was putting a great deal of pressure on Borisi to give his 
consent to the marriage. Gratiani met Borisi again at Hassan Pasha's 
house and renewed the request; Borisi again made excuses for his delay 
in making any decision. Nani and Contarini's report on Gratiani's marital 
ambitions was considered at the Council of Ten in Venice on March 20th 
and referred to the Col/egio for their consideration; if necessary it would 
also be considered by the full Senate. Strict secrecy was to be 
enforced. (13) Gaspar Gratiani's attempts to cajole Borisi into making a 
decision were extremely offensive to the Venetian Embassy. Almoro Nani 
told the English Ambassador Paul Pindar that Borisi was a man who was 
well able to look after his own interests and could make his decision on 
the matter best if left to make up his own mind. Nani and Contarini had 
themselves refrained from giving him any advice on whether or not to 
accept Gratiani's proposal because to interfere in matrimonial matters 
was always a mistake and people generally refrained from involving 
themselves. Pindar agreed and said: 
"he had even declined to advise his brother about the marriage of 
one of his daughters because many people judge things by the 
event and one is blamed for a wrong opinion although given on 
good grounds." (14) 
Pindar had himself been a reluctant advocate of Gratiani's suitability as a 
husband. He told Nani that Gaspar had even tried to persuade the 
Imperial Ambassador to make representations to the Venetian 
Ambassador, but Pindar had dissuaded him with the suggestion that 
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such a delegation arriving at the Venetian Embassy might be taken badly 
by the ambassador and Borisi, whereas if he, Pindar, went on his own as 
a good friend of Venice his representations would be well received. 
Pindar's visit was a token effort, undertaken more to prevent Gratiani 
pestering him further, than as a serious effort to influence Borisi. Nani 
reported: 
"I think that he only wished to be able to tell Gratiani that he had 
done what he had asked." (15) 
That shortly afterwards Gratiani was appointed Prince of Moldavia 
did nothing to help Borisi make up his mind. If he considered Gratiani to 
have any chance of remaining Prince of Moldavia for a long period Borisi 
would probably have been prepared to marry his daughter to the ruler of 
an important principality. That Borisi was extremely reluctant to agree to 
an alliance between his family and a Prince of Moldavia and that the 
Venetian Embassy and the Senate were unenthusiastic about the match 
suggests that contemporary opinion of the occupants of Moldavia and 
Wallachia's thrones amongst the West European embassies in 
Constantinople was so low that little importance was now attached to 
establishing useful relations with them. 
Given the extreme insecurity of the Prince of Moldavia's position 
and his own knowledge of Gratiani's personality and ambitions, Borisi 
seems to have expected Gratiani to be removed from the Moldavian 
throne after only a short rule. Not only would this place his daughter in 
danger, but the family's interests in the principality might also be 
imperilled. It seems that Borisi wished to have the matter taken out of his 
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hands altogether by referring it to the Doge and Senate, probably hoping 
that they would refuse permission for the marriage to take place. Gratiani 
departed Constantinople to take up his throne long before any decision 
was reached in Venice, although it is possible that the marriage went 
ahead anyway for Marc' Antonio Borisi was arrested and executed by the 
Ottomans for treason in 1620, apparently because of his connection with 
Gaspar Gratiani. 
Gratiani's election as Prince of Moldavia was not greatly 
welcomed by Venetians. Polo Minio reported to Contarini: 
"The choice of Gasparo Gratiani as Prince of Moldavia has 
alarmed me because I have my family in that province." (16) 
Gratiani was not it seems regarded as likely to be an influence for peace 
and tranquillity in the principality. Minio may have suspected that the new 
prince would try to rebel, which could result in the Sultan attempting once 
more to place Moldavia under direct rule. If this were to happen Minio 
and the Borisi and other families like them would lose their property and 
their business interests in the principality. Moreover Gratiani's greed 
made it probable that the taxes levied on his subjects would be 
exorbitant. (17) Nevertheless Minio went to congratulate Gratiani, out of 
regard for his great influence with the Ottomans, and out of concern for 
the interests of his family in Moldavia. He was also asked to use his 
influence at the Venetian Embassy in the matter of Gratiani's marriage 
proposal. 
Gaspar Gratiani had used his position amongst the Ottoman ruling 
circles to enrich himself. As a favourite of the Sultan and a friend of 
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Iskender Pasha he was in an excellent position to demand gifts and 
bribes for his intervention on behalf of foreigners or the Sultan's subjects 
in their dealings with foreigners. For instance Almoro Nani drew attention 
to Gratiani's involvement in the release of Turkish prisoners in Italian 
hands. Gratiani collected the ransom money to pay over to their captors 
and no doubt collected a commission for his trouble. Nani reported that 
there had been a considerable delay between Gratiani's collection of the 
ransom and the release of some of the captives; this suggests that 
Gratiani had used the money for some project of his own. Gratiani was 
also involved in arranging the return of the prisoners although by the time 
their ship arrived in Constantinople he had been in Moldavia for some 
months: 
"This Berton [a ship] was to come under the English flag, so 
Gratiani wrote to the English Ambassador recommending it to 
him." (18) 
Gaspar Gratiani was a man who liked to have his finger in every pie, as if 
he could not resist the chance of involving himself in the affairs of others. 
Nor could he resist patronising the English Ambassador by drawing 
attention to his elevated status as Prince of Moldavia. 
Immediately after his election to the Moldavian throne, on 13th 
February 1619, Gaspar Gratiani persuaded Paul Pindar to lend him 
some of the money necessary to pay for the gifts promised to his 
supporters in the Divan, particularly Iskender Pasha, who had procured 
his election to the Moldavian throne. In April 1620 the debt still had not 
been repaid and Pindar demanded that the money be reimbursed, 
414 
therefore a contract was drawn up for Gratiani to sign, guaranteeing 
payment, and was sent to the Moldavian agent in Constantinople, Mihai 
Stanzer, who was obliged to agree to stand surety for the debt. According 
to the contract signed and witnessed on 17th April 1620 this was a loan 
of six thousand six hundred zecchini which was to be paid back in full in 
four months time without interest. Pindar then left Constantinople to 
return home to England. 
Pindar's motive in lending Gratiani the money was not to make a 
direct profit out of his support for Gratiani. It would appear that the 
ambassador, who was a very rich man, was pleased to assist Gratiani's 
installation in Moldavia. Pindar was probably aware that Gratiani had 
been given the task of negotiating a peace treaty between Poland and 
the Ottomans which would ensure that England's trade in the Balkans 
and the Danube region was not interrupted by conflict. Secondly, Gratiani 
was a personal friend and former colleague, a man whose talents as a 
diplomat had served the interests of the English Embassy and mercantile 
community well in the past and could be expected to be useful in the 
future. Pindar was entirely unaware of Gratiani's pro-Habsburg 
sympathies and his membership of the Christian Militia and may have 
expected him to remain on the Moldavian throne for a number of years. 
As we have seen, the Ottomans also put great trust in Gratiani, seeing in 
him a faithful servant of their interests. Gratiani, with the additional status 
of Prince of Moldavia, would therefore have been a useful ally for the 
English Embassy to call on if necessary to intervene with the Sultan on 
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matters pertaining to England's interests. Pindar therefore probably 
considered that he had much more to gain than lose by supporting 
Gratiani in a private capacity out of friendship and goodwill. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Paul Pindar had involved himself any further in 
Gratiani's campaign for the Moldavian throne. (19) 
By the time the four months designated in the contract were up, 
Gratiani was at war with the Sultan and was not therefore in a position to 
pay his debt. A copy of the contract was sent to England by Robert Salter 
in 1622. It shows that the transaction was witnessed by Marc' Antonio 
Borisi and Cristoforo Brutti, a nephew of Bartolomeo Brutti. Clearly 
Gratiani had not kept his bargain and repaid the loan after four months, 
nor Pindar been reimbursed by the time he left the Embassy to return to 
England. He left his affairs in the hands of Robert Salter who spent nearly 
three years seeking some means to achieve payment. Eventually half of 
the debt, 3600 zecchini, was received, travelling by Caravan from 
Poland to Constantinople. Presumably Salter despaired of ever wresting 
the rest of the money from Stanzer or his heirs and successors who were 
liable, according to the contract, for this debt. 
The naming of a foreigner, ignorant of the language of the country 
which he was to rule, as Prince of Moldavia was a logical extension of 
the system of nomination to the throne which had been in existence for 
some time, whereby the throne went to those who had served the 
Ottoman Divan most and who could afford to pay the highest bribes. The 
Ottomans were keen to place on the Moldavian throne a man whom they 
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thought they could trust implicitly, particularly as relations with Poland 
were difficult. They wanted to prevent the King of Poland's interference in 
the principality and thought that Gratiani would remain loyal to the Sultan 
and Iskender Pasha who had done so much to promote him. Unlike 
lacob Eraclide Despot, a Greek who had ruled Moldavia between 1561 
and 1563, and who had been distantly related to the Moldavian ruling 
house, Gratiani had absolutely no connection with the principality and his 
appointment broke all the traditional agreements contained in hati-serifs 
previously given to the principality. 
That Gratiani did not pretend to be a Moldavian prince appears to 
have made him more acceptable to some of the Moldavian boyars than if 
he had been a charlatan; the unpopularity of those perceived as 
charlatans was alluded to when leremie Movila was proclaimed Prince of 
Moldavia. It has been said that many Moldavian boyars had been 
concerned at Greek penetration into the powerful positions in the 
principality (20) and because of Gaspar Gratiani's lack of Greek 
associations they were prepared to receive him well; they may also have 
thought that the handicap of not speaking Romanian would make him 
more malleable and reliant on their help to rule. However, an additional 
reason for the Moldavian boyars' good disposition towards their new 
prince was that he was charged with negotiating peace terms between 
Poland and the Ottoman Empire and they were anxious that he should 
succeed. Had war broken out between Poland and the Ottomans, 
Moldavia would have constituted the main theatre of war. The Cossacks 
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and Tatars were likely also to have been drawn into the hostilities. Their 
entry into Moldavia was particularly feared because they would regard 
the war as an opportunity to plunder the principality and carry its 
population off into slavery. A war between Poland and the Ottomans 
would devastate the principality, and so the boyars were anxious to 
facilitate any attempts to maintain the peace. 
The Caimacam or deputy sent to prepare for Gratiani's arrival was 
well received and the new prince was met at Adrianople by twenty major 
boyars and accompanied to layi by many thousand men. Having 
experienced the rapacity of ethnic Romanian pretenders, the boyars 
were not concerned at the accession of a foreigner unless he was to be 
one who would reward foreigners with land and powerful positions in 
competition with them. Unfortunately Gratiani had brought 500 Uscochs 
(Latin speakers) with him as a personal guard, because he did not feel 
confident of his safety amongst the Moldavian boyars. He also 
maintained some 15 or 20 Ragusans in his household. Nor was he 
content to rely on Moldavian boyars to help him rule. Peter Mundy, 
accompanying Paul Pindar on his return to England in 1620, made 
mention of a Greek called Stano who had formerly been Pindar's 
Dragoman and was now going to Moldavia to enter the service of Gaspar 
Gratiani. (21) 
Gratiani had already established friendly relations with important 
men in Poland, with, for example, Thomas Zamoyski, the Voivode of 
Podolia, who was responsible for guarding the Moldavian frontier and 
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Samuel Korecki a relation of the Movila family and a member of the 
Christian Militia; the plans of the Militia included a general Balkan rising. 
The mission to negotiate a continuation of peace between Poland and 
the Ottoman Empire was very useful to Gratiani because it brought him 
into direct contact with agents of the Polish Crown. Gratiani also tried to 
win the loyalty of pro-Polish boyars who were former adherents of the 
Movila princes, by returning their land confiscated by 9tefan Tom~a. 
Although it cannot be said for certain that Gratiani was planning to revolt 
against Ottoman rule, it is reasonable to assume that Gratiani was 
preparing himself for the possibility of conflict between the major powers 
in Eastern Europe and had even before he had been chosen prince, 
considered taking up arms against the Ottomans if such a conflict arose. 
Once he was Prince of Moldavia, Gaspar Gratiani recruited an army of 
mercenaries, many of whom were former followers of Radu §erban or 
were from Western Europe. (22) 
The peace negotiations between Poland and the Ottomans were 
very nearly successful. Gratiani with the help of the Moldavian boyar 
Constantin Bacioc prepared a peace treaty and all that was necessary 
was confirmation from both sides. In the spring of 1620 the King of 
Poland sent an envoy, leremie Otwinowski, to Constantinople to confirm 
the peace treaty, but the Prince of Transylvania, Bethlem Gabor [Gavril 
Bethlen] persuaded the new Sultan Osman " that it would be in his best 
interests to go to war. The Polish envoy was ill-treated and war was 
declared. Gratiani, faced with hostility amongst his boyars in Moldavia 
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and ambitious to throw off Ottoman suzerainty, supported Poland in 
secret. He intercepted letters to the Tatar Khan from Bethlem Gabor, the 
Sultan's ally, and communicated their contents to the King of Poland. 
Gaspar wrote letters to the Habsburg Emperor in an endeavour to 
prevent the agreement of an armistice, for which Gabor was working, 
between him and the Sultan. He also tried to persuade the Poles to 
support Nicolae Patrascu Voda, son of Mihai Viteazul, in his struggle 
against Gabor. Two boyars, the Vornic Bucur and the Vistier Vasile 
Lupu, tried to thwart Gaspar's efforts to betray the Ottomans; in the 
meantime Gratiani attempted to involve both Gavril Movila, Prince of 
Wallachia, and Bethlem Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, in an alliance 
against the Ottomans but he was rebuffed. (23) 
News of Gaspar's treachery was communicated by Bethlem Gabor 
to the Sultan, who was furious. He sent a Capugi to capture Gratiani but 
the Prince of Moldavia was ready and ordered the massacre of the 
Capugi and 300 Ottoman soldiers accompanying him. He retreated to 
Hotin where he called upon Poland, the Pope and the princes of Europe 
to support him; only Poland responded. Gaspar also sent a gift of 30,000 
gold coins to the Polish Hatman Stanislaw Zolkiewski to obtain the 
support of the Cossacks. It was also reported that, in order to gain the 
support of a Polish army, he promised that after a victory against the 
Ottomans he would undertake a campaign to annex Wallachia and 
Transylvania and unite them under his rule. (24) 
Gratiani assured Zolkiewski that the Ottomans would only be able 
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to muster a small army because the Tatars were preoccupied with a 
quarrel between the Khan Djambele Ghirai II and his brother Calgai. 
Unfortunately for Gratiani that quarrel was soon resolved and a large 
force of Tatars entered Moldavia; the combined force of the Ottoman and 
Tatar armies was such that Gratiani and the Poles were out numbered 
two to one. The Ottoman commander Iskender Pasha refused a proposal 
of peace and did battle at Tutora, killing much of the Polish force 
gathered there. Gratiani's army had already fled. Zolkiewski was himself 
killed whilst trying to retreat across the Dniester. Gaspar fled towards 
Transylvania and was pursued and killed by two Moldavian boyars, 
Hatman Septilici and the Postelnic Dimitru Goia whilst asleep in a field 
near the town of Branistea in the district of Bacau in Moldavia. (25) 
As we have seen, it was Gratiani's service in the interest of the 
Sultan Osman III, and his predecessors, which proved vital to the 
realisation of his ambition to be Prince of Moldavia. He was able to 
insinuate himself into the Sultan's favour in a way which ~tefan Bogdan 
had not been able to do. Whereas Bogdan had been seen by the 
Ottomans as a disruptive influence on the Sultan's relations with other 
States, Gratiani came to be regarded as a man who would be useful to 
the Sultan's foreign policy. Thus when the decision to remove Radu 
Mihnea from Moldavia was made, Gaspar Gratiani was able to persuade 
those who advised Sultan Osman that he was a suitable candidate. His 
record of service and the esteem in which he was held, in addition to a 
liberal offering of expensive gifts, overrode any reservations about his 
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lack of any connection with the principality or experience which suited 
him to govern the principality. 
As a footnote to Gratiani's career: in October 1622 a man 
pretending to be Gaspar Gratiani, accompanied by bandits from the 
district of Mures, entered Moldavia and proceeded to steal sheep and 
horses. ~tefan Tom~a, Gratiani's successor as Prince of Moldavia, sent 
out a force to capture him. The false Gratiani escaped to the mountains 
and Tomsa requested the people of Bistrita to search for him and bring ) 
him to justice if they could. (26) Thus the late prince even succeeded in 
fostering a pretender, although not one with the ambition, persistence or 
sense of style of a Stefan Bogdan. 
l 
Pindar's interest in Gratiani's elevation to the Moldavian throne 
seems to have been based largely on personal friendship and cannot be 
attributed to any desire to involve himself in the affairs of the Principality. 
Pindar's correspondence preserved in the State Papers makes no 
mention of any official contacts between the two once Gratiani became 
prince and Pindar's interest in Gratiani extended only so far as his 
attempts to secure the repayment of his loan. Pindar understandably 
refused to involve himself in Ottoman affairs in the way that Glover had 
been forced to do so, nor had he been intent on emulating Edward 
Barton's diplomatic successes. 
After the departure of Paul Pindar, the English Embassy seems to 
have had no further contact with any princes of Moldavia. Pindar was 
succeeded by an agent for the Levant Company. The next English 
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representative in Constantinople to enjoy the status of ambassador was 
Sir Thomas Roe (December 1621 to June 1628). During Roe's Embassy 
attention shifted completely away from the principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia onto Transylvania. English Ambassadors in Constantinople 
had frequently enjoyed good relations with a number of princes of 
Transylvania, as we have seen in this thesis, particularly in connection 
with the English Embassy's interest in Moldavia and Wallachia, however, 
with the build up to and the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, 
Transylvania took on a new significance whilst Moldavia and Wallachia 
were marginal to this conflict. Sir Thomas Roe became heavily involved 
in negotiations with the Transylvanian Prince Bethlem Gabor because 
the English Crown, in order to protect King James' daughter Elizabeth's 
position in Bohemia, shared the Transylvanian's interest in opposing the 
Habsburg Empire's domination of Central Europe. (27) 
The episode of Gaspar Gratiani's successful but brief attainment of 
the throne of Moldavia provides a postscript to the discussion of the 
English Embassy's interest in the Principality. Pindar had arrived in 
Constantinople with express instructions to confine himself to protecting 
the English merchant community in the Ottoman Empire, which he had 
obeyed. In any case the example set by Sir Thomas Glover's 
involvement with Bogdan was hardly one to encourage Pindar to follow a 
similar course. Furthermore, after the public failure of Bogdan's suit, 
pretenders no longer sought the support of the English Embassy in 
Constantinople for their causes. Edward Barton's successes on behalf of 
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Aron and Mihai Viteazul had encouraged Bogdan to approach the 
English Crown; Glover's failure to achieve the same result for Bogdan 
ensured that the patronage of the English Embassy was not greatly 
coveted by other pretenders. Gratiani succeeded where Bogdan failed 
because he was able to refer to his loyal service to the Sultan and his 
potential usefulness in the future. Bogdan, on the other hand had little to 
recommend him to Sultan Ahmet I other than his genealogy which, whilst 
it gave him a claim to Moldavia through tradition and custom, did not 
persuade the Sultan and his ministers that he would behave as a loyal 
servant of the Porte. 
The Ottomans primary concern when appointing a prince was to 
ensure that the principality was placed in the hands of a man who would 
fulfil the increasing demands required of the prince of Moldavia; that is to 
follow Ottoman foreign policy, maintain internal peace and maintain the 
flow of money and raw materials to the centre of the Ottoman Empire. 
That Gaspar Gratiani did none of these things reflects the dilemma of all 
princes of Moldavia in this period: co-operation with the suzerain power 
did not guarantee that they would not be removed in favour of another 
candidate; to break away from Ottoman control necessitated persuading 
other powerful princes to intervene militarily in the principality provoking 
a swift armed response by the Ottomans and their allies. That so many 
princes of Moldavia and Wallachia were prepared to defy the Ottomans is 
itself a reflection on the type of men who were appointed prince. The long 
and difficult campaign involved in securing election ensured that only the 
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most ambitious, persistent and cunning men were ever sufficiently 
successful to be heard of or even seriously considered for appointment 
by the Sultan. 
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to discuss a specific topic, that is the nature of 
English support for an individual pretender to the throne of Moldavia, 
Stefan Bogdan, and to compare this support with that accorded to other ) 
pretenders by the English Crown and the English Embassy in 
Constantinople in its formative years. As one of the earliest permanent 
English Embassies, the Constantinople Embassy was established in a 
period when English interests abroad were expanding. The process of 
looking at the work of this particular embassy in the context of the 
expansion of English foreign policy in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries has been instructive about the development of an 
English diplomatic institution. Questions have been asked and answers 
sought with regard to the nature of English diplomatic policy in this 
period, not only in respect of the growth of the Embassy as a diplomatic 
institution but also the uses for which it was designed and the 
assumptions made about it. This thesis has also sought to illuminate the 
relationship between the Ottoman Empire and one of its European 
satellite states. 
The English Embassy was originally set up as a result of a specific 
need: that of providing aid and succour to the Levant Company's 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore it has been necessary to ask 
questions about the relationship between diplomatic and commercial 
policy of the period and particularly about how clearly they were defined 
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and separated. The relationship between the embassy and the English 
Crown is of further importance as are the different assumptions made by 
both parties at various times about the embassy's function. As the 
English Crown sought to expand its influence in Europe eastwards, 
assumptions about the role it wished to play were made and tested. This 
thesis sheds light on a process by which England tried to build itself a 
role in Eastern Europe where it had not had one before. Whilst the 
English Crown was intent on establishing its presence in the Ottoman 
Empire and expanding its own interests, other states were doing the 
same in competition with England. As a new institution, the English 
Embassy was creating a role for itself and the function of a permanent 
ambassador to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire had no clear definition. 
The problems facing Anglo-Ottoman diplomacy in this period has 
been one of the main themes of this thesis. One of the greatest problems 
faced by the ambassador in Constantinople was the long delay in 
obtaining instructions from the Secretary of State who performed an 
enormous number of tasks and was therefore not in a position to devote 
great attention to the Embassy. The duties of the Secretary of State 
included acting as Foreign Minister and supervising the seventeenth 
century equivalent of a security police force which performed counter-
intelligence activities. The Secretary of State was also expected to 
concern himself with any matter the Privy Council might discuss or any 
document which the sovereign might have to sign. The Secretariat was 
not an organised Foreign Office as such; there was no English diplomatic 
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service nor was there a separate office dealing exclusively with foreign 
affairs which would have had the opportunities and resources to build up 
the necessary expertise in Ottoman affairs. There was no corporate 
system of record-keeping to maintain archives of previous 
correspondence or official documents which could have been referred 
back to when decisions were made, as a result official papers were often 
mixed up with the private papers of the Secretary of State. Within the 
Secretariat there were no opportunities for individuals to specialise in the 
affairs of particular countries. Decisions about England's policy towards 
the Ottoman Empire were not necessarily based upon either the 
ambassador's advice or expert advice from other quarters, including the 
Levant Company which financed the embassy. 
The relationship between the Levant Company, the Crown and the 
embassy was in itself very complicated. The evidence put forward in this 
thesis leads one to the conclusion that there was no clear separation into 
areas defined purely as foreign policy or economic and commercial 
policy. Commercial and diplomatic expansion went hand in hand; when 
English merchants operated successfully in foreign parts, this was seen 
as enhancing the reputation of the English Crown. Business-men often 
played a central role in England's diplomatic expansion: one may see 
this in the Baltic, in Russia, in the East India Company and in Thomas 
Sherley's attempts to 'kick-start' diplomatic relations between England 
and Persia. Economic influence in a region facilitated the exertion of 
political influence, and vice versa. This does not mean that commercial 
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considerations were the dominant factor in England's relations with other 
states; as we shall see there were a number of assumptions made about 
the institution of a permanent embassy in Constantinople. 
When the English Embassy in Constantinople was established it 
had three basic functions, none of which was less important than any of 
the others: it existed to maintain the honour of the English Crown, to 
protect English interests in the Ottoman Empire and to act as channel of 
information and communication. (1) The vanity of Queen Elizabeth was 
fed by good relations with powerful rulers in the east and the extension of 
areas of the world where her name and reputation was known. The 
granting of ambassadorial status to William Harborne, the giving and 
receiving of presents and royal correspondence enhanced the Queen's 
magnificence and asserted her importance in the world in relation to 
rivals such as Spain, Venice and the Kingdom of France. William 
Harborne's commission as ambassador makes specific mention of his 
brief to nourish and deserve the affection of good princes towards Queen 
Elizabeth, to affirm the Queen's league of friendship with the Sultan, to 
do "good offices" for the Sultan and to do all in his power to ensure that a 
"noble traffic" was allowed to flourish. (2) In 1592, George Gifford argued 
that the Ambassador's role was vital in maintaining and conserving the 
Sultan's friendship: 
''the general state of Christendom standing as it doth". 
The ambassador's presence in Constantinople enabled the 
Queen to do "good offices" for her friends and "displeasure" her enemies 
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as others who did not maintain an ambassador in Constantinople could 
not. Despite the doubts of some about the desirability of league with the 
Sultan, it could not be denied or ignored that he was a major power in 
Europe and therefore influence with him led to influence upon the politics 
of Europe. England's interests, which were to be protected by the 
ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, could not be clearly defined at this 
early stage. 
In theory the establishment of a permanent ambassador in 
Constantinople should have allowed England to pursue an informed 
foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire which was flexible enough to 
deal with any difficulty or opportunity and which could foil an opponent's 
diplomacy effectively. The ambassador's role was to try to influence the 
Ottoman government to adopt policies or attitudes which were favourable 
to the English Crown's own foreign policy and to the interests of the 
Levant Company. In practice, however, England's diplomacy towards the 
Ottomans was not nearly as well developed as this. Foreign policy in this 
area was opportunist with no overall plan and, it would seem, no 
generally accepted ideas about England's interests with regard to the 
status and aspirations of the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador resident 
in Constantinople found himself in the position of interpreting English 
interests for himself, often without specific instructions and with no 
guarantee that his interpretation would be approved of in London. His 
expert advice was frequently ignored. On behalf of the Levant Company 
the ambassadors discussed in this thesis were successful in promoting 
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trade by seeking and winning concessions, achieving a degree of co-
operation between the English community and Ottoman officials and their 
representatives, and by taking charge of disputes in order to deal with 
them through official channels. The ambassador's diplomatic role caused 
much greater difficulties because the limits of this role were not agreed 
upon by the Ottoman or the English Crown. 
Another salient question is the role played by patronage as a 
political force in foreign affairs and whether it had as large a role in such 
matters as it played in domestic policy. Therefore at the core of this thesis 
are questions about the motivation behind the English Crown's offer of 
patronage to Stefan Bogdan and how that patronage was won and then ) 
lost. Thomas Gainsford emphasised the role of patronage as a central 
tool of foreign policy in his G/orie of Eng/and (3) when he referred to the 
importance of sovereigns adhering to the principle of supporting the 
innocent and distributing justice. He claimed that the English Crown's 
status amongst the other Crown's of Europe was enhanced because it 
was alone in taking this role seriously when it accorded its support to 
Stefan Bogdan. As we have seen, in Constantinople the French and 
Venetian ambassadors had previously accorded patronage to a number 
of pretenders on behalf of their sovereigns. William Lithgow concurred 
with Gainsford's view that Thomas Glover had acted to support an 
'innocent' and assist him in obtaining 'justice' from the Sultan. He 
insisted that Bogdan should have shown gratitude for Glover's help but 
neglected to do so. (4) 
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Bogdan and the other pretenders discussed in this thesis relied 
upon the patronage of powerful individuals in the Ottoman Empire and 
from other states to protect their life and liberty and to take up their pleas 
that they had been deprived of thrones which were theirs by right. The 
tendency of West European states to extend their concept of patronage 
beyond their own borders was exploited by these pretenders until the 
foreign rulers in question realised the difficulty and futility of exercising 
this role as patron in the Ottoman Empire. The King of France and the 
rulers of Venice did so first but the English Crown was made to realise 
that the Sultan did not welcome interference in what he regarded as his 
domestic policy by foreign princes nor did he recognise that any foreign 
prince had any such right to exercise his role as patron within Ottoman 
spheres of interest. 
The support which foreign states were able to give these 
pretenders was limited. In fact one of the major grounds for the Sultan's 
eventual refusal of 9tefan Bogdan's claim to be Prince of Moldavia was 
that he was too involved with foreign princes to be considered a 
trustworthy candidate. Edward Barton succeeded in obtaining the 
Moldavian throne for Aron whilst the English Crown failed to do the same 
for 9tefan Bogdan. The reason for this was that Barton had de facto 
authority in Constantinople because the Sultan valued his advice and 
had in the past made use of his diplomatic skills. The English Crown 
enjoyed no such authority with the Sultan since he did not recognise it as 
either equal in status to his or having any significant role in his empire 
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beyond protecting the rights of English subjects. 
We saw in the introduction that there is little evidence to support 
the idea that English patronage of pretenders was motivated by any 
specific policies directed towards gaining commercial advantages in the 
Levant. Support for pretenders would appear to have had more to do 
with an interest in the status of the principality and the relative strengths 
of the powerful states surrounding it. The embassy had a diplomatic role 
from its inception. The ambassadors faced a very difficult task not only in 
maintaining good relations with the Ottomans but also in making 
decisions about the best way to proceed in carrying out English policies. 
The favour of the Sultan and of his favourites was greatly sought after by 
the foreign embassies. Involvement with pretenders was risky because 
by its sensitive nature it could backfire and damage the relationship 
between the embassy and its host government. The ambassadors 
themselves shaped the embassy's role in Constantinople in accordance 
with their personal conceptions of what that role should be. All the 
ambassadors were ambitious and wanted to make a success of their 
embassy. As we have seen in this thesis Barton, Lello and Glover found 
their embassy threatened as a result of the activities and ambitions of the 
pretenders to whom they accorded support. 
The embassy had a specific function with regard to the Levant 
Company which has been set out in this thesis and which in various 
instances crystallised into a clearly defined diplomatic role, for example, 
in negotiations to obtain Ottoman support against Spain in the 1580's 
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and negotiations to maintain peace between the Ottoman Empire and 
Poland, undertaken at the request of Queen Elizabeth, both of which 
were linked directly to England's maritime interests and to Edward 
Barton's anti-Spanish policy. In a letter of February 1592, Sultan Murat III 
asked Queen Elizabeth to write and inform the King of Poland that the 
Sultan had granted him a peace treaty only because Edward Barton had 
pleaded for it in her name; he also asked her to urge King Zygmund to 
peace, friendship and obedience to the Ottoman Porte. The Sultan 
assured Queen Elizabeth that as long as she remained a faithful friend to 
him and kept him informed of her actions and policy towards him, her 
requests would always be granted, beyond any prince in league with the 
Porte, and her ships and merchants could trade freely in the Ottoman 
lands. This implies that Sultan Murat was keen to use friendly nations as 
agents of his foreign policy. (5) This was certainly true of Barton's 
accompaniment of Sultan Mehemet III to battle with the Habsburgs in 
1596. 
As we have seen, there was considerable argument as to whether 
Barton had exceeded his remit as ambassador. The official reason for the 
Sultan's request that Barton accompany him to war was that it was 
thought that he could be useful in peace negotiations. However, his 
critics argued that he embarrassed Queen Elizabeth when he joined the 
Sultan's retinue.The Levant Company was particularly vehement in 
asserting that Barton's mission was totally unnecessary. Barton's 
insistence that he had gone as a disinterested party to assist negotiations 
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for peace and obtain the release of Christian prisoners of war was not 
accepted by all his critics who asserted that the interests of Christendom 
had been compromised by his association with Sultan Mehemet's party; 
this led to accusations that Barton's good relations with the Sultan were 
maintained by Barton communicating secret information about the anti-
Ottoman activities of Roman-Catholic countries. England's adversaries 
were jealous of Barton's influence with the Sultan and probably hoped to 
shame Queen Elizabeth into ordering her Ambassador to limit his 
activities to purely commercial matters. The Levant Compant was 
concerned at the ti me and money which Barton spent on diplomatic 
activities which they regarded as unnecessary It was even less clear to 
the Levant Company merchants how the support of pretenders served 
either England's interests or those of Christendom. In 1592 George 
Gifford reported that Barton gave himself wholly to matters of State which 
the merchants disliked because they wanted him to be rather: 
"in the nature of a factor than of an Ambassador". (6) 
Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham were interested in the 
possibilities of using princes of Moldavia and Wallachia as agents of 
English influence but did not wish to become financially involved, and so 
their letters of support for Petru Cercel and loan Bogdan were of no 
practical help_ The English Embassy built a relationship with Moldavia in 
a different manner, through correspondence and agreements with Petru 
Schiopul and Bartolomeo Brutti. However, although Brutti showed 
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himself particularly anxious to build up a personal relationship with the 
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English Crown, his offers of service were ignored by the Queen who 
does not seem to have shared her ministers' enthusiasm for the 
principalities. 
Edward Barton's influence with the Sultan was greatly sought by 
pretenders. As we have seen, Edward Barton was initially prepared to 
lend his influence to both Aron and Mihai Viteazul only because he did 
not intend to become closely involved with either of them. It was 
essentially bad-luck which forced Barton to become closely involved with 
Aron. This involvement harmed his reputation with Queen Elizabeth and 
other European princes but does not appear to have done any lasting 
damage to his relationship with the Sultan. However, Barton's example 
warned other ambassadors of the dangers of financial involvement with 
pretenders. 
Henry Lello was vehemently opposed to supporting Bogdan and 
made his forebodings clear in his correspondence with the Secretary of 
State. The latter, Cecil, was also wary of associating the embassy too 
closely with Bogdan for fear of damaging its favour with the Sultan; he 
advised Lello to beware involving the embassy in the Prince's campaign 
beyond protecting his person and his freedom and advancing his cause 
along official channels only. Lello was steadfast in refusing to be drawn 
into Bogdan's affairs, despite the pretender's best efforts to involve the 
embassy in stirring up dissent in Moldavia and in discrediting the agent 
of the reigning prince resident in Constantinople. Thus Lello spared 
himself the trouble which befell Sir Thomas Glover. He was fortunate in 
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that he had been ordered not to involve the embassy financially in the 
fate of the pretender. Lello's steadfast refusal to be duped into supporting 
Bogdan's underhand dealings against his rival, suggests that in many 
ways he was stronger and cleverer than Glover, contrary to the latter's 
public image. Lello failed to gain the Moldavian throne for Bogdan, as he 
knew he would, because the English Crown was the pretender's only 
principal supporter and remained so. Lello was unable to procure 
Bogdan the genuine support of an individual of major influence upon the 
Sultan, either through bribery or, more importantly because no person of 
sufficient influence considered Bogdan a worthy protege. Although 
bribery was important in obtaining decisions at the Porte, decisions were 
naturally still made based upon analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of any course of action 
As we have seen, Sir Thomas Glover initially seems to have 
welcomed the Crown's decision to support Bogdan, but changed his 
mind once the pretender arrived in the Ottoman capital, probably 
because he had been made aware of the his unsuitability as a protege. 
He then tried desperately to have the King's letters of recommendation 
revoked. Bogdan was eventually defeated by another pretender, ~tefan 
Tomsa, who was less compromised by foreign associations. One should ) 
not forget that Glover was very nearly successful but in the end his 
influence in the Ottoman capital was shown to be no greater than that of 
any other of the foreign ambassadors there. Such influence existed only 
with regard to specific matters which were acknowledged by the 
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Ottomans as being of legitimate concern, whereas Barton had had a 
particularly special relationship with Sultans Murat III and Mehemet III 
who trusted his advice. Thus he was permitted to interest himself in 
matters outside what the Ottomans normally considered as 
ambassadorial business. 
The English Crown's conception of its ambassador's role in 
Constantinople was not the only matter of importance. Ultimately the 
Sultan and his ministers could choose to ignore the ambassador's 
requests or indulge them. Although both the Sultan and the English 
Crown placed value upon their diplomatic relations, for both parties this 
relationship was an experiment which had advantages and 
disadvantages. The Ottomans, the English Crown and the Levant 
Company sometimes questioned the desirability of continuing this 
diplomatic relationship. Furthermore, it had still not been established 
exactly what this relationship ought to be. Relations between England 
and the Ottoman Empire were not universally disapproved of amongst 
the political community in England despite probable religious scruples. 
More importantly, both Sir Francis Walsingham and Robert Cecil 
regarded such relations as valuable. In his introduction to the first edition 
of Principal! Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English 
Nation, published in 1589, in a piece dedicated to Walsingham, Richard 
Hakluyt the younger declared that the establishment of Anglo-Ottoman 
relations was one of the great achievements of the Queen's reign, that 
her status and her subjects interests were advanced by the presence: 
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"at Tripolis in Syria, at Aleppo, at Babylon, at Balsara" 
of English Agents and Consuls. Hakluyt continued to support the 
maintenance of friendly Anglo -Ottoman relations in the second volume 
of his second edition in a piece dedicated to Robert Cecil countering 
criticisms that alliance with the "Turke" betrayed Christian aims. He 
pointed out the value of the trade in the Levant which was supported by 
these friendly relations and the advantages gained by the maintenance 
of the capitulations. He also emphasized the value of Christian 
Embassies in Constantinople to other Christian States connected with 
the Ottoman Empire, Poland in particular. Edward Barton's mediation of 
peace between Poland and the Ottomans in 1590 was mentioned by 
Hakluyt as being of particular significance and brought great honour to 
England. The text of letters from the Grand Vizier to the Queen, dated 
1590 and from the Sultana to the Queen, dated 1594 were published by 
Hakl uyt. (7) 
Paul Wittek (8) has concluded that Sinan Pasha's letters were 
published at the request of the government, as part of a propaganda 
exercise to silence critics in England and abroad of England's Embassy 
in Constantinople and draw attention to Queen Elizabeth's influence with 
the Sultan. Hakluyt not only obliged the Crown by publishing documents 
which reflected favourably upon its foreign policy, he added his own 
arguments to silence the English Crown's critics. Hakluyt had been 
English Ambassador in France until 1588 when he returned to England; 
it is possible that he began the preparation of his Voyages on 
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Walsingham's instructions and in his employ. His editorial line was that 
England was not the only country which maintained friendships and 
alliance with the Sultan: the King of France and his ambassadors in 
Constantinople had a similar relationship to the Sultan; the King of 
Poland was another case in point, and: 
"even the Emperour of Christendome hath had league with the 
Turke, and pay'd him a long while a pension for a part of 
Hungarie." 
Hakluyt argued that England's diplomatic relations with the Ottoman 
Empire were no different from those enjoyed by other Christian nations, 
therefore no blame should be apportioned to a state which was merely 
exerting its influence and authority amongst the other powerful Christian 
nations of Europe. 
Richard Knolles' Generall Historie of the Turkes dealt with the 
history of Moldavia and Wallachia in the context of Ottoman history, in 
particular Ottoman relations with Poland. Knolles attributed Bogdan's 
failure to gain the Moldavian throne to Constantin Movil~'s exploitation of 
Ottoman corruption. (9) The Ottoman Divan was undoubtedly corrupt but 
the reasons for Bogdan's failure were more straightforward than this: it 
had been very difficult to persuade the Sultan to risk damaging relations 
with Poland by overthrowing the Movil~ dynasty in Moldavia. When 
Sultan Ahmet I was eventually so persuaded, Bogdan's supporters were 
unable to convince a sufficient number of the his counsellors that their 
protege was the most suitable candidate for the principality because few 
of his supporters inside the Divan were sufficiently committed to his 
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cause. Furthermore, to concentrate on Constantin Movila's use of corrupt 
practices to oppose Bogdan's suit ignores the fact that Bogdan made 
extensive use of the same methods to obtain consideration of his suit. His 
supporters in the Divan had, as we know, been offered substantial gifts 
and bribes. Nor were Bogdan's supporters innocent of involvement in 
espionage, violence and 'black propaganda'. 
Nicolae lorga was the first of those writing about Bogdan to do so 
in the context of Romanian history and Anglo-Romanian relations, as 
opposed to Anglo-Ottoman relations. (10) He regarded Anglo-Romanian 
relations as uncoordinated and not the result of a concerted English 
policy. As we have seen attempts were made under Petru §chiopul, 
through the efforts of Bartolomeo Brutti, to put Moldavian relations with 
England on a stable footing through correspondence with the English 
Ambassador and the Queen of England and by granting trading 
privileges in Moldavia to English merchants in 1588. However, these 
efforts were less successful than he had hoped: there was no direct 
correspondence between the Queen of England and Petru 9chiopul and 
Brutti's efforts to bring about a proper diplomatic relationship with the 
English Crown did not bear fruit. Nevertheless, good relations with Petru 
9chiopul and the expertise of Bartolomeo Brutti were particularly useful 
to Edward Barton in 1590 when he negotiated a maintenance of peace 
between the Sultan and the King of Poland. Relations between the 
English Embassy and princes of Moldavia probably continued to be of 
some use to Edward Barton for the gathering of intelligence. It is unlikely 
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that Barton would have neglected to maintain a correspondence with 
Brutti and later with Aron Vod~ 's advisers; such a correspondence would 
have been invaluable in providing information about matters concerning 
the status and integrity of Moldavia. 
Much of the ambassadors' correspondence with the Secretary of 
State's office was concerned with reports about significant developments 
within the Ottoman Empire which the ambassador concerned considered 
to be of interest to his political masters in London. Particular attention 
was paid to the Sultan's foreign policy, both in Europe and the Middle 
East; a frequent topic of these letters was the state of relations between 
Poland and the Ottomans not only to do with Moldavia and Wallachia but 
also with regard to the Tatars and the Cossacks. As we have seen, the 
ambassadors wrote often, for example Henry Lello sent dispatches once 
a fortnight; the length of the letters and the obvious concern for detail 
therein is an illustration of the importance of the ambassador's role as 
intelligence collector and analyst. From the embassy's inception it was 
clear that accurate information was vital if it was to fulfil its functions 
properly. Accurate intelligence was also important for the English 
merchants in the conduct of their trade. William Harborne also had to 
contend with attempts by the French and Venetian Ambassadors to wreck 
his chances of establishing a permanent embassy to protect English 
trade and the persons and property of English subjects in the area and 
he needed to establish fruitful relationships with the Sultan's advisers 
and Ministers. To achieve this he had to know how to approach these 
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individuals and how to persuade them that he was to be taken seriously. 
However, the greatest impetus to setting up an intelligence 
gathering network came about because Harborne was given the task of 
procuring Ottoman naval support against Spain. If he were to carry out 
this task he could not rely merely on official sources of information. He 
needed to discover which individuals close to the Sultan were 
sympathetic to English interests and which were hostile. He wished to 
discover how the Sultan could be persuaded to enter into alliance with 
England. He also required information about what the King of Spain's 
envoys, supporters and spies were doing to counter him. 
The ambassador, his secretary and his Dragomans formed the 
core of the intelligence network and cultivated all possible sources of 
information. Official channels of information included such things as the 
audiences which the ambassador attended at the Sultan's palace and 
the embassy Dragomans' attendances on day to day business of the 
embassy. Friendships and acquaintanceships were cultivated in order to 
obtain useful information unofficially. Items of political information and 
gossip could be traded on a quid pro quo basis. This sort of intelligence 
exchange could be particularly useful, if conducted properly, because it 
helped to build up an atmosphere of co-operation and trust between the 
Ottomans and the English Embassy. Paul Pindar, when secretary to 
Henry Lello, attracted the attention of Sultan Mehemet Ill's mother, an 
immensely influential woman at the Ottoman court; Pindar was 
encouraged by Lello to cultivate a friendship with her which could be of 
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great advantage to the English Embassy. The giving of gifts to highly-
placed officials and of bribes to them and their servants has been 
referred to many times in this thesis. The ambassador and his staff also 
probably traded favours with people outside the Ottoman establishment 
who might have useful connections or information. Hospitality at the 
Embassy was, as we have seen, another instrument of intelligence 
gathering. Some of this activity occupied a grey area between a 
legitimate 'need-to-know' and espionage. We also know that numerous 
spies were employed by the ambassador and his staff on an unofficial 
basis and their connections with the Embassy carefully concealed. 
The English Embassy's intelligence network increased in size 
under Edward Barton. The merchants complained about the size and 
cost of his staff and the fact that he employed men such as Thomas 
Wilcox and Paolo Mariani at all. Barton maintained a wide range of 
acquaintances, extending from Meletius Pigas, Patriarch of Alexandria, to 
Moshe Benevisti and David Passi, who were alleged to have been spies. 
Meletius Pigas became Patriarch of Constantinople, and his friendship 
provided Barton with a useful entree into the Greek Orthodox 
establishment which was responsible for the whole of the Orthodox 
Christian community within the Empire. Its members included bankers 
and merchants with connections all over the Empire and beyond its 
borders. As we have seen Mariani, Passi and Benevisti were executed 
on charges of espionage on behalf of Spain; if these charges were true 
these men's usefulness to Barton must have been immense, because he 
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could tap into their intelligence networks too. It is impossible to say how 
much of Barton's intelligence network remained in operation under 
Henry Lello; we have seen that Sir Thomas Glover employed spies and 
agents many of whom were subsequently also found to have substantial 
Spanish connections. 
The ambassador's right to accord his protection to foreign 
nationals was, as we have seen, jealously guarded for practical reasons, 
in that it discouraged intimidation of Embassy staff and servants by 
Ottoman officials and their associates and allowed the ambassadors to 
intervene on behalf of, enslaved Christians. The right of protection or 
'extra-territoriality' gave the embassies a special status within the Empire. 
It was this right which attracted Petru Cercel, loan Bogdan and Stefan 
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Bogdan to approach the French, English and Venetian governments for 
their support and letters of recommendation. It was also inevitable that 
some individuals enjoying this protection took advantage of the freedoms 
it endowed to involve themselves in activities, including espionage, 
which the right of protection was not intended to facilitate. Inevitably the 
'Frankish' Embassies were targeted as sources of employment by spies 
because they offered some protection against Ottoman wrath. We know 
that Paolo Mariani was the subject of allegations of espionage whilst in 
the employ of the English Embassy. We also know that 9tefan Bogdan 
tried to use the English Embassy, whilst under Henry Lello's protection, 
as a base from which to conduct operations to stir up revolt in Moldavia 
against leremie Movil~. Lello used these activities as evidence to support 
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his argument that Bogdan was an unsuitable object of English patronage 
and reported that he was very careful to ensure that Bogdan was 
prevented from conducting his operations under the roof of the embassy. 
Sir Thomas Glover was not so scrupulous: not only did he fail to prevent 
Bogdan's covert activities he also appears to have actually participated 
and financed these operations. Discovery by the Ottomans of Glover's 
complicity would have seriously undermined the embassy's 
effectiveness, if it did not destroy the embassy altogether, for such 
activities were understandably viewed by the Ottomans as an abuse of 
the embassy's rights of protection of Christians. As we saw in Chapter III, 
the Ottomans were aware of the potential for abuse inherent in this right 
and tried during Paul Pindar's Embassy to remove clauses relating to 
'extraterritoriality' from the Capitulations of England and France. 
We .have also seen that covert operations against the Movila 
princes of Moldavia were not the limit of Bogdan's secret anti-Ottoman 
activities whilst under the protection of the English Crown. He was also 
committed to promoting Spanish interests, perhaps as a member of an 
organisation dedicated to the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire in 
Europe, similar to the Christian Militia which recruited Gaspar Gratiani, a 
man who also enjoyed English protection. There is also evidence that Sir 
Thomas Glover was involved or at least implicated in Bogdan's 
espionage on behalf of Spain. Glover's association with Bogdan 
eventually so compromised him that Paul Pindar was sent in secret to 
Constantinople to take over the Embassy and investigate the exact 
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nature of the pretender's influence over the ambassador and the extent 
of Glover's involvement in activities which could discredit the embassy 
and anger the King. If King James were to become disenchanted with the 
English Embassy in Constantinople, because of Glover's secret and 
unauthorised dealings with the King of Spain, he might decide to 
discontinue diplomatic relations with the Sultan. The Earl of Salisbury, 
Henry Wotton, Paul Pindar amongst others were anxious to prevent this. 
Furthermore. if the Ottomans had obtained evidence that an accredited 
ambassador of a foreign sovereign was personally implicated in spying 
on behalf of a country hostile to the Sultan, they would have been given 
an instrument with which to curtail the rights of foreign embassies 
severely. Once the English Crown discovered how vulnerable its 
Embassy was to such abuse, it was decided that henceforth 
ambassadors should curtail the activities of their servants and 
associates. 
9tefan Bogdan won the support of the English Crown because he 
was a superficially attractive individual who argued very persuasively 
that the English Crown would benefit if it supported a successful 
campaign for the Moldavian throne. He 'proved' to Queen Elizabeth's 
satisfaction that he was a legitimate prince who was the victim of injustice 
at the hands of an usurper. The concept of legitimate title was very 
important to the English Crown. We do not know what was said during 
Bogdan's audiences with the Queen, however from what little we know 
about the English government's perceptions of Bogdan's plight it is 
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probable that he led the Queen to believe that he was a Protestant, as his 
father had been. The Queen may also have been persuaded that due to 
the influence of a devoutly Roman Catholic King of Poland, Moldavia was 
at risk of falling under the control of the forces of the counter-reformation. 
The King of Poland, Zygmund III Vasa, was also involved in a 
struggle with the Protestant nobility in his native Sweden over the 
succession. (11) Moldavia had previously been "saved" from Jesuits due 
to the intervention of Edward Barton in the name of Queen Elizabeth in 
1593. The important role of the English Crown in dispensing patronage, 
to support the innocent and distribute justice, could be brought to bear 
both against the creeping influence of the Pope and against the Ottoman 
Sultan's infidel disregard of the important concept of legitimacy. As we 
have seen, the English concept of legitimacy, in reality, had little 
relevance to the principality of Moldavia. 
King James I upheld Queen Elizabeth's decision to accord the 
pretender her protection and assistance and was persuaded to commit 
himself to Bogdan's cause in return for Bogdan's promise for allegiance. 
The pretender even promised to hold the principality of Moldavia as a 
client of the English Crown. It was expected that the presence of an 
English client on the Moldavian throne would enhance the status of 
England in the East and increase its influence and that of all Protestant 
princes in opposition to the Catholic powers in the area. It would also 
enhance the status and influence of the English Embassy in 
Constantinople, since the ambassador might be called upon to act as 
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intermediary between the Sultan and the Prince The ambassador would 
also have privileged access to intelligence about Poland, the Tatars, the 
principalities and the Habsburgs.and he would have a further tool with 
which to press the case for access for English ships to the Black Sea. It 
could only serve to assist English trade in the area to have a grateful 
prince on the throne. English travellers, businessmen and embassy 
agents could enter and cross the principality with the assurance that they 
would receive assistance and protection. Finally an outpost of English 
influence in the area would ensure that the English Crown would have 
an important role to play in Eastern Europe and enjoy greater influence 
there than the King of France. 
James I aspired to be an influence for peace in Christendom. His 
conviction that Christian states could live in peace with one another had 
earned him the oft-quoted nickname of ''the wisest fool in Christendome". 
However this does not mean that he was not keen to extend his influence 
to the outer edges of Europe.lndeed, his oft-stated distaste for relations 
with the Ottoman Empire has been shown in this thesis not to have 
prevented him making use of his official relationship with the Sultan to 
pursue this foreign policy. 
Much has been written in this thesis about the status of Moldavia 
in this period, particularly when viewed in terms of the struggle for control 
conducted between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Long before an 
English Embassy had been established in Constantinople, the role of the 
prince was reduced to that of caretaker and tax-farmer under the tutelage 
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of a stronger power. The period under discussion was one in which the 
struggle for control was played out between Poland and the Ottomans. 
By 1620 it was clear that Poland could no longer seriously aspire to 
influence or control the election of princes; it was the Sultan, and he 
alone, who controlled appointments. The prince was now little more than 
an officer of the Sultan, although he still had the trappings of an 
autonomous prince. Developments of the eighteenth century, when the 
Sultan abandoned completely the idea that rulers should be natives with 
some royal connections, had their roots in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. In 1721 the Prince became a Pasha, official 
confirmation that he was little more than the Sultan's employee. 
The principalities had remained under the rule of Christian princes 
because it was more profitable for the Sultans to leave them in that state 
than attempt to rule them directly. They were on occasion embroiled in 
resistance to Ottoman rule because they were ruled by Christian princes 
who usually resented their dependent status and were amenable to 
attempting to break away from his control. The principalities were also 
areas of great interest to other Christian rulers in Europe because of their 
position as buffers between the Ottoman Empire and Christendom. Their 
usefulness to an anti-Ottoman campaign was obvious. This thesis has 
shown that their importance in Eastern Europe was not lost on England, 
a country which had no direct interest in the principalities but had, from 
the inception of the embassy in Constantinople, acknowledged the 
importance to Christendom of their continued autonomy. The embassy 
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perceived a need to provide the English Crown with intelligence about 
the principalities' strengths and weaknesses, their alliances and 
alignments. The earliest official Anglo-Romanian relations were, as we 
have seen, of some importance to the politics of the area and attest to the 
special status of the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and 
Transylvania. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Notes on Coins 
Asper: a Turkish silver coin with the approximate value of an English 
halfpenny 
Sultanine: a Turkish gold coin with the approximate value of a Venetian 
zecchino (chequin), a Spanish ducat, or a Hungarian gold dollar. 
1 Sultanine was equal to 180 aspers (1 asper being one halfpenny) also 
equal to 7 shillings and 6d. A Hungarian dollar was approximately equal 
to 5s sterling. 
For payment in gold merchants tended to use foreign currency especially 
zecchini, Sultani (Sultanine), Hungarian gold dollars, the Italian Scudo 
and the Spanish Ducat all of which had similar value. John Sanderson 
lumped them altogether as 'gold ducats'. The term 'silver ducat' was 
used to refer to the Spanish rial, German Thaler, Italian piastre and 
French Crown. Three silver ducats were approximately equal to two gold 
ducats. 
The value of Turkish coinage did fluctuate due to debasement. Relative 
values of these coins to English money are uncertain. In 1590 one gold 
ducat equalled 6s 8d [see SP 97 2 f 14 and f 21] In 1599, according to 
Thomas Dallam (Dallam's Voyages p 88) one zecchino was valued at 
9s. In 1610 according to William Lithgow the gold ducat was worth 7s 6d. 
According to John Sanderson [Travels p 267] the exchange value of the 
zecchino was over 7s. 
[see Sanderson, Travels,. pp 294-5] 
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APPENDIX II 
Grand Viziers: [the Sultan's deputy and Chief Minister] 
a) during the reign of Murad III [1574-1595] 
Dec. 1582 - July 1584: Kanijeli Siyavus 
July 1584 - Oct. 1585: Ozdemiroglu 'Osman 
Dec. 1585 - April 1586: Hadim Mesih 
Apr. 1586 - April 1589: Kanijeli Siyavus 
Apr. 1589 - Aug. 1591: Koja Sinan [commander in Yemen and Tunis] 
Aug. 1591 - Apr. 1592: Ferhad [commander in Persia] 
Apr. 1592 - Jan. 1593: Kanijeli Siyavus 
Jan. 1593 - Feb. 1595: Koja Sinan 
b) during the reign of Sultan Mehemmed III [1595-1603] 
Feb. 1595 - July 1595: Ferhad 
July 1595- Nov. 1595: Koja Sinan 
Nov. 1595 - Dec. 1595: Lala Mehemmed (died) 
Dec. 1595 - Apr. 1596: Koja Sinan 
Apr. 1596 - Oct. 1596: Damad Ibrahim 
Oct. 1596 - Dec. 1596: Jigalazade Sinan 
Dec. 1596 - Nov. 1597: Damad Ibrahim 
Nov. 1597 - Apr. 1598: Hadim Hasan 
Apr. 1598 - Jan. 1599: Jerrah Mehemmed 
Jan. 1539 - July 1601 : Damad Ibrahim 
July 1601 - Oct. 1603: Yemisci Hasan, a protege of Koja Sinan 
Oct. 1603 - July 1604: Yavuz Malkoc Ali 
c) during the reign of Ahmet I [1603-17] 
Aug. 1604 - June 1606: Lala Mehemmed 
June 1606 - Dec. 1606: Dervis (Bostanji Basi) 
Dec. 1606 - Aug. 1611: Kuyuju Murad 
Aug. 1611 - Oct. 1614: Nasuh Pasa 
Oct. 1614 - Nov. 1616: Okuz Mehmed 
Nov. 1616 onwards: Halil 
Other influences on the Sultan were people such as his mother, his 
wives, his sisters and their husbands, Court poets and historians, Court 
physicians, Army and Navy commanders as well as his favourites, 
people whose company he enjoyed and whose advice he respected. 
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APPENDIX VI A map showing the Principality of Moldavia's position In 
relation to Poland, Wallachia and Transylvania 
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